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Abstract 
 
Between 1833 and 1838 the diplomatic relationship between Britain and the Ottoman Empire 
underwent a radical change. The starting point for this transformation came when the army of the 
Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II, suffered two consecutive heavy defeats at the hands of that of his 
rebel governor, Mehmed Ali Pasha; the first being in Syria, on 14 April 1832, and the second in 
Konya, on 21 December 1832.  This last defeat of the Sultan rapidly escalated the matter into an 
international problem. All the very complicated diplomatic developments, which would continue 
right up to the Convention of London, 15 July 1840, started at the beginning of 1833.  
All of these are well documented historical facts in both Turkish and English literature. 
However, the unknown side of the story is what role Mahmud and his finest diplomats played in 
the process of resolving the Mehmed Ali problem using diplomacy. This role has been 
overlooked by the vast majority of scholars. This neglect ensues from a lack of knowledge of the 
Ottoman diplomatic effort in this process. The most obvious way to overcome this problem is to 
depart from the orientalist perspective, and use the Ottoman documents, which bear witness to 
Mahmud’s instructions to his diplomats and their reports from various European capitals of their 
progress and observations. When examining this intensive diplomatic period from the point of 
view of the Ottomans, it becomes clear that in fact Mahmud was not a Sultan who merely sat 
back smoking his water pipe and watched incidents unfold in his Empire’s lands; On the 
contrary, he had his own diplomatic plan, courage, motivation, resourcefulness and some capable 
diplomats who did their utmost to faithfully implement their sovereign’s diplomatic orders. 
Therefore, the highest priority of this thesis is to reveal in every aspect this stupendous and 
dramatic diplomatic struggle made by the Ottomans in this period. Bearing in mind the above-
stated points, this thesis attempts to contribute the academic literature on the Orientalism- which 
has been largely done in the field of cultural history- by looking at a specific example in the field 
of diplomatic history.  
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Introduction 
 
“The “Turks” (as the Ottomans are usually called by western historians) have generally been 
presented in an unflattering light. Their Empire is seen as a ramshackle affair, ruled over by a 
series of half-mad Sultans, who, when not succumbing to the pleasures of the harem, liked nothing 
better than to slaughter their Christian subjects; its history in the nineteenth century has generally 
been seen through the prism of decline and fall.”1 
 
Although his period of reign, 1808-1839 (31 years), was very long, Mahmud II was one of the 
most ignored Sultans of the nineteenth century. His diplomatic abilities in particular are never 
taken into account when scholars examine the fevered diplomatic developments between 1831 
and 1840; called ‘The Eastern Question’ by western historians. One of the main reasons for the 
phenomenon mentioned above by Prof. Charmley, is prejudice and preconceived ideas in the 
western scholar’s mind. Furthermore, it could be revealed that the cause of this biased point of 
view is repudiation of the Eastern World with views based only on their own western sources. 
These issues continue to be discussed under the umbrella of Orientalism, a concept originated by 
Edward Said. However, this has been conducted as a cultural history centred debate and 
therefore it seems that it might be useful to provide diplomatic examples in order to make some 
contribution to the Orientalism debate. In this context, although this thesis is not a theoretical 
study, it will attempt to convey the essence of the diplomatic story of Mahmud and his diplomats 
between 1833 and 1839.    
In 1832, the Ottomans were confronted by the biggest problem they had ever encountered in 
their long history. Sultan Mahmud II, ruler of the Ottoman Empire, employed governors to 
administer various districts in his lands, and one of them; Mehmed Ali; had amassed an army 
and rebelled against his sovereign. He had been holding the governorship of one of the most 
important and fertile territories in the Ottoman Empire since 1805, almost from the beginning of 
the nineteenth century. Having resolved Egypt’s internal issues he then worked on improving his 
territory’s economy, military strength and administration, until they were superior in strength to 
the rest of the country. When he felt himself ready he instigated riots against the Sultan and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 John Charmley, Britain and the Ottoman Empire 1830-1880, in ‘Religion and diplomacy’ K. Robbins and J. Fisher 
(eds.), (Holland: 2010), p.63	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Ottoman Central Government under some pretext of concocted ‘problems’, to be subsequently 
examined in the first chapter of this work. After a couple of unexpectedly rapid victories against 
Mahmud’s army (the first in Syria on 14 April 1832 and following that on 21 December 1832 in 
Konya, an Ottoman city in Middle Anatolia), this domestic issue within the Ottoman Empire 
suddenly attained the status of an international problem. At this stage, it should be acknowledged 
that the period of time from the battle of Konya to the resolution of the Mehmed Ali problem 
with the Convention of London, 15 July 1840, has already been extensively examined from the 
European perspective in English historical literature. According to the general attitude within this 
widely accepted account of events, Mahmud and his statesmen were passive actors in the 
process, and did almost nothing apart from watch the diplomatic developments in their territories 
unfold. Such a view, infused as it is with ‘Orientalist’ assumptions,2 represents the attitudes of 
the European statesmen of the time, and, in the absence of the view from the Turkish side of the 
hill, has tended to hold the field. 
As a matter of fact, Mahmud and his statesmen’s diplomatic struggle is a neglected topic 
amongst Turkish historians too. For instance, although Muhammed H. Kutluoğlu examined the 
period of 1831-1841 in the context of Egyptian Question, he did not mention anything about 
Namık Pasha, Nuri Effendi, or Mustafa Reşid Pasha, or the Ottoman diplomats’ reports; nor did 
he discuss the significance of Mahmud’s orders to these diplomats. The question arises, how 
could we know what the Ottomans did to diplomatically resolve the problem, without examining 
these indispensable materials? Kutluoğlu also mentioned almost nothing about the vital events 
directly related to the Mehmet Ali Problem, such as the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, the Euphrates 
Project, and the treaty of Balta Limani, all of which are examined chapter by chapter through the 
thesis. There are other Turkish historians, who studied the period; however, they too failed to 
scrutinize the Ottoman diplomatic struggle, such as Şinasi Altundağ, have confined their studies 
to the chronology of the historical events marking the struggle between the Sultan and his vassal 
governor, and reflected upon its impact in the international arena. Some of them, such as Sevim 
Ünal, have examined Palmerston’s and his ambassadors’ diplomatic efforts based on the Foreign 
Office documents, as has been done in the English literature, and yet others, such as Mübahat 
Kütükoğlu, have investigated the problem based on its economic effects on Anglo-Ottoman 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 A.L. Macfie, Orientalism, (London: 2002) is a convenient primer on the debates sparked by  Edward Said, 
Orientalism (1978)	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economic relations. However, it could rightly be said that none of them have considered 
Mahmud and his statesmen’s intensive diplomatic endeavours between 1833 and 1839. As a 
result of this approach to the era, the Turkish scholars have looked at Mahmud’s relations with 
Russia, Britain, and the other European powers from an almost orientalist perspective, just as the 
European scholars have done. Consequently, the most important aim of this thesis is to examine 
the diplomatic events that occurred in the time span between the Central Government’s defeat 
against the Egyptian Army in Konya, right up to 1839, in every detail. This will be done from the 
point of view of Mahmud’s deliberate and purposeful diplomatic manoeuvres and through these, 
his self-evident plan, which was to change the diplomatic atmosphere in Europe with respect to 
Mehmed Ali problem to one that was in favour of assisting the Ottoman Empire. This includes 
the efforts of his most capable diplomats’ in various European cities, particularly London, to 
implement their sovereign’s plan. We have studied this period from this point of view because 
the story that unfolded upon examination of this topic with use of the original Ottoman 
documents, revealed that Mahmud and his diplomats made vigorous efforts to resolve their 
enormous problem, Mehmed Ali, by using diplomatic means, and this was clearly an historical 
fact which has never been examined in detail. Furthermore, the Turkish and English studies thus 
far have been surprisingly remiss, as seen in their neglect of the Ottoman diplomatic effort in this 
period. Thus this study is an attempt to read the period, particularly 1833-1839, from the much-
neglected Ottoman perspective, based on the hitherto overlooked Ottoman documents.   
The thesis provides an exhaustive account of what the ‘Mehmed Ali crisis’ looked like from the 
Ottoman perspective. To embrace that perspective, it is necessary to appreciate Mahmud II was a 
capable and even brilliant ruler who, seeing the dangers facing his realms, brought his talents to 
bear to solve them. Escaping the reports of the dragomans and the European ambassadors they 
served, we hear, again, the authentic voice of Ottoman diplomacy. That is not to say Ottoman 
ambassadors were any more (or less) talented than their European counterparts, but it is to say 
that their voice has not been heard. It also means we get some idea of the complexity of 
Mahmud’s thinking. The Mahmud who emerges from the Ottoman archives is an autocrat of 
great ability, but one who did not just act on instinct or caprice. His ambassadors provided a 
crucial network of information, but it was Mahmud who made the decisions. What we see here, 
it is contended, is a ruler grappling with complex problems, often with inadequate tools and 
incomplete information – the messiness of the past is not tidied up to provide a smooth narrative.  
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After an opening chapter dealing with the background, the study proceeds in a broadly 
chronological way, first tracing the initial Mehmed Ali crisis, then the Ottoman reaction to it.  It 
then moves through a series of chapters which seek to illustrate how Mahmud and his advisers 
attempted to realise his original vision of an Anglo-Ottoman alliance despite the set-back of 
Unkiar Skelessi. In this respect, the second chapter examines Mahmud’s first diplomatic 
manoeuvre, which is seen in the present literature as an action borne of desperation, as his first 
diplomatic step taken deliberately to implement his plan. Closely following this, in the third 
chapter, Mahmud’s biggest diplomatic action, the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, is analysed in a 
manner contrary to that which the Turkish and Western Scholars have evaluated this treaty so 
far. After all these diplomatic developments, a significant opportunity appeared in terms of 
Mahmud’s diplomatic ambition to make an alliance with the British. This diplomatic 
development came in the form of a request from the British to the Sultan to use the Euphrates 
route, which passed through the Ottoman lands; this process is studied in the fourth chapter with 
a summarized background of the project. The positive diplomatic atmosphere between 1834 and 
1837 resultant from all the mentioned diplomatic developments is scrutinized very carefully in 
the fifth chapter in the context of the enormous diplomatic effort of Mahmud and his diplomats. 
The sixth chapter is an attempt to discuss both topics together: the economic and diplomatic 
developments in the context of the Mehmed Ali problem. The one exception is chapter 7, which 
attempts, in episodic fashion, to show something of the burgeoning network of contacts between 
the Ottoman Empire and the British; much more work could be done on this area. The thesis 
finishes with an original account of the way in which Mahmud manoeuvred his resources to a 
final showdown with Mehmed Ali. But it was not enough, and he died just as his armies, upon 
which so much money and care had been lavished, crumbled in the face of Ibrahim Pasha’s 
assaults. However, or so it is contended here, his efforts left a legacy in the form of a British 
willingness to intervene which had not been there in 1832. 
The reader is well-supplied with accounts of how these crises looked from the Chancelleries of 
Europe; this is a first attempt to show what it looked like from the Topkapi Palace, and it could 
be expected that this effort will be somewhat helpful to those who wish to understand the history 
of the Ottomans free from the customary prejudices and biases. 
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                                                          CHAPTER ONE 
 
1.1. The Mehmed Ali Crisis          
The famous Eastern Question defined itself in terms of which European Power or Powers would 
succeed to the position occupied by the Ottoman Empire when it finally fell apart. From the late 
eighteenth century it began to assume the form of a rivalry between the Empire of the Tsars and 
the British; but in the 1830s another dimension was added to it. In place of the possible partition 
of the Ottoman Empire by the European Great Powers, it now seemed as though it might be 
taken over by another Oriental rival – the Khedive of Egypt, Mehmed Ali.    
Before the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi some of the British politicians, notably, Palmerston, George 
Canning, William Lamb, Charles Grant and Viscount Dudley, thought that the Ottoman Empire 
was on the verge of collapse and they did not want to offer any assistance because of their desire 
to cultivate a good relationship with Russia.3 They thought Russia was a more civilized country 
than the Ottoman Empire because it was a Christian state and would offer better opportunities for 
an economic relationship. One of these politicians, Richard Cobden, was a Radical M.P in the 
British Parliament. According to him, “the Ottoman Empire was a despotic Muslim State in 
decline and Russia was a peaceful, commercial, Christian Empire.”4 It could be said that this 
perspective reflects the influence of the Orientalist perspective of the time that the East was 
characterized as being backward and needing to be modernized by the West. Some Western 
politicians believed the East could never progress without their help. It may be concluded that 
these misconceptions affected the relationships between the Ottoman Empire and the European 
Powers. This can be seen clearly in their diplomatic relationships during the Mehmed Ali Crisis. 
This time however, in contrast with their support for the Greeks in the 1820s, British policy 
makers would eventually recognize the importance of the Ottomans and support them against 
Russia and Mehmed Ali after the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, on 8 July 1833. 
After the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, British policy toward the Ottoman Empire, now managed by 
Palmerston, completely changed, because he had become more concerned about the danger 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Laurence Mark Guymer, Sir Henry Bulwer and the Ottoman Empire 1858-1865 [unpublished UEA Phd. thesis, 
2009], p. 13.	  
4 Ibid, p.15.	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Russia posed to the strategic position of the Ottoman straits. Furthermore, according to Webster, 
Palmerston had already realized what danger Russia posed to the Ottoman Empire even before 
the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. However, he was unable to support the Ottomans at that time. 
Webster stated that: 
“Palmerston was more prescient than his colleagues, but his own conviction was not sufficiently 
strong, his influence in the Cabinet not yet sufficiently powerful to obtain necessary action. From 
the weakness of these months came a whole series of difficult problems.”5 
    
Russia had desired to secure ports first on the Black Sea and then on the Mediterranean Sea for 
her own interests since the establishment of the Russian Empire. With the Treaty of Unkiar 
Skelessi, the Russian bureaucrats found an opportunity to implement their dreams as Russia and 
the Ottoman Empire agreed to protect each other. The Ottomans agreed that, in case of war, the 
Dardanelles would be closed to all other Powers.6  As Bailey mentioned, 
 “Britain did not fully awaken to the importance of the Ottoman Empire’s geographical, political, 
and economic position in Europe until 1833 when Russia threatened England’s position in the 
Near East by signing with Turkey the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi.”7  
 
All of these reasons were enough to scare Palmerston about British interests in India because, if 
Russia could dominate in the Ottoman lands, this might damage British interest from India later 
on. Thus, as mentioned above, Palmerston and the British policymakers thought that they had to 
assist in the politics and economics of the Ottomans as much as possible, to defend British 
interests against the Russians. At the same time, other European Powers with interests in the 
Ottoman Empire, namely France and Austria, also interfered in the Mehmed Ali Problem.  
In this context, the intervention of the European Powers over this domestic issue was a blow for 
the Ottomans. Although many scholars have said that the defeat of Mahmud II by his own 
governor was a great blow, this can be looked at differently. There is no doubt that this defeat 
can be seen as a shame for the Ottoman Empire. However, this military failure was converted 
into a diplomatic success by Mahmud II and his governments. It should be considered that at that 
time, Mehmed Ali Pasha had enough power to capture Istanbul, and even had a chance to declare 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Sir Charles Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston: 1830-1841, vol.I (London: 1951), p.273.	  
6 V.J.  Puryear, International Economics and Dıplomacy in the Near East 1834-1853, (United States of America: 
1969), p.9.	  
7 F.E.  Bailey,  British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement,(New York: Howard Fertig, 1970), p.38.	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his independence, but due to the successful diplomatic policy of Mahmud II, Mehmed Ali could 
not properly utilise this opportunity. The reason for this is that Mahmud II was using the 
conflicting interests of the European Powers politically, to the Ottoman advantage, so the 
powerful Mehmed Ali Pasha could be stopped.  Therefore, this period should not be considered 
simply as a military failure, there was a diplomatic advantage achieved by the Ottomans. In this 
chapter, in order to properly understand Mahmud II’s objectives, a different method will be 
followed from that of foreign scholars. They have used Foreign Office documents, and any state 
archives other than Ottoman, to examine this period. Predictably, although there are many 
serious British and American academic studies in this area, because they have failed to evaluate 
the Ottoman documents they have not fairly assessed the Sultan`s effort to solve the problem. 
Therefore, the purpose of this chapter will be to investigate Mahmud II’s struggle to prolong the 
Ottoman Empire`s life using diplomacy. This argument will be clearly examined in detail and 
with proofs, in the light of the Ottoman documents; in this and following chapters but first it 
would be useful for the readers to look more closely at the main character of the story, Mahmud 
II. 
 
1.2. The Beginning of the Reform Age 
This historical figure has endured as a matter of debate among historians. The reason for this 
controversy relates to point of view. It would be useful for the readers to be acquainted with the 
diverse aspects of these important characters before we start to examine Mahmud’s enormous 
diplomatic struggle during the Mehmet Ali Problem (1832-1839). 
 
Abdul Hamid II is known as an Ottoman Sultan who in one sense laid the foundations for the 
Republic of Turkey with his significant reforms. However, Mahmud II, who acceded to the 
throne almost seven decades earlier than Abdul Hamid II, also established much of the modern 
government organisation we know today, and he too struggled in order to regenerate many 
beleaguered Ottoman State Institutions. Despite Mahmud’s reformist character, there are many 
different opinions about him. Therefore, before this examination, based on the primary sources, 
of Mahmud II’s and his politicians’ enormous diplomatic efforts to resolve the Mehmed Ali 
Problem, it would make the reader’s task of understanding this period easier to know some of the 
13 
	  
	  
	  
different historians’ thoughts about Mahmud II, “the most amazing Sultan”.8 Furthermore, 
acquaintance with these opinions will help the reader appreciate the Sultan’s diplomatic 
manoeuvres as described in the thesis.    
 
First of all, it should be understood that before he became the Sultan, Mahmud lived through 
some very hard times in his early twenties. His cousin, Selim III, was killed at the command of 
Mahmud’s brother, Mustafa IV, and the same order was issued for Mahmud himself. However, 
he escaped death at the last moment thanks to the sacrifices of some women of the Palace, 
particularly Cevri Kalfa.9 Therefore it should be considered that when Mahmud became Sultan, 
he knew that he would have to re-establish his authority but at the same time he knew well that it 
had to be done subtly. Zurcher explains that Mahmud had two plans. In his first fifteen years of 
power, the first plan was to assign the statesmen who supported him to key places within 
government agencies and the Army. The second of Mahmud’s aims was to weaken the  local 
notables, who had put Mahmud into power.10 Findley describes Mahmud’s first years as a 
preparation period for strengthening his political power.11 It can be said that he was to show as 
much success with his shrewd domestic policies as he did in the very complicated diplomatic 
game played during the Mehmed Ali Crisis, which will be studied in every respect throughout 
the thesis.  
Kutluoğlu summarises Mahmud’s struggle in his first years with local notables in the Balkans 
and Anatolia most succinctly: 
 
“Soon after the conclusion of the war with Russia in 1812, Mahmud II set out to reestablish the authority 
of the central government in the provinces. In the Balkans, between 1814 and 1820, Thrace, Macedonia, 
the Danubian shores, and much of Wallachia were taken from the notables and put under the control of 
central authority, sometimes through the employment of military force, and sometimes through peaceful 
means; for example, when a local notable holding an official post died, it was not assigned to his heirs, 
but to new officers appointed from the capital, who compensated the deceased notable’s relatives with 
appointments elsewhere in the Empire. The same methods were applied in Anatolia. During the summers 
of 1812 and 1813 the principal notables along the Black Sea coast were eliminated. After the death of the 
powerful notable Çapanoğlu Süleyman Bey in 1814, the local governors, who took advantage of the 
divisions within his family, occupied his districts in north eastern and eastern Anatolia during the next 
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two years. The death of the notable Karaosmanoğlu in 1816 and had the same effect around Aydın and 
Saruhan. Thus by the end of 1817, almost all of Anatolia was once again brought under the direct control 
of central authority.”12     
 
After all mentioned preparations had been made, when Mahmud felt the conditions were ready 
he started to make the projects in his mind a reality. There are many different views on his 
reformist character. The question posed is whether he was a “gavur”13 (infidel) Sultan or a 
“cruel despot”14 or “his negative personality traits” such as “his impatience led to his headlong 
pursuance of his reform programme”15 or a successful reformist Sultan with his many reform 
projects in different fields16 or an absolutist modernist17 or even the co-founder of modern 
Turkish diplomacy with his cousin Selim III.18 
 
First of all, it should be considered that Mahmud lived in an age that had seen many negative 
developments. The lands of his Empire were like a circle of fire. Not only had many rebellions 
arisen against Istanbul, but also the economic and military conditions of the country were in 
disarray. Mahmud had to find some solutions to rescue his Empire from these disastrous 
problems. He was aware that this could be only via a strict reform programme. However, 
because of the negative conditions the Empire suffered, it is not possible to say that his reform 
programme solved all of its problems. As Berkes comments, Mahmud’s reform period was a 
beginning period for the reforms rather than an achievement one.19  
 
On the other hand Marufoğlu remarked upon the Western Countries’ effects on the Ottoman 
reform programme. He stated in his excellent book about Northern Iraq that one of the most 
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important external factors related to the Ottoman Empire’s social, political, and financial reform 
programme were the Western Countries’ merchandise sales and raw material procurement in the 
Ottoman lands, and their desire to secure their commercial connections with Iran, India, and Far 
East Countries. In particular he pointed out the British influence on the Ottoman social and 
economic reform programme subsequent to the Mehmed Ali Problem.20 
According to Findley, the opinion of the Ottomans that reform was necessary was based on the 
frequent military defeats the Empire endured. Therefore, military reforms during Mahmud’s 
reign were considered preferable.21 However, until 1826 the army itself was the biggest barrier to 
an army reform programme. Thus Mahmud’s most significant reform, which was to clear the 
way for other reforms, was the abolishment of the Janissaries, also called the Yeniçeri Ordusu, in 
1826.  
Šedivý mentioned about two topics together: the external influence on Mamhmud’s reforms and 
abolishment of the Janissaries. He stated in his book that 
In the 1830s all the Great Powers desired the preservation of the Ottoman Empire, which was generally 
regarded as the necessary condition for the maintenance of the European balance of power. Mahmud II 
tried to satisfy this wish, and, having destroyed the main opposition to any attempts for the regeneration 
of the country he governed, the Janissaries, in 1826, he started a new phase of reforms.22 
 
This army had been one of the main obstacles to any kind of reform, particularly military, and 
none of the Ottoman Sultans had been able to set the seal on this important issue until Mahmud 
dealt with it.23 However, it was not easy to abolish the Janissaries. Mahmud had made his 
preparations very inconspicuously so he would have the necessary power for this dangerous aim. 
Uyar and Ericson express the opinion that Mahmud’s decisive stance and measured approach 
had begun to bear fruit ever since 1822. According to these historians, Mahmud discharged the 
conservative wing, which was averse to the reform programme, from the critical positions of 
power, and he appointed his own trusted statesmen there instead. In this respect, he started to 
make an effort to ally himself with politicians, military leaders, and particularly top-class ulema 
(scholars). According to Uyar and Ericson, Mahmud’s technique to reach this aim was by 
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making concessions and promises, and then if he could not win them over, he purged those who 
had not been persuaded from office.24  
 
When Mahmud felt the conditions were ready he started to make moves towards his overall 
strategy and in June 1826 declared he want to establish a new troop, the Ekşinci Ocağı, among 
the Janissaries. As expected the Janissaries mutinied against the Sultan but this time everything 
was different, since their rival, the Sultan, was ready for the struggle. As previously described, 
Mahmud had been making his preparations for this day, so they did not find the Sultan unready 
like Osman II25 or Selim III. As it will be seen, over the course of the entire thesis, in the very 
intensive diplomatic struggle during Mehmed Ali Problem, 1832-1839, Mahmud was a very 
shrewd and vigilant Sultan in internal as well as in external affairs. Uyar and Erickson even 
asserted that Mahmud and later important reformists were aware that this project, the 
establishment of the Ekşinci Ocağı, was to fail, however, they knew that when the Janissaries 
rejected this new troop, this rejection would be a reason, acceptable by everyone, to abolish this 
old Ottoman Army, the Janissaries.26 
 
It happened as Mahmud expected and when he declared that he was abolishing the Yeniçeri 
Ocağı on 17 June 1826, the Ottoman Ulemas, scholars, the folk of Istanbul and the statesmen and 
soldiers, who were loyal to Mahmud, united against the Janissaries. They were all very decisive 
and after a very bloody struggle Mahmud and his side won against the Janissaries.27 This was not 
sufficient for Mahmud and he also abolished the Bektaşi Ocağı, which was a kind of religious 
group whose members had been supporting the Janissaries.  
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This abolishment was called “Vaka-i Hayriye”, which means auspicious event, by the reformist 
Ottomans. However, some historians have a different view with respect to this process. For 
instance, according to Uyar and Erickson the reformists did not consider the possible negative 
results of this military reform upon social, economic, and political life.28 Another criticism 
comes from Aksan. She indicates two problems; first, there was an immediate cash requirement 
for establishing a new army and it was a fact that the Ottoman Economy was not in a good 
condition; second, there was a shortage of officers to command the new army since many of the 
old Ottoman officers, from the Janissaries, were killed in June 1826.29 One of the most important 
Turkish historians, Ortaylı, criticises Mahmud’s methods in the abolishment process as ‘cruel’.30  
 
On the other hand the problems the Janissaries caused had been very serious. In Palmer’s opinion 
the Janissaries were the biggest obstacle to the Ottoman Empire’s reform programme. He also 
says that Istanbul had become a Janissary city by the beginning of the nineteenth century. He 
gives a very interesting example of this in that, according to rumours, even the majority of the 
fires in Istanbul had been set by the Janissaries for the purpose of taking fire extinguishing 
levies.31 Palmer’s words might be a slight exaggeration but it is a fact that Mahmud had to do 
something to start his real reform programme and this he accomplished in 1826.           
Although the majority of Turkish historians now believe that Mahmud was a very significant 
reformist Sultan of the nineteenth century, some foreign representatives at the time did not, and 
reported negatively about Mahmud’s reform programme. Although there is a possibility that 
these opinions might have emanated from an orientalist perspective, which has many biases, 
even so it is useful to give these opinions in order to show a different perspective from those who 
examine Mahmud’s extensive reform programmes in detail.   
“As the Austrian and Prussian diplomats in Constantinople concluded between 1826 and 1839, Mahmud 
II’s headlong Westernisation generally manifested itself through the adoption of entirely unnecessary and 
pointless measures like the orders concerning the implementation of European-style clothing or the 
shortening of traditional long male beards, which were regarded by the sultan as old-fashioned. At the 
end of 1835, Stürmer reported: “Everything in the new institutions is sacrificed to ostentation and to 
appearances; examined closely, their value is reduced to zero . . . At the same time Stürmer conveyed to 
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the Prussian Envoy in Constantinople, Count Hans Karl Albert von Königsmarck, his conviction that “all 
the innovations are superficial and do not get at the root of the problem in any way, and being more 
child’s play than real progress according to European civilisation, they are bound to collapse sooner or 
later.”32  
 
Despite these foreign representatives’ statements, Mahmud was still a reformist Sultan with both 
strengths and weaknesses. He initiated many reforms but the most important one with respect to 
this study concerns the developments in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In order to understand 
the infrastructure of Mahmud’s and his diplomats’ diplomatic struggle during the Mehmed Ali 
Crisis, 1832-1839, to be examined in detail in this work, it is important to be aware of the 
improvements in this Ministry.  
Modernist reforms in external affairs in the Ottoman Empire started with Mahmud’s cousin, 
Selim III. He initiated permanent diplomatic missions in some of the European Capitals. Selim 
was eager to improve Ottoman diplomacy, so before he opened the Ottoman Embassies in 
Europe, his statesmen, under his guidance, discussed some important diplomatic issues with 
British diplomats. One example of this was the organisation of matters of state between the 
Ottoman Empire and each European Power, such as; which Ottoman official would match with 
which European official, which diplomatic appellation would be the most suitable for each new 
Ottoman ambassador, and which mode of travel, sea or land, would be the most suitable for 
diplomatic travel.33   
Selim had some significant reasons to improve diplomatic relations with European Countries. 
Turan crystallizes these reasons when he says that it was an obligation to be well informed about 
developments in Europe since matters were very volatile after the French Revolution. Another of 
Selim’s reasons was that he was headed towards a policy of balance when it came to any 
developments in the Eastern Question, so it was necessary to get involved in the European 
decision process about the Ottoman Empire.34 In this respect, the first serious step came in 1793 
when Yusuf Agah Effendi was sent to London as a first permanent Ottoman Ambassador.35  
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Despite this significant diplomatic effort of Selim’s, there were some negative circumstances 
which would hinder his diplomatic success. Findley summarises these conditions saying: 
 
“In the long run, however, Selim's attempts to establish permanent diplomatic and consular 
representation had only limited success. Lack of qualification or interest among the vast majority of his 
subjects, the changeable diplomatic climate of the Napoleonic Era, the failure to create any central 
coordinating agency in Istanbul, and finally the period of reaction and uncertainty following Selim's own 
deposition and death, were so many obstacles to the continued development of his new systems.” 
 
However, it is true to say that every diplomatic step Selim made was to positively affect 
Mahmud’s diplomatic innovations and struggle.  
There was another important diplomatic reform in the reign of Selim III which contributed to 
Mahmud’s Foreign Ministry reforms. This was to reform a vital office under Reis Effendi,36 
called Amedi.37 According to Findley the reforms in this Office started with some regulations in 
1797. Findley describes the duties of the Amedi Office’s staff that they would accompany Reis 
Effendi to meetings with foreign ambassadors and were responsible for correspondence with 
these foreign embassies.38 The Office’s importance rose after Selim sent permanent Ottoman 
ambassadors to various European Capitals, because the staff in this office was to establish a 
connection between Reis Effendi and the ambassadors in Europe. In addition to this, this office 
was to send coded messages to these ambassadors and decipher their secret reports as well.39 
Clearly, this office was vital to the Ottoman Empire’s diplomatic effort. However, it was not 
working well in the time of Selim III. Examining the reform programme in the Foreign Office is 
important in the understanding of the scope of Ottoman diplomatic ability in the Mehmed Ali 
Problem, which is the main topic of the thesis; because Mahmud’s capable diplomats did not 
spontaneously appear in the 1830s. On the contrary, there was an effort, with successes and 
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failures, by some Sultans, particularly Selim III and Mahmud II, to reform the Ottoman Empire’s 
Foreign Affairs and the restructuring of the Amedi Office was one of these significant reforms. 
 
In this respect, reports were presented to Selim concerning this Office. Two main problems were 
conspicuous in these reports. The first one was that the Office was overstaffed. Patronage was 
given as the reason for this problem. According to this report, the solution would be to ensure 
that nobody who was unqualified for the job or over middle age would be employed at the 
office.40 The second problem was one of lack of education of some of the staff at the Office. For 
this reason it was decided that the staff would be dismissed if they did not have the necessary 
educational background to fulfil the Office working conditions.41 
These instructions are significant because they are a sign of the Ottoman’s intent to reform the 
Empire according to modern political principles and this effort made prior to his accession to 
power was to ease Mahmud’s reform programme.   
At this stage, we can start to examine what Mahmud did to improve his Empire’s diplomatic 
system. As mentioned above, knowledge of this process would be useful, to understand the 
background of Mahmud’s and his statesmen’s diplomatic struggle during the Mehmed Ali Crisis.    
 
First of all it should be known that centralization was the driving force behind all Mahmud’s 
reform programmes. After the abolishment of the Janissaries, mentioned above, there was no 
longer any obstacle to Mahmud’s reforms. In particular, some of the Empire’s internal problems 
had become international problems during Mahmud’s reign, such as the Greeks, and the 
Mehmed Ali Problem, and something would have to be done about these matters. However, the 
Ottoman Empire had very serious economic and military problems at that time due to the 
establishment of the new army, Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye. The end of the Janissaries 
caused two problems; the first was that the Empire needed more financial resources to develop a 
new army, and the second was that the new army was so inexperienced. For these reasons there 
remained only one way forward, and that was diplomacy. It will be illustrated throughout the 
thesis that Mahmud was to use diplomacy very well to help his Empire escape from these serious 
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problems. He had to make the Empire’s diplomatic institutions fit for the great diplomatic 
struggle to come.  
The first attempt Mahmud made in this direction was to convert the official translators from non-
Muslim to Muslim.42 In accordance with this purpose he officially established Tercüme Odası, 
the Translation Office in 1833.43 The Empire had naturally used many translators up to this date 
but a big problem related to the translators appeared in the 1820s. Since the eighteenth century 
the Rum Family members in Istanbul had served as the official translators of the Ottoman 
Empire.44 However, these translators had lost Mahmud’s trust after the Greek Problem, and as a 
result of this doubt harboured by Mahmud they were discharged from this critical position. 
Findley illustrates this situation thus; 
“In the spring of 1821, Constantine Mourouzi, then Translator of the Imperial Divan, was dismissed and 
executed on suspicion of complicity in revolutionary intrigues. Stavraki Aristarchi, thought to be more 
reliable though still suspect as a Greek, was appointed on a temporary basis (vekaletan) to take his place. 
Within twelve months, however, he also had compromised himself sufficiently with both Patriarch and 
Porte that he was dismissed and sent into exile.45” 
 
As can be seen in Findley’s words, Stravraki Aristarchi was the last non-Muslim translator in the 
Empire. After Aristarchi’s exile there was an interregnum period, until the official establishment 
of the Translation Office in 1833. In this period some Muslim translators, who were in fact 
“convert”, had been assigned as the official ones. The first were Yahya Effendi and his son 
Ruhiddin.46 Yahya Efendi was to be the first Muslim official translator and this was the first sign 
of the Translation Office, which was to have only Muslim Ottoman statesmen. He and his son 
were responsible for the translation of French and Romaic languages.47 One of their most 
important missions, directly related to the main argument of the thesis, was that of following 
European public opinion closely via the European newspapers and informing Mahmud II about 
the latest developments at that time. This is evidence that Mahmud had, as early as 1823 - ten 
years earlier than Mehmed Ali Problem, - been keen on having knowledge about developments 
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in Europe and determining his diplomatic policies according to those developments. As it will be 
seen in the following parts of the thesis he was to do the same thing during the Mehmed Ali 
problem through the instrument of one of his best men, Mustafa Reşid. Findley quoted very 
explanatory words from Strangford Canning about this: 
“M. Chabert [one of the dragomans of the British Embassy] called upon him a few mornings ago, and 
found him (Yahya Effendi) surrounded by a number of the young Turks whom the Porte has lately 
formed into a sort of Collegiate Establishment for the purpose of instruction in the European 
languages. They had a prodigious pile of the Frankfort Gazettes before them, and were busily engaged 
in translating indiscriminately, by the sultan's positive order, every Article in which the name or the 
Affairs of Turkey were to be found. His Highness will, assuredly, be not a little astounded on reading 
some of the paragraphs dated from Odessa - Augsburgh - and Nuremberg.48” 
 
Ultimately, after these ten years the Tercüme Odası, Translation Office, was officially 
established in 1833.49 This Office had a great importance to Mahmud’s reforms because many 
significant political characters had been educated by experience at the Office, such as Mustafa 
Reşid Pasha, Ali Pasha, Fuad Pasha and others. Also the establishment of this office shows that 
Mahmud was decisive in determining his own diplomatic policies based on his own loyal 
Muslim diplomats, who would naturally struggle to defend the benefits of their own Empire. As 
can be seen in the chapters of this study, Mahmud was to reap the fruits of this diplomatic reform 
during the Mehmed Ali Problem, particularly between 1834 and 1839, via his Muslim diplomats, 
who would endeavour to carry out the orders of their Sovereign in the European Capitals.  
 
When considering both the diplomatic developments in the nineteenth century: the improvement 
of the Amedci Office and the establishment of Tercüme Odası, it can be said that the Ottoman 
Foreign Office had been gaining a more Muslim identity with every passing day.  
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After these positive developments Mahmud thought that it was the right time to reopen the 
permanent Ottoman diplomatic Embassies in the European Capitals. After Selim’s death the 
Ottoman Embassies, which had been opened in his time, lost their significance. Mahmud had 
many diplomatic plans. In fact, he was obliged to do so, since as mentioned the only remaining 
way to rescue the Empire was diplomacy, and therefore he needed to have far-reaching plans, 
which would be able to protect the Ottoman benefits in Europe. As a result of this opinion he 
reopened the Ottoman Embassies. The first significant diplomatic representatives were 
Mavroyeni, Mustafa Reşid Pasha, Namık Pasha, Fethi Pasha.50 All of them were to take an 
important place in Mahmud’s diplomatic game between 1832-1839.  
Despite all of these positive developments in foreign affairs there was still need for reform in 
foreign affairs. As mentioned above Reis Effendi was responsible for the Empire’s foreign 
affairs, however the modus operandi was still almost the same at the beginning of the 1830s as it 
had been in the classical ages of the Ottoman Empire. Thus the modern foreign state organisation 
would have to be established as soon as possible to fulfil the conditions of this modern age.  
Thereupon the expected step was taken by Mahmud and he turned Reis Effendi into the Foreign 
Ministry on 11 March 1836 and the last Reis Effendi, Akif Effendi, became the first Foreign 
Minister of the Ottoman Empire.51 As Turan mentioned, this step was not only a change in the 
name of this position in the government. Mahmud had also changed the structure of theold 
Office and the new structure of the Foreign Ministry had been prepared according to modern 
international conditions at that time.52 As İpşirli mentioned, the Foreign Ministry later on was 
combined with the Prime Ministry in 1838.53           
After looking at Mahmud’s mentioned reforms with regard to the main topics of this study, we 
can start now to examine in detail what Mahmud and his diplomats accomplished diplomatically 
to resolve one of the biggest problems the Ottoman Empire had faced up to that time, the 
Mehmed Ali Problem. 
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1.3. The First Mehmed Ali Crisis 
Although from the Ottoman point of view Mehmed Ali was a rebel khedive who had been 
implementing reforms in Egypt since the beginning of the nineteenth century, and who now 
hoped to challenge the authority of the Sultan; according to some historians he was the founder 
of Modern Egypt54Fahmy writes on this subject that the majority of Nationalist Egyptian 
historians evaluate Mehmed Ali’s period in Egypt as a period in which Egypt attempted to free 
herself from her pre-modern and feudal structure in the Ottoman Era, and started to rise in order 
to take part in a modern and capitalist Europe with Mehmed Ali’s Administration. These 
Egyptian historians assert that Mehmed Ali was a national hero, who struggled to save Egypt, 
which had long been under Ottoman control, from collapse, and carry it through to the modern 
age with his hard work and determination.55 However, as will be seen in the following chapters, 
Mahmud II and his statesmen thought differently about this Ottoman administrator and from 
Istanbul’s point of view he was just a rebel governor, one who was to bring a vast amount of 
strife to the Ottoman Empire.This led to difficulties not only for the Ottoman Empire but for the 
European powers. The trouble was not limited to one incident, but it erupted twice. The first 
began in 1831 and was finished by the Treaty of Kutahya on 14 May 1833. The second incident 
began in 1839 and was finished by the Convention of London on 15 July 1840. This chapter will 
examine the first Mehmed Ali crisis and consider its effect on European diplomacy. 
First of all, Mehmed Ali’s occupation of Anatolia will be examined. However, the aim of this 
chapter is not only to define the story of Ibrahim Pasha`s battles in Anatolia, but to examine the 
influence of this problem on the relationships between the Ottoman Empire and the European 
Powers; particularly England.     
“Whoever could have Egypt, he can have India as well” said Napoleon in one of his letters from 
1798.56 These words clearly summarize Egypt’s importance. At that time, Mehmed Ali saw the 
difference between the Ottoman and French Armies during the French-Ottoman War in Egypt. 
Later, when he became the governor of Egypt, he brought some military experts from France, 
who helped to modernise his army in a very short time. The most famous of these was “Captain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  K.	  Fahmy,	  Paşanın	  Adamları,	  Kavalalı	  Mehmed	  Ali	  Paşa,	  Ordu	  ve	  Modern	  Mısır,	  (İstanbul,	  2010),	  p.12.	  
55	  Ibid.	  P.14	  
56 Şinasi Altundağ, Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşa İsyanı Mısır Meselesi, ( Ankara, TTKB,1988), p. 23.	  
25 
	  
	  
	  
Seves” also known as Suleyman Pasha.57 He would later perform many beneficial services for 
Mehmed Ali during the war with the Ottomans. France had been giving assistance to Mehmed 
Ali and was pleased to see a strong army in Egypt, as France had been competing with England 
in the Mediterranean. France, knowing of the British interests in India, hoped to use Mehmed Ali 
against Britain.58 Mehmed Ali was aware of Britain’s interests as well, and aimed to use this 
knowledge to gain favour with England. As Vereté mentioned that Barker, the British Consul-
General in Egypt, reminded Palmerston “the pasha had made to His Majesty’s government for 
intimate relations and protection, to which no clear reply was ever given.” However, Palmerston 
responded to this desire in a negative way. As Vereté indicated: 
 
“Palmerston thought that the Turkish sovereign might raise the question of British aid against his 
revolted pasha. If this were to happen, the secretary of state allowed the ambassador “to say no more... 
than to assure him [the sultan]of our general wishes to maintain and uphold him as an ancient ally and 
old friend and as an important element in the balance of power in Europe.”59 
 
Although Palmerston would not support the Sultan against his rebel governor until the Treaty of 
Unkiar Skelessi was signed, he did not want to take the risk of opposing of the Sultan.    
Because of Mehmed Ali`s desire for Egypt’s autonomy, he began to introduce modernization and 
westernization from the beginning of his administration there. Mehmed Ali implemented these 
reforms because he hoped to challenge the authority of the Sultan. From the threat of the French 
Army, he had learned that economic, political and military reforms were necessary.  He was not 
satisfied with simply modernizing the army but acquired monopolies on important goods as well. 
Therefore, Egypt’s economic structure became very strong.60  Webster indicates Palmerston’s 
opinion on this topic: 
 “But Mehemet also established many state monopolies and fixed prices so as to secure huge profit 
to himself. “The fact is”, wrote Palmerston in 1838, “that Mehemet Ali has divided the population 
of Egypt into two classes the Rich and the Poor. The rich class consists of Mehemet Ali himself 
singly and alone: the poor class of all the other inhabitants of Egypt.”61 
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Furthermore, Webster added “this is of course a Palmerstonian exaggeration”. These words are 
an expression of Palmerston’s feelings against Mehmed Ali because from Palmerston’s 
perspective, Mehmed Ali could lead to many uncomfortable situations for Britain in the Middle 
East. On this point Temperley writes that Palmerston said:  
“For my own part I hate Mehemet Ali, whom I consider as nothing but an ignorant barbarian, who 
by cunning and boldness and mother-wit, has been successful in rebellion; ... I look upon his 
boasted civilization of Egypt as the arrantest humbug; and I believe that he is as great a tyrant and 
oppressor as ever made a people wretched.”62   
 
On this subject there is an interesting passage in the Ottoman documents. According to this, as 
was well known, the poor citizens were suffering under Mehmed Ali’s administration. There is a 
complaint from the Ottoman administration about his arbitrary projects, his not listening to 
Central Government advice and his refusal to give up his selfish policies.63 
The same opinion from Palmerston was shared by Barker. Some of his reports were quoted by 
Webster in his book. Barker reported about Mehmed Ali that: 
“His downfall would be hailed as a blessing by all classes, by every individual, whether native or 
European except the few whose well being depends immediately on his successful usurpation.”64 
 
It can be understood that the dislike for Mehmed Ali was not only Palmerston`s opinion, it seems 
that some other British had the same thought with him.   
The reforms made Egypt stronger; and when Mehmed Ali was certain of the power of his Army, 
he rebelled against the Sultan. It should not be forgotten that he was a khedive. According to 
Ottoman sources, the Sultan thought that if Britain pressed Mehmed Ali to abandon his plans, he 
could gracefully admit defeat without losing his position, as the Egyptian public would accept 
him not as threat to the Sultan but as a just governor.65 According to this Ottoman document, the 
public of Egypt began to see Mehmed Ali as a new Sultan, which worried the Ottoman 
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governments. Mehmed Ali`s desire for independence had been to the Sultan clear since the 
1810s. Mehmed Ali wanted Syria to be under his administration because he was planning to use 
it to establish his own Empire in the future. Altundağ in his book a report quoted from French 
ambassador Drovetti, he noted that, even in 1811, after Mehmed Ali had defeated his enemies, 
he began to dream of an independent Egypt.66 Barker also reported of Mehmed Ali that:  
“he has at length thrown off the veil which has hitherto but half concealed his ultimate object and 
publicly declared that that object is to dethrone the Sultan Mahmoud and to put the son of the 
Sultan in his place.”67 
           
From this point of view, it can be seen that Mehmed Ali initiated rebellion in the Ottoman 
Empire. The relationship between him and the Sultan was strained. Neither side trusted the other, 
which led to war. This war would create a new phase in the Eastern Question, straining the 
sensitive balance of power in Europe as the Great Powers struggled to gain control over the 
Ottoman lands. 
The Sultan had promised to give him the governorship of Syria and Crete as a reward for his 
support, during the Greek rebellion. Despite this, Mehmed Ali had not sent his army to help the 
Sultan in the Russian-Ottoman war at the end of the 1820s because he had wanted to be the 
Anatolian commander-in-chief, and had wanted his son Ibrahim Pasha to be the Rumelian 
commander-in-chief, and the Sultan refused to grant this.68  As a result, Mahmud did not want to 
make Mehmed Ali governor of Syria. Therefore, he only gave him the Crete governorship.69 
Mahmud had also recognised that Syria was very close to Egypt and, therefore, it would give 
Mehmed Ali additional economic and military strength. There was another reason for this 
dispute between Mahmud and Mehmed Ali. Some Ottoman government officials did not like 
Mehmed Ali because of his successful reforms in Egypt. In other words, they were jealous of 
him. Because of this, they sometimes gave misinformation about him to the Sultan.70    
Mehmed Ali`s ambitions and his strained relationship with the Sultan led to open rebellion in 
1831. Mehmed Ali assigned his son, Ibrahim Pasha, to attack Syria in the autumn 1831. Ibrahim 
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was a clever and capable Commander. He had big ambitions like his father. His were slightly 
different from Mehmed Ali`s, however, Mehmed Ali had only wanted to establish an Egyptian 
Empire. Ibrahim Pasha hoped to establish an empire across the Arabic world.71 Nevertheless, he 
always obeyed his father`s orders because he was not as established a statesman as Mehmed Ali. 
Ibrahim Pasha occupied Akka, on 27 May, Damascus, on 16 June, and Aleppo, 15 July 1832.72 
These unexpected and quick occupations made Mahmud so angry and nervous that he sent the 
Ottoman Army against Ibrahim Pasha. The Ottoman Army had been one of the strongest armies 
of Europe for several centuries. It included the “yeniceri ocagi” or Janissaries. Yet, over time, the 
strength of the army had declined. So Mahmud decided to abolish the Janissaries because they 
were draining the government`s resources. This was difficult, but after gaining the Ottoman 
public’s support against them, he was able to abolish the Janissaries in 1826. This abolition was a 
major turning point in the history of the Ottoman Empire because the new army, the Asakir-i 
Mansure-i Muhammediye, was established, which did not oppose reforms as the Janissaries had 
done. However, the new army was very inexperienced. When looking all battles of the Ottomans 
after 1826, this should be considered. Mahmud hoped that his new, and modernised army, would 
be a major source of renewed strength for his Empire; its first test had come. 
The first battle between the Sultan`s army and Mehmed Ali`s army occurred on 14 April 1832.73  
This battle did not last very long, but it was obvious that the Egyptian Army was better prepared 
than the Ottoman Army. After the Syrian public realised this difference, they began to support 
Ibrahim Pasha.74 Mahmud began to think that he should have taken more serious precautions. 
Therefore, he sent a new Army with Huseyin Pasha as its Commander. On 29 July 1832, this 
Army was also defeated by Ibrahim Pasha at Hums. In this battle, the Ottoman Army was almost 
destroyed.75 With this victory, the Egyptian Army moved toward Anatolia. At the same time, the 
Ottoman government decided to send the last and biggest army to Konya, a city in middle of 
Anatolia.76 There, Ibrahim Pasha announced that he was going to reintroduce the “yeniceri 
ocagi”(Janissaries).77 Perhaps Ibrahim Pasha began to make significant decisions such as this, 
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because he believed that the establishment of his own noble family was certain. In addition, he 
began to persuade some of the Ottoman public to join his army, using propaganda which 
opposed the Sultan.78 There was one last chance for the Ottomans to stop Ibrahim Pasha and his 
army. Mahmud prepared to send his last and biggest army against Ibrahim Pasha.79 This last and 
largest battle occurred at Konya on 21 December 1832. The Egyptian army defeated the Ottoman 
army in this battle.80 After this victory Ibrahim Pasha began to openly oppose Mahmud in public 
statements. According to his propaganda, “the Sultan, Mahmud II, was not a good Muslim” 
because he had made many reforms based on Western culture and Christian rules.81 This 
propaganda is particularly interesting because Mehmed Ali had established similar reforms with 
the help of French advisors in Egypt; nevertheless this was the accusation that his son used 
against the Sultan. Even so, Ibrahim’s propaganda seems to have taken effect among some 
Ottomans in Istanbul. On this topic Šedivý quotes Martens, the Prussian Envoy in Istanbul, 
“Finally, the Ulemas start to say openly that it would be better to see and have Ibrahim here 
than the Sultan.”82  
 
This sudden and unexpected loss came as a surprise to the Sultan and caused panic in Istanbul. It 
also surprised Europe where, until now, the European Powers had been calmly watching the 
struggle. They assumed that this was a typical conflict between the Sultan and his governor.   
They also believed that the central army would certainly win. Nevertheless, the weakness of the 
Ottoman Army, particularly after the abolition of the “yeniceri ocagi”, was finally revealed to 
them after this last defeat. This transformed the problem into an international one because it 
attracted the attention of Europe. Where, before this, the Eastern Question had seemed to be 
about which of the European Powers would replace the Ottomans if their Empire collapsed; now 
it became apparent that there might be a non-European answer to it. Such a challenge to Ottoman 
power raised the possibility that the Empire might be in danger of imminent collapse. This was a 
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turning point for the European diplomatic agenda and would remain a serious question in the 
following decades. It is particularly significant because the Mehmed Ali crisis had an important 
effect on the Anglo-Ottoman relationship, as seen through the Ottoman and British documents. 
 
 1.4. Diplomatic Relations between the European Powers and the Ottoman Empire from 
the defeat of Konya to Unkiar Skelessi 
The lands of the Ottoman Empire had always been important to the Great Powers because of 
their strategic locations. Therefore, the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire became a 
significant issue for the European Powers. The victory of Mehmed Ali worried Europe, which 
became pessimistic about the Empire`s future and concerned about its possible collapse. As a 
result, they began to interfere even more in the domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire. As 
mentioned above these anxieties of the European Powers would be used by the Sultan to extend 
the life of the Empire.         
To understand this complex period properly, one should understand the aims and interests of 
each of the Great Powers regarding the Ottoman lands.  As previously mentioned, Russia had 
hoped to gain access to Ottoman waters for a long time, as it wanted to improve its commercial 
and military power. Ever since the reign of Peter the Great, Russia had been looking toward the 
Ottoman Empire for expansion, and from the reign of Catherine the Great it had actively pursued 
a policy of trying to annex Ottoman territory; most recently in 1774 in the famous treaty of 
Kutchuk Kainardji. From the 1790s onward, British policy had been wary of Russian designs, 
even if her policy-makers had not always been able to act against them.  France was equally 
averse to Russia becoming the dominant power in the Mediterranean because it would threaten 
French interests in the region. Austria also did not want Russia to gain influence in the Ottoman 
lands because it was competing with Russia in the Balkans. Metternich was also scared of liberal 
movements and wary of revolutionary forces and so consequently disliked the Mehmed Ali 
Crisis. This meant that Austria and Russia were on one side of this question whilst Britain and 
France trended to be on the other: conditions in the East seemed to neatly divide the Great 
Powers.  In addition to this, Istanbul was a major concern. It became the centre of European 
diplomacy after the Ottomans were defeated by Mehmed Ali`s army. This defeat led to strife 
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European powers because each either desired this great city, or at least wanted to keep it from 
anyone else.  
Initially Russian governments wanted to divide the Ottoman Empire in order to reach the straits. 
However, after the fiasco of the Ottomans in Konya, they decided to protect the territorial 
integrity of the Ottoman Empire, at least until a more convenient time when it would be able to 
dominate singly over this neighbour.83 The reason for this was that the Russian Tsar and his 
governments preferred a “weak” Ottoman Empire instead of the effective power represented by 
Mehmed Ali. In this topic Anderson stated that: 
“Moreover Mohammed Ali, if he succeeded in creating a great ‘Arab Empire’ embracing Syria, 
Mesopotamia and parts of Asia Minor, might prove a much more dangerous neighbour to Russia 
than Mahmud II had ever been.”84 
 
At that time, the British through the diplomatic work of Stratford Canning provided the Ottoman 
Empire with a guarantee of help against Mehmed Ali. Canning went to Istanbul in an effort to 
help solve the Greek problem.85 He met Ottoman government officials, and also discussed the 
Mehmed Ali problem and he promised that the British Government would send 15 naval ships as 
long as the Ottomans would pay for the British crew. It was also mentioned in the document that 
this meeting was confidential, as the Sultan did not want the other European powers to become 
aware of this meeting. This demonstrates the Sultan’s determination to acquire the support his 
country needed because even when he was unable to obtain British support, he sought elsewhere. 
Therefore, it can be seen that the Sultan was actively addressing the problem by use of 
diplomacy. According to Canning, this contribution from Britain would be enough to defeat 
Mehmed Ali. Moreover, Canning recommended the Sultan should send an official to London to 
discuss this matter with British politicians.86 The Sultan was very pleased with this offer, 
especially because Ibrahim Pasha`s army was so close to Istanbul. When Canning arrived in 
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London, he presented his opinions about this plan to help the Ottomans in a memorandum to 
Palmerston on 12 December 1832.87  
In his biography of Stratford Canning, Michael Warr has stated a different view: 
“Stratford cast about in his mind for a way to persuade the Turks to yield more territory to the 
Greeks. He had discovered that Mehmed Ali and Ibrahim, baulked in Greece, were planning what 
seemed likely to be a direct attacked on Turkey from the Eastern Mediterranean. This important 
news was well calculated to subdue the Turks and render them more amenable”.88 
           
According to Warr, Canning`s primary goal was to solve the issue of Greece. In the rest of his 
book, Warr commented on Canning`s main mission in Istanbul more clearly: 
“Stratford was a true genius in these matters. He knew how to handle the Turks and he took infinite 
trouble. Sir Robert Gordon had done neither and therefore failed. When Turks yield to pressure, it 
is never clear why they have done so. But in this case the decisive factor was the news of Mehmed 
Ali`s impending attack on Turkey. This was a piece of luck for Stratford”.89 
 
This situation can be seen in Webster’s book; The Foreign Policy of Palmerston. He states that,  
“Stratford Canning had improved the position of the new Greece by using against the Sultan the 
ever-increasing threat from the South.”90 
 
Despite this, as mentioned above, when Canning returned to England, he informed Palmerston 
about the demand of the Sultan. Palmerston, however, replied that “there were no ships 
available”.91 At that time, most of Britain’s fleet was busy resolving the Belgian problem, and 
the rest was carefully watching events in Portugal. So instead, Britain just sent twenty 
cannonballs as a gift to the Ottomans, and did not provide any other assistance.92 
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Mahmud ordered Namık Pasha to London to determine the British attitude.93 If Namık Pasha 
found the British side to be in a positive mood, he was to tell them that, in remuneration for this 
assistance, the Ottoman Empire would be willing to offer commercial privileges to Britain.94 
This hinted at the future big commercial treaty of Balta Limani, signed five years later in 1838. 
This treaty had both positive and negative results for the Ottomans, and marked a significant 
turning point in the Anglo-Turkish relationship. Namık Pasha arrived in London in December. 
While in London, he was welcomed by British politicians, even William IV. He was invited to 
the Palace for three days.95 However, there was not enough time for a long delay because 
Ibrahim Pasha was moving quickly in Anatolia. Therefore, the Sultan was impatient to learn the 
result of these meetings with Namık Pasha.96 As can be understood from this process and the 
tone and meaning within the Ottoman documents, Namık Pasha and the Sultan were optimistic 
about receiving British help. But when Namık Pasha met the Prime Minister Lord Grey, the 
Sultan`s requests were rejected.97 As a result of this, the Ottoman plan for British military help 
could not be realized. This decision, to refuse the Sultan, was partly the result of the naval 
situation, but it also reflected a Whig view that the Empire was doomed; the result was not what 
was expected, as the Sultan went to Russia for help. After the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi in 1833, 
British politicians regretted their negligence and sought to make amends for it. This is evidence 
that Palmerston, the leading British politician of the time then serving as Foreign Minister, was 
uninterested in the Ottomans.98 For most British policy makers, domestic issues were more 
important than the Eastern Question. As Bailey has commented, Palmerston later said on 28 
August 1833: 
 
 “If England had thought fit to interfere, the progress of the invading army would have been 
stopped, and the Russian troops would not have been called in; but although it was easy to say, 
after events had happened, that they were to be expected, yet certainly no one could anticipate the 
rapidity with which they had succeeded each other in the East.”99  
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At first, the Sultan expected that Britain would help the Ottomans. But when it became clear that 
British help was not forthcoming, he looked elsewhere for support against the Egyptian Army. 
Ibrahim Pasha had just begun to move toward Bursa and closer to Istanbul. Which country would 
help the Sultan? It could not be France because they had occupied Algeria in 1830. Also, the 
majority of French politicians and the public had been supporting Egypt for a long time. 
Moreover, Mehmed Ali had modernized his country with the help of French soldiers and 
advisors. There was only one country left which desired to get involved: Russia. Goryanof who 
wrote an entire book based on original Russian documents, stated that the Tsar, after 
understanding the benefits which would come from supporting the Ottoman Empire, sent 
Commander Muravyef to discuss the problem with both Mehmed Ali and the Sultan.100 
Goryanof cites a prescription given to Commander Muravyef before he went to Istanbul. 
According to this document, the Tsar had made the decision to assist the Ottomans because he 
realized that if Mehmed Ali won against the Sultan, this situation would benefit France. 
Additionally, Istanbul would fall under the control of people who opposed Russia. Thus, it was 
necessary to stop Mehmed Ali.101 Although the Ottomans and the Russians had been enemies for 
almost two hundred years, after Palmerston`s rejection the Sultan chose to accept Russia’s 
support against Mehmed Ali. 
In the meantime, Ibrahim Pasha, who wanted to continue to Istanbul, was ordered by his father to 
stop in Kutahya, the city next to Bursa.102 This was because, at the Sultan`s request, the Tsar had 
sent the Russian Fleet to Istanbul in February.103 This means, as mentioned before, the Sultan’s 
efforts to solve the problem with diplomacy were working. On the other hand, the Russians had 
been trying to implement their plan about the Straits for centuries and, with this military landing 
in Istanbul, they had turned their aims into reality. This situation startled British and French 
diplomats, frightening both sides. There were now eight Russian battleships in the Istanbul 
Straits.104 This made both the British and French displeased and nervous. Meanwhile, the 
Ottoman government carefully watched the actions of both sides. They realised that the French 
and British diplomats would work together to obstruct Russia.105 In addition to this, a negative 
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reaction arose in British public opinion. In this respect, Namık Pasha106, still the Ottoman 
Ambassador in London, reported that some British military officers had registered to come and 
help the Ottoman Army. He also reported that the British and French press had turned against 
Mehmed Ali.107 Despite all this, British policy makers did not realise enough the danger of the 
Russian presence, as can be seen in one of the Ottoman documents.108 This Ottoman document 
indicates that Palmerston still did not completely realise the dangers of this situation until the 
signing of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi because his attention was focused on the Belgian 
problem. However, French diplomats more were alert to the Russian danger than Britain. 
Although they had supported Mehmed Ali since the beginning of the crisis, once the Russian 
Fleet was seen at the Porte they suddenly felt that they had to do something. Hereafter, France 
sent Baron Roussin as an ambassador to Istanbul in February.109 He was to meet Ibrahim Pasha 
and discourage him about returning to Egypt.110 However, he could not succeed in this mission. 
Instead Mehmed Ali sent an ultimatum, asking for the governorship of Syria and Adana.111 This 
demand made the Sultan very angry. The situation was negotiated in the Ottoman Government. 
Mustafa Reşid Pasha, who would be Foreign Minister in 1837, was sent to Kutahya to discuss 
the issue with Ibrahim Pasha. The instructions given to Resid Pasha were very important 
because, as stated above, the Sultan hoped to resolve the crisis through diplomacy. In these 
instructions, Resid Pasha was told to focus on keeping the administration of Adana in favour of 
the Sultan. If he could not achieve this, the conditions of the France and Britain would have to be 
carefully considered, and they would have persuaded to act against Mehmed Ali as a second 
plan.112 As can be seen from this ordinance of the Sultan, he was anxious to compensate for the 
weakness of Ottoman military power with diplomatic tactics. This aspect of Ottoman policy has 
usually been overlooked by Western historians who have written about it exclusively in terms of 
Ottoman weakness. Yet, as this account shows, the Ottoman Sultan was perfectly capable of 
using sophisticated balance of power diplomacy to compensate for what he hoped was temporary 
military weakness. But Mahmud did recognize the need for ‘hard’ power. He, in addition to the 
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support from the Russian Fleet, wanted 30,000 soldiers, 6000 cavalry, and 110 troops of cannon 
from the Tsar113 but at first only 15,000 soldiers were sent.114 This was still an unexpected 
amount because both sides had been at war for almost three centuries, yet now, for the first time, 
Russian soldiers were to be seen in Istanbul. This move was not popular with public opinion or 
many officials in Istanbul, who were as surprised as the British by this sudden alliance with the 
old enemy.  
As Altundağ indicated,115 Mahmud was able to keep his opinion about Russian assistance secret 
until Ibrahim Pasha came to Kutahya. The Sultan did not say anything about his plan to his 
governments when they could not do anything to solve the problem. Following this, Russian 
soldiers were seen in Istanbul, and French and British diplomats were in a state of panic. 
According to the Ottoman document, both sides sent their war ships to Strait and this situation 
made the Ottoman public restless.116  According to Goryanof, Roussin, the French Ambassador, 
was trying to pressure to the Sultan for a decision about the return of the Russian Army and fleet 
to Russia. These pressures made the Russian ambassador Butenev`s job more difficult. The 
Sultan mentioned in an official document that the Ottomans could not trust France, after the 
French made a guarantee to solve the problem and failed; Ibrahim Pasha had attacked Aydin and 
Saruhan, regions close to Izmir. Also the Sultan was aware that if he wanted the Russian army to 
go back to Russia, Istanbul would be unprotected and Ibrahim Pasha could attack Istanbul. If this 
happened there was no way to protect Istanbul.117 Therefore, the Sultan had to take the risk of 
keeping the Russians in Istanbul. Roussin`s demand that Russian army go home was rejected. In 
the light of this it can be said that although the Ottoman-France relationship had been good for 
centuries, it deteriorated after the French occupation of the Algeria in 1830. As mentioned, 
French diplomats supported Mehmed Ali until the Russian fleet appeared in the straits. At that 
time Roussin seemed angry and the Ottoman governments reported that they were worried that 
he might have acted rashly.118 In the same document it was indicated that Roussin had threatened 
the Ottoman governments over the Russian Amy and fleet leaving Istanbul within twenty four 
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hours.  This situation was untenable diplomatically for the Ottomans and they informed the 
British Ambassador, Ponsonby, of this. After all Roussin’s pressuring, the Tsar appointed as a 
private officer one of his best men, Orlov, to solve the problem.119 
At the same time the French and British ambassador reported that Ibrahim Pasha stopped in 
Kutahya, thus it was not necessary for the Russian army to stay in Istanbul any more. However, 
the Ottoman governments stated that they did not want to hear just words about this problem, 
something had to be done, and until Ibrahim Pasha went back to Egypt, the Russian army would 
stay in Istanbul.120 They said this because as mentioned above they felt they could not trust the 
French when previously Mehmed Ali had still wanted the governorship of Adana contrary to the 
French guarantee about solving the problem. In addition to this, the Sultan suspected that France 
had been continuing to support Mehmed Ali despite Roussin seeming to be trying to solve the 
problem.121 Also at that time the Sultan and his bureaucrats complained about the French and 
British fleets which were seen around the Straits. The Sultan said that “I would prefer these 
fleets to threaten Egypt not me”122  
Despite the rejection of its wish for British support, the Ottoman government still had Namık 
Pasha in London, insisting on getting British help in this regard.123 In this context, although the 
Russian Fleet was in Istanbul, the Ottoman governments were still asking both the British and 
French, whether they had any solution in this problem or not.124 When we analyse this situation 
in the light of this correspondence, it shows that the Ottomans were unwilling to continue with 
the Russian Army in Istanbul and were trying to use the both French and British interests against 
Russia. It is clear that the Sultan was not willing to put all his eggs in the Russian basket, and we 
can see, even this early, evidence of why he would later seek to escape Russian control. 
At that time Ibrahim Pasha occupied Izmir but the great powers, Britain, Russia, France, and the 
Austrian Ambassadors protested against this occupation and lowered their flags to half-mast.125 
They also sent a letter of protest to Ibrahim Pasha.126 This protest worked and Ibrahim Pasha had 
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to recall his men. This event is another good example of the Sultan’s plan to use diplomacy to 
solve the problem bringing benefits for the Ottomans. 
Ibrahim Pasha wanted to attack to Istanbul but at that time French ambassador Roussin and 
Russian officer Orlov were pressing Mehmed Ali to make a peace treaty with the Ottomans. 
With this in mind French ambassador Roussin met Ibrahim Pasha in Kutahya. In this meeting 
Ibrahim Pasha wanted control of Damascus, Aleppo and Adana, a big region in the south of the 
Empire.127 In the same document it mentions that French Ambassador Roussin offered a 
guarantee of forgiveness to Ibrahim Pasha from the Ottomans however, this was found 
“inappropriate” and not accepted by the Sultan. This rejection is evidence in favour of the main 
argument of this chapter. Although the Sultan wanted to solve the problem quickly, he rejected 
the French promise which was given without his permission. It meant the Ottomans still were 
trying to protect their interests despite the many obstacles. We should certainly not see Mahmud 
as a tool of any foreign power.  Another Ottoman document reported that Ibrahim Pasha sent a 
letter pertaining to this at that time.128  In it he said that if he returned to Egypt, the European 
powers, France, Britain, and Russia would attack Istanbul and also that Russia was only in 
Istanbul because of their interests in the Straits and not to assist the Ottoman Empire. It is very 
interesting because despite his occupation of Anatolia, Ibrahim Pasha could still assert that he 
was defending the Ottoman interests.  The Sultan replied that if he went back to Egypt, then all 
problems would be solved.129 The British and French diplomats were insisting that the Ottoman 
government should sign a treaty with Mehmed Ali,130 as otherwise they knew that the Russian 
army and fleet would remain in Istanbul. Despite this pressure the Sultan did not give the 
governorship of Adana to Ibrahim Pasha. He hoped to make a treaty without yielding Adana.131 
However, England and France wanted to solve the problem as soon as they could because of the 
Russian danger, and as mentioned above Roussin had given a guarantee to Ibrahim Pasha 
concerning his father Mehmed Ali`s requests. As a result of all these negotiations and pressures 
the treaty of Kutahya was made on 14 May 1833 between Mehmed Ali and Mahmud II.132 
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Bailey shows the date of this Treaty on 3 May 1833133, however, it is shown on the Turkish 
sources on 14 May 1833.134 With this treaty, despite the Sultan not wanting to yield the 
governorship of Adana to Ibrahim Pasha in addition to Jeddah, he could not prevent it. Also the 
governorship of Damascus was given to Mehmed Ali in addition to Egypt and Crete.135 
Moreover, the Ottoman public who supported Ibrahim Pasha in Anatolia during occupation of 
Egyptian army would be forgiven by the Sultan.136 In this respect it can be said that neither side - 
either the Sultan or Mehmed Ali - were satisfied with this treaty. This was because the threat 
Mehmed Ali posed had not yet been completely eradicated by the Sultan and there was a chance 
he could rebel again in the future. Also Mehmed Ali had wanted to achieve independence since 
the beginning of his struggle. Despite this they made, or in other words they had to make, this 
peace treaty because of pressure from Britain and France. For these reasons, one might guess that 
the problem would rear its head again soon. 
There are two very interesting documents in the Ottoman Archive. Although there is no 
discussion in the secondary sources about any secret alliance between Russia and Mehmed Ali in 
this period, these documents speculate about a possibility of such an alliance. According to one 
of them, if this alliance was true, the British and France war ships should have been increased in 
the Dardanelles.137 Another document reported that Britain should have been warned about the 
possibility of this alliance.138 Both these documents are fascinating because although the alliance 
was a possibility, it is not mentioned in either secondary or primary sources. The Orientalist 
argument should perhaps be revaluated in the light of these documents. As mentioned above the 
orientalist perspective claims the Ottomans were not aware of what was going on around them. 
However, it can be seen from these documents that they considered every option for solving this 
problem with minimum damage. Also they were not dependent on Russian help, they had 
contingency plans. At this time, the Ottoman government had to utilize every weakness in the 
relationships between great powers. In fact, this was a common feature of the diplomacy of this 
period, as can be seen in the above story of the Ottoman Empire.       
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Only fifty days later, to Palmerston`s regret, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was signed on 8 July 
1833 between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. This treaty changed most of the British 
politicians’ opinion about the Ottoman Empire. We shall see what the content of this Treaty was 
that frightened the British Government so much. 
 
1.5. The Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi139 
As described above, the Sultan had trusted the British so much for assistance against Mehmed 
Ali, but Palmerston was too preoccupied with dealing with the more immediate matter of the 
“Belgian and Portuguese problem”140, to support the Ottomans. In addition to this, Webster 
stated on this subject that,  
“absorbed in internal difficulties and in the struggle in Western Europe the British Government 
and British public opinion neglected this all-important problem until too late to influence 
events”141  
 
Also mentioned above, some British politicians thought of the Ottomans as being only barbarians 
and Muslims. For these reason they broke the Canning promise. As can be seen despite all the 
requests of the Ottomans, the British government rejected their appeal in favour of more 
important matters to them.  After this rejection, the Sultan asked the Tsar for Russian help. The 
French and British sides were unhappy with Russian fleet and army remaining in Istanbul, as 
they were afraid of Russian dominance in the Ottoman Empire. The Russians continued to 
support the Ottomans because they did not want another Power in Istanbul, including Mehmed 
Ali.  
 After the Treaty of Kutahya, France and Britain was expecting that the Russian army would 
leave Istanbul. However, as it will be examined in detail in the following chapters, the Sultan did 
not want to lose his time by struggling to solve any kind of domestic problem, he wanted to 
improve the country militarily, economically and administratively. As he had seen from the 
Mehmed Ali Crisis, it was necessary for the country stand on its own two feet. Hence, the Sultan 
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unexpectedly requested a treaty of friendship with Russia. Orlov, the Tsar’s private officer in 
Istanbul, reported that the Sultan wanted to make a secret treaty with Russia on 30 April.142 After 
that Ahmet Pasha, the Sultan’s private officer dealing with this secret treaty, met the Russian 
ambassador Butenev at that time and Ahmed Pasha said on behalf of the Sultan:  
“The Sultan was displeased with the treaty of Kutahya because he was aware that it was not a 
peace treaty; it was a just temporary ceasefire. For that reason he was planning to form an 
alliance with Russia against Mehemet Ali. In addition, Ahmed Pasha indicated that this plan of the 
Sultan’s should not be mentioned to any other Ottoman government officials until the Sultan had 
made the public announcement. Furthermore, the Sultan suspected that France, maybe even 
Britain, was supporting Mehemet Ali.”143 
 
As can be understood from this meeting mentioned above the Sultan had clearly been utilizing 
diplomacy to deal with the Mehmed Ali problem. Indeed, he was successful in his aim because 
until this alliance became a reality with the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, Britain and France did not 
realize the importance of these negotiations.       
Thereafter, the Russian Foreign Minister, Count Nesselrode, delegated full authority to Orlov to 
make this treaty and Nesselrode sent an ordinance to Orlov about it. 144 In this ordinance some 
reasons for this treaty were explained. These reasons were important because in this ordinance 
the Russian’s actual aims can be clearly seen. Nesselrode stated that: 
‘First of all, when a friendship treaty became a reality with the Ottomans, Mehemet Ali would 
understand that Russia was a big obstacle to his aims. Thereafter, peace would reign in the 
Ottoman lands because of Russia. 
Secondly, as it was the Sultan who demanded this treaty, it would show Russia as innocent in this 
agreement to other European Powers. 
Thirdly, when a danger appeared for the Ottomans, the Ottoman government had to accept the 
domination of the Tsar in its own lands and thanks to treaty the Ottoman Empire would be rescued 
from the pressure of France. 
Finally, to make a friendship treaty with the Ottomans would be very beneficial for Russian 
interests. With this agreement Russia would be able to deploy some Russian soldiers in the 
Ottoman lands and if any problem happened in the Ottoman lands, Russia would intervene in the 
problem for the benefit of the Russia. As a result of this, whether the Ottoman Empire collapsed or 
not, Russia would be the dominant power in the Eastern Question.” 
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This ordinance clearly expresses why the Tsar was struggling so much for an alliance with the 
Sultan. Also it adequately explains the reason of Palmerston`s fear and panic after the Treaty of 
Unkiar Skelessi.           
The ordinance should be examined carefully. There are many important points in this report. One 
of them, Russia’s real intentions towards the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, can be 
understood from this Russian document. The Tsar did not want a strong neighbour instead of the 
Ottoman Empire which had many problems. Also it is well known the straits were very 
significant for Russia. Another important point of the report was Russia would support the 
Ottomans for a while, then at an opportune time Russia aimed to dominate on Ottoman lands. 
After due process the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was signed between Russia and the Ottoman 
Empire on 8 July 1833 in Istanbul.145 The treaty contained 6 open articles and 1 secret article. 
The open articles were about the Ottoman-Russian alliance toward any dangers for both 
countries which meant that in any possibility of a war both sides would have helped each other. 
The treaty would initially be valid for eight years.146 Ponsonby, the Britis Ambassador in 
Istanbul, learned of the treaty just two days after its signature. Bailey indicated that when 
Palmerston learned of it on 10 July 1833, he sent a letter ordering Ponsonby to fight for an 
abrogation of the agreement.  Unkiar Skelessi was officially objected to by Britain on 14 August 
1833.147 At that time the French protested against the Treaty as well. At the same time Ahmet 
Fevzi Pasha, the Ottoman ambassador in Petersburg, sent a report to Istanbul. In this report he 
mentioned that he met with Orlov and the Prime Minister Teselrod, and they said that the French 
and British fleets would not dare to enter into the Straits. If they did venture to do this, they 
could see that it might cause war in Europe. Nevertheless, the Tsar ordered his army to be ready 
for war.148 With this order the Tsar showed his resolution, to France and Britain, to protect 
Russia’s interests. Austria did not like the treaty either, but owing to the conditions in Europe 
after the liberalist movements in 1830 Metternich, Austrian Foreign Minister, felt that he had to 
act in accordance with Russia.149 However, at least he made the treaty of Muchengratsz in 
September 1833 to thwart Russia’s big plans and he wanted to collaborate as much as he 
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could.150 According to this agreement, Prussia, Austria, and Russia would prevent Mehmed Ali 
fighting against the Ottoman Empire; otherwise if they could not hinder the collapse of the 
Ottomans they would collaborate over the Ottoman lands.151  
On the other hand, after the British and French protested against the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, 
the Ottoman government made a statement. They said that this agreement was not harmful to any 
other state, it was a beneficial treaty for the Ottoman Empire, and the Empire was free to make 
an agreement with any other country.152 In this respect, it can be surmised that the Ottomans 
were seeking some support for their policy. Although this is not stated in secondary sources, 
there is some evidence in the Ottoman document for it. According to this document, a previous 
ambassador “the Ottoman friendly” Istrankfort sent a letter to British translator Saper about the 
rightness and success of the Ottoman policy in this respect. 153 However, Palmerston and British 
diplomats recognized the dangers of Unkiar Skelessi and Ponsonby demanded a meeting to 
discuss the situation. The reason for the treaty was explained to the British Ambassador by the 
Ottoman government.154 
In this part, it can be said that the secret article was extremely important. Despite the Sultan’s 
explanation to Ponsonby of the reasons for the treaty, Palmerston`s anxiety turned a dread after 
he learned the secret article of the treaty. The secret article was not made known for quite some 
time. However according to the Ottoman bureaucrats, the British and French diplomats sensed 
the possibility of the existence a secret article, and sent several diplomatic notes to find out about 
it.155 Eventually the Ottoman government had to make an announcement, and with this 
announcement Palmerston understood more clearly the great danger of Unkiar Skelessi. As 
Bailey pointed out about Palmerston`s appreciation of his policy until Unkiar Skelessi: 
 “Palmerston`s inactivity in Mediterranean affairs in the previous two years, due in part to the fact 
that he had not yet fully comprehended the magnitude of his tasks, made it possible for France to 
make extensive gains in Northern Africa, and Russia to extend her influence over the coveted 
Straits, gains which seriously threatened the new route to India.”156  
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In addition to this, the majority of the British public began to hate the Russians and Mehmed Ali. 
On this topic Anderson indicates: 
“The crisis of 1832-33 and the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi did not immediately arouse as much 
attention in the British press and parliament as might have been expected. But from the summer of 
1833 onwards it became increasingly common for British journalists and pamphleteers to 
denounce Russia as a threat to the independence and existence of the Ottoman Empire (as a few of 
them had been doing in the 1820s and even earlier); and there was now a large reservoir of 
Russophobe feeling in Britain to which writing of this kind could appeal. Russia by contrast was 
remote, strange and little-known; she was frightening in a way that no other European state could 
be. Hostility to Russia, moreover, carried with it hostility to Mohammed Ali, the man whose 
ambitions had brought a Russian army to the Straits and seemed to have established a Russian 
protectorate in Constantinople.”157     
 
As Anderson mentioned, at first the British Parliament was slow to react to the Treaty of Unkiar 
Skelessi. An example of this can be seen in Baker’s article on the subject. He states: 
“Palmerston wrote to William Temple on 8 October 1833, “The Cabinet meet the 3rd November, 
and then we must consider this Eastern Question, and give instructions about it” They are 
significant because they are the first expression of the government’s views on British interests in 
the Levant after the alarming events of 1833”158   
 
The most alarming part for Britain and France was the secret article. In this article was 
mentioned that in the case of any threat against Russia, the Ottomans would close the straits 
against all other state`s fleet.159 It can be understood from this secret article that the Russian 
plans for domination in the straits had been realized with Unkiar Skelessi. However, according to 
Anderson, this comment of Palmerston’s was a misconception. Anderson writes this about it: 
“But there was nothing in the terms of the treaty to which the western powers could legitimately 
object. Nevertheless there were widespread fears in Western Europe that, while barring other 
navies from the Straits it gave that of Russia free passage through them. Palmerston himself 
appears to have believed this; but the belief was false.”160 
In fact, Anderson’s opinion appears to be a misevaluation. The reason for this can be understood 
from Goryanof’s comment. He stated, based on the Russian documents that in case of any war 
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the strait would be closed against all foreign fleets apart from the Russian fleets. This meant that 
when any battle happened the British Fleet could not attack Russia. However, the Russian policy 
makers wanted to be able to attack the British Fleet. The Russian Fleet in any war had the right 
to use the Straits to attack the British Fleet, due to the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi.161     
Of course, both British and French sides were not unresponsive to the threat they perceived. 
After learning of the secret article, the French and British armies were seen around the Bozcaada, 
Tenedos, which was close the Dardanelles Strait, to threaten both states, Ottoman and Russia. 
Orlov sent a letter about this to Potnef, the Russian Ambassador. Russian support to the 
Ottomans would continue.162 In addition, Ponsonby sent a diplomatic note and asked the 
Ottoman governments on 30 January 1833, whether in the event of the outbreak of war between 
Britain and Russia, they would open the straits for Britain or not.163 When the British 
Ambassador did not receive an answer, he asked the same question again on 21 February 1834 
and this time emphasized that this question was so simple that the Sultan should have given a 
clear answer to it bearing in mind the Anglo-Ottoman friendship.164 It can be understood in the 
light of these diplomatic notes that the Ottoman government was trying to evade answering this 
question. When analysing this situation in the light of the above events, it shows that although he 
had made the treaty with Russia, the Sultan probably wanted to avoid losing the friendship of 
Britain in the future because he was aware of the Tsar`s possible plans, and the treaty could be 
enough to acquire the friendship of the Britain because of the fear of the British politicians of the 
Russian danger in the Ottoman lands. As will be seen in the following chapters, after the Treaty 
of Unkiar Skelessi a new term would begin in the Anglo-Ottoman relationship. This situation can 
be given as evidence of the diplomatic success of Mahmud. As mentioned above, the Ottomans 
wanted to ally with Britain at the beginning of the Mehmed Ali Crisis but Palmerston did not 
realize the importance of the Ottoman Empire in the early years of his career. In fact, as it will be 
seen in the next chapter, Palmerston soon noticed his grave error in leaving the Ottomans alone 
with Russia.  
As a result of all above diplomatic processes Palmerston made a big decision. He understood 
well that the great hazards of Unkiar Skelessi would be a big problem, in terms of the British 
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interest in the region. He believed this danger would continue until the treaty was abolished. 
Moreover, as will be seen in the next chapters, Mehmed Ali would begin to damage Britain’s 
economic interests. There were many evidences of this and they will be examined in detail in the 
following chapters but one example can be given here. In 1834, Mehmed Ali would prohibit 
Britain’s silk and cereals commerce.165 This situation would negatively affect Britain, which 
needed raw material for its developed industry. It seems likely that Britain wanted the abolition 
of the treaty not only for diplomatic and political reasons but also to promote its economic 
interests in the Ottoman Empire. As will be discussed in the next chapters this would lead to 
good relationship between Britain and the Ottoman Empire. 
At the same time, Mahmud was trying to make some important reforms and Russian hegemony 
might have prevented these reforms.166 Also Palmerston realised that all these negative events 
were based on one factor: ‘the weakness’ of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the Ottomans must 
have economically, diplomatically, and military supported.167 Only with this reform programme, 
would the Ottomans be rescued from Russian domination. This British policy would continue 
until the Congrees of Berlin, 1878.  After much effort the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was 
overruled with treaty of London in 1841. In this respect, the important question must be asked: 
which diplomatic events would have to have been seen in those 8 years to convert Palmerston`s 
failure in 1833 to a success in 1841? Other significant question should be asked that what was 
the role of Mahmud and his diplomats in this success story? After Unkiar Skelessi, the change of 
Palmerston’s viewpoint to favour the Ottomans would lead to a watershed in the Anglo-Ottoman 
relationship. In terms of their economy it took the Treaty of Balta Limani between both countries 
in 1838. This treaty would change the whole Ottoman economic structure completely. In respect 
of the political relation as mentioned above, Mahmud really wanted to extricate the country from 
these difficult conditions, as he realised that unless the Empire was strengthened in every way, it 
would be impossible for the Empire to continue its existence autonomously. Consequently, the 
big reform period of Westernization and modernization within the Empire would be initiated in 
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the 1830s. Thanks to this reform period, the Empire that was doomed to die because it was 
defeated by its own governor would maintain its life for almost one hundred years more. The 
Ottoman government used the contention between European Powers well in the following years. 
Of course, after the change in the British Policy, the influence of Britain would appear but this 
reform period cannot be defined just as a British success. As it will be examined in the next 
chapters, Mahmud had been striving to solve the problems of the Empire since the 1820s. In 
short, this period 1832–1839, has a long and interesting part to play in the Anglo-Ottoman 
relationship. All these exciting processes will be examined in detail in the following chapters in 
the light of the Ottoman documents.  
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                                                              CHAPTER TWO 
The Striking Effects of Russian Military Presence in Istanbul during the Mehmed Ali 
Problem 
 
There is an historical argument - widely accepted in literature by both Turkish and Western 
scholars as irrefutable truth - that when Mahmud II learned that the British Government had 
rejected his request for a military alliance to help combat his rebel governor, he had no other 
choice than to invite Russian military power to the Bosporus. Although this opinion has received 
wide acceptance, the Ottoman documents suggest a more complex story. We need to take into 
account Mahmud’s record as a ruler. The Sultan had confronted two of his Empire’s gravest 
issues; problems which had not been overcome by his predecessors for the past three centuries: 
firstly that fact that the rebel governors would not accept the central authority of the Sultan and 
the Janissaries, (part of the military power of the Ottomans); and secondly, that whenever these 
governors’ requests were rejected, they would damage the political authority of the Sultans by 
way of instigating rebellions. Mahmud II had succeeded in addressing these two vital concerns 
within less than twenty years. The argument which will be advanced here is that Mahmud also 
had a master-plan to deal with the third great problem confronting his Empire – the threat from 
Russia. That plan involved getting the British to conclude a military alliance with him. The 
intention here is not to contest the narrative which says that when this failed, he had to appeal to 
the Russians; it is, rather, to suggest that even when he did this, Mahmud saw it as another way 
of getting the British on to his side; the Russian alliance was a dangerous gamble by a man with 
a plan – not an act of desperation by a Sultan who had run out of ideas. This, it is argued, is 
much more in line with what we know of Mahmud as an energetic Sultan; when one route to his 
goal failed, he did not abandon the goal, he found another route to it. 
           
As is well known, Mehmed Ali Pasha’s rebellion started when his army attacked the Ottoman 
Army in Syria in the autumn of 1831. The first serious battle between the Sultan`s army and 
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Mehmed Ali`s army occurred on 14 April 1832. This battle did not last very long, but it was 
clear that the Egyptian Army was better prepared than the Ottoman Army. After the Syrian 
public realised this difference between the armies’ strength, they began to support Ibrahim 
Pasha.168  Next, the Egyptian army marched swiftly into the Ottoman lands. It occupied Akka on 
27 May; Damascus on 16 June; and Aleppo on 15 July 1832. This was most alarming for the 
Sultan and also for the European Powers. Mahmud II began to think that he should have taken 
the threat more seriously. So he sent a new army with Hussein Pasha as its Commander, but on 
29 July 1832, this army also was defeated by Ibrahim Pasha at Hums, and almost destroyed.169 
With this victory, the Egyptian Army moved toward Anatolia, and the Ottoman government 
decided to send its last and biggest army to Konya, a city in middle of Anatolia.170 As Mahmud 
II prepared to send his military forces against Ibrahim Pasha, he knew this was the last chance 
the Ottomans had to stop Ibrahim Pasha and his army.171 This final battle, in which the Egyptian 
army defeated the Ottomans, occurred at Konya on 21 December 1832. However, before this 
vital battle, Mahmud II realised the weakness of his army, and started to seek a diplomatic 
solution to overcome the problem while incurring minimal damage to the Empire. One of the 
most significant signs that the Sultan was seeking a diplomatic solution to the Mehmed Ali 
problem was his sending of Namık Pasha to London, to negotiate for an Anglo-Ottoman military 
alliance before the last battle with Mehmed Ali’s army in Konya. This demarche is very 
important because it illustrates well that deciding to seek another power’s cooperation against the 
enemy before a battle is very different to asking in desperation as a last solution afterwards. On 
the contrary, this assignment of Namık Pasha’s shows that Sultan Mahmud II had already started 
to seek a way to overcome this crisis much earlier than the last battle in Konya. 
Consequently, the mission and visit of Namık Pasha should be examined in detail to properly 
understand the Sultan’s diplomatic approach. A full airing of this material is vital since Namık 
Pasha’s mission, his reports, and the Sultan’s return instructions have been either ignored, or 
downplayed in all the English historical accounts. However, as an example of Ottoman 
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diplomatic endeavours during hard times, this correspondence between the Sultan and the Pasha 
should be analyzed extensively. But such correspondence is only one component of the wider 
perspective. When all the pieces are assembled, the big picture becomes clear. This big picture is 
that of Ottoman diplomatic capability and it is in respect of this ability that this thesis, by using 
the Ottoman documents, will try to join the component parts together to reveal the entire 
perspective.            
The narrative thus begins with the instructions given to the Pasha by the Sultan.172 As mentioned 
above, Mahmud II appointed Namık Pasha to his mission before the great battle in Konya on 21 
December 1832. The most important thing to note here is the precise instructions given by the 
Sultan. These are important because they are based on the primary sources, which will help us to 
understand the diplomacy of the Ottomans at that time.  
First of all, a significant feature is the instruction’s style of discourse. This style is not that of a 
powerless Empire. Mahmud II gave orders to Namık Pasha that if the Pasha was unsuccessful in 
his quest to form a military alliance with Britain, this failure would damage the Ottoman image 
in the diplomatic arena. Therefore, in the case of a British rejection of the military alliance 
against Mehmed Ali, the Pasha should at least negotiate for some British military support in the 
form of mariners, ammunition and military officers. This order shows very well that the Sultan 
was still concerned about the Ottoman’s diplomatic image, despite all the difficulties and defeats 
from Mehmed Ali. However, the importance of making a military alliance against Mehmed Ali 
was again impressed upon Namık Pasha, and the first and most important aim of this mission 
was the creation of the Anglo-Ottoman alliance. Despite acknowledging the possibility that the 
British might reject the Ottoman request, the document suggests that the Sultan was optimistic 
about the chances of an alliance; in this he turned out to be wrong. Mahmud was calculating the 
geo-politics of the Near East; what he had not taken into account was the internal politics of the 
Whig Government of Lord Grey. 
Namık Pasha arrived in London in early December, 1832, and was accorded a warm welcome 
from senior politics and King William IV; he was even invited to the Palace for three days.173 
Palmerston accompanied the Pasha to the Palace: the third day was the Queen’s birthday,174 but 
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there was not enough time for a long delay because Ibrahim Pasha was moving quickly across 
Anatolia, and the Sultan was impatient to learn the outcome of Namık Pasha’s meetings.175 
However, despite all Namık Pasha’s efforts, Britain had other problems, such as the Belgian and 
Portuguese problem, which required the full resources of the British navy; the Government was 
also fully-occupied with the Reform Bill debates; consequently the British Cabinet refused the 
Sultan’s request.  At that time, the British public was insufficiently alert to the importance the 
Ottoman lands held for British interests. Although the Cabinet had turned down his proposal, 
Namık Pasha still had something important to indicate to the Sultan so he sent a critically 
important report from London in December.176 He therein opined that leaving London would be 
the most suitable course of action because there was nothing further he could do in London at 
that time. But, from his report on his final conversation with Palmerston, it was evident that the 
Foreign Secretary was not happy with the Cabinet’s decision. Palmerston had confided that he 
regretted that the British Cabinet could not lend military assistance to the Empire at that time. 
Namık Pasha had asked him to keep the Cabinet’s decision secret and not inform any other 
European Powers since news of this decision would spur the rebel governor and his supporters 
on in their destructive efforts against central government. Additionally, Namık Pasha requested 
that Palmerston conceal his departure from London for the same reason. It is clear that the Sultan 
was still hoping that bluff, and the possibility of a British alliance would have an effect of 
Mehmed Ali; it would only be when this hope, too, failed, that there would be a resort to Russia. 
What the Ottoman documents reveal is the lengths to which the Sultan was willing to go to try to 
try to secure a diplomatic resolution to the crisis. Even if the British would not lend immediate 
military aid, it was possible that their diplomatic assistance might be useful. 
The Pasha, although disappointed with the British decision, still left the door open for future 
cooperation by emphasising that he appreciated the friendship and hospitality which he had been 
shown. It was clear that the British appreciated the importance of the Ottoman Empire, and that 
they saw Mehmed Ali as a threat to both Empires; but it would only be when the Ottomans had 
failed to deal with the threat that the British would realise that they had underestimated the size 
of the threat. The British expressed their support for the Sultan in his struggle and they agreed 
with Namık Pasha about coercing the other European Powers over hostilities against Mehmed 
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Ali.. Namık Pasha also stated that Palmerston expressed in reply that he was in agreement with 
the decision that the Pasha should go to Istanbul immediately and report to the Sultan about all 
his negotiations in London, and assured him that his departure from London would be kept 
secret. It seems that although the Foreign Minister was not yet strong enough to induce the 
Cabinet to send military support to the Sultan, he did want to show goodwill to Mahmud II 
through Namık Pasha in order to not to cut all ties with the Ottoman Empire. Within this context, 
Palmerston stressed that he considered the Ottoman Empire as an ally, and as such he desired the 
prosperity and smooth running of the country. At the same time he would like her enemies to 
despair and he would not allow any other European Powers to exacerbate the problem by 
assisting Mehmed Ali. He lastly stated that although the Cabinet had not made the decision to 
strike a military alliance with the Empire yet, it did not mean it would be impossible in any 
circumstance. An alliance might well be possible in the advent of more favourable 
circumstances. Palmerston clearly wanted to leave the road open for closer Anglo-Ottoman 
cooperation, and did not want the Cabinet’s decision to close it; but, like the Ottomans, he had 
under-estimated the military power of the Pasha of Egypt.                            
Although they had refused the alliance, three different official letters were sent to Istanbul by 
three different British authorities. The first one was written by the King William IV himself, in 
person. In this letter,177 William IV stated that “he and his public regarded the Sultan’s offer 
highly, but owing to some difficult problems which Britain had to contend with at that time, 
unfortunately, this offer could not currently be accepted”. The King continued by saying, 
“However, this unavoidable rejection did not mean that Britain did not care about this problem 
of the Ottomans’. Quite the contrary, he had appointed Colonel Campbell, who was on duty in 
Colombia as a diplomatic agent, to admonish Mehmed Ali rigorously if he were to break 
negotiations (which had started a short time ago in Kütahya after the battle of Konya) and dared 
to rebel again. Also, the King added that Namık Pasha had performed his mission admirably, but, 
as mentioned, conditions in Britain were currently unfavourable for supporting the Sultan against 
his rebel governor.  
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The second178 and the third179 letters were written by the Prime Minister and the Foreign 
Minister. These letters were similar to the King’s letter. Just like his, they unfortunately had to 
convey that Britain was unable to help the Ottomans, however the Sultan could be sure that the 
British politicians were fully aware the importance of the Ottoman Empire for Britain and in the 
eventuality of any possibility of attack by Mehmed Ali’s army on Istanbul, they would not allow 
the Ottoman Empire to fall into decay. All of this suggested two things to Mahmud: that the 
British would do nothing at this juncture; but that they might yet be driven into the alliance – 
although that might take a dangerous, and difficult line of diplomacy, one which would astonish 
the Sultan’s own advisers with its audacity. 
Sir Charles Webster summed up the Foreign Secretary’s position well: 
“Palmerston was more prescient than his colleagues, but his own conviction was not sufficiently 
strong, his influence in the Cabinet not yet sufficiently powerful to obtain the necessary action. 
From the weakness of these months came a whole series of difficult problems.”180      
 
These difficult problems appeared much earlier for Britain than Palmerston had expected, and 
were in two stages. The first one was the Sultan’s calling the Russian naval power to the 
Bosporus. Calling Russian military power to the Ottoman lands was a surprise development for 
all parties to the problem – even for the Ottoman politicians – since the last war and truce 
between these two regional powers had only just been made three years prior to this invitation to 
the Russian army. In fact, hostility between these two powers in the region had been going on for 
centuries. As Rodkey mentioned; “Russia, since the time of Peter the Great, had been the 
traditional enemy of Turkey”.181 Although, because of this hostility, nobody was expecting this 
surprise move from the Sultan, from an analysis of the Ottoman documents, it can be understood 
that this call was Mahmud’s audacious way of forcing the hand of the British. 
It is easy to see the move for a Russian intervention as a sign of Mahmud’s plight, and there is no 
denying that he needed help badly; but he never saw the resort to Russia as an end in itself, but 
rather as a means to his initial end – a British alliance. In order to fully understand the reason 
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why the Sultan called the Russian army to Istanbul, the orders of the Sultan and the reports of the 
Ottoman statesmen and also the historical developments of the period must be examined in 
detail.  
Mahmud never abandoned the idea of getting the British on his side, he simply tried to find a 
better way of getting them there. He was extremely reluctant to accept Russian help.. 
Goryanof,182 showed that, when the Sultan agreed to talk to General Muravyef, the special 
officer of the Tsar, about Russian military help, the Sultan was initially unwilling to accept it – 
despite the news of Mehmed’s victory at Konya. At this point Mahmud II was still awaiting the 
good news from Namık Pasha in London, and he was still hopeful of an Anglo-Ottoman military 
alliance..It would only be when it became clear that the British could not help him – either 
militarily or diplomatically, that Mahmud would accept Russian help; and even then, only 
because he thought it would force the British to revise their attitude. Mahmud saw the Russian 
offer as a means to this end.  
Mahmud’s plan, audacious as it was, caused a deal of opposition from his advisers. The Minister 
of Defence spearheaded this opposition party.183 Namık Pasha, in his last meeting with 
Palmerston in London, had given this opposition in the Empire as a reason for the necessity of an 
immediate Anglo-Ottoman military alliance because, according to the Pasha, the Minister of 
Defence openly opposed Russian military power in Istanbul, and in addition to this the other 
ministers were extremely perturbed by it.  General Muravyef was surprised at the request from 
the Sultan, because his first offer of Russian military help against Mehmed Ali had just been 
rejected.. As a matter of fact, when the Ottoman documents, which will be examined separately 
in the following parts of the chapter, are analysed, it is clear that the Sultan’s opinion about an 
alliance with Britain did not change but now his aim was to manoeuvre diplomatically to turn 
anti-Ottoman Britain public and government in a pro-Ottoman direction. In order to do this, he 
chose to remind them of the importance of the Ottoman Empire in terms of British self-interests. 
Historical conditions left only one way for the Sultan to succeed in this reminding, and this was 
to frighten the British Public about India, the biggest possession at that time for Britain, by using 
Russia as a weapon. Thereupon, the Russian Navy, which contained nine warships under the 
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command of Admiral Lazaref, arrived in the Bosporus on 8th of February 1833.184 As Mahmud 
had anticipated, the move produced immediate alarm in Britain.  
Palmerston suddenly wanted to meet with Namık Pasha, who was about to leave London, to 
discuss this surprise development. Namık Pasha’s report informed the Sultan that they met in the 
second half of February, 1833,185 Palmerston stated that he had received an official letter from 
Istanbul which said that Orlov, who had just appointed by the Tsar to solve the problem on 
behalf of the Russians, had met with Ibrahim Pasha, who was in Konya with his army at that 
moment. When Orlov related his mission and the instructions of the Tsar about an immediate 
peace agreement, the Pasha said that he was under his father’s authority and awaiting for his 
orders. He also stated that he wanted to make peace with the Sultan and so did his father, a 
governor of the Sultan’s, so his army would be at the service of the Sultan. It was an interesting 
explanation which might be due to two reasons. Either he was trying to gain time, or the sight of 
the Russian warships in Istanbul worried Ibrahim Pasha as well. Since the situation turned out 
like this, it seems that Mahmud II was killing two birds with one stone by using the Russian navy 
in the Bosporus as a trump against both the British public and Mehmed Ali.   Ibrahim Pasha 
added that he had just sent a letter to Istanbul for permission to move his army to Bursa, which 
was very close to Istanbul, since there was a food shortage in Konya so his soldiers were 
suffering difficult conditions there. After including all this information in the letter to 
Palmerston, this insolent behaviour from Ibrahim Pasha and the dangerous results for the Empire 
that could be anticipated if the army moved to Bursa, along with the refusal of the British 
Cabinet to co-operate were given as the reasons for calling the Russian Army to the Bosporus. 
This is compelling evidence revealing the Sultan’s plan, which still aimed to make an alliance 
with Britain by alarming them with the presence of Russian power in the region. Clearly, the 
Sultan was indicating to Palmerston that if Britain accepted the alliance he would not need to call 
the Russian Navy. Then, as if Namık Pasha had been waiting for this moment, after Palmerston’s 
words, he again put his request for joint military action against Ibrahim Pasha’s army. However, 
Palmerston only replied that they had sent Colonel Campbell to Alexandria to negotiate with 
Mehmed Ali and they were still waiting for his news. The problem was that despite realising the 
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dangers to be apprehended from Russia getting a stranglehold on the Sultan, Palmerston still had 
no military forces he could use; he also wondered whether it would actually be necessary.  
Palmerston’s views on Mehmed Ali were at one with those of the Sultan, and he clearly saw the 
dangers of an Ottoman/Russian alliance: 
“I am convinced that it is for the general interest of Europe that Mehmed should derive as little 
benefit as possible from his conquest and the less he gets in Syria, the better- & for this reason, 
because if he gets much then the Sultan is thrown permanently into the hands of Russia.”186 
 
However, nobody, including Palmerston, was aware that calling the Russian army was a part of 
an overall strategy and as described in the following chapter, the Sultan had already started to 
seek ways of getting rid of the Russians.187                  
As a further repercussion, this arrival of the Russian Navy woke up the two sleeping giants, 
France and Britain. In response, Namık Pasha sent a report from London which indicated that 
Britain and France had started to cooperate over the removal of the Russian Navy from the 
Bosporus.188 It was an interesting development because up until the Russian Navy was seen in 
the Bosporus, Britain and France were rivals in the Mediterranean. The Sultan’s plan seems to 
transform the two competitors into two allies  Given the rivalry between France and Britain in 
the Near East, it would prove more difficult than Mahmud had anticipated to create an anti-
Russian coalition, and this would not happen until long after his death; but his instinct was not 
wrong. This situation shows that calling the Russian Navy not only influenced Mehmed Ali but 
also caused some significant changes in the European diplomatic arena. Brown analysed the 
reasons for the transformation of Britain’s relations with France succinctly in his book about 
Palmerston.189 According to him Palmerston initially attempted to converge with Metternich of 
Austria, over the Mehmed Ali Problem. However, over time, he began to doubt the sincerity of 
Metternich’s intentions with regard to the Ottoman Empire.     
In reality, the Sultan and the Ottoman statesmen disapproved of this cooperation, since France 
had been supporting Mehmed Ali for a long time. They also remembered the French occupation 
of Algeria in 1830. There was somebody else who did not like French cooperation with Britain 
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as well - Metternich, the famous Foreign Minister of the Austrian Empire. There is an interesting 
Ottoman document about this topic.190 It is interesting since it explains many details of Austrian-
Ottoman relations related to the Mehmed Ali Problem. The document indicates that the chief 
translator of the Austrian Empire came to the Foreign Minister of the Ottoman Empire and 
explained that he had received a letter from Metternich. Metternich stated in the letter that a 
French official from the French Foreign Ministry, Taliran, met Palmerston and negotiated with 
him about the Anglo-French cooperation on the Mehmed Ali problem. However, Metternich 
ordered the ambassador in London to recommend Namık Pasha to be firm in insisting on only 
British military help. Metternich was suggesting to the Ottomans that France should not be 
incorporated in the problem and they should only trust Britain. He also even mentioned that he 
sent a Colonel, (the Ottoman document says his name was Birukes) just as Britain had sent 
Colonel Campbell, and he was to act with Campbell. But Palmerston, who did not trust the 
Austrian, could not be sure about Metternich’s good intentions. He was in a dilemma whether to 
join forces with Metternich to solve the Mehmed Ali problem. Part of him was optimistic and 
another part pessimistic. David Brown describes two different sides of Palmerston’s thinking 
well in his book about him. Part of him wanted very much to cooperate with the Austrian Empire 
to solve the Eastern problem. According to Brown, Palmerston was worried about the support the 
French were giving to Mehmed Ali and about the latest intimacy between the Ottomans and the 
Russians owing to the Sultan’s call.191  Therefore, primarily, the solution, to Palmerston, seemed 
to be to cooperate with Metternich. As mentioned above through the Ottoman document, 
Metternich at first responded in a positive way towards this desire of Palmerston’s and suggested 
to Namık Pasha that he insist upon British military help. Meanwhile, whilst this complicated 
diplomatic interaction was going on there was a surprise development. The French prime 
minister announced to the Austrian ambassador in Paris that they had a satisfactory solution for 
the Ottomans and he asked whether the Austrian Empire would like to join them or not.192 The 
ambassador responded that he did not have any instructions pertaining to this topic so he would 
need to write and ask the opinion of his government. This announcement of France’s has not 
been mentioned in the standard historical literature on this subject. Afterwards, Metternich 
indicated to France that he kept informed from his ambassador, and first he needed to learn what 
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this solution of France’s was, and then he could make a decision. It seems that this was an 
attempt by Metternich to divert France, since at the same time he also suggested secretly to the 
Ottoman diplomats that they should not openly reject the French offer at first, and only after a 
while they should explain the negative answer to this offer.193  
The British and the French had not expected the Sultan to call in the Russians. The Russians 
were the hereditary enemy of the Ottoman Empire, and the presence of the Russian Navy in the 
region was an extremely dangerous situation in terms of British interests in India and French 
power in the Mediterranean. In fact, neither were any Ottoman statesmen expecting it, as the 
Russians were the biggest enemy in the majority of Muslims’ view.  
The British public was in a state of panic after the Russian Fleet was seen in the Bosporus. The 
Sultan’s plan seemed to be working. The most important indicator of this was William IV’s 
actions. When the Russian warships arrived, Namık Pasha was still in London. When the Pasha 
went to the Palace for the last time, the King told the Pasha that he did not approve of any 
Ottoman-Russian alliance because there was no benefit for the Ottomans in associating with the 
Russians and also the Russian Empire was an enemy both to the Ottoman Empire and to Britain. 
Moreover, according to the King, Russia’s only aim was to find a route to India, a British 
country.194 Interestingly, the King did not mention anything about India when he first met Namık 
Pasha. This shows that the Russian danger reminded the King of the vital importance of the 
Ottoman Empire to Britain and the British Public.  
Namık Pasha was a shrewd ambassador. He replied to the King that he was very well aware that 
the Russian Empire had been a great enemy of the Ottoman Empire for a long time, but when the 
Tsar first offered the Sultan Russian help against Mehmed Ali, the Sultan had not accepted this 
offer and instead sent his ambassador to London for the Anglo-Ottoman military alliance. 
According to the Pasha, this was strong evidence of the Sultan’s enduring trust in Britain. 
Nevertheless, when Britain rejected this offer from the Sultan, only then was the proposal of the 
Tsar accepted.195 The Pasha was attempting to show the great mistake the British Cabinet made 
in their rejection, by using the Russian danger to illustrate British advantages. In fact, there could 
have been no better time than that one to play the trump card for the military alliance.   
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However, despite all the efforts of Britain and France, the Russian warships remained in the 
Bosporus for a further four months. After a while, the Sultan requested 30,000 soldiers, 6000 
cavalry, and 110 troops of cannon from the Tsar,196 in addition to the Russian warships, because 
he was not pleased with Britain’s continuing position after his surprise diplomatic manoeuvre. 
From the Ottomans’ point of view, the only action of British politicians was merely to pontificate 
without taking any decisive action. The Ottoman government stated that they did not just want to 
hear words about this problem; something had to be done, and until Ibrahim Pasha went back to 
Egypt, the Russian army would stay in Istanbul.197 The reason for the Sultan’s dissatisfaction 
was that despite all the Ottoman politicians’ efforts to strike a military alliance with Britain using 
the Russian trump; it seems that Palmerston could not be convinced of the necessity for full 
support of the Ottomans in the time it took between the Russian military landing and the Treaty 
of Unkiar Skelessi. This treaty was to be the biggest manoeuvre Mahmud II made in order to 
realise his goal of an Anglo-Ottoman military alliance. It would be only when the Treaty of 
Unkiar Skelessi was revealed that Palmerston would realise the depth of the defeat British 
interests had suffered; he would spend many years trying to put right what he later saw as his 
greatest mistake. As Baker put it: 
“The truth seems to be that the swift succession of events in the Near East caught Palmerston 
preoccupied, unprepared, and belated. There is a thinly veiled admission of this in the sentence, 
‘Preparations, however, have been made, and are still making, to enable H.M. Gov’t. to deal with 
future circumstances according to the view which may be taken of the exigencies of  the 
moment’.”198  
 
 
Meanwhile, news of the Russian warships in the Bosporus had the same impact on the French 
public as it did upon the British public, so France retreated somewhat from supporting Mehmed 
Ali, as had been their practice since the beginning of his rebellion. This impact is seen in an 
Ottoman document wherein it was stated that the French Ambassador came to the Sultan and the 
Russian Ambassador to say how he was sorry about the French support to Mehmed Ali that had 
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been given from the outset.199 It was also stated in the same document that this apology from the 
French ambassador was natural because France would never dare to challenge to the Russian 
army which had 400.000 soldiers. As can be understood from this statement, the Sultan also was 
attempting to utilise his ‘Russian trump’ diplomatically against his other enemies.   
In point of fact, the appearance of the Russian army in İstanbul did enhance the French and 
British efforts to induce Mehmed Ali to recall his army from Anatolia back to Egypt. Baron 
Roussin, who had been assigned to this mission in February,200 acted on behalf of France, and as 
mentioned above, Colonel Campbell acted on behalf of Britain, in prevailing upon Mehmed Ali. 
On this topic, The Foreign Minister of the Ottoman Empire met the British Ambassador, 
Ponsonby. Ponsonby from the outset indicated that Britain desired the maintenance of the 
territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. He told him that in order to support this policy, 
Britain had assigned Colonel Campbell with only one mission; which was the persuasion of 
Mehmed Ali to re-acknowledge his subservience to the central government, Istanbul.201 After 
these words, Ponsonby asked whether the Russian warships would leave the Bosporus or not. In 
response to the question the Minister stated that it was certain that the Russian warships would 
leave Istanbul soon, however, they did not know if the weather conditions were suitable for their 
leaving at that moment or not. These words seem to indicate that the Minister was trying to gain 
some time. The Sultan was probably pursuing the progress of his plan and waiting for diplomatic 
conditions to take shape in favour of the Empire. Only then he would expel the Russian trump 
from Istanbul, if, of course, he could.   
 
Moreover, the Minister mentioned to Ponsonby, in the same meeting, about how aggressively the 
French Ambassador, Roussin, had behaved over the Russian warships. Interestingly, he was 
stating that the Russian fleet staying in Istanbul any longer was a matter of dishonour for France; 
presumably this was the justification for his undiplomatic behaviour. Roussin’s rather aggressive 
attitude prompted the Minister to express his concerns over any possible action he might 
subsequently take, which might upset the diplomatic balance in the region. He was worried about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199	  BOA, File No: 369 Document No: 20346.	  
200	  Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanlı Tarihi, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2007), p. 135.	  
201	  BOA, File No: 365 Document No: 20198.	  
	  
61 
	  
	  
	  
French policies related to the Mehmed Ali problem because the French diplomats had gone so 
far as to make threats in a situation intended for negotiation. As can be seen in one Ottoman 
Document, the French diplomats threatened the Ottoman statesmen that they would continue to 
support Mehmed Ali and moreover encourage the expansion of the boundaries of Greece (which 
country had just gained independence from the Ottoman Empire) if the Ottoman Empire were to 
continue to allow the Russian warships to stay in the Bosporus.202 Concerning this, the Minister 
requested Ponsonby to talk to Roussin in order to discourage him from further aggressive 
behaviour which ran contrary to the rules of diplomacy. Ponsonby agreed to fulfil this request 
from the Minister.203 All these documents are evidence that the Ottoman statesmen were trying 
to resolve to problem in a diplomatic way by following the Sultan’s instructions. Sometimes they 
attempted to use Britain against France, as happened in this example, sometimes they tried to use 
Russia against all the powers in this diplomatic struggle including Mehmed Ali. In fact, they had 
to, since the Empire was in very difficult circumstances both economically and militarily and 
therefore the sole and exclusive remedy for the Empire seemed to be to use diplomacy.  
 
Findley details admirably, in his masterful publication about administrative reform in the 
Ottoman Empire, this necessity of using diplomacy to solve the Empire’s problems. He stated 
that the idea was widely acknowledged daily in the Ottoman Empire, that the survival of the 
Empire was not only dependent on improving her military power but also, more importantly, in 
the long term, depended on success in reaching her diplomatic aims with respect to the other 
European Powers, through her diplomatic ability. He indicates Uriel Heyd’s opinion that the 
Ottoman statesmen realised the high importance of using diplomacy as early as 1829 and this 
was one of the results of Treaty of Adrianople. In conclusion Findley asserts that the joint 
intervention of the European Powers which saved the Ottoman Empire’s life was evidence of this 
realisation.204 These words of Findley’s elevate the importance of the thesis since this study is a 
very tangible and visible example of the Ottomans’ reliance upon diplomacy during the Mehmed 
Ali Crisis.         
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When considered from this point of view the Ottoman diplomats’ level of capability in using 
diplomacy would shape the Empire’s destiny. Indeed, the Ottomans had successfully coexisted 
with the other powers in the region since the second half of the fourteenth century, and this had 
increased their diplomatic skills but they only had not needed to use this ability because of their 
strong economic and military position. In other words they had used their strong economic and 
military system to maintain their position with other powers in the region for centuries but this 
time, in the nineteenth century, they were urgently in need of diplomacy to maintain the 
territorial integrity of the Empire. Diplomacy was needed to preclude the extravagances of the 
French diplomats. In spite of the assent of Ponsonby in warning Roussin, the Sultan was cautious 
and ordered to the Ottoman statesmen that, 
“although it is clear that France would not do anything to the detriment of Ottoman interests, 
French diplomacy in Istanbul should be pursued very carefully to avoid the eventuality of the 
French acting in accordance with their stated policies.”205  
 
As well as these measures taken on account of France, the Sultan and his officials also sought to 
thoroughly consider every diplomatic angle. So the Foreign Minister gave orders to the other 
diplomats of the Empire that they should be careful to not to cut all ties with France.206  
Meanwhile, the Tsar mobilized against pressure from the French over the Ottomans. He 
appointed Orlov instead of Butenev to Istanbul as an ambassador. Orlov was endowed with 
massive authority. Mavroyeni, the Ottoman lieutenant ambassador to Vienna, reported from 
London that he met with Delyot, the Russian ambassador to London, in Buckingham Palace. The 
ambassador indicated that Butenev was very young to be directing the Russian Navy and army in 
Istanbul so the Tsar appointed Orlov, who departed from Petersburg on 9 April 1833, with 
special authority to set the things right in Istanbul. He also mentioned that this appointment was 
a goodwill gesture from the Tsar to the Sultan and so he hoped that the Sultan and the Ottoman 
statesmen would be pleased with this effort of the Tsar’s.207 Goryanof stated, on the instructions 
of the Tsar that Orlov had been charged with preventing the French from applying pressure in 
Istanbul.208 As has already been covered previously, the Sultan’s plan had started to work 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205	  BOA, File No: 365 Document No: 20168.	  
206	  BOA, File No: 365 Document No: 20168.	  
207	  BOA, File No: 350 Document No: 19814.	  
208 Goryanof, Rus Arşiv Belgelerine Göre Boğazlar ve Şark Meselesi, p. 89. 	  
63 
	  
	  
	  
because after the appearance of the Russian warships and soldiers, King William IV had begun 
to be more concerned about the Mehmed Ali Problem because of the British interests in the 
region. The King negotiated with Mavroyeni over this on the same day he met with the Russian 
ambassador in the Palace. William IV asked his opinions about whether there was a possibility of 
the Sultan and Mehmed Ali reaching an agreement. The lieutenant ambassador answered that he 
was sure that Mehmed Ali would accept the Sultan’s conditions since he had already yielded 
more than he had expected. Mavroyeni also informed the King that he would send a report to 
Istanbul about his negotiations in the Palace. When the King heard this, he wanted him to 
indicate to the Sultan that there was no need to continue Orlov’s mission any more. Furthermore, 
he appointed Admiral Malcolm as Commander to the British Navy presence in the 
Mediterranean and more importantly, gave orders that he was to act in favour of the Ottoman 
interests. In addition to this, the King stated that Colonel Campbell reported to him from 
Alexandria that he met with Mehmed Ali, and the Pasha had given him a warm welcome. He 
relayed to Mehmed Ali the King’s instructions about ending this rebellion against the Sultan 
immediately and reaccepting his sovereignty. In response the Pasha interestingly stated that as a 
matter of fact he had never thought to step outside of the sovereignty of the Sultan and had 
always accepted him as his patron.209 Mehmed Ali was either mocking both the King and the 
Sultan or was overcome with fear as a result of the Russian military presence in Istanbul and the 
British and French diplomatic pressure.  
The same Britain which had done nothing except murmur some placatory words when Namık 
Pasha asked for a military alliance at the most critical juncture, was now volunteering to assist 
the Ottomans. When analysing this alteration of the British policies related to the Ottomans in 
the light of the main argument of this chapter, the reason for this change seems to be due to the 
emotions stirred in the British public about the British interests in the region by the Sultan with 
his risky plan of calling Russian military power to the Bosporus. Moreover, this alteration took 
place very rapidly, as the reversal of policy had taken only two months to occur, from February 
to April. The meeting in the Palace was an important sign, and serves as an excellent example of 
this transformation in British policies towards the Ottoman Empire because all the British 
politicians Mavroyeni had met in the Palace had changed their minds in respect to the Ottomans 
and now leaned towards sending military help. The most important of these were, William IV., 
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The Prime Minister Lord Grey, and the Foreign Minister Palmerston. These people were now 
giving their positive opinions about aiding the Ottoman Empire against her enemies in the region 
and they were taking a position most emphatically in favour of the Ottomans, contrary to the 
February meetings with Namık Pasha. In this respect, the King announced that;  
 
 
“when considering the words of Mehmed Ali, spoken to Colonel Campbell, there was no need for 
Russian military power to stay in Istanbul anymore and therefore it will be our auspicial decision 
to resend the Russians from the Ottoman lands because if the Sultan does not do it, this situation 
will be a point of contention among the powers in the region and this would damage the Ottoman 
interests.”210  
 
After these words, the King addressed a vital topic which was to be on the agenda of the Anglo-
Ottoman relationship in the following decades. He expressed that; 
 “The Sultan should make required reforms in the finance and administration system immediately 
after making an agreement with Mehmed Ali. Otherwise, without these vital reforms, I am afraid to 
express that the Ottoman Empire will very soon be fragmentized by Russia and other enemies of the 
Empire.”211  
These words of the King are quite interesting because, as it is examined in the following 
chapters, the Sultan and his best statesman and diplomat Mustafa Reşid would determine their 
policies concerning the system’s finance and administration reforms. That means the door, which 
was opened by the Sultan’s Russian ‘trump’ against the British public to better facilitate a 
military alliance, had turned in time into an administrative and financial cooperation in order to 
maintain the Empire and also allow it to escape from Russian influence in Istanbul. This 
cooperation and reform program would be actualised with the Treaty of Balta Limani, 1838, for 
the finance system and with the rescript of Gülhane, 1839, for the administrative system. All 
these reforms were connected to the improvement in the Anglo-Ottoman relationship with the 
Sultan’s and his statesmen’s efforts to win over the King and his statesmen to their side in view 
of the Mehmed Ali Problem. Thus, it would be fair to say that these reform programmes, aimed 
at releasing the Empire from the difficulties with Western methods, could be viewed as being a 
further level of the Unkiar Skelessi operation; this point of view will be examined in great depth 
in the following chapters.  
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The other important character among the British politicians, who had changed their opinions 
about the Ottoman Empire with the emergent Russian danger in Istanbul, was the Prime 
Minister, Lord Grey. He was in the palace on that day and he too talked to Mavroyeni about the 
Mehmed Ali problem. Like the King, he too stated that he was sure Mehmed Ali was content 
with his concessions from the Sultan in the Kütahya negotiations. Therefore, he would like to 
express in private that the Russian Navy, (which was, according to the Prime Minister, currently 
doing some research related to defence strategies in the Mediterranean Straits), should leave the 
Ottoman lands immediately, since any delay over this necessary decision would cause French 
hostility which was bound to damage the Empire. In this respect he added that he would like to 
assure the Sultan that the British government did not want any conflict between the Ottoman 
Empire and France since they would like to be beneficial to the Empire.212 Lord Grey was not 
satisfied with only these words to show his government’s inclination to aid the Ottomans against 
Mehmed Ali and the Russian danger in Istanbul and he added, in order to reassure the Sultan that 
the new commander to the British Navy Power in the Mediterranean, Admiral Malcolm, would 
depart from Malta tomorrow. This British Navy Power would act on behalf of Ottoman interests 
and wherever it needed to go for these interests, for example, to Alexandria or to anywhere in the 
Mediterranean it would go. When analysing the Prime Minister’s words, no evidence could be as 
strong as these to support the main argument of this chapter; that the Sultan’s plan had started to 
work since the head of the British government indicated that the British Navy power- which only 
fifty days ago had no time to be interested in Ottoman problems - would act on behalf of 
Ottoman interests. Moreover, Lord Grey relayed this development to Colonel Campbell, who 
was negotiating with Mehmed Ali in Alexandria at that time, and the Colonel reported from 
Egypt that Mehmed Ali did not expect the British government to support the Sultan. When he 
heard that the British government had decided in favour of the Ottoman central government, the 
Pasha was extremely surprised since he was aware of the rejection from the British government 
in February. On the other hand he was not aware of Mahmud II’s capacity for diplomacy. After 
all these declarations from the British, the Ottoman ambassador Mavroyeni, who could see the 
big change now in the political atmosphere in London concerning the Sultan’s request, stated to 
the Prime Minister that he agreed that there was no need for the Russian military power to stay in 
the Ottoman lands now. Russian departure would mean France would relax the pressure in 
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Istanbul, and when he witnessed that the final decision of the British Cabinet was in support the 
Sultan, Mehmed Ali would be content with the rights the Sultan conceded to him in the Kütahya 
Negotiations.213                  
Meanwhile, Palmerston joined in the general disapprobation over the arrival of the Russian 
warships. As mentioned above, he had sent Campbell to the Egypt to negotiate with Mehmed Ali 
and induce him to recall his army to the Egypt. When the Sultan saw that his plan had started to 
work, he ordered to Foreign Minister to negotiate with the Russians diplomats to move the 
Russian warships to Süzebolu, away from the Bosporus.214 The Sultan’s plan was working 
because apprehension from both Britain and France about the Russian Power in Istanbul had 
been increasing daily. As a result of this they strengthened their cooperation to end the Mehmed 
Ali Problem with a minimum of damage to their benefits in the region. France stopped 
encouraging and supporting the Pasha and the British Public began to realise the real importance 
of the Ottoman Empire for British interests. When analysing this changeover in the policies of 
the both powers from the Ottoman perspective, all of these rapid developments were by virtue of 
the Sultan’s plan. In spite of the change in these two powers’ policies against Mehmed Ali, the 
Sultan had been keeping his eye on both the powers. He ordered his ministers to meet with both 
the ambassadors, Roussin and Ponsonby, to understand the background and the level of this 
cooperation.215 In addition to this, he heard from his officials that when the British translator, 
Pizani, met with the Foreign Minister, he mentioned two different arguments. According to one 
of them, Mehmed Ali was a rebel, but according to another one, if his struggle was for the 
Egyptian people it could not be considered as a rebellion.216 Pizani’s words made the Sultan very 
angry and he ordered that Ponsonby’s opinion should be sought about this statement. Mahmud II 
was also wondering what the reason for this explanation was, when Britain had formerly 
appeared to be completely opposed to the rebel Governor. On account of this statement, the 
foreign minister should ask quite frankly what the final position of both powers in the Anglo-
French cooperation against Mehmed Ali was when he met with the ambassadors. The Sultan’s 
concern can be seen in how very careful he was about his plan and how no eventuality which 
might damage it, was overlooked even if it was only the statement of an ordinary translator.   
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At the same time, as mentioned above, the Sultan ordered his ministers to ask the Russian 
diplomats to move the Russian warships to Süzebolu. However, he was still extremely cautious 
over the diplomatic balance and so he suggested that they should use very tactful language in this 
negotiation with Russia. Thereupon, the Foreign Minister met with Orlov and General Muravyef 
at his house.217 First, the Minister made mention of how pleased the Sultan was to have the 
Tsar’s support by sending his warships and soldiers to Istanbul, then tactfully went on to ask if 
Orlov would move to the Russian warships to Süzebolu. The Minister made this request on the 
Sultan’s orders, because the political atmosphere in London related to his Empire had started to 
change and the Sultan was relying on these latest developments in the British political agenda. 
However, the Russian diplomats did not want to relinquish their presence in Istanbul that easily 
since they had been trying to reach this position for almost two centuries. In response, the 
ambassador stated that Mehmed Ali had not recalled his army to the Egypt and therefore the 
problem had not yet been resolved. For this reason he was wondering why the Sultan wanted the 
Russian warships moved from the Bosporus. After these words, the Foreign Minister responded 
that there were many reasons for this demand. The first was that the Russian support had 
effectively intimidated Mehmed Ali and he had ordered his son to stop his army in Kütahya. The 
second was that all the efforts of General Muryanef, Colonel Campbell and Ambassador 
Roussin, all negotiating with Mehmed Ali face to face in Alexandria, seemed to have had an 
impact on the Pasha. When he had mentioned these points, the Minister concluded that as a result 
of all these factors the resolution of the problem seemed to be close at hand.218 He said this 
because even as he was speaking to the Russian Ambassador and General, Reshit Pasha, who 
had been assigned by the Sultan to resolve the problem as soon as possible, was negotiating with 
Ibrahim Pasha in Kütahya.                  
Meanwhile, negotiations had been proceeding in Kütahya. Mustafa Reşid, who would be vital 
character in the Anglo-Ottoman relationship in the following years, was conducting negotiations 
on behalf of the Sultan, with Ibrahim Pasha doing the same on behalf of his father, Mehmed Ali 
Pasha. After many heated debates about Adana, which was a critically important city for both 
sides, eventually, the treaty of Kutahya was made between the Sultan and his rebel governor 
Mehmed Ali, and signed on 14 May 1833. This treaty’s articles did not seem to satisfy either 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 BOA, File No: 350, Document No: 19814.	  
218 BOA, File No: 350, Document No: 19814.	  
68 
	  
	  
	  
side. The reason for this was that the Sultan did not want to give away the governorship of 
Adana but was forced to do so because of the diplomatic conditions. However, the Sultan 
mentioned in an Ottoman document that although the governorship of Adana was given to 
Mehmed Ali as the lesser of two evils; due to the possibility of a change in Russian policy over 
the Mehmed Ali problem and also the ‘apostate nature’ of France, this did not mean that the 
problem was over, far from it, this problem would present itself in a completely different way in 
the near future.219  
The reason for Mehmed Ali’s dissatisfaction was that he felt he was missing a big opportunity 
for his army to gain ground towards the capital city of the Empire, Istanbul. In fact, the Pasha 
was so close to reaching this goal since his army was in Kutahya (a city very close to Istanbul), 
when the treaty of Kutahya was signed, but the Sultan’s diplomatic manoeuvre of calling the 
Russian army to Istanbul had changed Mehmed Ali’s policies just as it had changed British and 
French policies. Because of all of these reasons, this treaty only remained in force temporarily, 
and it seemed the Sultan and the Pasha would again clash sometime soon.    
In conclusion, the Mehmed Ali Problem led to a new era in Anglo-Ottoman relations in a 
positive way, something which would continue for the next four decades until the Congress of 
Berlin (1878). When the European historical literature has examined this period it views it as a 
result of the diplomatic struggle of the European powers in the Ottoman lands. However, the 
Ottoman diplomatic efforts in this struggle in her own lands have so far been neglected. In 
particular calling the Russian Army to the Bosporus and the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi have 
never been examined either by European or Turkish scholars as Mahmud II’s diplomatic plan to 
solve the Mehmed Ali Problem, a problem which could have almost demolished his Empire. 
However, when analysing the Ottoman documents in detail, the main aim of the Sultan was to 
forge a military alliance with Britain, even at the moment he seemed to want an alliance with 
Russia. This chapter has endeavoured to reveal this risky plan of the Sultan’s based on the 
Ottoman documents. In fact, calling the Russian Army to Istanbul was only one part of the 
overall scheme. As a matter of fact, this new period in Anglo-Ottoman relations had just started 
with the appearance of the Russian Army in Istanbul. The following developments would take 
place in record time unprecedented in history, in only six years. These developments can be 
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sorted historically thus: the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, 1833; the Euphrates Project, which was to 
be vital for British politicians to understand alternative possibilities with regard to how to reach 
India via a different route other than the Cape of Good Hope; the treaty of Balta Limani, 1838, 
which would yield many profits and privileges for Britain in her treaty with the East; and lastly 
the Rescript of Gülhane, 1839, the biggest reform programme in the Empire up to that time, in 
conformity with Western, particularly British, principles. More importantly, all of these rapid 
developments will be examined in the light of the Sultan’s plan and his officials’ diplomatic 
endeavours in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The vital importance of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi from the point of view of Mahmud 
II’s secret plan 
 
In the field of diplomatic relations, very few treaties have been more hazardous, whilst at the 
same time so crucially important, as was the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. The reason for the 
significance of this treaty was that it had resulted from Mahmud II’s secret plan to overcome his 
rebel governor, Mehmed Ali. When confronted with the biggest defeat that he had ever faced at 
the hands of this enemy, he realised that there was no alternative way to solve this politically 
fatal problem outside of using diplomacy. With this in mind, he sent his special official, Namık 
Pasha, to London to negotiate an Anglo-Ottoman military alliance against Mehmed Ali. 
However, at that time, the other great powers, Russia and France, had different kinds of plans for 
the Ottoman lands, such as occupation, as France had done in Algeria in 1830, or control of the 
Ottoman straits, as was Russia’s ambition. The only exception amongst these powers was 
Britain, which had no ulterior motive in its dealings with the Ottoman lands. Consequently, this 
military alliance was seen by Mahmud as a way of salvation for his Empire. As has been 
examined in detail in previous chapters, this request of the Sultan’s was rejected only because 
Lord Grey’s Cabinet had an agenda replete with other foreign and domestic issues. After a few 
more attempts by Namık Pasha in London, Mahmud realised that he needed something to remind 
the British about the great importance the Ottoman lands held in terms of British interests in that 
area. His plan was to make an alliance with the Russians, Britain’s biggest foe in the region.  
As a matter of fact, as covered in the second chapter, at first, he simply called the Russian 
military power to the Bosporus in the first months of 1833 instead of straight away making an 
alliance with what was historically his Empire’s biggest enemy in the region. As could be 
guessed, this diplomatic manoeuvre came like a bombshell to the French and the British. Yet 
despite all the diplomatic negotiations between these powers’ diplomatic representatives and 
Mahmud’s statesmen between February and July, no worthwhile results had been achieved, from 
Mahmud’s point of view. The reason for the Sultan’s dissatisfaction was that the Mehmed Ali 
Question had not yet been overcome despite a provisional agreement, the treaty of Kutahya in 
71 
	  
	  
	  
the May of 1833. Consequently, he decided to carry his risky plan a step further and on 8 July 
1833 he negotiated an agreement with Nicholas I. Regarding this, in this chapter this treaty will 
be examined from a different perspective than that which other scholars have used so far, as has 
the previous chapter in respect to the calling of the Russian Army to the Bosporus. The Ottoman 
documents reveal that the Sultan did not make this treaty in a desperate mood or as a last solution 
with no alternative; on the contrary, he had his own diplomatic plan which was to attract British 
cooperation using this treaty to remind them he was an important ally. This had been his plan all 
along in calling the Russian Navy Power to Istanbul. With Russian guns near India, Britain’s 
largest sphere of interest in the East, Russia had started to look like a big danger in this region. It 
also seemed like a potential disturbance of the European peace, which had been successfully 
established in 1815 with the Congress of Vienna. As a result of this peaceful environment Britain 
had become the most important power in Europe, and did not want to lose this status. Pertaining 
to this, we will examine this treaty in detail from the point of view of Mahmud’s secret plan. 
As has been extensively analysed, after Mahmud’s manoeuvre of calling the Russian military 
power to the Bosporus, all Britain’s and France’s diplomatic pressures upon Mehmed Ali 
brought about a cease fire agreement between the Sultan and Mehmed Ali. However, neither side 
was happy with the articles of the agreement. The reason for this was that on the one hand, ever 
since the beginning of his struggle against central government Mehmed Ali had wanted to gain 
his independence from the Sultan. However, he had had to accept Mahmud’s sovereignty with 
the treaty of Kutahya. On the other hand, the Sultan was unable to completely resolve the 
problem with the treaty and he strongly believed that Mehmed Ali would rebel again soon.220  
When analysing Mahmud’s disposition towards this treaty from the point of view of his secret 
plan, he clearly felt that he needed a more serious gesture to win full British support against 
Mehmed Ali and the other great powers, Russia and France. This gesture was to be in the form of 
a treaty, called the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. After many diplomatic developments over the 
Treaty of Kutahya, 14 May 1833, and the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, 8 July 1833, the Sultan 
decided to step forward diplomatically to implement his secret plan. To this end, the Treaty of 
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Unkiar Skelessi was signed between the Ottomans and the Russians, at Mahmud’s own request, 
on 8 July 1833.221  
There is actually quite extensive literature which recounts in detail the political process before 
the treaty. Therefore, this process will not be examined here. Instead, Mahmud and his 
statesmen’s diplomatic campaign to solve the Mehmed Ali Question after the treaty will be 
examined properly based on the Ottoman documents as a narrative of the process from the 
Ottoman perspective.  
As could be predicted, the French and British public reaction became very strong, particularly 
when they learned that there was a clause detailing that in the case of war in the region, the 
straits would be closed to all European war ships but not Russian ones. Brown encapsulated what 
the treaty really meant from the British perspective when he said; 
“The treaty was ostensibly a defensive one- a commitment on both sides to support the other in the 
event of attack- but in effect what it meant was that Russia had gained an advantage over 
European rivals in dealing with the future of Ottoman territory by securing control over access to 
the Straits. It was obvious in London that this represented a threat to British influence in the area 
and to Britain’s access to its own empire.”222 
 
Only a few days after the treaty, the French ambassador to İstanbul, Admiral Roussin, sent a 
letter to the French ambassador in Austria. He suspected that there was a highly likely possibility 
that an attacking and defending treaty had just been made, or was on the point of being made, 
between the Sultan and the Tsar.223  He also wanted his letter to be immediately sent to Paris and 
he was going to try to send a copy of the treaty as soon as possible. Thereupon the French 
ambassador in Vienna went to meet with Prince Metternich to ask for a summary of this latest 
news from Istanbul. At first Metternich stated that there was no such information in Vienna at 
that moment, and then the ambassador asked his opinion as to whether this kind of treaty might 
be made between the two Empires. In response, Metternich said that he did not suppose that the 
Sultan wanted an attacking treaty with the Tsar under such circumstances, however, the Ottoman 
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statesmen might have asked the Russian ambassador Orlov whether, if as a result of the Russian 
army’s abandonment of Istanbul a state of distress appeared again, could the Russian war ships 
come to Istanbul once more or not. Interestingly, he added that if the ambassador’s answer had 
been given as an official letter, from Metternich’s point of view this letter might have been 
understood as a treaty. He also mentioned that if this was the case, Austria was supporting the 
Russian guardianship in terms of the Ottoman interests.     
It could be said that the most prominent representative of these discontented statesmen was the 
British ambassador to Istanbul, Ponsonby, who began to display aggressive behaviour towards 
the Ottoman statesmen. In this context, his several protests about the treaty, particularly the 
article related to closure of the straits in the case of a war, came in August.224 Principally, he had 
been trying to learn what Mahmud and his statesmen meant by this article and he had several 
times officially asked the Ottoman government about its meaning. This article set the alarm bells 
ringing in London with respect to a Russian danger growing every passing day, in terms of 
British interests in the Ottoman lands, particularly the security of the Indian route. Reflections of 
this British anxiety could be seen in Ponsonby’s official letters, which were persistently 
questioning one after the other. Most galling of all for Ponsonby were the nebulous responses 
from the Ottoman statesmen. He would have liked to learn what was going on behind the scenes 
as soon as possible and then inform his government in detail. For instance, on 30 October 1833, 
he requested with two official letters to the Ottoman Foreign Minister an explanation of the 
article related to the straits.225  When he did not receive a clear answer he again asked for 
satisfactory reply, only 22 days after the last request. This letter of Ponsonby’s was very 
extensive this time and it was tendered to Mahmud with the comments of the Foreign 
Minister.226  In this letter Ponsonby asked his questions much more clearly than he had in the 
previous one. His inquiry was that if any European power waged war with Russia, and if the 
Ottoman Empire did not fight this power, what would the Ottomans choose to do based on the 
Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi? Would they allow the Russians to pass their warships through the 
both straits, the Dardanelles and the Bosporus, while they did not give the permission for passing 
to the other power’s warships? Or would they prohibit the other power to pass through the straits 
as well as Russia? Ponsonby was not content with the responses to his questions and directly 
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asked that if Russia fought with Britain and the Ottoman Empire was not at war with Britain, 
what would they do based on the treaty? Would they permit the Russian warships to pass through 
the straits and at the same time disallow the British warships from passing through? At the end of 
all his questions Ponsonby proposed that his questions only required clear responses such as 
confirmation or disaffirmation. According to him any suspended or shadowy reply would lead to 
misinterpretation of the debated clause and break down the good and longstanding Anglo-
Ottoman relations. For these reasons, he argued, to gain Britain on his side, it would be very 
useful and of benefit to the Sultan and his people to implement the same straits passing rules for 
all sides.227  At the same time, Palmerston had been trying to dissuade Mahmud from the treaty. 
On this subject Bolsover commented; 
“On December 6 Palmerston informed the Russian government that Great Britain would take steps 
to uphold the real independence of the Ottoman Empire. The same day he ordered Ponsonby to 
remind the Porte of the fate which Poland had suffered through dependence on Russia. He further 
urged Mahmud to reform the Turkish Empire by organizing his own resources for the suppression 
of revolt. Palmerston even promised to control Mehemet Ali if the Sultan acted as sultan and not as 
vassal of the tsar.”228  
 
The last comments from Ponsonby and Palmerston are very interesting since it shows that the 
British politicians had started to play their trump card against the Ottomans, just as Mahmud had 
done with his diplomatic manoeuvres against them. This could be seen by the Sultan as a 
positive development, because the same British politicians had previously not lifted a finger to 
help, apart from some placatory words and letters, when Mahmud sent Namık Pasha to London 
in March 1833 to enlist British military support in the Mehmed Ali crisis. However, only eight 
months later, there they were striving to get the Ottomans on the British side against their own 
Russian crisis. Mahmud was starting to see success in external issues; likewise he did in the 
internal ones too.  
 
It is also necessary to look at this period from the point of view of the Russians, and in order to 
do this we have obtained an official Russian letter, fully translated into Turkish, informing 
Mahmud and explaining the Russian diplomatic policy and efforts after the period of the Unkiar 
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Skelessi in detail. The main purpose of this policy was to overcome this diplomatic crisis by 
explaining the innocuousness of the treaty regarding the balance of European power. With this in 
mind, Nicholas charged the Prime Minister Nesselrode to assure the British that Russia would 
never do anything at the expense of European peace. Thereupon Nesselrode sent an instruction 
with respect to this mission to the Russian Charge d'affaires in London, Pavel Medem.229 The 
instruction arrived in London on 26 December 1834. When it arrived, the new British cabinet, 
Sir Robert Peel's first government, had been just established that same month and the new 
Foreign Minister was Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington. Nesselrode started to carry out his 
instructions by pointing out that one of the last operations of the former Foreign Minister 
Palmerston was to attempt to change, through Ponsonby, the article of the treaty related to the 
closing of the straits in the case of a war in the region. According to the Russian minister a 
question related to this article was asked ten months ago and therefore its repetition upset the 
Tsar and his servants.  In fact, as mentioned above, the Ottoman statesmen had explained several 
times to Britain and France what they aimed to achieve with the treaty and Nesselrode began his 
message with these Ottoman explanations. He stated that the Ottoman diplomats had answered 
the question very well in the February of 1834, that the mentioned article had not brought any 
difference to the current rules about using the straits, which had been accepted by all European 
powers since time immemorial, and these rules were a sign of the Sultan’s domination in his 
lands and very beneficial and useful for the Ottoman public interests. In this regard, according to 
this Ottoman explanation the treaty did not grant any privileges to any European power. 
Nesselrode added that they were expecting that it would be enough for the British that there was 
no secret intention between the Ottomans and the Russians. However, he stated that they were 
disappointed in Ponsonby’s reaction since he had re-questioned them on the same issue ten 
months later. In his opinion, although it was an undeniable fact that the Ottomans had the right to 
avoid having to re-explain the situation since they had already clarified the issue extensively and 
transparently, they had still issued a new official letter (examined in detail below) to Ponsonby 
because they cared about European peace. He continued saying that despite the Ottoman 
diplomats having clarified the article in detail in the last letter, Ponsonby seemed to be discontent 
again, since he clearly did not regard waiting his government’s further instructions as necessary, 
having asked for a wider explanation about the article. In fact, the ambassador had made this 
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second request on 4 December, only twenty two days after his first. Istanbul had not answered 
this second request of the ambassador because of the extensive reply given to the first one. 
Nesselrode stated that the new British cabinet and its ministers had raised obstacles to continuing 
good Anglo-Russian relations. Nesselrode also congratulated himself and the Russians since they 
had been mediating between Britain and the Ottomans to solve the last problems as a result of 
the treaty. This Russian perspective is quite salient since Nesselrode must have been aware of the 
strong British reaction and the panic in London due to Unkiar Skelessi and its secret article. 
What could his motivation have been to say these words while London was on red alert about a 
Russian danger at British cost in the region? It could be said that in the light of Nesselrode’s 
instruction, he probably want to reassure the new Foreign Minister, Wellington, that the article 
did not contain any hazard for European peace. The reason to believe this was his aim is that he 
instructed Medem that he should give the summary of their explanations, to the new Foreign 
Minister.. Nesselrode also ordered that Medem should submit a previous instruction as well, the 
one which was given to the former Russian ambassador to London, Prince Christopher von 
Lieven. According to Nesselrode this instruction would be enough to convince Wellington, since 
it was a very clear explanation that Russia had never asserted, either before the treaty or after it, 
any privilege for right of passage through the straits if the Ottoman Empire closes them. He even 
took his daring words a step further and stated that the treaty was an official guarantee of this 
longstanding rule. He asserted that all these assurances would reassure Wellington about Russian 
policies and the treaty. Nesselrode wanted Medem to include a previous instruction, one which 
had been sent to the former ambassador Prince Lieven under the direction of the Tsar on 22 June 
1834, to his communication for when he met with the Duke of Wellington. This instruction was 
to offer to the former minister Palmerston the opportunity to have these mentioned assurances 
about equality with other European Powers pertaining to the use of the straits (which had only 
been made verbally up to then) put into an official document. Nesselrode believed there could 
not be a more serious offer than this to show their sincerity over this issue. He further reported 
that they were unsure whether their offer had had an impact upon the former minister, as 
Ponsonby’s last acts in İstanbul had created room for doubt. However, he strongly believed that 
Wellington would be convinced about Russian’s amicable policy with regard to the straits after 
meeting and listening to Medem. From Nesselrode’s point of view, Medem’s mission was 
crucial because it would produce two important results. The first anticipated one was that there 
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were many false reports from the former Whig Government and its ministers about Russia’s 
objective with the treaty, and Medem would eliminate those prejudices and persuade the new 
government and its ministers about the innocent nature of the treaty. The second anticipated 
result of Medem’s mission was that explaining all the afore-mentioned Russian arguments to the 
new government would probably put an end to British pressures on the Sultan and his ministers 
in Istanbul. Nesselrode concluded his instruction saying that all of these diplomatic efforts would 
show the British ministers that the problems in the East could be resolved with solidarity 
between Russia, the Ottoman Empire and Britain.      
At this stage, it is vital to examine the Ottoman diplomatic responses against all these reactions 
in order to look at the story from the point of view of the Ottomans. To better facilitate viewing 
the whole Ottoman diplomatic attitude, it is hereafter expressed in itemised responses.  
The Sultan and his statesmen stated in their replies: 
a) The British and French ambassadors have much misinformation about the treaty and its debated 
clause and therefore suffer many misapprehensions relating to its real purport.230  
b) This treaty is absolutely not an assault treaty; on the contrary, it is a defence treaty concerning 
the security of the Ottoman lands.231   
c) The longstanding rules related to both the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus would continue to 
remain in force for all the states, Russia no exception.232   
d) Nevertheless every independent country has the right to make any treaty with respect to its own 
issues as long as it does not encroach upon another country’s rights.233  
e) If the British and French ambassadors continue to propound their idle allegations about this 
clause after this explanation, this redundant insistence would impinge upon not only the Sultan’s 
right to determine his country’s internal policies but also his sovereignty in his own lands.234   
f) Since these matters have been repeatedly expounded in great detail to the British and French 
ambassadors, no further explanations will be forthcoming.235  
 
While all this dialogue was being exchanged, an important development occurred in terms of 
Mahmud’s secret diplomatic plan. Mahmud sent Namık Pasha; the same emissary who had gone 
to London to make the Anglo-Ottoman military alliance before the treaty, to London to negotiate 
the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi and its results for the Anglo-Ottoman relationship. This assignment 
is quite interesting as it shows Mahmud’s real intent through the instructions he gave to the 
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Pasha. Furthermore, Namık Pasha sent very extensive reports236 with regard to his negotiations 
in London and these fully reveal the Sultan’s real objective within his latest diplomatic 
manoeuvres. 
Namık Pasha arrived in London on Sunday, 17 October 1834. He had three letters with him. The 
first one was for Palmerston from the Ottoman Foreign Minister, the second one was for the 
Prime Minister from the Ottoman Prime Minister and lastly the third one was for the King from 
the Sultan. These letters were extremely important since they were a testament to the Sutlan’s 
strong desire for an Anglo-Ottoman alliance to solve all the problems. The Pasha met with 
Palmerston the day after his arrival; 18 October 1834. He was warmly welcomed by Palmerston, 
and after asking after each other and handing the letter from the Ottoman Foreign Minister to 
Palmerston, he stated to Palmerston that he would like to deliver the Sultan’s letter to the King. 
Palmerston answered that the King was not in London at that moment, but he would inform the 
King of the situation and then let the Pasha know what he said.  After this, Palmerston asked the 
Pasha the purpose of his visit in London.  Namık interestingly answered that he would have 
thought Palmerston knew his mission’s purpose in London since before his departure from 
Istanbul the exact copy of his instruction for this mission in London was given Ponsonby in 
Istanbul. A rebellion against Mehmed Ali had occurred in Damascus just before the Namık’s 
departure from Istanbul, by objectors to the treaty of Kutahya. In fact one of Namık’s missions 
was to discuss this rebellion. Mahmud was supporting the rebels since he was hoping to restart 
the conflict with the Pasha and win this time by taking advantage of the Damascus rebellion. 
Namık Pasha declared this as the Sultan’s intention and added that because of this internal 
conflict the Ottoman Army had started to make war preparations. Namık Pasha informed 
Mahmud in his report that Palmerston spoke briefly on this issue and although these words at 
first seemed to Pasha to be in Mehmed Ali’s favour, soon afterwards and for the rest of his 
negotiations in London this meaning changed.237 However, Palmerston’s only concern was to 
prevent any possible pretext Russia could have to intervene in Istanbul using her right stemming 
from Unkiar Skelessi. He was meticulously anticipating every possibility in order to prevent it 
happening. Rodkey expressed extensively Palmerston’s this attitude that 
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“Undoubtedly throughout the period from 1833 to 1839 Palmerston believed that peace must be 
preserved in the Near East if such a policy as he favoured for the rejuvenation of Turkey was to 
succeed. In 1834, when the first the reis effendi ((Turkish minister of foreign affairs), and later 
Vogorides revealed that the Sultan resolved to encounter al the risks of a new struggle with 
Mehmed Ali in order to remove the sword of the Pasha, “hanging always threatening over his 
head,” Ponsonby exerted his influence at the Turkish capital against a renewal of hostilities. 
Palmerston entirely approved the course followed by the ambassador on this occasion and directed 
the admiralty to have Vice-Admiral Rowley, the British naval commander in the Levant, maintain a 
watch for the Ottoman fleet in the neighbourhood of the Archipelago. If it appeared in those waters 
the British admiral was to get in touch with Turkish commander, to urge him to suspend any orders 
he might have to undertake hostile operations against the Egyptian fleet”238   
 
This order shows that as Mahmud had expected, Palmerston started to approach the Eastern 
Question much more seriously after Unkiar Skelessi. After his meeting with Palmerston, Namık 
send a message to the Prime Minister, Lord Grey, asking for a meeting and he got a reply very 
quickly, on the same day, and they met on Tuesday, 19 October 1833. The Pasha submitted to 
him the letter from the Ottoman Prime Minister. Namık explained the Sultan’s opinion about the 
Damascus rebels and the preparation for armed conflict to the Prime Minister as well. Grey did 
not say much about this in the meeting but he did say that whenever the Pasha needed help 
during his mission in London, he was at his service.239    
At last Namık Pasha was to meet with the King: on Wednesday, 20 October 1833. This was a 
private meeting and there were only three people present; the Pasha, the Foreign Minister and the 
King. The most important feature of Namık’s report for us is that it contains his full explanation 
to the King with respect to the real aim of his mission in London. This explanation is vital since 
it is very strong evidence substantiating the main argument of the thesis. Considering that when 
Namık was in London, the treaty was in force, his declaration gains much more meaning in 
support of the main argument of this thesis. First, he submitted the Sultan’s letter to the King, 
and then he conveyed the real meaning of his mission.  He stated that it was quite obvious that 
the Ottoman Empire had had close ties and a long lasting friendship with Britain for centuries. 
Because of this, his illustrious highness had sent him to London to cement this sincere friendship 
between the two countries and there was no other aim of his mission except this noble duty. It 
seems that after his two big diplomatic manoeuvres based on Russian military strength, (i.e. 
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calling Russians to the Bosporus and the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi) Mahmud decided that now 
was the right time to persuade the King and Palmerston to join in an Anglo-Ottoman alliance 
against all enemies of both powers in the region. He was right, because William stated that he 
and his people were very well aware that the Turks were faithful to their word, people of -wise 
and virtuous character, and there were even some adages about that in England. He continued 
that when Namık Pasha came to England for this alliance they were unable to help the Sultan and 
his people, despite really wanting to, because of some serious problems which Britain was 
encountering at the time. He also mentioned that he knew very well that their unpardonable 
neglect had obligated the Sultan first to call the Russian army to the Bosporus and eventually to 
make the treaty.240 Mahmud should have been satisfied to hear these words of William’s because 
they showed that his plan was working. The King continued his words in the same direction and 
stated that despite Russia’s domination in the Ottoman lands as a result of the treaty due to their 
disregard of the Sultan’s desire, he and his people really stood for the territorial integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire and continuity the Sultan’s sovereignty in his own lands. He also mentioned 
that they want this not only for the Ottoman interests but also a strong Ottoman Empire would be 
most beneficial in terms of the British interests in the region. Interestingly, the king also stated 
that these opinions and British political strategies were not only the result of the strong 
fellowship between both countries, but also based upon sound political wisdom. According to the 
King, this British support was not a transient state of affairs and the Sultan could trust the King 
and his government.  William, not content even with these words, added that the Sultan should 
have no doubts that they truly and wholeheartedly desire for the Ottoman Empire to maintain her 
existence as a strong and prosperous country and support of this was one of their state policies.241 
Namık Pasha described in his report how William repeatedly emphasized to him that a strong 
Ottoman Empire would be very beneficial for British interests in the region. The words of King 
William recorded in Namık’s report are vital, since Mahmud’s secret plan seems to have been 
successful in reminding the British of the political and strategic importance of the Ottoman 
Empire to their interests, especially India. Namık also stated in his report that he reported the 
King’s words verbatim: neither more nor less. 242 
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Namık met with Palmerston again and discussed William’s words.  It seems that Namık 
appraised Palmerston in this meeting of William’s words. The first thing he mentioned was that 
the King had stated in the last meeting that he knew Muslims to be people who remain true to 
their word. And then Namık said to Palmerston that he could not understand the underlying 
meaning of these words because when he heard them he wondered what the King meant. He had 
a suspicion that he saw this as a flaw in the Muslims. In the light of Namık’s words he seems that 
he was extremely sensitive to nuance; he was suspicious of any negative attitude from the King 
and his government towards the Anglo-Ottoman alliance against Mehmed Ali. Therefore he had 
been careful to note each one of their words. Palmerston immediately responded that the King 
only meant that he wanted to praise Muslims’ steady character and to express that the enduring 
fellowship between both countries, which had been declared several times by the Sultan through 
Namık Pasha, would be enough assurance from King William’s point of view. After this 
response Namık pressed further to understand the true opinion of the British on this subject and 
criticized them that although they were always saying that they really wanted the Ottoman 
Empire’s territorial integrity, at the same time they still recognized Mehmed Ali as a political 
actor despite his rebellion against his sovereign and clearly did not want the Ottomans to fight 
Mehmed Ali by taking advantage of the Damascus rebellion. He even interestingly gave a 
metaphor of this - that this contradictory attitude resembled someone who was expected to 
wrestle with two people at the same time despite being tied hand and foot. In response 
Palmerston said that he acknowledged the truth of Namık Pasha’s reproach and he wanted to 
explain in detail what was their latest and fundamental policy relating to the Mehmed Ali 
Question.243  
Palmerston began by explaining his and his government’s opinion about Mehmed Ali. He stated 
that they understood what kind of character Mehmed Ali was, so the Sultan could be sure that 
they certainly did not support him. However they did not support the Ottoman intervention in 
Damascus either because of potential Russian involvement. If such a conflict did not go well, the 
Tsar would send in his army under the right arising from the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. In such 
an eventuality, as might be expected, Britain would intervene in the matter in order to defend her 
benefits in the region and this situation could easily lead to war.  Apart from this, of course they 
desired an Ottoman victory against Mehmed Ali Pasha, but as he explained, the situation had the 
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potential to backfire. Palmerston went on to say that in his view Mehmed Ali Pasha was an old 
man, and after his death, his son Ibrahim Pasha did not have the calibre to maintain the situation 
he would inherit from his father, so the Sultan would be able to assign a new governor in his 
stead. Another interesting dialogue that occurred between Palmerston and Namık in that meeting 
was that Palmerston intimated that he could not understand why the Sultan could not use 
Mehmed Ali for the Ottoman benefit. Namık replied that Mehmed Ali had not paid tax to the 
central government for two years and was also gradually taking over Rakka, an Ottoman City 
under the Sultan’s control, and had been plotting mischief for three years, how could they 
possibly use him for the benefit of central government?244  
In addition, as Mahmud had expected, Palmerston led up to the treaty and Ottoman-Russian 
alliance resulting from Unkiar Skelessi. He began with a reproach about the treaty asking what 
possible reason was there to make this treaty with Russia? Of course they were not suggesting 
that the Sultan and his statesmen quarrel with Russia, but the only unacceptable article in the 
treaty was concerning the shutdown of the straits to all powers aside from Russian warships in 
the case of a war in Europe.  He added that of course they could make a friend of whomsoever 
they wished but this ally should be turned into a unilateral one, whereas this situation gave the 
Russians an unfair superiority in Istanbul.  Palmerston fully believed that although the Tsar and 
his statesmen gave the appearance of those who had good intentions towards the Ottomans, they 
were in fact secretly trying to set a trap for the Ottomans whilst appearing benign. In this context, 
he stated that if there was a salutary thing in the interest of the Sultan and his people, the Tsar 
would prevent it and Mahmud could be sure that the British could not tollerate this. Everything 
in London was working out as Mahmud planned with his diplomatic manoeuvres of calling 
Russians to the Bosporus and signing the treaty with the Russians. As a matter of fact, in his 
report, Namık was pointing out this change in political atmosphere in London by comparing with 
his last fruitless visit to London, in December 1832.   He reported that previously, the British 
ambassadors to Istanbul, especially Canning, had been prejudicing British public opinion against 
the Ottoman Empire with their biased reports. He continued his descriptions of the new political 
atmosphere in London related to the Ottomans and stated that he found it quite different being in 
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London for these four days and people’s perspectives in England were very much more positive 
this time.245 Mahmud should have been delighted when he read these words from his emissary.          
At this stage, it should be mentioned again, as was expressed in the first chapter, that it is not 
enough to examine the Mehmed Ali Question based only on the diplomatic reports since, as 
Namık Pasha pointed out, ambassadors’ accounts might well include some prejudice and bias. 
Rodkey expressed this change in British policy towards the Ottomans very well in his extensive 
article; 
“Obviously, before the close of 1833 the moment of hesitation in British policy for the preservation 
of the Ottoman Empire had passed. Palmerston was resolved to revive and to extend the traditional 
policy of Great Britain in the Levant and was determined to defeat at all cost any attempt which 
Russia might make to intervene independently in the internal affairs of Turkey under the terms of 
the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi.”246  
 
Although Rodkey recounts the change in Britain towards the Ottoman Empire very well, 
something has been neglected in his account, as other foreign scholars have so far done. This is 
to show to what extent Mahmud had a role in this radical change in Palmerston’s policies. It is 
clear that without examining this role, the narration of the period would only be based on the 
other powers’ perspectives which would inevitably create a one sided narrative.    
Despite all these efforts by Mahmud and the Ottoman statesmen, especially those of his official 
emissary Namık, Ponsonby had been insisting upon his request for an extensive explanation 
about the debated clause being answered again. He asked about this matter once more, via his 
translator Pizani, putting this enquiry to the Ottoman Foreign Minister as he had put the previous 
ones; 
“If I accept the official explanation of the Foreign Minister, it would mean disobedience of the 
exact instructions given by my government to me. The reason for this is that the clause was 
incongruent to the Anglo-Ottoman contract, which had been a law in force for a long time, and I 
have articulated this fact several times in my official letters given to the Minister. I wanted the 
Minister to inform the Sultan about his official letter and to warn the Minister that if the Sultan’s 
answer was not satisfactory, he would ask the same questions again and again.”247 
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As a matter of fact Ponsonby’s threats started to push the limits of diplomatic usage. This was a 
matter of complaint that occurred in many Ottoman documents. The reason behind this 
overreaction was in his abhorrence of Russia and her designs on the region. Webster analysed 
this characteristic very well when he says; 
“More serious are the charges against him of excessive hostility to Russia, and his desire to use 
force against her. It is true that Ponsonby became convinced that Russia was planning the 
disruption or at least control of the Ottoman Empire, and that he made it his principal object to 
defeat her. He certainly stated as facts what could only be conjectures and he wished Britain to 
display her maritime power to counteract the military position of Russia whose armies were in the 
Principalities. Above all he wished to convince both Russia and the Sultan that Britain would never 
again shew the same weakness she had displayed in 1832-1833.”248   
 
Ponsonby had given as evidence to his words in one of his letters to the Foreign Minister about 
the debated clause of the Unkiar Skelessi that according to the eleventh clause of the treaty 
signed in 1809 between the Ottoman Empire and Britain, access by the other states’ warships to 
both the Dardanelles and the Bosporus was prohibited.249   
Nevertheless, there were some exceptions among British diplomats who thought about the treaty 
in a different way than that which was the general tendency in London at the time; such as Percy 
Clinton Sydney Smythe, who was the predecessor of the ambassador to Russia. He declared that 
he recognised that the Sultan was right to cooperate with Russia to solve the problem. He also 
commented that he believed the Sultan would find an opportunity to regenerate his Empire only 
when he solved the Mehmed Ali Question. In his opinion, therefore, the Sultan was right to look 
for another country’s support in dealing with the problem.250        
Mahmud would have liked this strong interest in the Ottoman Empire from all the British 
politicians that they showed ever since he declared a rescript and explained his real aims and 
underlying motives in forging a military alliance with Britain.251  This document is really vital to 
properly understand his secret plan. He itemised his orders in the rescript: 
a) If friendship was made with Britain, the economic and social problems could be solved, 
customs tariffs could be collected easily, the country would quickly prosper, and as a result of 
all these improvements the population would increase. 
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b) If they were able to promote good relations with the British, the French would have to copy the 
British attitude and thereby the Ottomans would be able to rid themselves of French animosity.  
c) If the British gave orders to Mehmed Ali, he would have to renounce the lands he had acquired 
after his rebellion and give up his insurrection and start to support central government with his 
army. 
d) If Mehmed Ali saw an Anglo-Ottoman alliance, he would have to resign his warships to central 
government. As a result all of this the Egyptian public would understand that Mehmed Ali was 
an ordinary governor of the Sultan not a successor to him. 
 
This document is really important not only because of the unfolding of Mahmud’s diplomatic 
plan but also because it shows how Mahmud was disposed to get British support, even in the 
previous years, in economic reforms, such as with the treaty of Balta Limani in 1838, and in 
social and administrative reforms, such as with the Tanzimat Reform Era in 1839. 
There was another British statesman who held the same opinion as Mahmud. This was David 
Urquhart. He was present in the Ottoman lands in the 1830s. He wrote a book for the King about 
the resources of the Ottoman Empire. He presented in this book several potential advantages in 
favour of British interests to be gained by supporting the Sultan and his Empire against their 
enemies. On this topic Bolsover stated that; 
“In it Urquhart argued that the destruction of the Janissaries had removed the chief source of 
decay from the Turkish administration and that the Ottoman Empire could now be made strong and 
vigorous by developing the principles of local self-government inherent in its institutions.”252 
 
Mahmud had British friends who supported him; however his aim was to get wholehearted 
backing from the British government and King William with the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. Every 
passing day his plan was becoming a reality, since Palmerston had recently sent an instruction to 
the British naval commander to tell him to support the Ottomans against both Russia and 
Mehmed Ali. Baker spoke of this instruction saying: 
“The Russian danger appeared so great at the time that Vice-Admiral Sir Josiah Rowley was 
secretly instructed on 31 January 1834 to sail up the Straits in order to assist in defending 
Constantinople against a Russian attack, if the Turkish government should request such aid 
through the ambassador, Lord Ponsonby. Yet Mehemet Ali, who was most likely to cause the 
Russians to return, was to be dissuaded from renewing the conflict by the remonstrances of Great 
Britain and France.”253   
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Despite all these diplomatic developments in the Anglo-Ottoman relationship, the Sultan’s direct 
military support from Britain would be a few more years in coming. In this waiting period, 
Mahmud did not slacken in the implementation of his plan and made some more diplomatic 
manoeuvres in the following years with the aim of making an Anglo-Ottoman alliance against 
the other powers possible. As will be examined in detail in the following chapters, these 
manoeuvres, in order, were that in 1835, Mahmud using Britain’s request for use of the 
Euphrates route to reach India since it was the shortest and easiest route to further benefit his 
plan, in 1837-1838, Mahmud’s use of Palmerston and his diplomats’ attempts to use the Ottoman 
economic resources in favour of British interests to solve the Mehmed Ali problem. As it 
happened, in the Euphrates negotiations, and as a result of this process, the Treaty of Balta 
Limani came about in 1838. Because of all of these actions, not only Mahmud, but also his 
successor Abdulmecid, and Mahmud’s best statesman, Mustafa Reşid Pasha, would draw 
advantage from British support and guidance, to reclaim the Empire economically, 
administratively, socially, and militarily from 1835 onwards. As a matter of fact, as mentioned 
above, both of them, Mahmud and Palmerston, had a strong desire for this cooperation to be 
beneficial for the prosperity of the Ottoman Empire, each of them seeking to better their own 
interests.     
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Euphrates Project in the Context of the Mehmed Ali Crisis and Its Effects on Anglo-
Ottoman Relations 
 
The theme established in the last chapter, that the Ottomans were far from passive participants in 
the ‘Eastern Question’, can further be demonstrated by an examination of the response of the 
Sultan to British attempts to find a faster route to India via the Euphrates . This chapter will also 
show that the Ottomans were also able to resist Russian pressure, when Russia was insisting on 
the Ottomans rejecting the British project, by using the legal rights which appeared with the 
Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. 
As studied in the first chapter, in contrast to English literature on the topic, the main aim of the 
Sultan, by inviting the Russian army and by making the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, was to make a 
military alliance with Britain by arousing their fears about a Russian danger for India. Similarly, 
Britain’s need to use the Euphrates would be exploited by the Ottomans to gain England’s 
support against Mehmed Ali. Presentation of this argument with the Ottoman sources on this 
topic is helpful in understanding that the Ottomans were not merely playing a passive and 
ineffective part in the diplomatic game of the region at that time. However, before analysing the 
Ottoman diplomatic effort, it would be useful to examine in brief the earlier attempts to find the 
most suitable route to India prior to the Euphrates project, in order to apprehend the necessity 
and importance of the project itself.  
Andrew and Chesney, who worked out a faster route to India, Britain’s most important 
possession, mentioned that “the problem of the age we live in is ‘how to save time’” and added, 
“to the oftquoted, though misquoted, saying that ‘knowledge is power’ must now be added the 
axiom that ‘time is power.’”254 Indeed, the time saved for Britain in reaching her colonies meant 
millions of pounds and also prestige around the world, because this met her needs for raw 
materials and markets to sell her products after the Industrial Revolution. Therefore, the 
importance to British merchants and statesmen of arriving at India by the easiest route is clearly 
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apparent. As a result of this significance, in order to find the easiest, cheapest and securest route, 
much fieldwork had been done throughout the second half of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.  
As is well known, India played an important role in the British economy and social life. Some 
historians assert that Britain captured the whole of South Africa in order to protect the seaways 
which were going to India, and this was also the main motivation when the British policy makers 
determined British policies in the Middle East and Near Asia.255 Despite this importance, the 
distance between Britain and India was still too great. For this reason, some British officers, 
statesmen and merchants suggested that a shorter and cheaper route must be found immediately 
in the event of the necessity of intervening in India for British interests, and also in order to give 
essential instructions to the British governors who were in charge in India.256  
After 1757 which was the date Britain gained more importance than France in India, these 
navigation projects were accelerated. However, before investigating these works, it should be 
mentioned that it was an important policy of British statesmen, when the political atmosphere 
was unsuitable in the region they wanted to implement a project, to try to change the conditions 
to benefit their interests.  
 
4.1. The Projects to Reach India prior to the Euphrates Expedition 
Navigating the way to India had been undertaken at first by the strong and enduring vessels of 
the East India Company, but the journey alone had been taking eight months and it is not 
difficult to guess the trials and tribulations of crew and passengers during these voyages.257 
When considering these conditions, it is easy to understand the high importance of the Euphrates 
project. In addition to this, the company personnel who had relatives in Britain wanted the route 
between the two countries to be shorter.  
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In order to achieve this target, some British merchants led by George Baldwin, made the first 
attempt by passing Egypt and then travelling via the Red Sea.258 Employers of the East India 
Company wanted to use this Egyptian route and so it was used for a short time. However, 
political and geographical factors caused the route to be abandoned. The reasons for this were 
that the monsoons meant the route could not be used from July to September and also, 
interestingly, it was banned by the Ottoman Sultan because it was too close to the Holy Cities of 
Islam: Mecca and Medina.259  
Because of these reasons interest in the Egypt route subsided and instead another route was 
developed. First it went from Istanbul to Aleppo, then after passing the desert an expedition 
would be made from Basra to Bombay by ship.260 However, in common with other routes, this 
route was not used frequently until the 1830s.    
Having above summarised the alternative routes, it is now necessary to examine the situation in 
the 1830s, a short time before the start of the Euphrates project.  
At the beginning of the 1830s, the debate over whether to use the Egypt route or the Basra route 
to reach India, resumed. As mentioned above, British policy makers attempted to implement a 
strategy of turning the political atmosphere in favour of British interests. In this regard, strategies 
were implemented to make Anglo-Ottoman relations in the region better. The main ones were as 
follows: to strike up a friendship with the Pashas who had domination in the region, offer these 
Pashas aid in developing their armies by appointing British officers to them, rejuvenate 
commerce in the region with the help of British merchants, the “transfer of civilisation” to these 
regions by opening Christian schools, and most importantly, carrying out scientific research and 
studies on the routes with a view to improving communication and navigation within the 
region.261  
In this context, investigations were started on the routes in the region in 1829. The first serious 
one was the study by Thomas Love Peacock who was working in the Indian Office as an 
assistant. The first important characteristic of his work was that he summarised previous studies 
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on seaways and sea trade, also the notes of travellers and visitors, from the past up until that 
time. Then he prepared a report with this summarising information and submitted it to the British 
Government on 10 November 1829. More importantly, for the first time, he mentioned the 
possibility of using the Euphrates to reach India. In his view the only way this plan could be 
implemented was to go from Mosul to Bagdad by raft and then big vessels could be worked 
between Bagdad and Basra. To reach the Persian Gulf from the city of Basra would be very easy 
because of the proximity of this city.262 Nonetheless, no serious step towards using the Euphrates 
was suggested in this navigation plan. 
The first serious effort to use the Euphrates was made by Mr. Taylor and Davud Pasha, the 
governor of Bagdad. In brief, one of their important aims was to build a canal to link the 
Euphrates and the Tigris; another goal was to do some research to help make these rivers fit for 
navigation. Taylor appointed two British officers, Elliot and Ormsby, who were able to speak 
Arabic, to investigate the feasibility of these plans. Interestingly, Elliot was known as Dervish 
Ali, and Ormsby was known as Halil Aga in the region, and they continued their investigation 
under these identities.263   
In 1831, these two officers met Chesney, who was to implement the Euphrates project a few 
years later, in Bagdad. At that point, Chesney came down from Anah, a region in Iraq, to Faluja 
via the Euphrates; the distance travelled was 260 km. These three officers studied together and 
prepared maps and topographical drawings of the region.264 With all of these works the part of 
the investigation comprising the route from Mosul to Basra, had been completed. Afterwards, 
Elliot and Ormsby left Bagdad and started out on the research for the route going towards 
Damascus. They stopped at almost every harbour in Syria and additionally found a chance to 
inspect the overland routes of the region in detail. Lastly, these two officers also prepared 
another map of the region and Ormsby submitted this map to the authorities in Bombay in the 
June of 1832.265   
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After all these developments, Chesney started to come into prominence in the project to reach 
India via the easiest route. He first came to the Ottoman lands in 1829 to captain British war 
ships in the Black sea, to help the Ottomans who were at war with the Russians at that time.266 
However, the Russian army won the war and Chesney did not have a chance to use his 
experience in the navy. Although it was the end of the war, he did not immediately leave the 
Ottoman lands but began his studies on the Indian route via Egypt.   
Chesney arrived at Izmir on 5 April 1830 and from this city he travelled to Egypt. He met with 
Barker who had been studying the necessary elements for the applicability of the Egypt and 
Basra routes. This meeting was in Alexandria. Barker submitted his report which was related to 
both of these routes. The general aspects of the formation of Chesney’s project (which was to be 
implemented in 1835), had started to take shape as early as 1831. Indeed, Chesney seemed to be 
interested in both routes at the beginning. However, he began to take more interest in the 
Euphrates route on his return to England. Interestingly, Chesney met Ibrahim, the son of 
Mehmed Ali, during his journey to Egypt, in 1830, in Cairo. Even more interestingly, Chesney 
mentioned the possibility of the French opening the Suez Canal, which would connect the Red 
Sea with the Mediterranean, in 1869, 39 years earlier than the French project. Nevertheless, 
Chesney abandoned this plan when there was no progress made on it, and focused on the 
Euphrates project.267 It was for this reason he came to Jaffa. He started to investigate navigation 
via a route which at first included going to Alexandretta Port and then from there to Antioch and 
Aleppo; after these cities proceeding to Basra via the River Euphrates. In accordance with this 
purpose, he travelled three thousand two hundred kilometres on the Euphrates in open rafts, 
prepared drawings of the Euphrates, and wrote a report on the subject of river navigation for the 
House of Commons: subsequently he was selected for membership of the Royal Society in 
consideration of his services.268 Chesney’s reports were twelve articles which included the 
security of the route, his experiences during his journey from Aleppo to Basra, and a way for 
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steamships to make the journey. Chesney’s first plan was to go Alexandretta from Jaffa, and then 
to down to Basra via the Euphrates River from “Bir”, near Urfa, a city in the Ottoman Empire. 
He did a lot of research in the region and returned to Britain with his data, and in order to present 
his findings to the Government he started to write up his opinions about the Euphrates project.269   
He first sent his report to Stratford Canning, a diplomat who had recently worked in the Ottoman 
Empire on a special mission, Greek Question, and who at that time was in Paris. Canning was 
impressed by the report and sent it directly to Palmerston, the Foreign Minister. Chesney’s 
report, after being found interesting by other naval officers and British statesmen, eventually 
came to the notice of King William IV who was himself a sailor. Chesney, having gained the 
support of British public opinion and the King, began to focus even more on the project.270  
                           
4.2. How the Euphrates Project turned into an International Issue 
Because of the ‘Eastern Question’, the Euphrates project was not simply an Anglo-Ottoman 
affairs; Mehmed Ali Pasha and the Russians both had interests in it which had to be addressed by 
the Ottomans. The rebellion of Mehmed Ali, and soon after the signing of the Treaty of Unkiar 
Skelessi, led to irreversible changes in the diplomatic configuration of the region. When studying 
this change within the scope of the Euphrates project, the political and diplomatic circumstances 
become clear. First of all, the increasing British fear about a Russian danger for India as a result 
of Unkiar Skelessi caused them to take Chesney’s project on the Euphrates River, which was 
seen as the most important of the Indian routes up to that time, more seriously. As mentioned, the 
most important supporter for Chesney’s project was King William IV. The King negotiated face 
to face with Chesney in the atmosphere of the Unkiar Skelessi Treaty and referred to the effects 
of the possible threat of the Russians to India. He particularly suggested that Chesney properly 
investigate the political position of the Russian empire in the region.271 This meeting could 
indicate that the effects of the Unkiar Skelessi Treaty seemed to influence the King’s decision 
about the Euphrates Project. Moreover, according to a 1830s newspaper there was a strong 
public support for the Euphrates Project, not only to make the Indian route shorter but also to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269 This information can be found in; Captain, (Colonel) Chesney, Reports on the Navigation of the Euphrates, 
Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of London, Vol. 4, (1834). 	  
270Jones, Dorsey D. Jones, Chesney Chose the Euphrates Route, pp. 12-15.	  	  
271 Jones, Dorsey D., Chesney Chose the Euphrates Route, p. 12	  
93 
	  
	  
	  
neutralise Russian strength by enhancing British presence in the region.272 Following these 
developments, the two ships Euphrates and Tigris, which were to be used on the Euphrates 
River, were built in Liverpool. These two ships would first be operated on the river from Bir to 
Basra, 1140 miles. If the river was found to be suitable for navigation, steam ship journeys 
would be undertaken more frequently. The information the statesmen gave to the British public 
about this was that a promise had been obtained from both Mehmed Ali and the Sultan that 
security on the route would be assured.273   
Although the British policy makers represented the situation as above, obtaining the required 
permission to use the Euphrates River was not as easy as they made out. Indeed, this was a 
complex diplomatic issue which took a long time to resolve. The British proposal to use the river 
to get to India was carefully considered by Mahmud II and his ministers, even though they 
planned and wished to make Anglo-Ottoman relations much better as soon as possible, to fortify 
themselves against Mehmed Ali. This situation can be understood from the insistent British 
questions to the Ottomans for a proper response about the river navigation because they had not 
responded since the first British demand.274 When the British statesmen could not elicit an 
answer, they attempted another way to obtain the relevant permission to navigate the River. This 
was to use the biggest problem influencing diplomatic relations in the region at that time; the 
Mehmed Ali Pasha Question. The British bluffed that they had already negotiated with Mehmed 
Ali about reaching India via the shortest and easiest route and if the Ottomans would not give 
their permission to use the Euphrates route, then they would have to cooperate with Mehmed Ali 
because the Pasha had assured them that Britain could use the Egyptian route to reach India via 
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the Red Sea and had promised that British Ships would be aided and secure.275 When British 
politicians propounded this point, they possibly wanted to use Mahmud II’s weakness, which 
was his hatred for Mehmed Ali. They probably thought that the Sultan would prefer to give his 
permission to use the Euphrates rather than see an alliance struck between Britain and his rebel 
governor, Mehmed Ali, based on the river usage.   
However, the Ottomans stated that when they analysed the relationship between Mehmed Ali 
and England it seemed to them that the relationship between the two was not suitable for an 
application to use the Egyptian route.276 It can be deduced that the Ottomans’ statement meant 
that they were aware of the diplomatic situation and the British bluff about the support of 
Mehmed Ali on the Egyptian route. Clearly, the situation was not, as foreign scholars have 
portrayed, that the Ottomans were unaware of the diplomatic process and the games the 
European Powers played. On the contrary, they had full knowledge of the true intentions of the 
other powers. Moreover, Mehmed Ali Pasha monopolized Egyptian agricultural products and 
trade so it can be surmised that this situation was not one that Britain liked, because she had been 
seeking raw materials and markets since the Industrial Revolution. As a matter of fact, it was this 
kind of policy from Mehmed Ali that led Palmerston to hate him. Later on, Palmerston indicated 
that the Pasha was the one who succeeded in rebellion; furthermore, he said that the Pasha was 
“a tyrant and oppressor”.277 This successful analysis by the Ottomans of the true nature of the 
relationship between Britain and the Pasha enabled the Ottomans to realise that the British claim 
about negotiating support for the Indian route from Egypt was not true; on the contrary, it was a 
diversion. Thereupon, when the British policy makers saw their false claim designed to elicit the 
permission of the Sultan to use the Euphrates had not worked, they went a step further 
diplomatically - rather it appears to be a non-diplomatic attitude - and threatened the Ottomans 
that since the benefits of the route to the British Public living in both India and Britain were vital 
for the British government, then in order to protect these kinds of benefits they were prepared to 
do anything necessary within their powers.278     
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Thereupon, the Ottomans’ response became very severe and they stated that the request to use 
the Euphrates could only be made based upon the Anglo-Ottoman friendship since Mehmed Ali 
was merely a simple governor of the Empire. The implication was: “Who does he think he is, 
how dare Britain think to ask his permission for the Indian route!” and within this context the 
British ambassador was warned.279 This response of the Ottomans can be evaluated as more 
evidence that despite their need to strengthen a military alliance with Britain due to all the 
difficulties the Ottoman Empire was in, they still reacted negatively to Britain because of her 
attempt to threaten the Ottomans using Mehmed Ali; furthermore they were still seeking other 
ways which could be more beneficial for them. This severe response also showed that the 
Ottomans were still an active power in the diplomatic struggle in the region. It was also a 
message to the European powers that other powers could not carry out whatever policy they 
wished, but had to consider Ottoman policies before doing anything in the region. Nevertheless, 
the British stubbornly continued to implement the Euphrates project which had support right up 
as far as the King, and at the insistence of the British politicians, Sultan Mahmud, who had 
wanted all along to solve the Mehmed Ali problem by forming a military alliance with Britain, 
instructed his ministers to prepare a detailed report about the situation and the project. An 
important point to be mentioned at this stage is that according to the general narration of the 
development of events in English literature, whenever one of the great powers wanted the 
Ottomans to accept their offer about anything it seems that they immediately accepted without 
any investigation. In fact, what we have already seen from examining the Ottoman sources for 
the Mehmed Ali crisis applies here too, namely that the Ottomans were alive to the rivalries 
between the European Great Powers, and anxious to find ways of exploiting these in their own 
interests. The Sultan’s instruction to compile a report about the project was one of this kind of 
Ottoman strategy showing how active the Ottoman Empire was in the diplomatic struggle. In this 
respect, a while later, on 14 October 1835, this report was written and these subjects were raised: 
§ Britain had been taking a long route to reach India, her vital possession, in an eight month 
journey from the Atlantic Ocean via the Cape of Good Hope, travelling almost the half the world. 
§ This long journey had been a hardship for the British people in the late delivery of letters and 
also for the British public officers navigating between England and India.  
§ British politicians would like to solve all of these problems by using the Euphrates River, 
which would abbreviate the Indian route for them.  
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§ On the other hand, it could be stated that negotiating that kind of serious matter with a mere 
Ottoman Governor like Mehmed Ali was contrary to International Law. 
§ Nevertheless, applying this project would cause commerce to be rejuvenated in the region, and 
as a result of this, customs collected by the British merchants would increase. Furthermore, when 
the British economic and political benefits in the Ottoman lands increased, this situation would 
lead Britain to strengthen ties with the Ottoman Empire and this convergence could be used 
against Mehmed Ali and the Russians.280  
 
All of these articles show that the Ottomans were well aware of the developments around them 
and the tough conditions Britain endured related to reaching India. More importantly, the 
Ottomans had their own plans, for instance, by making commercial relationships with Britain 
better, they could use this commercial commitment with Britain for making military alliance 
against Mehmed Ali and the Russians when the need arose.      
These factors caused the Sultan to look favourably towards the Euphrates Project. However, 
there was also a Russian side to the diplomatic process of the project. As mentioned above, the 
Russian Empire was an ally of the Ottoman Empire even if it was just on paper. As such, the 
Russians wanted to get involved with the Euphrates Project. In the official letter which was sent 
from the Russian Ambassador in Paris to the Russian Ambassador in Istanbul in 17 December 
1834, it was stated that if the British demand about the Euphrates River had been accepted and 
applied, this situation would lead to enormous problems for the Ottoman Empire, and Britain 
would post military stations in the Ottoman lands, alleging for an excuse the need to protect 
British Ships and Public Officers.281 Moreover, in the same letter the Russian Ambassador 
mentioned that if Mehmed Ali Pasha had given permission for the use of the Egyptian route, in 
such a case Britain could use only corner borders of Egypt and therefore Britain would not be 
able to establish domination there. However, if the Ottomans gave permission to use the 
Euphrates River, in contrast, Britain would probably achieve domination both in the Ottoman 
lands and on the Ottoman Coasts with the River project. It is also stated in the same letter that the 
Russian Ambassador reported that the meeting between himself and the Ottoman ministers was 
positive, because he inferred from this meeting that the Ottomans would reject the British request 
about the project. In the light of this statement it could be understood that the Ottoman 
politicians were diplomatically successful in diverting the Russians from getting involved in the 
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project. The reason for this success was that the Ottoman statesmen were stalling the Russian 
ambassador, because at the same time, within this meeting, they were planning to accept the 
Euphrates project with the intention of improving Anglo-Ottoman relations. This diplomatic 
manoeuvre is another evidence for the main argument of the thesis; that the Ottomans made an 
alliance with the Russians, Unkiar Skelessi, to excite British fears about Russian plans in terms 
of India. It could be understood from this, that although the Russians were an ally of the 
Ottomans as a result of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, the Ottoman side was still seeking a way 
to reject Russian advice about the British demand to use the Euphrates River, and in addition to 
this the Ottomans were planning to make Britain their ally by accepting the project in spite of 
Russian opinion. All of these data show that Mahmud II’s plan, using Unkiar Skelessi, was only 
a diplomatic manoeuvre for the benefit of the Ottomans.   
After all these developments the project was taken more seriously by Britain, and in the July of 
1835, Palmerston demanded a meeting with Nuri Effendi who was the Ottoman formally 
commissioned to negotiate the Euphrates project and also an alliance between Britain and the 
Ottoman Empire.282 This development shows that the Sultan’s plan was working because the 
Euphrates project was the one vital matter that made the Anglo-Ottoman alliance possible, when, 
only two years ago it had been rejected by the same person, Palmerston. At the same time, the 
British Ambassador to Istanbul, Ponsonby, informed the British public that (as mentioned above 
on one of the Ottoman documents) the reason for the belated permission to implement the project 
was Russian pressure on the Ottomans.283 Interestingly, the Ottoman ambassadors were 
monitoring the British Press on the Anglo-Ottoman relationship in relation to the Euphrates 
project. In this context, in one Ottoman document it was mentioned that after reviewing the 
British newspapers’ it was seen that the British public saw the Russians as the most important 
difficulty for the Euphrates project because of the proximity of Russia to the Ottoman lands.284 It 
was mentioned on the same document that it was difficult to obtain permission to use the 
Euphrates; soon it was even mentioned in the British newspapers that the implementation of the 
project was probably impossible because of the Russians! Despite all of this negative news, the 
British Press was attempting to keep the project in the public eye by making up news about it.285 
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It can be seen on the same document that the delay in permission from the Sultan was deemed 
normal according to the British Press because the British government was neglecting to support 
the Ottomans against the Russians. For this reason, according to the British Press, war ships 
should be sent to the Dardanelles and the Ottoman government informed that these British war 
ships would be a guarantee for the Ottomans in the case of a Russian attack after permission was 
granted for the project.286 All of these documents are vital, and provide a very good opportunity, 
for the proper understanding of the main argument of this chapter. The Ottomans, however, were 
beginning to convert British public opinion from a negative attitude about the political and 
diplomatic position of the Ottomans with the Russian Empire, to a positive one, using the 
Euphrates project. In addition to this point, the other important point that can be inferred from 
these documents is that it is clear the Ottomans were not unaware of the political and diplomatic 
conditions the other Powers were in, as shown in narratives by foreign scholars who were 
following the these developments very closely.  
On the other hand, there was opposition within the Ottoman Government to the project. The 
most important person with this view was the Sadrazam, the Prime minister. He warned the 
Sultan that if the Sultan gave permission for the project, Britain would make other demands of 
the Ottoman Empire, such as the combination of the rivers Euphrates and Tigris, and the 
establishment of British security lines along both sides of the rivers.287 Another member of this 
opposition was Nuri Effendi, who was on duty in London. He wrote a report about the current 
political atmosphere in London on the project. His report was quite interesting because it was 
more evidence that the Ottoman ministers had their own opinions about the diplomatic 
developments and they were not simply puppets in the international arena. He mentioned that the 
Sultan should not give permission for the project because from his point of view the British 
politicians seemed helpful and friendly initially but in fact were only considering their own 
benefits. In this respect, they wanted to use the project only for British interests and the 
Ottomans would suffer as a result. He also mentioned that Palmerston was hostile towards the 
Russians and he had wanted to declare war on them, and would include the Ottomans in this war 
and this situation would damage the Empire.288  Despite these opponents, there was an important 
support to the Euphrates project from Namık Pasha, the Ambassador to London. He thought that 
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the project would be very beneficial for both sides. According to him, the Ottomans would earn a 
lot of money by it, and if the route which was going to India passed through the Ottoman lands, 
customs revenue would quickly increase. Therefore, from his point of view the Sultan should 
give permission to Britain to use the Euphrates.289  
After all these developments, Sultan Mahmud II evaluated the project in detail and lastly asked 
the opinion of the governor of Bagdad, Ali Pasha. He responded that the project would lead to 
the clearing and widening of the Euphrates and this would stimulate trade in the region.290 
Subsequently, the Sultan saw the project as an intermediate step which would lead to the Anglo-
Ottoman alliance he needed to fortify against Mehmed Ali, and he decided to give permission to 
Britain for the Euphrates project in the autumn of 1835.291             
In 1835 a large ship, named The George Canning, departed from the Liverpool Harbour towards 
Alexandretta carrying two ships, The Euphrates and The Tigris, which were to be operated on 
the Euphrates. They weighed 300 tons. Some of the officers voyaging with the George Canning 
Ship recorded that,  
“fifteen Officers, every one of them distinguished by eminent scientific, literary, or professional 
attainments; twenty picked artillerymen, chiefly artificers, six enginemen, seven Liverpool 
blacksmiths, and two interpreters, are engaged in the expedition, in all fifty persons, under the 
command of Colonel Chesney, of the Royal Artillery."292  
 
However, Chesney faced many difficulties when he arrived at the Ottoman lands. At first, the 
governor of Antakya, a city in the South, stopped Chesney and his convoy from landing at 
Antakya. They landed under favour of a British warship.293 The reason for these kinds of 
problems was understood later on: that the Governor of Birecik reported to Istanbul that the 
British officials had tried to commandeer local supplies: some camels, carriages and hinnies in 
order to transfer the parts of the two ships, the Euphrates and the Tigris. After this report, the 
Ottoman government gave instruction to the governor that if the British officials did not stop 
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behaving like this towards the Ottoman public soon, he would cancel permission for the 
project.294 After that he notified Chesney of this government order.  
Another vital problem for the project was Mehmed Ali. In contrast to the promise given by 
Mehmed Ali about supporting Britain in the project to reach India, Pasha created some 
difficulties in the transfer of the pieces of both ships to Birecik, and this situation was 
complained about to Istanbul.295 In addition to this, many events did not go as planned and 
required. The most important of these were problems following the route, and with the water 
depth of the Euphrates River, and local tribes, called Aneze Arabs, attacked the British officers. 
These attacks were complained about to the Ottoman Government on the September of 1835.296 
Just after this complaint, in the same months, the rescript was given by Mahmud II which 
ordered that necessary precautions should be taken against rebel tribes.297 Despite this command, 
attacks from the tribes continued. In spite of all of these problems the assembly of the pieces of 
the ships was successfully completed. Nevertheless, in a report which was drawn up by the 
governor of Bagdad, Ali Pasha, on 9 February 1837, it was stated that one of the ships, The 
Euphrates, had foundered on its first sailing and the other one, The Tigris, although it was able to 
reach Basra and return to Bagdad, could not be sailed on the rest of the route. As a result, this 
report was duly submitted to the British Ambassador in Bagdad by the mariners of the ship.298    
Consequently, it can be understood from this chapter in the light of the Ottoman documents 
relevant to the Euphrates Project, that the Ottomans were not passive players in the region during 
the process because despite all the difficult situations they were having at that time, they did not 
accept all British and Russian requests about the Euphrates Project without deliberating matters 
from the point of view of Ottoman benefits. More importantly, they played their own diplomatic 
games and produced their own policies, to work to turn the negative developments in terms of 
the Ottoman profits, into positive ones.                      
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Mahmud and his statesmen’s Diplomatic Harvest Season after all their efforts to win 
British cooperation 
 
With the beginning of 1834 the new relative position of the parties in the Anglo-Ottoman 
relationship had started to become more apparent. When looking at this new position from the 
point of view of the Ottomans, the most significant factors to examine are Mahmud’s diplomatic 
manoeuvres, such as those of the summoning of the Russian Navy Power to the Bosporus and 
the much-disputed Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. Another bold diplomatic move was to be added to 
these shrewd diplomatic tactics was with the British attempt in 1835, when she wanted to request 
permission for the use of the Euphrates Route, which entailed passing through the entire length 
of the Ottoman lands, to reach India, her biggest possession, much more quickly, via the shortest 
possible route. As could be guessed, this British desire was another chance for Mahmud to 
implement his real aim, which was to secure a military alliance with Britain to assist him in 
combatting his rebel governor, Mehmed Ali. After all these manoeuvres from Mahmud, British 
policy towards the Ottoman Empire seemed to undergo a radical change; this was particularly 
visible in the revised attitude of the famous British Foreign Minister, Palmerston. As a matter of 
fact, many international scholars of history have conducted detailed studies of this British policy 
change, but they have universally neglected to study the degree of Mahmud’s and his 
statesmen’s role in this change, owing to a failure to avail themselves of the Ottoman record of 
events. Naturally, this omission has brought about a one-sided narration of the period. This is the 
reason that the previous chapters of this thesis have been endeavouring to reveal this account of 
affairs and reveal the Sultan’s role in matters based on the Ottoman primary sources up to this 
point. This chapter will examine in detail both these issues: what were the effects of Mahmud’s 
diplomatic mentioned manoeuvres on the Anglo-Ottoman relationship in the period 1834 to 
1836, and also what other policies did Mahmud and his statesmen follow in those years in order 
to facilitate the forging of an Anglo-Ottoman military alliance so they would be better able to 
resist all their enemies in the region.  
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5.1. 1834-1835 developments 
The most significant development in 1834-35 was the Euphrates project. Although all the details 
of this project are examined thoroughly in one of the thesis’s earlier chapters, it could be said 
with respect to this chapter that although the Ottoman statesmen had tried to not to show their 
true colours to the Russians at the beginning of the process because of the clauses in Unkiar 
Skelessi299, Mahmud eventually gave his permission for this project despite all the opposition 
from Russia, which was trying to use all its privileges of presence in the Ottoman lands which 
had arisen from the Unkiar Skelessi treaty, to prevent the British from achieving their aim in this 
matter. As can be imagined, the Sultan’s permission in favour of the British negatively affected 
the Ottoman-Russian relationship. This permission given by the Sultan became a somewhat 
negative blueprint for future diplomatic relations between Mahmud and Nicholas.300 Another 
remarkable aspect of this process was that Mehmed Ali also tried to exploit this project for his 
own plans just as Mahmud had. In this respect, he played a double game. He indicated to 
Palmerston that he really wanted to cooperate with the British in this project but was tied hand 
and foot since he was only a simple governor, and it was the Sultan who was preventing him 
from helping the British with the project.301 At the same time, we also know from his statement 
to the Russian translator in Alexandria that he thought that the Euphrates project was totally 
unacceptable.302 The Ottoman diplomats reported this state of affairs to Mahmud and informed 
him that Mehmed Ali was expecting to profit in either event: whether Britain was going to 
triumph over Russia’s wishes in this competition over access to the Euphrates; or Russia had its 
way.303  
In 1835, the Ottoman documents indicated that relations between the Sultan and his rebel 
governor were getting more and more volatile with every passing day, and on both sides  their 
open hostility was becoming daily more apparent. Mehmed Ali had planned for his ambitions in 
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this direction – a complete independence from the Sultan – to come to fruition in this year. To 
make matters worse, Mahmud’s fears over the treaty of Kütahya had begun to come true. As a 
result of Mehmed Ali’s political attack, Mahmud thought that it would be wise to accelerate his 
diplomatic solution-seeking with the European powers, particularly Britain. In this context, he 
ordered his statesmen that they should obtain the opinions and attitudes of the British and French 
ambassadors about their opinion on Mehmed Ali’s latest attack by requesting an official letter 
from them.304 Upon receiving this instruction, the Foreign Minister replied that he intended to 
request this letter from Ponsonby. However, before he could do this, Ponsonby actually sent a 
letter by himself through his translator which spontaneously brought up the subject. He stated in 
his letter that Mehmed Ali’s demand for independence was a sheer fantasy and his government 
would neither accept it nor conform to it.305 In fact, the indications were that this attempt of 
Mehmed Ali’s had started to show his true colours since the last period of 1834. Rodkey 
indicated on this topic that: 
“In October, 1834, after Campbell had warned the foreign office of serious intentions on the part 
of Mehmed Alito declare himself independent, Palmerston warned the Pasha in no uncertain terms 
not to disturb the status quo.”306  
 
Right after that the French translator brought a letter from the French ambassador about the same 
issue, which stated that the French government did not accept the legitimacy of this demand. 
However, the Ottoman Foreign Minister was not as completely satisfied with the French 
communication as he was with the British one. He gave as a reason for this, that the French 
Ambassador also advised in his letter that the Ottoman Empire should not make any military 
advance towards Mehmed Ali. After this, the French Ambassador was told that the Ottoman 
Empire did not have any malevolent intentions and he was officially warned about his last letter. 
In response he stated that the sentiments he had expressed in the letter were merely a reflection 
of the instructions which he had been given by his government, however he strongly believed 
that the Ottoman Empire did not harbour ill-will against Egypt and therefore he apologised for 
any offence the letter may have caused.307 The hard-line warning obligated the French 
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Ambassador to concede his position and demur. To add to the opinions conveyed by these 
ambassadors, the Austrian Ambassador also presented a letter of the Austrian government’s 
views about the same issue, and just like the British and French Ambassadors he did it of his 
own accord.308 Mahmud was pleased with these explanations of the ambassadors since it meant 
he no longer felt so diplomatically isolated against his insubordinate governor, and with the help 
of this support, he could compensate for his army’s weakness and inexperience with his abilities 
in diplomacy and politics, as he had done in the past to combat the seemingly insurmountable 
domestic issues of the Empire.309 As a result of his endeavours, it seemed that the diplomatic 
developments of 1835 had started to take a turn for the better. One other example for this came 
from Prince Metternich’s instruction to the Austrian ambassador to London, Prince Esterhazy.  
Namık Pasha was in London at that time, to negotiate the latest developments in Anglo-Ottoman 
relations after the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. Esterhazy showed the instruction to Namık Pasha 
whereupon the Pasha reported to the Sultan and informed him about it immediately, on 3 May 
1835.310 Metternich explained in the instruction that Austria had always stood up for the 
territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and from this point of view Mehmed Ali’s real aim of 
independence from that empire, which had now come to light, should never be accepted. The 
most important information in the instruction was that Metternich had intercepted a secret 
document informing him that Mehmed Ali had organized a revolt in Albania, via the governor of 
Crete: Mustafa Pasha. Esterhazy told Namık Pasha that Metternich had already informed the 
British Foreign Minister of the situation and requested that the British and Austrian ambassadors 
to Alexandria, Albania, Crete, and Greece, should be kept abreast of all the latest developments 
and should not be allowed, under any circumstances, to contact Mehmed Ali about this 
dangerous attempt.311 When Namık Pasha learned of Metternich’s talking with the Minister with 
respect to defending the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the Sultan’s authority 
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over it, he saw this situation as an opportunity to elucidate the Ottoman points of view once 
more. So he went to talk to the Foreign Minister about the subject. He explained that if Britain 
put pressure on Mehmed Ali and tried to ignite within him once again the desire to obey his 
sovereign and abandon his destructive rebellion against central government, he strongly believed 
that Mehmed Ali would not attempt to oppose Britain in the matter.312   This last diplomatic 
strategy was very likely to lead to another important development towards success, which was a 
thought that pleased Mahmud, since it seemed that diplomatic support from the European powers 
was in his favour now.  
Despite all these positive developments, there was another major difficulty with which Mahmud 
had to contend. The problem was with the city of Damascus. Damascus was a critically 
important Ottoman city but it was now under Mehmed Ali’s control. Under Mahmud’s direction 
the Ottoman statesmen had undertaken some discreet activities to rescue Damascus, but the 
British government did not have a favourable attitude towards any forcible intervention in this 
city since they thought that any possible crisis in the Ottoman lands might give the Russians an 
opportunity to exploit the incident to their advantage using the new rights that had arisen from 
the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. Consequently, because of the British sensitivity over Russian 
policy, Mahmud did not want the British to know about the Ottoman activities in the region, at 
least in the beginning. However, Britain came to hear of the Ottomans’ latest activities in 
Damascus, and Palmerston sent a despatch about it to both Ponsonby and Colonel Campbell.313 
As a matter of fact, this was prepared after Mehmed Ali’s complaints to the British. This is 
interesting because Mehmed Ali appears to have made a decision to induce the British via 
diplomatic ways to agree with the rightfulness of his struggle, just as his sovereign Mahmud had 
done. This despatch contained some complaints about these latest Ottoman activities in the 
region, firstly conveying that the British government was aware of the Ottomans’ secret activities 
in Damascus to try to circumvent a revolution from Mehmed Ali, but the Ottoman power in this 
city was not currently sufficient to successfully achieve any such thing. Secondly, they were also 
well aware that the Sultan had ordered for preparations to start with a view to establishing an 
army (from the districts, which were under the control of the central government, and at Reşid 
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Pasha’s command) for the purpose of attacking Mehmed Ali.314 The Ottoman statesmen 
responded immediately to the British claims. They said that firstly, the central government had 
not been provoking any kind of revolution in Damascus as had been asserted. The last revolution 
had occurred as a result of the cruelty and atrocities of Mehmed Ali and his son, Ibrahim Pasha, 
towards the public in Damascus. However, if there were any Ottoman soldiers in Damascus, it 
was to force the Egyptian soldiers to withdraw, back to their boundaries, because although Urfa 
and Rakka were Ottoman cities and not under the control of Mehmed Ali, they were under the 
occupation of his army at that moment. The Ottoman statesmen wanted the British statesmen to 
evaluate the Ottoman activities in Damascus in this way.315 As previously examined, they were 
trying to conceal their real purposes for being there and at least gain some time. They also stated 
clearly that they had legitimate reasons behind the recent increase in Ottoman activities against 
Mehmed Ali. One of them was that Mehmed Ali had stopped paying his taxes to the central 
government.316 Mahmud probably took this as a signal that Mehmed Ali had made a decision to 
accelerate the process of acquiring his independence. This Ottoman statement seems to have 
changed the British mind on the matter, since Colonel Campbell subsequently met with Mehmed 
Ali and impressed upon him, in the name of The British government, those exact points which 
Mahmud had hoped and wished would be suggested by the British.  As a matter of fact, prior to 
this last situation, Palmerston felt that he himself, as a result of Mahmud’s risky manoeuvres, 
should have prevented the Sultan from being dominated in his own lands, since a Balkanised 
Ottoman Empire could have been dominated by Russia much more easily, an eventuality he 
wished to avoid. On October 1834, he communicated his opinion about this to Campbell, and 
explained to him about the kinds of cities which Mehmed Ali had been trying to enlarge his 
province by occupying. Rodkey explains this situation in more detail thus: 
“To sever from the Ottoman Empire the  vast and fertile provinces held by Mehemet Ali, the British 
foreign secretary maintained, "would not only trench deeply upon the integrity of the Turkish 
Empire, but would fatally impair its independence. "Instead of encouraging the Viceroy in his 
ambitions, Palmerston strongly recommended that he should evacuate Orfa and Diarbekir, and pay 
the tribute that he owed to the Sultan.”317 
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When Campbell spoke to Mehmed Ali on the matter he told him that his wisest course of action 
would be to become a submissive and capitulatory governor to his sovereign, Mahmud II. 
Campbell added that if he were to co-operate in this way, he would be safe from any possible 
attack or seizure. Most importantly, Campbell indicated that the King of Great Britain was a 
close friend and ally of the Sultan, and the King had been calling most emphatically for the 
continued territorial integrity and stability of the Ottoman Empire in every respect and had long 
considered this to be the key factor in European peace and security, hence, the King would never 
consent to the division or weakening of the Ottoman Empire. Campbell also mentioned that the 
King also would not allow the Ottomans to be hurt, nor would he allow Mehmed Ali to proclaim 
his independence since this ambition was irrational, inadvisable and detrimental to European 
stability. Campbell concluded his meeting with Mehmed Ali with three points: firstly, that he 
should have to calm down and try to be an obedient governor; secondly, he should pay the 
necessary taxes as agreed according to the treaty of Kutahya; and thirdly, he should immediately 
withdraw his army from Urfa and Rakka, where he had no right to be since these cities were not 
under his control.318  This advice from Britain would have been a stunning blow to Mehmed Ali 
because he had been striving to induce the European powers to accept his struggle’s legitimacy, 
just as Mahmud had been doing, to promote his own cause. Since this last negotiation with the 
British about Damascus had started badly following his rebel governor’s complaints to Britain 
about him, it is easy to see that Mahmud must have been extremely pleased with the way events 
were turning out. However, events had turned once again into an even more positive outlook for 
the Sultan. In their doing so, the Sultan, so to speak, ‘killed two birds with one stone’. The first 
benefit achieved was that Mehmed Ali in his approach had debased himself in the sight of the 
British. In one sense, it could be said that ‘the hunter had become the hunted’. The second 
benefit, it transpired, was that in contrasting with his governor, Mahmud actually reinforced his 
requests in the eyes of the British about collaboration with the English to solve the problem.      
France, which had now started to act in tandem with Britain in the Eastern Question, wanted to 
get involved in the Damascus issue as well. Although France seemed to have acted as an ally of 
Britain in solving the Mehmed Ali problem after the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, it could not be 
expected from her to change her policies with respect to Mehmed Ali that easily, since she had 
been a source of strength and support for the governor ever since the beginning of his campaign. 
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In France’s previous dealings in the matter, whenever she became involved with the problem, 
she ‘played a double game’, at one time in opposition to Mehmed Ali and at another time in his 
favour, and this approach had been most vexatious to the Ottomans.319 
The same thing happened in connection with the Damascus issue. France sent a motion to her 
ambassador to Alexandria, Bigos, and this motion was shown to Mavroyeni, the charge d'affaires 
of the Ottoman Empire to Vienna, by the French ambassador to Vienna.320 There were two 
aspects to it. The first one was saying to Mehmed Ali that the Egyptian soldiers should be 
immediately withdrawn from Urfa and Rakka and in addition to this; he pay the taxes of Egypt, 
Crete, and Damascus to the central government.  
The second aspect of the message was of concern for the Ottoman Empire. It was saying that the 
central government should have lessened its preoccupation with Damascus and concentrated its 
efforts on achieving what was necessary with the treaty of Kütahya. As previously indicated, this 
approach annoyed the Ottomans once more. Mavroyeni declared that the allegations the French 
were making were nonsensical and had no basis in fact. Mavroyeni also said something 
uncomplimentary about Mehmed Ali in the light of the latest developments. He asserted that in 
his opinion the governor had destroyed his dignity in the eyes of the European powers because of 
his overambitious aspirations and blatant deceit.321 
Mavroyeni also went on to make further scathing comments on the subject of Mehmed Ali; that 
he was destitute of foresight and very inexperienced in terms of the European Powers’ policies. 
Mavroyeni also met with Metternich about this issue and mentioned his complaints to the 
British, and thereafter went on to discuss the comments of Britain and France about Damascus. 
Metternich stated on these issues that Mehmed Ali’s complaints were extremely inconvenient. 
He also said that he ordered his ambassador to go to Alexandria in order to protest and his 
ambassador warned the governor even more sternly than had the British and the French. He 
lastly said to Mavroyeni that Mehmed Ali had attempted to make some complaints about his 
sovereign as well but according to Metternich that was a grave error because the Austrians had to 
honour the sovereignty rights of the Sultan in compliance with their administrative principles. 
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Mavroyeni said that he sent a motion, indicating his rejection of Mehmed Ali’s complaints, to his 
ambassador to Istanbul.322    
Following on from all of these developments, Mahmud found one more opportunity to develop 
increased intimacy with the British, which was prudent because he badly wanted to conclude this 
potentially disastrous matter within the shortest possible time. The opportunity was provided by 
the need to improve economic relations, and this was to culminate in the forging of the treaty of 
Balta Limani on 16 August 1838.323 Before these economic negotiations were made, an 
important economic incident had taken place between the Ottomans, the British and Mehmed 
Ali. The details of the matter were that, after the termination of the Levant Company in 1826, 
there was no obstacle arising within British legislation that limited their trading with the 
immense and fertile Ottoman lands. However, there was a negative side, which was called “7 
Vahid”.  The Ottoman economy had always been closed ever since the establishment of the 
Empire, which meant that the State had to grant permission regarding the import of all goods. At 
first, the exportation of goods was not so highly regulated, as the State did not have to give 
permission for every export. The majority of these items were salt, all kind of pulses, and 
gunpowder, flour, spices and sugar.324 However, in 1826 Mahmud banned seven goods from 
exportation. These forbidden items were called the “7 Vahid”. The British merchants were 
dismayed by this prohibition, and so they complained about this troublesome situation to their 
Ambassador.325 Mahmud realised that this demand from the British merchants could be used in 
solving the Mehmed Ali problem, and negotiations over this matter commenced in the 1830s. 
However, it seemed that Mehmed Ali would not relinquish his control over these monopolies in 
his region that easily. In 1835, Mehmed Ali took the step of prohibiting the British merchants 
from trading in silk in Damascus. Following this development, Ponsonby appealed to the Sultan 
for termination of Mehmed Ali’s monopoly on these items.326 The translator of the British 
Embassy, Pizani, visited the Reis Effendi, the Ottoman Foreign Minister, to negotiate this issue. 
In the meeting, the Reis Effendi asked about the reason for which the courier, who came to the 
British Embassy a few days ago, had been sent. Pizani responded that the Foreign Minister had 
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sent an official letter, to communicate the fact that Mehmed Ali was denying any commerce 
involving Damascus silk to the British merchants based on 7 Vahid, and the Minister was 
demanding a rescript from the Sultan on this issue.327 Thereupon the Reis Effendi requested an 
official declaratory letter from Ponsonby. Subsequently, in response, Ponsonby presented two 
official letters, explaining the situation. Ponsonby stated in these letters that if these prohibitions 
were coming from the central government, Istanbul, although this decision’s meaning was 
contrary to the rapport between both countries, they could not deny that this was a right of the 
Ottoman government. However, if Mehmed Ali had made this decision without asking the 
central government, he did not have a right to act in contravention with the international treaties 
and principles; in fact, nor did he even have the power to make such a decision. Ponsonby added 
that if the situation was indeed as he suspected, he demanded that the Pasha be dismissed from 
his position for raising difficulties for the British merchants, and also that all the tariffs which 
had caused the merchants such difficulty and expense be revoked.328 In response, the Reis 
Effendi advocated to the Sultan that it would be a necessary course of action to submit a rescript, 
one which proclaimed that Mehmed Ali’s decisions and actions had been without the proper 
knowledge and permission of the central government, and they knew and accepted that these 
kinds of decisions were adverse to the friendship between the countries.329  
This incident was appears to have been a good opportunity for Mahmud and his statesmen to 
seize in order to sharpen the unpleasant emotions and feelings of hostility between the British 
and Mehmed Ali. In this context, the Reis Effendi asked Pizani a critical question: what would 
happen if Mehmed Ali did not obey the Sultan’s orders? Would the British statesmen complain 
that the rescript was useless and think the Sultan’s orders impotent, or would they attempt to 
rescue British commerce in the region from Mehmed Ali’s arbitrary rulings, by enforcing the 
rescript and obligating the Pasha to fulfil what it instructed?330 This question was a roundabout 
way for the Sultan to pose his real enquiry; which was whether Britain would intervene with 
military force against Mehmed Ali when more and more conditions indicating the prudence of 
this intervention had been cropping up with every passing day.  
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The Reis Effendi’s question was found to be a significant question and Pizani said that he should 
let Ponsonby know about it. The following day, Pizani reported back that Ponsonby had said that 
the question was quite clear and to the point but he had also indicated that he needed more time 
to ponder upon it.331 He sent the response only four days later saying that if the governor toes the 
line they would indeed be indebted to the Sultan. Otherwise, if he were to oppose the order, there 
would be only one reason from Ponsonby’s point of view. In this respect, he touched upon a 
quite interesting and unimagined aspect of the situation. According to Ponsonby the reason was 
Russia. He explained that diplomatic relations between the Pasha and the Russians were in very 
good shape. He also said on this topic that because of this he and his government were very well 
aware that the Pasha had been making concession eleven percent extra  to the Russian merchants, 
and therefore, if he insisted on contravening the rescript, they would perceive it as disobedience 
to his Sovereign for the sake of the Russians. Ponsonby went on to say that in such a case we 
would have to think very carefully about what we could do to help against Mehmed Ali without 
adversely affecting the Ottoman interests.332 After Ponsonby’s response, it was decided that if 
the rescript were to be given to the British, then they would be the ones to contend with Mehmed 
Ali since it was obvious that his prohibitions made them very angry. In addition to this, when the 
British merchants obtained extra trading privileges in the region and so rose head and shoulders 
above the merchants of the other European powers, the British nation and state would feel the 
warmest appreciation of the Ottomans. At the end of his report Reis Effendi stated that this 
rescript was vital because by way of it, they would be able to provide the stimulus the British 
needed in order to exercise their power over the Pasha, and also it might even provide cause for 
Britain to wipe out his army and even his existence.333 Mahmud’s men seemed to be as 
enthusiastic to gain British cooperation against the renegade governor as was Mahmud.   
In this regard, one of the most encouraging pieces of news with respect to this cooperation came 
from Nuri Effendi, the Ottoman ambassador at London. He had met with Palmerston on 14 July 
1835, and reported that prior to this meeting with the Foreign Minister he was well aware that the 
debated article of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi had deeply hurt the British and as a result of this 
situation, the Anglo-Ottoman alliance might be only possible with the Russian repulsion of the 
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British.334 He therefore said that he had seen fit to have a word with Palmerston about the 
Russians in order to lead up to discussing the Egypt problem. In this context, he stated that he 
had heard something about the Russians but he could not verify whether the information was true 
or false due to the fact that he had not received any news from Istanbul for two weeks. He had 
heard that there were a few articles in the newspapers to the effect that some Russian war ships 
in the Black Sea had started to make certain preparations. He asked Palmerston about whether he 
had any information concerning this news or not.335 Palmerston responded that he did not know 
about this situation; however he knew that twenty thousand Russian soldiers were on the road to 
the Castle of Silistra through Moldova and since the castle was under the control of the Russians 
this would potentially cause much harm. Palmerston then started to talk, in fact complain, about 
the Russians’ position in Istanbul and as one might expect, these complaints were a welcome 
sound to Mahmud’s ears, since Palmerston’s complaining like this was evidence that his 
manoeuvres had really started to properly bear fruit. Palmerston opened the dialogue by saying 
that the Russian ambassador had been playing a very active role in Istanbul and interfering with 
Ottoman administrative and diplomatic affairs.  He also stated that in these circumstances, how 
could it be asserted that the Ottoman Empire was an independent country with this Russian 
penetration in the Ottoman lands? He also proffered that while the Russians were continuing 
with their influence in Istanbul, how were the British at the same time supposed to be aiding the 
Ottoman Empire? After this frank exchange of views Palmerston stated, just as Mahmud had 
expected, that if the Ottomans had been feigning to be an allied country with the Russians 
because of any feeling that they had no other source of help, Britain would be the guarantor for 
the Ottomans that neither the Russians nor Mehmed Ali would be able to damage the Ottoman 
Empire so long as the British Maritime power was in the Mediterranean Sea.336  
This offer of Palmerston’s shows an explicit change in the British policy in 1835 concerning the 
Eastern Question when compared to the period before 1833. Baker clearly expresses the main 
aims of the British policy after the Unkiar Skelessi when he writes: 
“The two chief aims of British policy in this quarter from 1833 to 1839 were, first, to prevent a 
renewal of Russian intervention in Turkish affairs, and eventually to destroy the Russian sole 
protector ship of Turkey acquired in the treaty of 8 July; and secondly, to maintain the peace 
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between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali by dissuading both from attempting any measure which might 
led to a renewal of hostilities.”337        
 
After Palmerston had spoken, Nuri’s response was that there was no indulgence of the Ottoman 
Empire or any other reason related to it concerning the Russian control of the Castle of Silistra. 
According to Nuri Effendi’s explanation of affairs, sometimes calamities happen and as a result 
of these the Russians captured the castle. However, he could also reassure him that the Ottoman 
statesmen had been making great efforts day and night under the guidance of the Sultan to 
reform and regenerate the Empire and it was manifestly clear that after these reforms had been 
enacted they would soon be able to recapture the Castle.338  
In fact, Palmerston had been taking the reform of the Ottoman Empire very seriously as it was 
the only way to rescue the Empire from her enemies, particularly the Russians, and he fully 
appreciated the efforts the Ottomans were putting in to enhance the Empire. Rodkey’s comments 
on this topic are: 
“Henceforth until the renewal of war between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt in 1839 
Palmerston consistently counselled the Turkish government to keep the peacein the Levant in order 
that it might succeed with its plans for military and administrative reorganisation, and on more 
than one occasion he took practical steps to further Ottoman Reform. Late in 1835 he instructed 
Ponsonby to exhort the Turkish ministers to pursue “with increasing energy and perseverance that 
wise system of organization – military, naval, financial, and administrative”- which had already 
been so successfully begun.”339      
 
Nuri also said something useful about Palmerston’s words with regard to the Russian hegemony 
in Istanbul. He said that they had to make the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi as a result of Mehmed 
Ali’s rebellion because of the immediate necessity of an alliance with another power to fortify 
the Empire against the problem. At this stage of the meeting Nuri Effendi indicated – in 
accordance with the Sultan’s plan – that they had really desired to make an alliance with Britain. 
He added that if the British sponsored the Ottomans in every aspect, Mehmed Ali would have to 
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revert back his old position and accept the supremacy of the Sultan and thus the suspicions and 
uncertainties arising from the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi would be laid to rest.340  
It seems Palmerston in the meeting was much clearer this time with an Ottoman official on the 
Russian issue, so much so that he replied to Nuri’s words by saying; 
“We do not have anything further to say about Unkiar Skelessi for now; when we war with the 
Russians we will ask Istanbul and get the answer, there is no problem with that. The problem is 
what does Russian hegemony in Istanbul really mean? Even I have a proof in this matter. Although 
the Ottoman Empire had an intention to acquire 30 Russian officers to use them in the training of 
the Ottoman army, the Russian ambassador learned of this situation and restrained the Ottomans 
from doing that. Instead of doing that, if some British officers went to Istanbul, they would be able 
to reform the Ottoman Army very quickly and by this means the Ottoman Empire could gain an 
edge over both Russia and Mehmed Ali. I am making this suggestion since Britain really only 
desires for the Ottoman Empire to have power, strength, glory, and stateliness. In this respect, the 
King only feels partiality and deep love to the Sultan.”341  
 
Interestingly, after Palmerston had spoken thus he added that because of King William’s 
sympathy with Mahmud, he would like to send five horses to the Sultan as a gift, via a ship 
which was to take Lord Lambton to Petersburg, and Palmerston even intimated that he had 
chosen the horses with his own hands. Most interestingly, he mentioned that these horses were 
not so valuable themselves in financial terms but they would be a strong evidence to show 
Mehmed Ali and the Russians that Britain would stand by the Ottomans’ side in all 
circumstances.342 Mahmud was satisfied with the King’s gift and he sent a letter to William to 
thank him for it. Mahmud also thanked William for his country’s hospitality and the 
compliments to Nuri Effendi he had received.343 Mahmud was very pleased by this situation and 
he saw it as another occasion which had further improved the Anglo-Ottoman relationship. 
 
When Nuri Effendi was convinced that everything was going well in London, he reported that 
they should use praising and encouraging language much more with the British and at the same 
time more critical and adverse language with the Russians from then on. The reason for that was, 
he continued, that Britain had always behaved with extreme favour to the Ottomans. For 
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example, the last serious attempt Mehmed Ali made to declare and announce his independence to 
all the European powers, as examined above in detail, had been prohibited by Britain’s actions 
and this support could not be forgotten. On the other hand, the Russians had always been an 
enemy and generally brought trouble on the Ottomans from Nuri Effendi’s point of view. Owing 
to these circumstances, he mentioned, how could they prefer the Russians to the British? He also 
recounted Palmerston’s words about the Russian ambassador’s penetration into Istanbul and said 
that it was as clear as day that all grace and respect shown to him so far had been simulation, as 
if the Ottomans were a friend nation to the Russians, according to the appearance of the existing 
conditions.344  
Nuri mentioned another current and significant topic to Palmerston in their meeting: that when 
Mehmed Ali gave up all hope of British support, he had fallen back upon the Russians and 
therefore, he continued, if Britain took sides with the Ottoman Empire, Mehmed Ali would 
abandon Damascus and go back to his previous boundaries and as a result of this situation the 
Sultan would enhance the power of his rulership.345 Nuri was another Ottoman diplomat, who 
raised the Damascus Question. He added that if Mehmed Ali could be given a hard time in 
Damascus, the Damascus public would pay more attention to the prosperity and safety in the 
other Ottoman regions under the favour of the Sultan’s domination and this state of affairs would 
be conducive to establishing a volunteer army against Mehmed Ali from out of the Damascus 
public. In response, Palmerston said that they knew well that the Damascus public was 
complaining about the central government in the beginning, however, when they saw Mehmed 
Ali’s oppression, they would recognize and understand the value of the Sultan and decide to get 
rid of Mehmed Ali. After he had said this, when Nuri stated that it would be difficult to recapture 
Damascus from the Pasha at that moment, Palmerston responded that it would be very easy from 
the British point of view; however, first of all, the Ottoman statesmen should retire to ponder on 
the issue and later on they could reconvene to negotiate the topic further.346 It was another 
positive development for Mahmud because Palmerston had previously, at the outset, rejected the 
prospect of any Ottoman intervention in Damascus. However, just a moment ago, he had been 
talking about the ease of an operation in Damascus, despite the fact that he had been saying it 
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was not the right time at present. This was another change in the direction of British foreign 
policy and it could be taken as yet another success by Mahmud with his diplomatic policies. 
 After his many negotiations in London, Nuri Effendi was replaced by Mustafa Reşid Pasha, who 
was already in Paris in the capacity of the Ottoman ambassador. He was regularly sending 
detailed reports about the diplomatic atmosphere in Europe and the main character of these 
reports was that they were pro-British. Palmerston wrote a laudatory letter to the Sultan about 
both of the Ottoman diplomats.347 Palmerston was very happy with Reşid’s assignment to 
London because he knew very well how hard the Ottoman ambassador was trying to win 
acceptance for the Anglo-Ottoman cooperation in the region against their common enemies, 
Russia and Mehmed Ali.348 Palmerston stated about these assignments that: 
 “I would like to declare my pleasure with the letter of the Sultan with respect to the assignment of 
Mr. Reşid and also express my thanks about it to you, the Sultan. I would also like to express how 
very pleased I am with Mr. Reşid’s being sent to London vested as he is with extraordinary powers. 
All negotiations and correspondences with the Ottoman Empire, which are to be done through Mr 
Reşid, would be affected very positively, and are likely to develop the relationship between both 
friend countries daily. As a matter of fact, I want the Sultan to know that both the King and the 
British government are very sincere in their desire to improve and enhance this long standing 
friendship. For my part, I will do my best in order to maintain this historic relationship between the 
two countries. I also want to add a point about Nuri Effendi’s great efforts in London. He has done 
his utmost to increase the value of both his Sultan and his country in the eyes of the British Public. 
I would like to declare that I am sure he will strive as well to defend and protect his Sultan’s and 
his country’s rights in the presence of the French”349.  
  
It is interesting to compare these flowery words with Webster’s record: 
“Nourri Pasha, had no French and Palmerston found him an “oaf” on whom he could make no 
impression.”350 
In best orientalist fashion, Palmerston wrote that: 
“Nourri is a greasy stupid old Turk, without an idea in his head” “A perfect nullity with whom it is 
impossible to get on at all. He is like a Turk in a melodrama on the stage: one of Bluebeard’s 
attendants.”351 
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We have here a perfect vignette of British orientalism in practice. On the one hand Palmerston 
uses the most effusive language possible when writing to the Ottomans, as he thought it what 
they liked, but in private he revealed the contemptuous attitude which marked his own attitude, 
and those of so many other Westerners to the ‘Turk’. Such attitudes all fed into an 
underestimation of the diplomacy and policy of the Sultan, which is why the story from the 
Ottoman archives needs to be told. It at least counters the view that ‘greasy Turks’ were too 
‘stupid’ to have a policy. The British may just have been too arrogant to have seen what it was. 
 
Webster also explained, with great expertise, about the vital importance of the Sultan in the 
diplomatic process in that the following; 
“The representatives of all these states at Constantinople endeavoured by bribery and by the use of 
the favourites and indirect methods of approach to get past the official machinery to the source of 
power and decision, the Sultan himself.”352    
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5.2. 1835-1836 developments 
Since the beginning of 1835, the most prominent name in Anglo-Ottoman relations from 
amongst the Ottoman statesmen was that of Mustafa Reşid Pasha.353 He had taken a very active 
role in trying to solve the Mehmed Ali problem and because of this, he was consigned many 
times as an ambassador to London and Paris by Mahmud, and ultimately promoted to the rank of 
Foreign Minister of the Empire. He had made great efforts towards striking an alliance with 
Britain against Mehmed Ali, as had his highness Mahmud. When his efforts in this direction are 
properly appreciated, it is clear that from Mahmud’s point of view, he was just the right person, 
as, too, was Namık Pasha, to implement his diplomatic plan. In these years of intensive activity, 
Reşid Pasha negotiated with the most significant characters in European diplomacy, such as 
Palmerston and Metternich, to solve the problem using diplomatic channels. In his efforts to 
achieve this end, he sent many detailed reports to Mahmud and these reports are a vital part of 
the whole picture, for those who wish to examine the Ottoman diplomatic efforts in solving the 
problem in 1835 and 1836. One of his longer reports reveals very well that the supposedly close 
relationship with Russia in the 1833 and 1834 was only sham in order to get Britain on the 
Ottoman side. This hidden agenda was expounded upon after the diplomatic processes arising 
from Unkiar Skelessi, once Mahmud was convinced that the British had sufficiently well grasped 
the great importance that the Ottomans held in relation to their interests, and felt alarmed that 
there might be a possible danger of Russian hegemony in the Ottoman lands. At this time, he 
decided that it was the right moment to desist from the appearance of wishing to cooperate with 
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the Tsar and his Empire. This was the purpose for which he sent Reşid Pasha to Europe: to 
examine how suitable the diplomatic environment was for his desired Anglo-Ottoman alliance. 
In his report,354 on 24 January 1836, Reşid communicated after an extensive depiction of the 
diplomatic atmosphere in Europe that it was quite obvious that the British were an enemy of 
Russia. Their attitudes and policies as they had last professed with respect to the enduring 
continuity of the Ottoman territorial integrity, were above any suspicion. He also stated that they 
totally detested Mehmed Ali under the present circumstances, and the only reason they did not 
want an intervention against this “uncouth” governor at that particular conjuncture was that they 
did not want the Ottomans to be involved in any conflict in Egypt until possible developments in 
Anglo-Russian rivalry were more apparent.355 Otherwise, according to Reşid, it was certain that 
the British would never abandon the Ottomans to face their problem alone once they had 
conciliated the British friendship. As a matter of fact, he said, the only figure that had 
antagonized the whole of Europe, including Austria, was that of the British. He also mentioned 
that the British were the enforcers of French cooperation with other European powers in terms of 
the Russian question. Reşid Pasha interestingly analysed France’s position in this diplomatic 
process in detail, which shows the Ottoman opinion about the French attitudes in the Easter 
Question. From Reşid Pasha’s point of view, French statesmen were “renegade” and 
“unreliable” people. He did add, however, that despite the fact that it was very well understood 
by all European powers how much Mehmed Ali was “trickster, tyrant, and cruel” person, there 
were various groups of the French people who still continued to support him. Also, in some of 
their opinions, the Muslim people were not deemed worthy of supporting. Furthermore, these 
French people think that France should have sided with Russia in the region since the current 
problem in the region was a British problem in terms of the British interests in India. There was 
no profit or loss for France if they were to interfere in someone else’s problem with Britain. 
According to Reşid’s report, these people went so far as to declare these kinds of opinions in the 
French Parliament “worthless” and also publish their views as articles in the French newspapers. 
Reşid added that there was a rumour that evens the King, Charles X, was prone to be friendly 
with the Russians, however, as long as this dichotomy continued amongst the French public, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
354 BOA, File No: 1190, Document No: 46885.	  
355 BOA, File No: 1190, Document No: 46885. 
	  
120 
	  
	  
	  
these political groups would not be able to succeed, and on the contrary, this kind of attitude to 
international affairs might even cause a revolution in France.356   
Having imparted this detailed description, Reşid Pasha then presented to the Sultan his analysis 
with regard to the then current sit 
uation pertaining to European diplomacy, together with his predictions about possible 
developments that might occur in the very near future. This analysis is vital to the understanding 
of the Ottoman diplomatic approach, Reşid’s considerable ability, and to appreciate how well 
aware, as an Ottoman diplomat, he was of the diplomatic arena in Europe at the time. He acted as 
Mahmud’s right hand, his ears and his eyes, helping to determine the Ottoman diplomatic 
policies.357 It is easier to itemise these analyses in order to see the whole picture in a condensed 
form. Reşid Pasha described the following in his extensive report:  
a) There was a serious issue in European diplomacy in the form of a reinstatement of the rights of 
the Polish, based on the treaty of Vienna. This issue was being discussed in the newspapers and 
in many other forums in Europe. It was even an issue that was raised by Charles X in his 
official speech. Despite all this discussion on the subject, it appears that the Russians refrained 
from even making a mention of the matter, perhaps due to an arrogance of character. It is a 
fact that this situation caused a day by day increase in tension in Europe. Within this context, 
there was also an on-going rumour that the Austrians were starting to keep their distance from 
the Russians. As a result of this, they had been making discreet and subtle diplomatic 
connections with the British and the French: there are many long articles to that effect on this 
topic in Europe.  
b) Nor were the Prussian-Russian relationships very strong either. Although there was a strong 
bond between the Prussian King and the Tsar due to a longstanding close affinity, conversely, 
the relations between each state’s military officials and civil servants were in a bad way.  
c) The Tsar was disappointed in the Austrian Kaiser since he did not attain the results or attitude 
he had expected to receive from the Kaiser, who had displayed an aggressive attitude towards 
the Tsar in their last meeting. This animosity might be used to the advantage of the Ottoman 
interests, with their problem.  
d) Britain had gained, for a while, a commitment from France to cooperate with the British so 
French statesmen would be unlikely to voluntarily break this alliance, and would continue to 
act in harmony with the British over the Eastern Question.  
e) Another vital item on the agenda concerning the Eastern Question was in that which was 
mentioned above: that the latest Austrian inclination seemed to have turned in favour of the 
side of the British and French. In parallel with this development, and as a matter of course, 
Austrian attitudes and policies with respect to Ottoman affairs had substantially changed. For 
this reason, it was crucial that the Austrian policies related to the East should be examined 
closely and in meticulous detail. Austria had a military strength both at sea and on land as had 
Britain. Because of this, all the European powers were keeping a careful eye on Austrian 
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policies since they knew well that whichever party could get Austria on their side would have 
procured a head start on this alliance.  
f) The most significant aim in terms of the Ottoman benefits was that of gaining British support. 
Britain was far more important than the other powers for the Ottoman Empire and therefore it 
made sense to work all the harder to get the British on the Ottoman side. In order to implement 
this aim, Ponsonby, the British ambassador to Istanbul, and the Ottoman ambassador to 
London should be used. Obtainment was also important in terms of the position of the French 
in the Eastern Question. As mentioned above, France depended on Britain in the Eastern 
Question and there were many factions in France so it was impossible for all of them to unite 
in the same party on the side of the Ottoman Empire. However, if the Ottomans could make an 
alliance with Britain, in that case, France would have to agree with whatever the British 
determined. 
g) Cooperation with Britain would be very useful and beneficial in solving the Mehmed Ali 
problem as well as the Greek Question, which would all be for the greater good of the Ottoman 
Empire.  
h) As mentioned above, the Austrian policies in respect of Eastern affairs should be examined in 
detail to understand whether their position favoured the British and the French side or was on 
the Russian side as it had been in the past. However, this aim seems to be very difficult when 
the only conduit for this information was through the Austrian ambassador to Istanbul or the 
Charge D'affaires to Vienna, Mavroyeni. To join these two for talks, a new Ottoman 
ambassador would have to be assigned to Vienna. This person must be master of Ottoman 
diplomacy and well versed in the matter at hand. Also he should be charismatic and 
persuasive, to win Metternich over completely. The importance of this mission did not depend 
on the course of events since, even supposing that in spite of the fact that this ambassador 
would have done his duty by following his official instructions precisely, if the Austrian had 
taken his side with Russia, this situation does not detract from the significance of his duty. The 
reason for this was that Vienna was the centre of the Europe, so it is possible, via the 
ambassador’s reports, to keep abreast of all the latest developments in European affairs at that 
time. For instance, if the relations between the countries become more strained and there was 
an outbreak of war, when Austria engaged alongside of Britain and France, in this case, The 
Ottoman Empire would be in a position to act upon these conditions. If, On the other hand, 
Austria continued to act on the side of the Russians as she always had done in the past, in this 
case, the ambassador could inform, second by second, the major capitals of Istanbul, London, 
and Paris about the developments from Vienna. Lastly, if no war broke out, in this case, the 
ambassador could not only continue his endeavours to persuade Metternich to place his 
country’s allegiance with the Ottoman side, but also he could examine the Austrian industrial 
and education system as a model in order to help guide the reforms planned for the Ottoman’s 
industrial and education systems.358 
 
As can be seen in this long and detailed report from Reşid Pasha, Mahmud and his top diplomat 
Reşid decided the time was right to disassociate themselves from all connections with the 
Russians and reveal the true extent of Mahmud’s real plan, which had been ongoing since the 
beginning of the Mehmed Ali problem. This report also comprehensively covers all the 
developments in the latest attitudes of the European powers in the Eastern Question at that time. 
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Reşid also alerted the Sultan at the end of his report to the fact that there was an item of news it 
would be pertinent to convey: that, even if it had not been printed prominently in the newspapers, 
Britain had started swiftly and avidly to prepare her navy. Furthermore, the French shipyards 
were also running at full capacity, very probably in preparation for the possible event of war. 
As a matter of fact, Reşid was right about his words because Nuri Effendi reported from London 
that the French diplomat, Monsieur Dothraki, who had previously been on duty as a French 
Charge D'affaires in Istanbul, was appointed to London as a special and secret official.359 Nuri 
deduced that Dothraki must have had a secret mission since there was already a French 
Ambassador in London and there had have been a reason for his appointment there. When Nuri 
suspected that in all probability Dothraki’s secret mission might well be pertinent to the 
Ottomans, he started to investigate to find out everything he could about the real aim of his 
mission. After a thorough investigation, he learned that Dothraki had met with Palmerston to 
negotiate over the Ottoman affairs.360 According to Nuri’s informant, Dothraki had expressed to 
Palmerston that British support for the Ottomans might possibly result in backfiring on the 
British interests in the region. The French diplomat brought forward some reasons to reinforce 
his opinion about this topic. In this respect he said to Palmerston that although Mahmud had 
given permission for the Euphrates project, problems might well arise with respect to this 
privilege later on. He continued that the other thing was that since the British had favoured and 
supported to the Ottomans in every aspect, it was sure that this assisted power of the Ottomans 
was to go in the Russians’ favour. Dothraki interestingly offered Palmerston the idea that if the 
British abandoned its discountenance of Egypt and Mehmed Ali, France could promise to 
support them as a friendly an allied nation which would enhance commerce with Egypt and 
Damascus.361 This offer discloses how Reşid Pasha was right in his determinations about the 
existence of the division between different parties in France with regard to Eastern affairs, since 
although some of them seemed like they had been acting jointly with the British in supporting 
the Ottomans, some of them had been still trying to mould public opinion in Europe in favour of 
Mehmed Ali as they had done in the first days of his rebellion. It also shows a possibility that has 
already been covered and will continue to be discussed in the chapters ahead, Mehmed Ali had 
been endeavouring to play diplomatic games to get the British on his side as his sovereign 
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Mahmud had been doing, and there is a distinct possibility that he might previously have made a 
deal with the French to induce the British to agree to this alliance against Mahmud and his 
government’s interests and wishes. 
There was somebody else, who had strong evidences and connections with regard to the newly 
emerging anti-Russia atmosphere in Europe, which Reşid Pasha had detected. It was Fethi Pasha, 
the Ottoman Ambassador to Vienna. He met with the British Ambassador to Vienna.362 Fethi 
Pasha stated that he was instructed to ask the ambassador this question: whether, if Russia 
showed its hand and declared war against the Ottoman Empire, in this case, would Austria 
comply with Britain and take the Ottomans’ side, or she would continue to support the Russians?  
After hearing this question, the British Ambassador responded that he had formally posed the 
same question to Metternich in person only two days ago.  Metternich stated that from his point 
of view the good relations between the Ottomans and the Russians so far showed they had been 
acting in favour the Ottoman Empire’s survival and prosperity, What is more, he also said that 
from that day forward, if any hostile act was perpetrated by the Russians against the Ottoman 
Empire, he officially promised that Austria was pledged to act jointly with Britain against Russia 
by sending her soldiers and maritime power in support of the Ottoman Empire. The ambassador 
said that he reported this answer to his government in London. In response, Fethi Pasha pressed 
the Ambassador to respond whether or not there was any current preparation for a possible war 
against Russia. The Ambassador replied that this kind of news about this topic was only 
fraudulent rumour concocted by the newspapers and there was certainly not any preparation for a 
war.363 
After conveying the Ambassador’s words to the Sultan, Fethi stated in his report that it was 
obvious that if any kind of war broke out, Britain and her allied states would send their naval 
power to the Black Sea through the Baltic Sea and they would land their troops there. After that, 
Fethi stated the most welcome words that Mahmud could have wished to hear: that any possible 
damage to the Ottoman Empire’s dignity and prestige would mean harm to the British policies 
and interests in the region. He also added that Austria was not in favour of any kind of situation 
like this developing either since Austria has very long borders between their country and the 
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Ottoman Empire.364 These last diplomatic negotiations show once more the European powers’ 
true attitudes and feelings about Russia and Mehmed Ali coming out with each passing day.                  
There was one person who had been acting in opposition to the Ottoman statesmen with respect 
to Anglo-Russian relations. It was Durham, the British ambassador in St. Petersburg between 
1835 and1837. He had been striving to persuade his government, particularly Palmerston, that 
the Russians did not have any plans to take over the Ottoman lands: this was in contradiction to 
all the Ottoman’s diplomatic attempts to create an impression in London with respect to Russian 
expansionism. Bolsover stated about this effort of Durham’s that  
“Durham reported from St. Petersburg that Russia possessed neither the will nor the 
means to seize Constantinople”365 
 
Nevertheless, there was an anti-Russian coalition in place, in opposition to Durham’s views; it 
was in the form of the Ottoman diplomats’ efforts in London, such as those of Namık Pasha, 
Mustafa Reşid, Nuri Effendi, and the British diplomat’s work in favour of the Ottomans, such as 
Urquhart and Ponsonby. Bell has expounded upon this anti-Russian coalition from the point of 
view of the British in reporting: 
“But the flirtation (Anglo-Russian based on Durham’s attempts) had to be exceedingly discreet, for 
many Englishmen, and some very influential ones, were bound to be censorious. The King, for 
example, and Lord Ponsonby, the British ambassador at the Porte, were violent Russophobes. The 
Tory opposition were inclined to treat any apparent complaisance to the Tsar as compromising 
England’s dignity: the merchants to regard it as betokening forgetfulness of their interests in the 
East. And, more to be considered still, there were the radicals, both in and out of parliament, with 
whom tsar-baiting was a favourite sport.”366 
 
All these positive developments with respect to the anti-Russian and anti-Mehmed Ali 
atmosphere in London were getting Mahmud and his statesmen’s hopes up about the possibility 
of an alliance with Britain against all their enemies. In this respect, he notified the Sultan from 
London that when he met with Palmerston, the Minister had smothered him with kindness. Nuri 
added that this kindness might be an indication that his thoughts about the Ottoman Empire were 
becoming more positive and amenable, and because of this he would not be surprised if 
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Palmerston assisted them with full co-operation in every aspect thereafter. Nuri Effendi also 
interestingly suggested that if he and his colleagues could subtly indicate their expectation from 
Britain of an alliance to Palmerston and his colleagues, they would be able to complete the 
diplomatic process which had been instigated in order to get Britain in their side. He closed his 
message with the suggestion that if he had a rescript which contained negative sentiments 
towards the Russians, this would be very likely to strengthen his hand.367 All of these reports 
from various envoys show that Mahmud and his statesmen had been carrying on executing their 
diplomatic strategies with no small success, and Mahmud’s men seemed to be as eager to play 
their part in the game as much as was Mahmud. Meanwhile, a translation of an article which had 
been published in a British newspaper was presented to Mahmud on 15 February 1836.368 It 
showed that the Ottoman diplomats had been following very closely the trends of British public 
opinion in relation to the Eastern Question. This article is also useful to illustrate the change in 
the British public opinion in terms of the Ottomans after Unkiar Skelessi. It was expressed in the 
article that the latest news from the Ottoman lands indicated that Mehmed Ali Pasha had started 
to develop an intimacy with the Russians. This latest development showed that the balance of 
power in the region had started to shift. Nuri Effendi also reported from London on this subject 
that the British realised that Mehmed Ali had started gravitate towards the Russians and 
therefore, the British would never give any support to him upon any account.369 In fact, the 
British had been most averse to the possibility of an alliance in the region between Russia and 
Mehmed Ali. Rodkey explains this situation very clearly when he says: 
“Englishmen insisted that Russia was pursuing an aggressive policy in Turkey, they were 
apprehensive of Russia-Egyptian co-operation for the partition of the Near East, and they seriously 
feared the extension of Russian influence in the direction of India.”370 
 
The article also mentioned that Britain had been mistaken in the formulation and implementation 
of its Eastern policies. These unsuccessful policies had vitiated the penetration of Britain in the 
East and they had also damaged Britain’s reputation in the international arena. Therefore, the 
reasons that the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi had been seen to be necessary should be negotiated 
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over with the Ottoman Empire as soon as possible. It was obvious that the errors committed on 
both sides would be made manifestly clear after the negotiations, and when they did, it was an 
obligation upon Britain that she strive to rectify these mistakes as soon as she could. The article 
also said that it was an absolute necessity that if Russia continued to insist on carrying out those 
policies in the Ottoman lands which had occurred as privileges of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, 
Britain should declare war on Russia. However, according to the article, the British government 
had been avoiding committing itself to any real action towards effectively solving the problem, 
and had been contenting itself with merely a set of meaningless negotiations and ineffectual 
words. The article also touched upon Mehmed Ali’s commercial prohibitions, and these have 
been mentioned above. From the point of view of the article, in order to re-establish the Sultan’s 
domination and influence in Damascus and Egypt, Britain had to help the Sultan as if the 
Ottoman Empire was indeed the long-time friend and ally that the British statesmen had been 
insisting was true for such a long time. In doing so, Britain would rescue the Ottoman public 
from the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi which could be used by Russia for the occupation of the 
Ottoman lands and subsequent oppression of the Muslim people. This article is quite interesting 
since it is telling the British public how Mahmud had been striving to impress his ideas upon 
them using his diplomatic manoeuvres. Clearly these diplomatic efforts had started to get noticed 
and prompt some advantageous responses. 
After all the developments previously described, Eastern affairs came to be considered a much 
more serious topic by the British press, especially in the years that followed. In particular, some 
British diplomats were conducting a campaign in the press in an attempt to change public 
opinion to the detriment of the Russians and at the same time recommend the opportunities for 
Britain to build bridges with the Ottomans by supporting them against Mehmed Ali and Russia. 
They proposed that this course of action would bear results favourable to British interests; such 
as greatly improved British prestige in the East; Russian advances in the region would be 
thwarted and then British influence would be promoted in the Ottoman lands. As a result of these 
better Anglo-Ottoman relations, British merchants would be able to trade with much greater ease 
in the Ottoman lands than that which was now possible. It was a number of British ministers who 
were conducting this campaign: Lamb has indicated in his article that these people were not only 
ordinary people; there were also amongst them some pillars of British political life. Lamb has 
neatly summarised this topic in saying: 
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“It has long been recognized that the immense growth of hostility towards Russia displayed by the 
British press in the 1830s was largely the result of a deliberate campaign organized by a few 
ardent Russophobes. Contemporaries singled out David Urquhart as the main, if not the only, 
instigator, but historians have recognized that others were intimately involved; they have generally 
included Sir John McNeill and James Baillie Fraser as leading participants. The British 
ambassador at Constantinople, Viscount Ponsonby; the private secretary to the king, Sir Herbert 
Taylor; and the foreign secretary, Viscount Palmerston, have all been regarded as having some 
connection with the campaign, but there has not been agreement about the extent of their 
involvement”371         
 
Mahmud, who saw that his plan was starting to work, on 19 May 1836 ordered his diplomats that 
an official notification should be made and sent via a secret letter to Ponsonby to the effect that 
Damascus should be liberated from Mehmed Ali and reverted back to the Ottoman’s domination, 
and in order to do that, British ministers should be persuaded to act.372 In response to this order, 
the Ottoman ambassador to Paris met with Palmerston. Palmerston said that he and his 
government were aware that Mehmed Ali had been damaging the Ottoman Empire and 
tyrannizing the Ottoman public in Damascus and for this reason it was an indispensable thing to 
disentangle Damascus from the rebel governor. The ambassador reported to Istanbul after he met 
with Palmerston that there were some the tell-tale signs that British ministers realised Mehmed 
Ali had endangered the British interests in the region, and their support to the Ottoman Empire 
could be expected against the governor. He also stated that despite all these developments in the 
British public in the Ottoman’s favour, he was afraid that the result may well end up consisting 
of only some palliative words and some empty negotiations instead of the military operation 
against Mehmed Ali that was needed, as had happened in the past.373 Thereupon Madmud gave 
orders to the ambassador that this situation should not be left in the hands of the British ministers 
since these days were absolutely critical to the survival of his country and last time they had 
done that it had damaged the Ottoman image in the eyes of the British government. Instead of 
this, he should watch the British ministers did very closely and when the right time came he 
should act according to circumstances.374 Mahmud’s warnings are quite interesting because as it 
is explained in previous chapters, he had previously not hold back from saying to the British that 
he wasn’t here just to listen to flowery speeches from them: he needed to see some action. That 
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same person who heard these words before was now acting very responsibly this time, and 
because of this the Sultan believed that he was close to obtaining his goal, and thought that 
nothing and nobody could have ruined his plan.  
In conclusion, it is fair to say that in the light of the all mentioned developments in 1834, 1835, 
and 1836, these three years were the most gratifying ones for Mahmud and his statesmen in that 
they receive the fruits of their labour after all their diplomatic efforts to turn the British public 
from an anti-Ottoman attitude to a pro-Ottoman one, stemming from the time when Palmerston 
and his government rejected Mahmud’s request for an alliance in the early months of 1833. It 
could be said, in the light of the conclusion of the earlier examination of this matter, that they 
had been successful in their quest to facilitate this alliance, particularly subsequent to the 
beginning of 1835. The reason for this was that the Eastern Question – the Ottomans, the 
Russians, and Mehmed Ali – had become a highly controversial topic on the agenda of the 
European Powers. The developments with respect to the problems faced by the Sultan did indeed 
appear to be for the good of the Ottomans, especially in Britain, Austria, and France, despite the 
fact that the French had been playing double game, falling in line with the policy set by the 
British when in fact their loyalties lay elsewhere. Above all other European powers, the majority 
of the British public realised the enormous danger and substantial damages, from the point of 
view of British interests in the region, that could potentially come from both the Russians and 
Mehmed Ali. Meanwhile, the negotiations about Anglo-Ottoman commercial issues had already 
started between both countries’ diplomats. As will be meticulously scrutinized in the following 
chapter, this process was to eventually give rise to the Treaty of Balta Limani, on 16 August 
1838.    
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CHAPTER SIX 
British public opinion, change and Balta Limani 
 
From Mahmud’s point of view the diplomatic developments in 1837 and 1838 were a precursor 
to the last stage of the Mehmed Ali problem, even though there were many perturbing diplomatic 
incidents in this period to impede his plans. In 1838, Mahmud now had far more hope that he 
would be able to resolve the problem in its entirety solely through the cooperation of the British, 
than he had had when his envoy Namık Pasha reported from London in 1833 that the Sultan’s 
request to forge an alliance with the British had been rejected by Palmerston and the government. 
However, a lot of positive diplomatic developments had happened between 1833 and 1838 and 
the diplomatic conditions were completely different in 1838 from the way they had been in 
1833.In the first days of Palmerston’s new position in the Foreign Office he was not well-
disposed towards Eastern affairs because of some other domestic and overseas problems, and 
thus the British had been too preoccupied to help. Now, their attitude had completely changed 
with respect to Eastern affairs and Palmerston seemed to be very anxious to defend the Sultan’s 
sovereignty rights and assist with the reforming and enhancement process of the Ottoman 
Empire. In this context, which is examined in every aspect in a separate chapter, the number of 
British people who were assuming a role in the commercial, social, and military life of the 
Ottoman Empire, had increased, due to Palmerston’s encouragement through his work on 
Foreign Office policy. Despite these positive developments there were still some obstacles, for 
the British merchants to their trade in the Ottoman lands which arose from the economic 
structure of the Ottoman Empire. They had frequently petitioned their government through 
Ponsonby for the resolution of these problems, a fact which will be examined in the following 
parts of the chapter. All of these complaints led to a negotiation process between the Ottoman 
Empire and Britain over these economic issues. At this stage, an intersection point appeared for 
both Mahmud and Palmerston. It was the Mehmed Ali problem. From Palmerston’s point of 
view, this problem could have been used to induce Mahmud to enter into a commercial treaty, 
one which would solve the British merchants’ problems. In addition to this, Palmerston also had 
some diplomatic and political intentions, which will be indicated above, through this possible 
treaty. From Mahmud’s point of view, this demand of Palmerston’s was his opportunity, to play 
his last diplomatic card with the treaty of Balta Limani, which was the result of this negotiation 
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process, before he undertook the biggest battle with Mehmed Ali. This chapter first of all will 
look at the positive developments, from the point of view of Mahmud’s plan, in the British 
public with respect to the Ottoman Empire; subsequently the diplomatic process which occurred 
around the treaty of Balta Limani will be the main focus of study, including its economic results 
on the Ottoman economy.      
 
6.1. The diplomatic developments in 1837  
1837 was another hugely rewarding year, just as 1835 and 1836 had been, in terms of Mahmud 
and his statesmen’s reaping the fruits of their labour after all their diplomatic efforts to turn the 
tide of British public opinion from an anti-Ottoman feeling to pro-Ottoman one, following 
Palmerston’s and his government’s rejection of Mahmud’s request for help in the form of an 
alliance in the early months of 1833. As previously examined, it could be said that they had been 
successful in their efforts, particularly from the beginning of 1835. The reason for this was that 
the Eastern Question (the Ottomans, the Russians, and Mehmed Ali) had become a highly 
controversial topic on the European Power’s agenda. As mentioned above, overall the 
international developments with respect to the problem seemed to be for the good of the 
Ottomans, especially in Britain, Austria, and France. This was despite the fact that the French 
had merely been appearing to go along with the British policies whilst in reality they were 
playing a double game since, at the same time, they were actually continuing to actively support 
Mehmed Ali.375 However, the majority of the British public realised the enormous danger and 
substantial damages that could ensue from the activities of both the Russians and Mehmed Ali 
from the point of view of British interests in the region. There is an article from 1837 which can 
be given by way of an example of this, which prompted the British politicians to adopt a much 
more prudent attitude in handling Eastern affairs. This column was published in The Morning 
Post, a British newspaper. As a matter of fact, originally it was a letter, one which had been sent 
to London for publication in the British media.376 It was sent from Istanbul on 18 October 1837, 
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  Mahmud gave orders to his diplomats, primarily Mustafa Reşid Pasha, even in 1833 at the beginning of the 
Mehmed Ali problem, that some articles in favour of the Ottomans should be printed in the British press through 
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and was published on 14 November 1837.377 A translation of the article was even presented to 
the Sultan. The article was complaining about how slowly the British realisation with respect to 
the importance of the events in the East had dawned upon them. According to the article, Britain 
had only just grasped the true import of the developments in the East: much later than the other 
European powers had, even though Britain was the country that should have been much more 
aware, since British influence was so pertinent to Eastern affairs. As a result of this delayed 
realisation, in the beginning, Britain had even supported Mehmed Ali. Fortunately, the article 
says, Britain quickly desisted from this error of judgement. The article went on to give some 
background information about what the longstanding Russian aims and ambitions had been, with 
respect to occupancy of the Ottoman lands, ever since Peter the Great, and about French double-
dealing in the Eastern Question. The most important message of the article was that Britain 
should have been more active and staunch allies to the Ottomans in the problem than the French 
and the Russians had been and should have supported the Ottomans in every respect to 
strengthen and enhance the Ottoman Empire much more readily. This would have been more 
appropriate coming from them, bearing in mind the longstanding amicable relationship between 
the two countries, not to mention the benefit such loyal action would have carried for the British 
interests. Furthermore, the article went on to say that they should have immediately made efforts 
to rescue Mahmud and his Empire from Mehmed Ali, and to save them from additional sources 
of “aggression” from other actors in the region.378    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
some British journalists and in exchange for money. This situation is a good example of how Mahmud was 
considering his diplomatic plans from every angle, and it seems that with this order he was attempting to create an 
infrastructure for a more positive atmosphere in British public opinion with respect to his Empire. He knew that it 
would be useful, when he eventually dared to pitch the last battle against his rebel governor, to gain the support of 
the British politicians through the influence the British public had on them. See this order   BOA, File No: 907 
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chapter.)  	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378 Of course a few British were still in favour of Mehmed Ali, and there was some news sympathetic to him to be 
found in the British media, such as an interview with Mehmed Ali, which was published in The Morning Post on 2 
November 1837. However, the interviewer was in fact not British, he was a German nobleman, Prince Puckler 
Muskau, but his interview, which was published in a British newspaper, was presenting Mehmed Ali to the British 
public as a romantic and meek Eastern man. Nevertheless, as examined in detail in these chapters, the King, 
Palmerston, many British statesmen and many merchants who had been trading with the East, and their families first 
and foremost were thinking positively about the Ottomans and believed that there were many potential benefits in 
improved relations with Eastern society. What these possible benefits were, that the British had been expecting, 
could be summarily given like this: the protection of British interests in India; maintenance of the British prestige in 
the East; diplomatic, political, and strategic benefits and position in the region; prolongation of the long standing 
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In addition to this literature in the press, there were also some reports and letters which were 
written by some British residents in the East, based on their own observations. These had been 
coming in to Palmerston from the Eastern lands, and they were mostly concerning Mehmed Ali’s 
negative sides. Arthur T. Holroyd’s letter to Palmerston can be given as an example of this kind 
of information. Holroyd explained in detail the Pasha’s methods in military and administrative 
matters in his extensive letter. He took great pains to describe them thus: 
“It is the opinion of most travellers who are conversant with Egypt that the country never was in 
such an unfortunate state as at present. The rich valley of the Nile, whose productions are amply 
sufficient for a much larger population than can now be found, is almost entirely monopolized by 
Mahomed Ali. His selfish and oppressive system of government has reduced his subjects to the most 
abject slavery. His exorbitant demands for replenishing his army, to satisfy his cruel and ambitious 
projects, have removed from their native soil most of the effective labourers; and many of the 
peasants, who were not serviceable for the army, have been torn from their homes, separated for 
ever from their wives and families, and compelled to drag on a miserable and toilsome existence in 
his arsenal. His governors or deputies pillage the Fellah of the little that should remain after the 
demands of the Pasha are satisfied, and he is driven to despair in answering the calls of him and 
his local authorities.”379  
 
With all these positive developments manifesting in the British public, Mahmud was to give, 
with a commercial treaty in 1838, what the British government had been expecting from the 
improved relations with the Ottoman Empire. He and his best diplomat Mustafa Reşid were 
hoping to use this commercial treaty to implement their diplomatic and political plans.  
 
6.2. The Treaty of Balta Limani in the Context of the Mehmed Ali Problem 
The treaty of Balta Limani was signed on 16 August 1838 between the Ottoman Empire and 
Britain at Mustafa Reşid Pasha’s villa. He was one of Mahmud’s biggest supporters in 
implementing the Anglo-Ottoman cooperation against his rebel governor. Before explaining 
what the treaty’s economic effects were on the Ottoman economy, the diplomatic reasons which 
led to the signing of the treaty need to be examined.  
As mentioned earlier, in 1838 Mahmud started to feel that his army was ready for the last battle, 
especially after the improvements he had been able to make between 1833 and 1838 on his army 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
European peace which had been in place since the Congress of Vienna; holding back the Russians from their 
ambitions; the extensive commercial potentials in the Ottoman lands, and so on.	  
379 Holroyd, Arthur T., Egypt and Mahomed Ali Pacha in 1837: a letter containing remarks upon "Egypt as it is in 
1837, Hume Tracts, (1838), p. 8. 	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with the European powers’ help. Moreover, at the same time, he and his diplomats had been 
doing their best to persuade the European powers, particularly Britain, that any action the Central 
Government took was rightful and just, because of the latest attacks of Mehmed Ali’s army on 
the lands which were meant to be the under the control of Mahmud, such as Urfa and Maras, the 
Ottoman cities in the East.380 As an even stronger reason than this, Mahmud had wanted to purge 
Mehmed Ali from Syria for a long time. Syria had been lost to Mehmed Ali’s control under the 
treaty of Kütahya, and in this respect, the Ottoman statesmen had been secretly carrying out, at 
the behest of the Sultan, some works in Syria to the detriment of the Pasha.381 From Mahmud’s 
point of view, all of these were reasonable grounds for the operation against his rebel governor. 
Despite this strong desire of the Sultan, and Palmerston’s verbal assent, it still seemed that 
Palmerston’s heart was not really in favour of this course of action, as he kept advocating 
restraint. On the other hand, his ambassador in Istanbul, Ponsonby seemed to be fully in support 
of Mahmud in his purpose.  Ridley succinctly explains,  with respect to the differences between 
Palmerston and Ponsonby regarding this operation that: 
“Lord Ponsonby, the Ambassador at Constantinople, strongly supported the Sultan. He urged 
Palmerston to re-establish British influence at Constantinople by vying with the Russians in 
support of the Sultan, and to go the whole hog by offering him military assistance if he marched 
across the Euphrates and attacked Mehemet Ali in Syria. Palmerston rejected this advice, and 
adopted a policy of pro-Turkish neutrality. If Mehemet Ali attacked the Sultan, Britain would 
intervene on the Sultan’s side; if the Sultan attacked Mehemet Ali, Britain would remain neutral, 
but Palmerston strongly urged the Sultan to do no such thing.”382 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, the main reason behind Palmerston’s decision was his 
strong apprehensions about any kind of war, and his fervent wish to prevent any upset of the 
European balance of peace. Therefore, Mahmud had started thinking up another diplomatic 
manoeuvre to try, as he had done for previous problems, to dissuade Palmerston from his strict 
opinion opposing Mahmud’s right to attack his rebel governor with military force. After a while, 
Mahmud realised that, it might be productive to use a ploy in an area which was significant in 
terms of British commercial profits. The British had been asking the Ottomans to decrease their 
tariffs and also to abolish the monopolies they held, as these were limiting the British merchants 
from increasing their profits in the Ottoman lands. Consequently, it was their fond ambition to 
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make a commercial treaty with the Ottomans in order to implement these aims. As a matter of 
fact, the Anglo-Ottoman negotiations on this issue had been ongoing at a brisk pace for a while 
and these negotiations were to culminate in a commercial treaty, called the treaty of Balta 
Limani, which was signed on 16 August 1838. Before examining the treaty’s effects, it will be 
useful to make some diplomatic and economic analyses of the period before the treaty. It was not 
only Mahmud who had some political and economical plans to realize through this commercial 
treaty, but also from Palmerston’s point of view, the treaty was clearly going to bring very 
positive results in terms of British interests in the region. Southgate evaluated in detail 
Palmerston’s primary political aims in signing the treaty of Balta Limani thus; 
“By negotiating a commercial treaty with the Sultan which would bind Mehemet as his vassal, 
Britain could re-emphasize the subordination of the Pasha and (incidentally) liberate a vast area 
from Adana to the Yemen from Mehemet’s monopolies and obstructions to foreign commerce.”383 
 
These aims of Palmerston’s bring to mind the goals which had been Mahmud’s main objective 
since the beginning. As a matter of fact, one of the most important aims of this work is to reveal 
to what extent Mahmud’s diplomatic manoeuvres were effective in turning Palmerston’s views 
against Mehmed Ali in the diplomatic process he was influencing between 1833 and 1838 
because the same person, Palmerston, for a short while in 1833, had even thought to support 
Mehmed Ali as a ‘safety switch’ in the region in terms of the British interests against the 
Russians. Brown examines this transient favour that Palmerston felt towards Mehmed Ali and 
reports; 
“Palmerston’s thoughts turned now not to opposing Mehemet Ali, therefore, but to backing him; to 
supporting him, indeed, as Turkey’s potential saviour. Britain and France he said, could back ‘a 
national resistance’ in Turkey to Russian aggression, and ‘in such a case, Mehemet Ali would 
come well into play’. With Franco-British support, Mehemet Ali might advance against Russia and, 
he concluded, ‘It is not then quite so chimerical as may at first appear, to suppose that England, 
France, & Mehemet would be a match for Austria & Russia in preventing those two powers from 
Polandizing Turkey’.384          
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Despite his previous thoughts on Mehmed Ali, he was thinking in a completely different way 
about the rebel governor now, after all the diplomatic developments described in these chapters 
that had occurred over the last five years.  
Palmerston had not only been surmising that a commercial treaty with the Ottoman Empire 
would bring about some desired political results, he was also expecting it to bring with it some 
highly satisfactory economic results. These economic aims included some positive and some 
negative aspects. The positive ones he anticipated would benefit his own country and the 
negative ones would hamper Mehmed Ali. Southgate also examined these economic expectations 
of Palmerston’s, saying that; 
“The treaty was important to British commerce with the whole of the Ottoman Empire and with 
Persia, and also a great diplomatic triumph. Lyons at Athens even said there had been nothing like 
it for British prestige since Canning had planted the flag on the heights of Lisbon…Better still, it 
was a challenge to Mehemet, who must either operate the treaty and thus weaken his resources as 
well as swallow his pride, or reveal himself a rebel.”385  
 
At this stage, two different historical arguments on this topic need to be covered. Despite the 
argument that Palmerston and Mahmud’s common aim with the treaty was that it might destroy 
Mehmed Ali’s monopolies and so cut off the Pasha’s economic resources, on the other hand 
there are some historians who do not agree with this view, such as Bülent Özdemir. According to 
him, Mahmud did not make the treaty with the aim of destroying Mehmed Ali’s monopolies. He 
explained his argument like this; 
“the Ottoman local authorities received no official information and instructions from the Porte 
regarding the new situation for six months, and on some regions up to one year after the 
conclusion of the treaty. For instance, in the case of Salonica, Consul Blunt reported in March 12, 
1839: “The local authorities of Salonica have not yet received any instructions, or any kind of 
information from the Sublime Porte, relating to the Commercial Convention.” There are two 
fermans among the sicils of Salonica dated 1 March 1839, which was the date that the convention 
would be effective, and 30 April 1839, which specifically deal with the convention of 1838 and with 
the prospective changes in the administration of customs houses, but no specific information and 
instructions were given to the local authorities respecting the new convention until August 1839, 
other than merely informing the local government that they would charge 12 per cent for exports 
and 5 per cent for imports as customs duty. The above findings confirm that Consul Blunt was right 
in thinking that the required information regarding the new convention was not sent to the local 
authorities just after the signing of the treaty in 16 August 1838. Again, by the time of the effective 
date of the convention, which was 1 March 1839, the local authorities had not received full 
instructions from İstanbul, but only a little information respecting the customs duties. This delay 
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may be explained in terms of the reluctance of the Porte, whose interests were not the same as 
those of Britain. In this sense, if the purpose of depriving Mehmed Ali Pasha of his basic financial 
sources, such as the state monopolies, was taken into account as the only cause of the conclusion of 
the Trade Convention of 1838, the Ottoman government should have been acting more 
energetically than this for the more rapid execution of the treaty.”386 
 
Although this long explanation from Özdemir on the matter seems to well account for the 
situation, there is another Turkish historian, Mübahat Kütükoğlu, who has examined the treaty of 
Balta Limani from every angle based on both the Ottoman and British documents, and who 
explains differently the reason why the Central Government had waited for six months before 
sending the official instructions from Istanbul to the provinces. According to Kütükoğlu, after 
the signing of the Balta Limani in 1838, both sides had the Customs Tariff issue before them 
which was supposed to be renewed in 1834 but had not been done so until the date the Treaty 
was signed. Apparently, the instructions relating to the Customs Tariff were of vital importance 
for the trade between the two empires since they determined the prices of export and import 
items very precisely. The diplomatic process that was gone through to define the terms of the 
Customs Tariff witnessed very enthusiastic discussions between the diplomats of Britain and the 
Ottoman Empire. Particularly, as specified in Article 7, the criteria to designate the prices of 
export goods subject to 9% Amediyye and 3% Reftiyye tax, and other issues such as which item 
was to be exported from which port (Bursa Silk has to be mentioned here as the most 
contentious) caused controversy. The disputes only came to an end after intense discussions on 
April 23, 1839 with the signing of the new Customs Tariff, 8 months after the treat of Balta 
Limani was signed. But the particular issue of where Bursa Silk was to be exported from (Izmir 
or Istanbul) was discussed for somewhat longer. The Ottoman Government had informed British 
officials that instructions for ports and provinces to enforce the 1838 Treaty were not to be sent 
unless there was an agreement on the Customs Tariff as this was vitally important for the 
Ottoman economy whether before April 23 or after.387 It could, therefore, be concluded that the 
Ottoman government did not want to put the Treaty into effect before ensuring that there was no 
damage to the Ottoman treasury even though one of the reasons why the Government signed this 
Treaty was to put an end to Mehmed Ali’s economic power by finishing off his monopolies.  
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The main aim of this chapter, of showing the treaty’s position in the context of the Mehmed Ali 
problem, would now benefit from a brief discussion on the treaty’s economic aspects and their 
consequent effects on the Ottoman Empire’s economic life. This discussion section of the 
chapter will mainly be based on sources from Turkish experts in the field of this period’s 
economic aspects, pertaining to the Treaty of Balta Limani. 
For the Ottoman economy, the treaty of Balta Limani was one of the most important 
developments of the nineteenth century, although it had both positive and negative effects.388  
This commercial agreement was a landmark in Ottoman history, because before this convention, 
the Ottoman Empire had maintained a closed economic structure. This means that it was the 
policy of the Ottoman Sultans and their statesmen to attach a higher priority to supplying the 
Ottoman public’s needs before exporting Ottoman goods to other countries. This practice had 
been imposing severe restrictions on trade with foreign countries. In particular, Mahmud made 
lawful the long standing traditional practice whereby he and his predecessor banned seven goods 
from being exported. These forbidden items were called the “7 Vahid”. The majority of these 
items were salt, all kind of pulses, and gunpowder, flour, spices and sugar.389  Palmerston had 
been persistent, over a long period, through his Ambassador in Istanbul, Ponsonby, in dissuading 
Mahmud from retaining his monopolies on certain trading because the British merchants were 
dismayed by this prohibition, and complained vociferously to Ponsonby about this frustrating 
barrier to trade.390 In particular, following the termination of the Levant Company in 1826, 
British merchants wanted to trade with the Ottomans, but the “7 Vahid” remained a trenchant 
obstacle to commerce. To help resolve this problem, Palmerston had occasionally sent a 
persuasive message to Mahmud via Ponsonby and tried to talk the Sultan out of this prohibition 
by explaining the extensive damage it would inflict upon the Ottoman Economy.  
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In fact, this situation was a very good opportunity for Mahmud because Palmerston, for the 
second time, was in a position where he had to ask for something from Mahmud. (The first time 
had been when he needed to obtain the Sultan’s permission for the Euphrates Project.) Therefore, 
Mahmud assigned Nuri Effendi to negotiate the conditions of a possible commercial treaty in 
London.391 As might be expected, as Mahmud usually did whenever he sent one of his diplomats 
to London, he gave Nuri Effendi instructions that while he was negotiating with Palmerston 
about the treaty, he also was to try to induce the King, the British government and Palmerston to 
look favourably upon the Anglo-Ottoman alliance against Mehmed Ali.392 As comprehensively 
studied in the fifth chapter, Nuri Effendi had previously paid some official visits to London to 
negotiate the Mehmed Ali problem under the direction of his sovereign, as well as negotiating 
the commercial treaty.393 All of these factors show that Mahmud seemed to be determined to use 
Palmerston’s economic request as leverage, as he had done in the previous diplomatic and politic 
events.  
Furthermore, the commercial treaty had many effects upon the Ottoman economy and all of 
these are still discussed in themselves as a continued controversial topic in the Turkish literature 
on the treaty. One of these discussions about the treaty of Balta Limani is about its effects on the 
Ottoman Economy. Some of them have asserted that Balta Limani negatively affected the 
Ottoman economy. According to them, if it had not been signed, the country’s industry would 
have been able to improve.394 They have opined that the Ottoman industry was prevented from 
developing since British products were getting cheaper year by year because of the Industrial 
Revolution and developments in shipping. Although the majority of the European governments 
had made tax provisions to defend against the developed British Industry, the Ottoman 
government did not, as in this treaty it had actually reduced its customs duties. For this reason, 
they claim that Balta Limani damaged the Ottoman economy. Interestingly, after Balta Limani 
the customs process was implemented as the exact opposite of the practice in other countries. 
The European countries took some precautions to protect their national industries against the 
strong British economy, but the Ottomans did not. Bailey comments upon these measures saying; 
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“In the second quarter of the nineteenth century England's trade with the European states was 
limited because of the barriers which these countries raised in order to foster their own industrial 
development. France, which began to realize the possibilities of industry and commerce after 1815, 
took the lead in this respect. Textiles were absolutely barred until 1834, when this unconditional 
prohibition was replaced by high duties. The German Zollverein, while not specifically prohibiting 
English goods, did tax foreign manufactures. Although its duties were not heavy at the start, there 
was a tendency to move upward. Trade channels with the Germanies existed, however, via 
Belgium, Holland, the Hanse towns, and states not members of this economic league, carrying 
goods across Europe to the Austrian and Russian frontiers. To keep these channels open was "the 
prime object of British commercial diplomacy." In the same way the Austrian lands were protected 
by high tariffs, one of which (1835) prohibited some sixty-nine articles and levied exorbitant duties 
on as many as sixteen hundred items. The Russian tariff of 1833, which replaced the absolute 
prohibition of all foreign manufactures established in 1810, proscribed more than three hundred 
articles; this became the basis of Russian tariff policy until 1844.”395 
 
As can be seen from the above, Mahmud took every possible course of action and undertook any 
kind of economic risk to rescue his Empire from disintegration or even worse, depredation by 
Mehmed Ali. As a result of this political reasoning, despite all the other European states’ 
protecting themselves with very high tariffs levied upon British goods; after Balta Limani, 
British merchants only paid twelve per cent on exports and five per cent on imports. In addition, 
there was an eight per cent duty required from Ottomans who wanted to carry on domestic 
trade,396  but while Ottoman merchants had to pay this duty, foreign merchants did not have to 
pay any duty on domestic trade any more after Balta Limani. This clearly gave foreign merchants 
a distinct and unfair advantage over the native Ottoman merchants in domestic competition. As 
is examined in the chapter with respect to the Anglo-Ottoman cooperation to reform the Ottoman 
Empire, this latest economic development seemed to be one of the chief reasons for the increased 
number of British merchants engaging in the domestic commercial life of the Empire in the 
second half of 1838.     
On the other hand, some Turkish historians do not fully agree with this point of view.397 These 
historians are proponents of the opinion that the reason Ottoman industry was not able to 
improve was not because of Balta Limani but because of the basic structure of the Ottoman 
economy.  At the beginning of the 1830s, Ottoman industry was still founded on handicraft-
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based manufacturing. Therefore, they argue, Balta Limani did not undermine Ottoman industry 
because Turkish producers had not yet started mass production.  
Another important consequence of this commercial treaty on the Ottoman economy was its 
influence on Ottoman agricultural production. After the treaty this began to change. In effect, the 
majority of agricultural life remained the same, that is, small scale production for the farmer’s 
daily life. In the meantime, however, after the Treaty, some of the farmers began to produce their 
crops specifically for export. Also, within about twenty years (1838-1858), the Ottoman public, 
especially the people of Istanbul, had begun to demand foreign products such as British clothes 
because of their cheap price and good quality. As a result, most of the small Turkish suppliers 
could not compete with these products.398 
Another significant opinion about the Treaty of Balta Limani, put forward by Turkish researchers 
like Bülent Özdemir, is that if the treaty had been so very important in the relationship between 
England and the Ottoman Empire, then it would not have also been signed with eight other 
European Countries within three years.399 In fact, although this seems a sensible question, 
another Turkish researcher, Mubahat Kütükoğlu has answered it with the proposition that 
England had such faith in its own mass-production and cheaper goods over that of other 
European Countries, that the English politicians permitted the same agreement to be signed 
between the Ottomans and other European countries to avoid fostering jealousy in the other 
countries.400 Moreover, when considering the situation from the diplomatic aspect, Britain was 
seeking for a European consensus to resolve the problem and Queen Victoria did not see any 
harm in sharing her country’s privileges gained by Balta Limani with the other European 
countries. So it was permitted in order to promote the European Alliance against the Mehmed Ali 
problem.401 
In addition, even after the Treaty, the British and Ottoman governments continued to dispute 
certain issues regarding article two. When the Turkish officers signed the treaty, they thought 
that British merchants were going to trade as wholesalers. However, British officers intended 
that British merchants would be able to engage in retail trade within the Ottoman dominion. 
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According to the Ottoman point of view, when the treaty was translated into English, a mistake 
was made.402 Owing to this, a large influx of British retailers with an enormous tax advantage 
over the native Ottoman traders would have had a disastrous effect on the citizens’ livelihoods 
and the entire economy. In fact, as is mentioned above, Ottoman merchants were not pleased 
with the treaty and had it not been for the fact that relations between the two sides were in good 
condition, the wrong attitude of the British side in exploiting the situation might well have 
caused the complete destruction of Ottoman trade. Thus, on the one hand, the Ottoman side 
contested this article and struggled to have it cancelled, while on the other hand, the British side 
insisted on upholding it: consequently it could not be cancelled and the article stood.  
There was a British man, Urquhart, who had more knowledge about the Ottoman economy than 
the other British, because he had been sent to the Ottoman lands much earlier, at the beginning of 
the 1830s, to investigate its economic potential in terms of British trade. He did not like the 
Russians and supported the Ottomans, as did Palmerston and Ponsonby. The only difference he 
had was that he also wrote some articles in the British press in support of the Ottoman Empire so 
he was a positive influence on the British public about the Ottomans as just Mahmud had 
intended. Lamb stated Urquhart’s and Ponsonby’s common opinion about the Russians that 
“Urquhart had encouraged Ponsonby to believe that the Ottoman Empire, if protected from Russia, 
was capable of being reformed and strengthened…”403 
 
As mentioned, Urquhart wrote some articles for the British newspapers and Ponsonby was his 
strongest supporter in this. Lamb said about this that 
“Ponsonby had seen the possibility of using Urquhart’s facility as a writer to forward this publicity 
campaign, (Anti-Russian) and he urged him to revise some of his letters to make them suitable for 
publication, to write an article in a periodical, and to write a regular column for the Morning 
Chronicle.”404  
  
Urquhart also had some valid opinions on the treaty of Balta Limani.  According to him, the 
substance of this important treaty was established at the beginning of 1833, when, despite there 
remaining certain disagreements, Bulwer and Ponsonby were able to successfully get it signed. 
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After the convention, as indicated by Urquhart, Balta Limani was still viewed with distrust by 
the Ottomans, due to several disadvantages remaining within it, and some feared it might even be 
the destruction of the Ottoman Economy.405 So in this sense, as can be seen, Balta Limani did not 
seem like a beneficial commercial course for the Ottomans to have taken. As would be seen in 
the following decades of the Ottoman Empire’s economic life, in consequence of losing the right 
of assignment of the customs duties, the Ottoman administration would be forced to borrow at 
high interest from European powers over the Crimean War. Subsequently and tragically, in 1874, 
the Ottoman government had to declare its treasury bankrupt.406  
Despite all these negative effects of the treaty of Balta Limani, Mahmud took the possibly fatal 
risks he did on his Empire’s economic life with this process, for the sake of his Empire’s 
salvation. He certainly did not want to be beset with the same problem of being totally alone, as 
had happened at the end of 1832 in Konya because he could not find anybody to support him 
after his army was defeated there against his governor’s army. Therefore, he had made some 
very risky diplomatic manoeuvres and some significant sacrifices, such as the ones in this 
commercial treaty, for the purpose of winning European support, particularly from the British. 
So those who want to examine this economic process have to consider the diplomatic and 
political conditions in the period along with Mahmud and his diplomats’ true diplomatic aims as 
indicated in the Turkish documents. Otherwise, Mahmud could be seen as a powerless and 
foolish Sultan who ruined his Empire’s economy by his own hand. But if he had not attempted to 
tip the scales in his Empire’s favour by his diplomatic struggle of six long years, his successors 
possibly would not even have had an Empire left to govern. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Anglo-Ottoman Cooperation to enhance the Ottoman Empire in the New Era after Unkiar 
Skelessi: 1833-1839 
 
The Russians’ ambitions to enlarge their lands, reach the Aegean and Mediterranean and 
penetrate even further on the other side, plus Mehmed Ali’s ambitions to gain independence 
from his sovereign, remained as reasons for the Ottomans and the British to be encouraged to 
reform and strengthen the Ottoman Empire, starting in 1834. This was largely because, should 
either of these ambitions be realized, they would cause immense damage to both the Ottoman 
and the British interests in the region. In particular, the rash and perilous diplomatic manoeuvres 
Mahmud had made in order to get the British on his side, of calling the Russian warships to the 
Bosporus and ultimately forging the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, gave the British many concerns 
about the continuation of the Ottoman Empire. As Bailey put it; 
    “The conclusion between Russia and Turkey of the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi in July, 1833, 
brought the Foreign Office and the British trader to a realization of the dangers ahead, and a 
positive interest in the maintenance of the Ottoman state developed which really constituted a new 
policy on the part of England.”407 
 
Despite the prevalence of this newly-acquired positive attitude towards the Ottomans which had 
arisen within the British public, it was by no means unanimous. There was some opposition, in 
the form of the likes of Richard Cobden, a radical M.P in British Parliament who still viewed the 
Ottomans in a very negative light. However, this anti-Ottoman side was not to be as strong as 
was the pro-Ottoman side, at least in this period. As might be expected, this bloc was pro-
Russian. Bolsover commented upon Cobden’s opinion about this conflict in London such that: 
“Moreover, Richard Cobden published a striking pamphlet to show that the destruction of Turkey 
by Russia would be a triumph for civilization over barbarism and a much-needed stimulant to 
British trade.”408 
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Cobden’s opinion was not only made up of positive feelings towards the Russians, but at the 
same time he harboured many prejudices against the Ottomans. According to him, “the Ottoman 
Empire was a despotic Muslim State in decline and Russia was a peaceful, commercial, 
Christian Empire.”409 Despite the presence of this kind of opinion amongst the British, the 
Ottomans had even now started to reform their Empire under Mahmud’s guidance. As this stage 
of the chapter these reform actions will be scrutinized, based on the Ottoman documents, under a 
separate section. This section will also be useful to help clarify the level of Anglo-Ottoman 
relations and how active a role Britain played in the modernisation of the Ottoman Empire. 
 
7.1. Anglo-ottoman cooperation to reform the Ottoman Empire 
As examined, Palmerston’s main aim, after the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, was to enhance the 
Ottoman Empire militarily, economically, and administratively against possible Russian attack. 
In fact, Mahmud, at first, wanted to make only a military alliance with the British against his 
rebel governor Mehmed Ali, but later on he also started to lean towards an Anglo-Ottoman 
cooperation to modernise his Empire. Mustafa Reşid Pasha, especially, with his diplomatic 
efforts, played a key role in encouraging the Sultan in this process.  
As a matter of fact, Mahmud was not the first Sultan to want to improve his Empire in 
accordance with Western development. Before giving detailed descriptions of exemplary acts of 
Anglo-Ottoman cooperation showing their combined efforts (1833 – 1839) to reform the Empire, 
and in order to see the whole picture, it will be useful to give a brief summary of the background 
of the Ottoman Empire’s reform programme.  
During the nineteenth century the European countries were successful in applying scientific 
developments to military tactics and weapons; unlike the Ottoman State, which failed to adopt 
new military innovations. This was not only because of a mistaken sense of superiority over the 
Europeans, but also because of its inability to keep up with European scientific progress. As a 
result, it suffered huge defeats at the hands of the European countries and even lost some of its 
territories to them. This led to the recognition that the Empire had fallen behind and led to the 
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introduction of a new era of political, military and economic reforms, initiated in the reign of 
Abdulhamid I (1774 – 1789). These reforms continued and even increased under the reign of 
Selim III (1789 – 1807) and reached their peak during the administration of Mahmud II (1808 - 
1839).  
During the rule of Abdulhamid I, “Mühendishane-i Bahr-i Humayun”, the Imperial School of 
Naval Engineering, today known as Istanbul Technical University, began to offer training 
modelled after a European-style military education.410 Abdulhamid’s successor, Selim III, set up 
the Nizam-i Cedid Army (New Order) in a totally European fashion and invited several French 
military staff to train the new army.411 Also during Selim III’s reign, the Ottoman Empire 
established its first permanent diplomatic missions in Europe. Unlike the other two sultans, 
Mahmud did not confine his reforms to the military, but engaged in reforms concerning social, 
economic and institutional areas. For example, he established the first modern medical school in 
Turkey, Mekteb- i Tıbbiye-i Sahane, as well as the postal and police reorganisation.412 Apart 
from these, the biggest reform he made was, with popular support, the abolition of the Janissaries 
(also called the Yeniçeri Ordusu) in 1826.  The Janissaries had been the major factor in military 
victories during the height of the Empire, but they were unwilling to adapt to changing military 
circumstances and had come to be a significant obstacle which barred the way to progress in 
their field. Mahmud II subsequently established a modern army called the Asakir-i Mansure-i 
Muhammediye.413 
This was the general picture of the Ottoman Empire up until 1833. The following parts of the 
chapter have a different approach than that seen in the other chapters. These are not a political 
and diplomatic analysis of Anglo-Ottoman relations, instead; they aim to closely examine every 
development, however small, between 1833 and 1839, in order to illustrate the extent of the 
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British contribution to this reform process.414 It can be said that this chapter is an effort to write a 
social history, but at the same time it is necessary to put the new situation that came about after 
the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, regarding the political and diplomatic relations between the two 
countries, into context. This will also be a very useful source for foreign researchers who do not 
have access to the Turkish language and are unable to use the Ottoman Archives. In order to 
attain this objective, all the Ottoman Archives with respect to British contribution to their 
developmental support, 1833-1839, have been examined in the context of the entire British 
assistance to the Ottoman reform programme. Of course, Britain was not the only Western 
country utilised to enhance the Empire. Prussia, Austria, Russia, and France were also amongst 
those countries who contributed assistance.  
One of the most significant ones, who desired to protect European peace by strengthening the 
Ottoman Empire, was Metternich. However, Metternich had a different opinion about this reform 
programme than his contemporaries. He disapproved of reforming the Ottoman Empire by only 
using European methods since according to him the Ottoman Empire was a Muslim state and 
therefore the innovations should have been suited to the Ottoman society. Šedivý indicated, in 
his book, a very useful passage from Metternich about this:  
“Base your government upon respect for your religious institutions which form the fundamental basis 
of your existence as a Power and which form the first link between the sultan and his Moslem subjects. 
Go with the times and consider the requirements that this will bring. Put your administration in order, 
reform it, but do not overthrow it to replace it with forms which are not useful to you and which 
expose the monarch to the criticism that he does not know the value of what he attacks nor of what he 
wants to replace it with . . . Do not borrow from European civilisation forms that are incompatible 
with your institutions because the Western institutions are based on principles different from those 
serving as fundamental to your Empire. The West is based on Christian law; you practice Islam, and 
you cannot found a Christian society . . . We in no way intend to hinder the Porte in the improvement 
of its administrative system but we advise it not to look for models for these improvements in examples 
which have nothing common with the conditions of the Turkish Empire; do not in any way imitate 
those countries whose fundamental legal systems are contrary to the traditions of the Levant; 
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strenuously resist importing into Moslem regions reforms that cannot work other than disruptively 
because, under the given conditions, they are devoid of all constructive and organisational power.”415 
 
In particular, up to the beginning of 1830, France was the country with the most influence on the 
Ottomans. When the French occupied Algeria in 1830, however, they plummeted in the 
estimation of all the Ottomans, especially Mahmud. In fact, the personal friendships which Selim 
III, the predecessor Sultan to Mahmud II, had cemented with the French served to help maintain 
a French influence in Istanbul despite the French Army’s attack on Egypt in 1798 under the 
command of Napoleon, but this time, with Sultan Mahmud, there was no such private connection 
with the French. In addition to this, the developing relations with the British, occurring after the 
Mehmed Ali problem, had brought Britain into the forefront in Istanbul, and as a result of this 
they had started to take on a supportive role and step in to help reform and improve the Ottoman 
Empire. Before starting on the main body of this chapter, it needs to be understood that the 
improved Anglo-Ottoman relationship after the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi had borne with it not 
only positive developments but also some problems. These problems appeared in the social and 
commercial life between the Ottoman people and the British, and will be propounded upon to 
clarify the whole picture, and include both the drawbacks and advantages. To separate each year 
in the light of the reform process would be easier and more useful, and work towards a better 
understanding of the whole period.  
 
7.2. The second half of 1833 
This year was a beginning in the utilization by the Ottomans of British support. In light of this 
fact there were not yet so many incidents to scrutinise in this year. However, the majority of the 
Ottoman requirements of the British seemed to come in the field of logistics support. For 
example, a contract was made with a British Jew to import a steamer from Britain. Two copies of 
this contract were presented to the Sultan and this situation was brought to the attention of the 
Ottoman Prime Minister by the Acting Minister of Artillery; Tahir Pasha.416 After a while, it was 
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ordered that one thousand pouches of Ottoman gold would have to be paid to the Jewish 
middleman since the production of the steamer was almost finished. It was also ordered that 
construction works for another steamer should be started immediately.417  
There was another equipment request, which was also indicated as another problem of the 
Ottoman Empire at that time. The request was about a machine and wheel in order to perforate 
rifle irons. However, the Ammunition Minister of the Ottoman Army reported that the intended 
equipment was redundant because its capacity was too big. The machine was able to perforate 
two hundred and fifty irons in a day; however there was no master and not enough tools to 
produce the other components to make 250 rifles in a day.418 This is an interesting piece of 
information because it shows that in 1833, the Ottomans still lacked the technical competence to 
produce their own armaments and thus it seemed likely that British support would need to 
increase, in the following years, in this area as well. 
Another notable thing related to this process in that year was that the Prime Minister strictly 
ordered that any gunpowder produced by the British should not be wasted. According to the 
Minister’s order this new premium gunpowder should be kept for a possible war and only the old 
gunpowder should be used in military drills and festivals and not the British type.419 The 
intended meaning of ‘war’ would have been a reference to the possibility of a battle with 
Mehmed Ali. This order shows that the inclination to engage Mehmed Ali in full armed combat 
in the second half of 1833 was actually very strong.  
Lastly in this year, a purchase that is worthy of note is that one thousand seven hundred and 
seventy-seven swords with their belts, each of them costing fifty five Ottoman Kurus, were 
bought from a British merchant, (the documents record his name as Lionel) in order to use in the 
parade which was to take place in front of the Sultan.420  
As mentioned, this year was only the beginning of the new climate of friendly collaboration in 
diplomatic relations following on from the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, and this Anglo-Ottoman 
cooperation to improve the Ottoman Empire was to continue without cessation.  
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7.3. 1834 
As might be expected the process started to accelerate in this year. A number of Turkish students 
were sent to London in order to learn the Western techniques. For instance, fourteen military 
officers were sent to receive education in London. Namık Pasha presented the official letter with 
respect to these officers to the British Foreign Minister.421 The letter expressed a wish that not 
only should these students be sent but also that reports should be received from them regularly, 
in Istanbul, about the experience they were gaining in London and what they were learning.422   
Factory building and modernisation gathered speed in this year. For example, some machines 
were imported from Britain in order to establish a rifle factory in Dolmabahçe, a district in 
Istanbul. The middleman was a civil servant stationed in Ali Bey. The iron used in the factory 
was sent from Sofia, and from Samokov, another city close to Sofia.423 Two British engineers 
were employed to work on the construction process in the factory and the same engineers also 
built a steam powered factory for serial production in the same district, Dolmabahçe. The 
Ottoman records give the British Engineers’ names as Chris and Walker.424 All the expenses for 
what they did in the setting-up process were paid in full at the end of the construction as 
agreed.425  
Another significant incident about the factory improvement project was that the Ottomans did 
not only charge the British engineers with the task of building factories but they also sent some 
Ottoman officers to Britain to get an education in industrial science in order to be able to 
continue improving Ottoman industry into the future with the knowledge possessed by their own 
citizens. One of these officers was Colonel Bekir Bey. He was sent to England so that he might 
improve himself in this field.426  
Another support the Ottomans got from the British was in the field of British expertise. They did 
not only build, repair or establish technology in the Ottoman lands, but also more importantly, 
they tendered reports in whatever their specialty was. These kinds of reports would have been 
useful and beneficial for the Ottomans to help them continue to implement this progress in the 
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following decades. One example of this kind of helpful report-making from the British can be 
seen in how a British expert in construction was sent to Samokov in order to produce iron and fix 
the roads. As part of his job, after his task had been completed, this engineer prepared a report 
based on his experiences in the production and fixing process, and presented it to the Ottoman 
government.427 Another example of this conveying expertise by way of reports can be seen in 
how a British expert was sent to the Ottoman iron mines to examine how they were run, and after 
his investigation he prepared a report on the mines and he too presented his findings to the 
Ottoman government.428 In addition to all these British experts, a British locksmith was 
employed as a servant in the Ottoman shipyards and his salary was one thousand five hundred 
Kurus a month.429   
The British officials who supported the Ottomans to help enhance the Empire were not only from 
amongst the British experts or military officers. It seems that the British ambassador, Ponsonby, 
sometimes helped the Ottoman government with his knowledge as well. In 1834, an epidemic of 
plague was seen in Tarabya, a district in Istanbul. Thereupon, Ponsonby suggested that in future, 
as a precaution against such a thing happening again, preventative measures concerning 
cleanliness and hygiene would have to be implemented in the region.430  
Meanwhile, an interesting law was passed by the British government concerning all the British 
officers and civil servants who were on duty in foreign lands. The law banned all these kinds of 
military and civil officials from accepting any kind of gift given by any foreign state.431 These 
officials would probably not have liked this law since this was the prime time to receive valuable 
gifts from the Ottoman government in return for their services, although of course they would 
still continue to be paid their fees, however much the remuneration was that they had agreed 
upon with the Ottoman government when the contracts were made. Giving gifts to the foreign 
officers had been a common thing in the Ottoman Empire, and the records of the previous years 
show that gifts were regularly given to the British diplomats.432 
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Another important influence the British had on the Ottomans was in weapon-making skills and 
methods. For this purpose, two British rifles were sent, at the request of the Ottoman 
government, from London to Istanbul as a model for the future production of Ottoman rifles.433 
These British rifles were in (then) current use by the foot soldiers in the British army and these 
two rifles were submitted by Palmerston in person to the famous Ottoman Pasha, Namık.434  It 
seems the Sultan had made a decision to renew all the equipment for his new army, the Asakir-i 
Mansure-i Muhammediye. 
With this new period in the Anglo-Ottoman relations underway, the Ottoman government had 
started to charge some British diplomats in the Ottoman embassies of some of the cities in 
Europe. For example, a British man started to work as a diplomat in the Ottoman Embassy at 
Paris and after a while, he got into debt of five thousand Francs, in Paris. Thereupon, the French 
ambassador at Istanbul indicated this situation to the Ottoman Foreign Office and requested this 
amount should be paid by the Foreign Office. 435   
As mentioned above, a British locksmith had been employed as a servant in the Ottoman 
shipyards. However, Mavroyeni, the Ottoman charge d'affaires at Vienna, reported that there was 
a British law in effect that made it illegal for a British subject to work in a foreign state’s military 
services as a servant.436   
At this stage, these examples can only be given as additional information, since it they are to be 
examined in detail in a separate chapter, which describes how the Anglo-Ottoman negotiations 
on the customs tariffs started to accelerate.        
As is common knowledge, Ottoman carpets were famous in the European countries for their 
ornate patterns and extremely high quality. However, mass production had now begun in Europe 
with the advent of the industrial revolution. This faster production method naturally influenced 
the Ottoman’s hand-produced market. In this respect, an order was placed for a large quantity of 
British rugs costing a fair sum, to carpet some of the Ottoman state offices.437 Although their 
own carpets were the best in the world, the Ottomans were ordering mass produced British 
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carpets! This order could be seen as an indication that with the beginning of the 1830s, because 
of the increasing relations with the European countries, imitation of European life had started 
amongst the Ottoman people. Some of the Ottoman people had started to prefer the European 
articles and styles to the Ottoman ones. This issue was discussed at length in Ottoman society 
then, and even today it is still a regular topic of debate. In this context, this preference for British 
carpets in 1834 can be considered as one illustrative starting point to a nationwide inclination to 
imitate European styles starting with the state’s example.    
 
7.4. 1835 
1835 was a year that the Ottoman diplomatic attempts to obtain Anglo-Ottoman cooperation 
against Mehmed Ali and Russia increased, on account of the efforts of skilful Ottoman diplomats 
such Namık Pasha, Nuri Effendi, and Mustafa Reşid. Of course, this situation positively affected 
Anglo-Ottoman cooperation in other areas, including the reformation of the Empire in line with 
Western scientific discoveries. In this respect, the most important strategy was that of sending 
students to Britain in order to witness first hand all the scientific developments in Europe which 
were ceaselessly advancing. The records are very detailed and indicate that there were four 
engineering students in Britain and their salaries were transferred to them once every three 
months.438   
At the same time, preparations within the Ottoman Army in the field of logistics reinforcement 
and the renewal process for a possible war with Mehmed Ali had continued and increased. As 
mentioned above, the Ottoman statesmen were so sensitive about economical gunpowder use 
that they had been very strict in their guidelines about not wasting it. Also, gunpowder making, 
based on the British and Dutch mode of manufacture, had begun in Azatlı Gunpowder Factory, 
in Istanbul.439  
Another feature of the construction process of the factories was that when the British engineers 
completed these factories, they did not remain in Istanbul but went back to Britain. In this 
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respect, any last checks of an armoury or factory had to be done before this British engineer 
returned his country.440  
Another significant development in the reform process according to the West was seen in the 
Ottoman press. Takvim-i Vekayi was the first Ottoman newspaper, and it was established in 
1831 under Mahmud’s order by Alexandre Blacque, who was called Blak Bey  amongst the 
Ottomans, for his defending of the Ottoman rights against the European powers. However, this 
newspaper was extremely unsophisticated in comparison with the European press. For this 
reason, Mahmud decided to get support from the European press to improve his one and only 
newspaper. Therefore, he ordered that collaboration should be made with the British and French 
press to learn how best to improve Takvimi-i Vekayi.441     
 
Continuing from the above; economic negotiations on customs tariffs had commenced in the 
previous years and they remained on the agenda in 1835 as well. Nuri Effendi, the Ottoman 
ambassador at London, was responsible for the management of the process. He had been 
regularly sending reports from London about these negotiations to keep the Sultan informed with 
respect the process which was so vital to the Empire’s economic life.442 Therefore, Nuri Effendi 
had been very active in London and it can be said that he left no stone unturned in this period.  
In these years, there were still French moneychangers in Istanbul and the Ottoman Government 
had been providing its needs for foreign currency from them. However, Nuri Effendi reported 
from London that the British moneychangers were not the same as the French ones and 
whenever it was necessary to get some money, the British ones supplied it immediately but the 
French ones did not. Thus, he mentioned that it would be more efficient if his expenses could be 
directly supplied from London instead of Istanbul.443   
As mentioned above, accepting gifts had been banned for all British civil servants and officers 
working abroad. Despite this, it seemed that Mustafa Reşid Pasha did not like this prohibition 
very much since, as he reported to the Ottoman Foreign Minister, decorating Ponsonby and 
British Embassy secretaries for their services and giving them some gifts would be very useful 
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for the service of Ottoman interests.444 The Ottomans had been doing everything possible to 
improve Anglo-Ottoman relations; for example, Mahmud even sent his portrait, as a gift, through 
Nuri Effendi to King William. 445  
This gift issue seems to have been an interesting item on the agenda at that time. Esad Effendi 
was assigned as the Ottoman Ambassador to Iran and he was supposed to go there to start his 
mission shortly. Before he went, he met with some Iranian diplomats in Erzurum, an Ottoman 
city in the East. The Iranian diplomats mentioned that the British and the Russian ambassadors 
had brought some gifts with them to Iran and then they hinted that they were expecting the same 
reciprocal behaviour from Esad Effendi.446  
Then an interesting development happened in Istanbul. As is well known,the Greeks rebelled in 
1821 and gained their independence in 1829. The Greeks had been Ottoman citizens since the 
second half of the fifteenth century. They had been conducting commerce with foreign countries 
in the name of the Sultan as the Armenians had done. However, after their independence, 
Mahmud decided to eliminate the Greeks, who were still present in Istanbul as Ottoman citizens, 
from the commercial life of the Empire. In this respect, he banned the Greeks from any kind of 
commerce, even small retail businesses.447 Palmerston was unhappy about this last development 
and he met and negotiated with Nuri Effendi in this issue.448 Nevertheless Mahmud was 
determined to stand behind his decision and he declared to Palmerston through Nuri Effendi that 
he was not going to change his prohibition, but yet, he conceded, he would give the Greeks 
permission that at least, they could visit Istanbul to purchase goods in order to take them back to 
their cities.449  
Meanwhile, building construction had been carrying on without a pause. Another rifle factory 
was in the process of construction in the charge of Abdulaziz Agah Effendi, the responsible 
officer for steam powered factories. In this project, some British experts and labourers were 
employed and their salaries paid regularly.450  
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Mahmud would have been pleased when he saw the military ammunition that had started to be 
produced in Istanbul. For example, some artillery had been produced in the charge of Behri Bey 
and they had been tested with British and Russian cannonballs. It was a pleasing development for 
the Ottomans because the new army needed every kind of ammunition in case of a war with 
Mehmed Ali. Another reason for their satisfaction was that in Namık Pasha’s first mission in 
London, before the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, William had been reluctant to send just fifteen 
pieces of artillery in reply to Mahmud’s earlier request, when he had been in his most difficult 
position and seeking an Anglo-Ottoman military alliance but now, they had started to produce 
their own artillery in Istanbul!451 Another example of the Ottomans producing their own 
ammunition for themselves was when some artillery-stocks were brought from Britain in order to 
use in the Varna Castle but later on, artillery-stocks which had been produced in Sumnu, an 
Ottoman province in the Balkans, were purchased, in order to be used in Sumnu Castle.452   
Another important development in the reform process which occurred in these years was that a 
number of British officers began to come to Istanbul to drill the new Ottoman army according to 
British military techniques.453     
 
7.5. 1836 
In this year, one of the important developments in the reform process was not only that British 
ammunition started to be imported directly to Istanbul, but also the process of learning how to 
make it continued. For example, the chief of gunpowder mills in the Ottoman Army, Ohannes, 
and his son Arakil, went to Britain and France in order to examine the British and French powder 
mills. They took notes based upon their observations and also investigated all machines used in 
the process of gunpowder production in the mill while they were there. At the end of their 
mission in Britain, the British Minister who was responsible for gunpowder factories in Britain, 
whose name is given as Thomas Modi,gave a testimonial saying that Ohannes and his son had 
learned how to produce gunpowder just like that produced by the British.454 Also Palmerston 
indicated to Ponsonby that Ohannes had completely encompassed the process of gunpowder 
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manufacture.455 Ohannes bought from both countries the necessary implements  for making 
gunpowder and brought them with him to Istanbul.456 When he returned to Istanbul he wrote a 
report about his experiences and explained in detail what was necessary to produce gunpowder 
like the British and French do and in accordance with this report, Azatlı Gunpowder Factory was 
modernised to encompass the European standards and methods.457Also he requested that the 
directors of the powder mills in Britain and France should be decorated since they had so kindly 
facilitated his work whilst he had been learning the techniques of producing gunpowder.458  
Sending Ohannes and his son to Britain and France in order to learn gunpowder production is a 
very good example of how the Ottomans had decided to take their own initiative in the reform 
programme. There was another example of this in that the Ottoman government issued a 
directive that it would be much better to manufacture their own ships in order to use them on 
their coast instead of importing them from Europe. However, the directive said, it would be 
necessary to import the ship making equipment required for this purpose from Britain so that 
they had the means to manufacture ships.459  
The Ottoman Empire was not only making preparations for war against Mehmed Ali, but they 
were also preparing for a possible war against Russia in some regions after the latest diplomatic 
developments in Europe. For instance, fifty-one big cannons were imported from Britain, 
through a British merchant, in order to use them in the Castle of Varna. The payment was made 
in two parts and the Sultan gave the direction to the head of the financial department that the 
second part of the payment should be made to the British merchant.460 In addition to this, some 
round shots were ordered from Britain for use in defending Bagdad and Ponsonby sent a letter 
about this to the British Government.461 There was a reason for the measures concerning Bagdad 
to be taken. The Ottoman Government had received some recent news about Mehmed Ali’s 
designs upon Bagdad. Ponsonby had also received some similar information too. He indicated to 
the Ottoman Government that he had heard news that the Ottoman governor of Bagdad and an 
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Iranian diplomat had met and talked about a rumour that Mehmed Ali had also been making 
preparations and at the first chance he got he intended to invade Bagdad.462   
Meanwhile, the construction of the mentioned rifle and armoury factories continued under the 
charge of Abdulaziz Agah Effendi. It had been decided that in order to facilitate arms 
manufacture, they needed to bring two qualified British engineers and also an ironmaster from 
Britain in addition to other British construction workers.  The reserved budget for the 
construction expenses had been increased to include the salaries and the house rentals for these 
three British workers.463 
One of Mahmud’s most important aims in the reform process was to renew and improve his 
maritime fleet based on European techniques. In this context, one hundred thousand Okka 
(almost one hundred thousand and twenty five kilograms) of European sheet copper had been 
imported from Britain, through British merchants, for use in the Ottoman Fleet.464 Moreover, 
Mahmud ordered his diplomats that they should negotiate with the British government for some 
British officers to come to Istanbul to train the Ottoman officers and at the same time modernise 
the new Ottoman army. Nuri Effendi reported from London and informed Istanbul about the 
negotiation process over these British Officers.465 Palmerston indicated to Nuri Effendi they had 
been leaning towards sending British officers to Istanbul and when it was necessary, he added, 
they could send however many officers were required.466 After these negotiations some British 
officers were sent to Istanbul.467 Despite all these positive developments, this process was not 
problem-free. The aim of each side was different. As Rodkey examined in detail, Palmerston’s 
main aim in sending the British officers to Istanbul was that he had desired these officers to take 
command of the Ottoman Army.468 However, this was not suitable from the Ottoman 
perspective, and this point was explained to the British officers, who were a senior grade officer 
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and a colonel.469 Mahmud also ordered the Foreign Office to inform Ponsonby about this 
situation. 
Another interesting development in these years was that some British merchants started to trade 
in the Ottoman lands, just as the local Ottoman merchants were doing. For example, a British 
merchant had been selling European coffee for a while but then, later on, his license to sell was 
cancelled. In response, the British Embassy deputy and Ponsonby requested that the Merchant 
should have his privileges to sell European coffee in the Ottoman lands given back.470 Another 
example of this kind was that a British merchant had licence to harvest the acorns of 1836’s crop 
from Kızılcatuzla, an Ottoman province in the West. Later on, all of the figures pertaining to this 
trade were presented to the central government for scrutiny.471  
 
A remarkable incident happened in this year with respect to a British man. His name was 
William Churchill. He was to get a license from the Ottoman Government to buy olive oil in the 
Ottoman lands but before this permission was granted he was beset with a big problem. It was an 
ordinary situation but unexpectedly, it had had a big influence even though this influence lasted a 
very short time. Churchill was in Istanbul and one day he went hunting in Kadıköy where he had 
an accident. When he was shooting with a rifle, he accidentally wounded a little Turkish boy. 
This accident caused such indignation from the Turkish officers and people, who were there 
when the accident happened, that they beat Churchill up and the officers put him in prison by 
order of the Ottoman Foreign Minister, Akif Effendi.472 When Pizani, the translator of the British 
Embassy, learned of the situation he went to have him released from prison, however Akif 
Effendi was very strict over this incident and even though Pizani argued with Akif he still 
maintained he could not release Churchill.473 Thereupon, he communicated the situation to 
Ponsonby, and after he had explained the accident he stated that he could not even talk to 
Churchill. When he examined the injured Turkish boy, Pizani revealed that the boy’s medical 
condition was good and said that there was no serious problem with his health and therefore the 
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judgement of the Kadıköy Muslim Judge had been most excessive.474 There was somebody else, 
who got very tough with Churchill. It was Ahmet Fevzi Pasha, who was soon to be the Ottoman 
Navy Minister. Akif and Ahmet Pashas were not to be easily persuaded on this issue. Ponsonby 
was indignant at the Pashas’ behaviours and told Pizani that beating Churchill and sending him 
to prison was an invective against Britain and the British dignity had been injured as a result. 
Then he ordered Pizani that he was responsible for this issue and he should demand from the 
Ottoman Prime Minister that this affront to British standing should be rectified as soon as 
possible.475 Ponsonby was not even happy with this retort and he carried the crisis a step further 
when he demanded the dismissal of both Pashas from the government.476 Palmerston was united 
with his ambassador on this issue and he too demanded that the Pashas be replaced.477 
Meanwhile, the Russians also wanted a say in the matter. They already felt aggrieved over the 
positive Anglo-Ottoman relations which were developing of late, so they saw this acrimonious 
dispute as a way to gain a potential advantage for themselves. After this last situation had 
developed, the Russian Ambassador stated in his official letter to the Ottoman Government that 
the British Government had been using the Churchill issue to destroy the Russian-Ottoman 
friendship, since there was a rumour that Akif Effendi and Ahmet Fevzi Pasha were pro-Russian. 
According to the Russian ambassador, Palmerston did not have any right to request a dismissal 
of the Pashas, on the contrary, he continued, the Ottoman Government should have requested the 
withdrawal of the British ambassador, Ponsonby.478 Apparently the Russians were uncomfortable 
with the latest diplomatic developments in Anglo-Ottoman relations and the Churchill issue was 
a chance to eliminate one of the causes for the new improved Anglo-Ottoman relationship, which 
was Ponsonby. The incident did have a repercussion on diplomatic negotiations. First of all, 
Mustafa Reşid Pasha was in London as the Ottoman Ambassador to Britain when the accident 
happened and he met with Palmerston to talk over the issue. He reported that Palmerston seemed 
that he was bent on ordering Ponsonby to insist upon the dismissal of the Pashas, Palmerston 
even, Reşid continued, construed his visiting as an irony.479 There was more diplomatic 
communication with respect to the incident found in the Austrian Ambassador’s words. He sent a 
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letter through his translator to the Ottoman Foreign Office. He stated in his letter that in his view 
of the incident based on the news he received from Vienna that the British Ministers in the 
cabinet did not place as much importance upon the situation as much as Ponsonby obviously 
did.480    
Nevertheless, the Sultan differed with the Russians because his first aim, as examined in great 
detail in previous chapters, which has already been made clear, was to get the British on his side, 
and he could not allow one small accident to destroy the perfectly composed Anglo-Ottoman 
relations after the enormous diplomatic effort it had taken Mahmud and his best men from since 
the beginning of the Mehmed Ali problem until that time, to achieve. Thus, he tried not to let the 
matter get blown out of proportion and found a middle way for both sides. Akif Effendi was 
dismissed from government, however Ahmet Fevzi Pasha remained in office, and was even sent 
to be inducted into the Ottoman Navy Minister five months after the incident. Mahmud probably 
meant to show with this appointment that he valued the Anglo-Ottoman cooperation which 
helped him against his enemies, however, he was still Sultan and he had to make his own 
decisions. After these positive actions from the Ottomans, Ponsonby, in spite of all his harsh and 
indignant statements since the beginning of the situation, stepped in to defuse the crisis. He 
secretly sent a letter to the Ottoman Foreign Office explaining that he felt no animosity towards 
Ahmet Fevzi Pasha, but Ponsonby’s angry responses to the incident had resulted from his 
opinion that a state’s officers should not have behaved as they did and should have found a 
different way instead of beating the suspect.481 That said, Ponsonby informed his government 
that the problem with Ahmet Fevzi Pasha had been resolved.482 
Another significant example of Mahmud’s caring for the British and smoothing over the crisis, 
was that he gave a license to the main character of the story, Churchill, to buy five hundred and 
sixty-four tons olive oil from different provinces in the Ottoman lands.483 In fact, it was 
Churchill who first requested this license from the Ottoman Government in acknowledgment of 
the trials and tribulations he had suffered.484 Thereupon the Ottoman statesmen examined the 
practicability of this request, prepared reports, and informed the Sultan about Churchill’s 
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demand.485 For example, Istefenaki Bey prepared a report on olive oil and its possible taxes and 
presented it to the Sultan.486 After examining this, Mahmud gave permission to Churchill to 
conduct this trade and ordered his civil servant to help him with all kinds of oil in Edremit, an 
Ottoman province, and indicated him about his permission for Churchill and his assistant.487 In 
conclusion, an ordinary accident turned into a big upset in the Anglo-Ottoman relations and even 
became an international diplomatic incident.  
Relations between Mahmud and William had remained on a good footing during this year. 
Mahmud had sent his portrait and various gifts earlier, and in response, William had sent some 
gifts back to Mahmud as well. As Palmerston mentioned when he met with Nuri Effendi, the 
Ottoman Ambassador at London, these gifts were not so valuable in a material sense but, he 
continued, they were very strong evidence to show Mehmed Ali and the Russians that the British 
would continue to stand by the Ottomans against all their enemies, and Palmerston believed this 
message would intimidate both of them.488 Mahmud would have been very pleased when he 
heard these words because his aim, an Anglo-Ottoman alliance in the region, which had been in 
his agenda since Mehmed Ali’s army beat his army in Syria, was finally on the point of being 
achieved. These gifts were sent on separate occasions. They were five horses489 sent on one 
occasion, and on another occasion, fifteen horses and a British phaeton.490  
Another interesting incident with respect to British merchants in the Ottoman commercial life 
was that one of them, called Barker in the document, borrowed eight hundred and eighty eight 
thousand Ottoman Kurus from the İzmir City Council but then went bankrupt without paying his 
debt to the Ottoman treasury. The Mayor of Izmir reported that until the treasury had taken back 
the value of his loan from his goods and assets, nothing he owned while he was alive would be 
submitted to anybody else.491 The Ottoman Government confiscated all his property in lieu of the 
debt he owed.492   
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Meanwhile, Mustafa Reşid Pasha in London found a medical book written by a British doctor 
about eye and ear diseases, and sent it to Istanbul.493 This incident is a good example of how the 
Ottomans were taking a keen interest in learning all kinds of European knowledge to enhance 
their Empire.  
At the same time Mahmud was still determined to improve and renew his new army according to 
European military techniques. As a result of this intention the Ottomans continued to import 
European ammunition models and arrange for European officers to educate the Ottoman officers. 
In this respect, Reşid Pasha requested a howitzer model from Britain.494 Moreover, the Ottomans 
requested more British military teachers to educate and improve the Ottoman Army495 and in 
response to this request, a number of British officers and military teachers came to Istanbul.496 
While these many significant changes continued in many aspects of life in Istanbul, a similar 
change appeared in the Ottoman Embassies in other countries. For example, the Ottoman 
Embassy in London was completely refurnished in this year and all the furniture which was 
chosen was in the British style.497  
The reform progress had not only been in military or industrial matters, but had also manifested 
in the cultural life of the Turkish people. In particular, Reşid Pasha had attached particular 
importance to the transfer of European cultural developments to the Ottoman Empire. As 
mentioned above, sometimes he sent some specialised book or other written on different 
subjects. For example, he sent English and French Grammar books, written by a British man.498 
Reşid Pasha also indicated that there was a French pamphlet that had been published in Paris 
which was inciting the French to view an alliance with the Russians favourably on account of the 
successes of the Ottoman Empire.499 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
493 BOA, File No: 712 Document No: 34067 J.  	  
494 BOA, File No: 677 Document No: 33016 B. 	  
495 BOA, File No: 747 Document No: 35297. 	  
496 BOA, File No: 677 Document No: 33021 A.  , BOA, File No: 677 Document No: 33016 B.	  	  
497 BOA, File No: 678 Document No: 33032 E. 	  
498 BOA, File No: 1185 Document No 46740 C. 	  
499 BOA, File No: 1185 Document No 46740 C.	  	  
163 
	  
	  
	  
7.6. 1837 
On account of all these positive diplomatic developments in Anglo-Ottoman relations, the reform 
process had been accelerated in this year. As mentioned above, Mahmud not only wanted 
transfer European techniques to his Empire, but he also wanted his statesmen to learn how to 
produce them on their own. In this respect, the practice of sending Ottomans to Europe for that 
purpose had increased. However, Britain was not the only European country he sent them to. 
Ottoman officers were sent to Austria as well. As examined in the preceding chapters, which 
describe the diplomatic process, Metternich had been supporting the Ottoman Empire to enhance 
its strength against Mehmed Ali, and in the new diplomatic atmosphere after the treaty of Unkiar 
Skelessi, Austria had become as close to the Ottoman Empire as Britain had become. For this 
reason, Mahmud sent some Ottomans to Austria to learn the European system just as he had sent 
them to Britain. First of all, it should be mentioned that references in the Ottoman records related 
to this year carry more detailed information than can be previously found, when relating events 
concerning those Ottomans who had been sent to Europe. For example, some Ottoman officers 
had been sent to Britain for the purpose of learning warfare science. They had different ranks, 
such as, a sapper Colonel, Bekir Bey, a sapper lieutenant colonel, Emin Bey, and some were 
engineers, İbrahim, Derviş, Enis, Arif, Mahmud, and Halil Effendis. These officers had their own 
salaries for their expenses during the education process.500 After the Anatolian commander-in-
chief, Sait Pasha, reported that some privates should be sent to Europe in order to learn European 
style clothing design and manufacture, six privates from the first and fourth regiment of the first 
brigade were sent to Vienna for the purpose of studying the design and manufacture of garments 
and three thousand Kurus were paid to each of them for their living expenses, the same as was 
paid to those officers who were sent to Britain.501  
In this year, it seems that the number of British merchants trading in the Ottoman lands 
increased. As a result of this, the number of problems they encountered during their trading 
increased as well; problems with both the Ottoman people themselves, and also with the 
Ottoman trading authorities. For instance, a British citizen called Nicholas Garbin had been 
trading in the Mentese Province, in the west. An Ottoman civil servant in the region, Mehmed 
Aga, borrowed six thousand six hundred and fifty Kurus from Nicholas. However, Mehmed Aga 
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refused to pay the money back and even attacked and threated Nicolas under some pretext or 
other, in order to avoid paying back what he owed to the merchant. Mehmed Aga even seized 
Nicholas’s six hundred and sixty-three Ottoman gold coins and also three hundred and ninety 
kilograms bee wax.502 Thereupon, Ponsonby applied to the Ottoman government with an official 
letter and explained the situation. He requested a fair trial in the district court, otherwise, he said, 
he would go for an appeal to the high court and request to take Mehmed Aga to Istanbul.503 
Judging by his involvement in this incident, Ponsonby seemed to be closely connected with not 
only diplomatic issues in Istanbul but also the British merchants’ problems in the Ottoman lands.  
This year was another significant year for Mahmud and his statesmen, striving as they were to 
implement the Anglo-Ottoman alliance plan, since the all developments had been most positive 
signs of good relations with the British. The Ottomans had started to benefit from the British 
techniques which did indeed seem to improve the Empire. As a matter of fact, the majority of 
this utilization of the various innovations had been, in the beginning stages, in the field of 
ameliorating the Ottoman army. It was a fact that the Ottoman economy had been having some 
difficulties in this period. An incident which can be given as an example of this is in how 
difficult it became to improve the Ottoman Army due to these economic conditions. As 
mentioned above, gunpowder was considered as a vital instrument by the Ottoman statesmen for 
a strong and self-sufficient army, and in light of this, Ottoman officers, such as Ohannes and his 
son, were sent to Britain and France in the previous years to learn how the quality gunpowder 
could be produced. In accordance with the same purpose, another Ottoman master, Evan, was 
sent to Britain. Moreover, as already touched upon, the main aim of the Ottomans was not only 
to import European ammunition into the Ottoman Lands but more importantly they wanted to 
learn to produce, with their own means, ammunition of as high a quality as that of the Europeans. 
For this reason, Master Evan was instructed to buy a machine in order to produce the Ottoman 
gunpowder. Evan reported from Britain that he needed one thousand two hundred pouches 
Ottoman Akçe, (Ottoman currency), for both his expenses and the machine.504 However, the 
Ottoman Ammunition Minister, Mehmed Emin, reported to the prime ministry that the budget of 
the Ottoman Powder Mill was insufficient to cover this payment.505 After a while, he informed 
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him that his department could only pay six hundred pouches; half of the requested amount. He 
also suggested that it might be possible to borrow the rest of the sum from the merchants, 
however, when the time to pay came, it would be a difficult bill to settle.506 Another example in 
this matter was though the previously mentioned preparations for a possible battle with the 
Egyptian Army had been ongoing, economic problems had negatively affected these preparations 
as well. According to a report about the latest measures taken in strengthening the army against a 
possible Egyptian attack, despite all the positive developments in administrative and financial 
reforms and the efforts to improve the army, still, eight thousand pouches of Akçe were needed 
to correct the ammunition deficiencies in the army. This situation might have caused some 
difficulties in mounting an immediate response to an unexpected assault from Mehmed Ali’s 
army.507 Although this report is an ominous sign of financial difficulties, at the same time it does 
show that administrative and financial reforms were on the agenda.   
Nevertheless, positive developments in the process of renewing the Ottoman army were ongoing. 
The Ottoman officers, who had been sent to Britain to study the latest developments in the 
British army system in the beginning of this year, were now starting to send positive news to 
Istanbul about their experiences and progress. For example, Palmerston indicated that Sarım 
Effendi, a new Ottoman envoy in London with the British military committee, sent an official 
letter to Istanbul saying that the Ottoman officers studying in Britain had brought their education 
to a successful conclusion.508 In addition to this, some of the officers were continuing their 
education: – some engineers from the Ottoman Powder Mill and some from the Eastern 
Command of the Ottoman Army – and their salaries had been sent regularly despite the domestic 
economic difficulties encountered by the Ottomans.509 At the same time, European officers 
continued to take charge of enhancing the Ottoman Army in this year too. In honour of this 
valuable service rendered in the Ottoman Armoury, the Ottoman government decorated two 
British officers, one Prussian officer, and one Prussian translator.510 Machines were also 
imported in order to use in the newly-founded Ottoman factories, however, these machines’ 
instructions were in English and a translator was needed for their correct operation. For this 
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purpose a British translator was employed in the factories and his salary was even raised in 1837 
in acknowledgement of his valuable services.511  
Meanwhile, Palmerston met with an interesting request from Mehmed Ali. Mehmed Ali’s 
biggest supporter since the early years of the nineteenth century was France, and he sometimes 
sent his officers to France to be educated there, in order to keep his army up to date with the 
latest scientific developments in Europe. However, after all the positive developments in Anglo-
Ottoman relations, he probably felt he needed to do something to get British support especially 
since France’s foreign policy was in accordance with Britain’s over Eastern affairs after the 
treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. This might have been another reason for Mehmed Ali to feel the need 
to get closer to the British since his biggest supporter was now allied with them. So he requested, 
through Campbell, the British Consul in Egypt, to send fourteen Arab boys to Britain for the 
purpose of taking education in the British factories.512  
When looking at the commercial life of 1837 in the light of the Anglo-Ottoman relations it can 
be seen that the number of British merchants increased and this state of affairs carried with it 
both positive and negative developments. As mentioned above, some problems did crop up 
between the British and the Ottoman public as had happened in the Churchill issue. This small 
issue surprisingly enough, almost caused a rupture of Anglo-Ottoman relations. After this 
incident, the Ottoman Government learnt something from the experience and issued a directive 
on all future arraignment of the British. This directive stated that the witnesses of the problem, 
whatever it was, and the translator for the accused British should attend during the suspect’s 
questioning and the officers should be aware of this directive.513 Consequently, the increase in 
the British population in the Ottoman lands resulted in a new set of legal and social rights for the 
British in the Ottoman lands. Another example of this matter occurring this year was when a 
British merchant applied to the Ottoman Ministry of the Interior to request a license to operate a 
ferry for the sole use of the British and other European citizens living in Büyükdere and Tarabya, 
the districts in Istanbul, since according to this British merchant, these people had had some 
difficulties finding a ferry to take to them to the centre of Istanbul.514  
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At the same time, as mentioned above, Ponsonby continued to defend the British merchants’ 
rights. Two examples can be given of this happening in this year. An Ottoman citizen, Civanı 
Acı Ergiri, and his brother had been trading in Galata, the Ottoman district in Istanbul, and to do 
so they borrowed money from two British merchants. However, they ran away from Istanbul 
without paying the debt. Therefore Ponsonby applied to the Ottoman Government to help catch 
them and bring them to Istanbul for trial.515 The other example is that there was a lawsuit 
between an Armenian Ottoman and a British merchant in Bursa, a city in the Empire, and 
Ponsonby applied to the Ottoman Government to have this lawsuit moved to the high court in 
Istanbul.516 
Meanwhile, the works to improve the new Ottoman Army’s infrastructure in terms of military 
education had been carrying on with all speed in 1837 despite all the difficulties that the Ottoman 
Empire had encountered at that time. For example, some geometric equipment and books for the 
military school were ordered from Britain.517 Moreover, some necessary equipment for the steel 
furnace, which was in the Armoury, was ordered from Britain through Sarım Effendi.518 Other 
orders from Britain to improve ammunition production included a copper sieve, chemicals, a 
flask, and a thermometer for use in the Powder Mill.519 The Powder Mill Minister indicated to 
the Ottoman Army Commander the need for these materials520 and then they were bought from 
Britain through Sarım Effendi.521 At this time, an important request came from the Ottomans. 
Sarım Effendi was instructed to request of the House of Lords that whatever the Ottoman 
officers who had been taking military education in Britain, learned in theory, they should put into 
practice in the British Army, if the House of Lords accepted this suggestion. After a while the 
request was accepted.522 
On the other hand, not everything was progressing outstandingly well in the process. For 
instance, construction works by British engineers were continuing in Istanbul on a cannon 
factory and rifle factory. It was reported to the Prime Minister that because of some difficulties 
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raised by the British engineers, the construction works were moving too slowly and this was 
causing a waste of money. The Ottoman civil servant responsible for this construction proposed 
in his report that paying extra money to the engineers could accelerate the process. In response, 
the Prime Minister ordered that the payment determined in the contract with the engineers should 
be increased to fifty thousand Ottoman Kurus (Ottoman money) and the salaries would have to 
be paid without delay.523   
Mahmud had also been following the European press very closely. The Ottoman diplomats, such 
as Nuri Effendi, Reşid Pasha, Namık Pasha, and Sarım Effendi, had been sending any articles 
they found from a European country which mentioned the Ottoman Empire.524  
Sometimes, interesting offers would come to the Ottoman Government from the British: such as 
a British painter applied to the Ottoman Government to paint the Sultan’s portrait.525   
 
7.7. 1838 
From the point of view of cooperation, both in the diplomatic arena and the reform process, it 
seemed like the Anglo-Ottoman relations had reached its peak. It transpires that all Mahmud and 
his statesmen’s diplomatic efforts had brought relations to their best position thus far. Although 
William died on 20 June 1837, there was no change in British policies with respect to Eastern 
affairs, with Queen Victoria’s accession to the throne. Owing to the international relations 
between the Ottomans and the British being so cordial, this year was an active year for British 
support in the Ottoman’s reform progress.  
In 1838, significant developments appeared following the efforts to reinforce the army in every 
possible way. The reason for this was that the imminent war between the Sultan and his governor 
seemed to be becoming more likely with each passing day. Therefore, Mahmud and his 
governments felt motivated to actively strengthen the Ottoman Army as soon as they could. The 
most urgent aspect of this matter was to improve and augment the army munitions, as had been 
happening in the previous years but now needed to happen much faster. For instance, the 
decision was made to buy some ammunition and cannonballs to increase the artillery fire power 
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of some of the Castles to five hundred shots.526 In addition to this the Department of War ordered 
that six hundred locks should be immediately produced for use with for the iron cannonballs 
imported from Britain and the bronze cannonballs produced in Istanbul.527 The order was for the 
production should start immediately; Mahmud wanted a rapid victory against his rebel governor 
this time. Having good gunpowder was still very important during this year as well, so two 
hundred and eighty-two tons of gunpowder was ordered from Britain.528 In addition to this, Hafız 
Pasha, an Ottoman attendant in Sivas, had started to produce gunpowder there and he was able to 
inform central government that four kilograms gunpowder cost 18 Kurus. In response, they 
asked for the details of the costing such as whether the expenses of saltpetre, sulphur, and 
labourers were included in the price or not.529 Hafız Pasha had also begun to produce 
cannonballs. However, a warning came to the Ottoman Government from the British Embassy 
that these cannonballs might be of no use because of their size.530 In addition, the Ottoman War 
Office was able to report that one hundred and sixty-nine tons of gunpowder had been produced 
in the Ottoman Powder Mill.531   
Despite these kinds of preparations, Mahmud and his statesmen had never seen the purchase of 
the necessary munitions from Europe as the only way to enhance the army; they also searched 
for a lasting solution better than foreign imports. The best way to achieve this aim was to 
produce their own munitions in their own country even if this production had to be made with 
the support of British experts and equipment. Consequently, the works to implement this plan 
continued throughout this year. For example, it was decided to bring an expert from Britain 
through Sarım Effendi in order to produce cannonballs in the ironworks under the British 
expert’s directorship.532 Another example of this is found in the Pravişte iron foundry in 
Salonika, an Ottoman city in the Balkans, which was rented to the manager of the foundry, 
Haşim Bey, and they too decided to bring a British cannonball expert over to direct proceedings 
during the renewal process of the foundry.533 To achieve the aim of independent manufacture, it 
had not  only been beneficial to have British assistance to establish the factories in the short term, 
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but also, for the long term, some Ottomans had been sent to Europe to learn how to establish 
these types of factories for themselves. One such emissary was Colonel Bekir Bey. He was sent 
to Britain in 1834 to improve himself in the field of industrial science, and after his training the 
Ottoman government recalled him to Istanbul in 1838 to supervise the establishment of an 
ironworks in Istanbul for the production of equipment and machine tools to enable more factories 
to be set up in the Ottoman lands.534 Mahmud had successfully reaped the fruits of his labour in 
the field of his endeavours to comprehensively renew the Empire, by sending his subjects to 
Europe to learn the European system and bring the knowledge back to their country.            
As well as these ongoing developments in the reform programme the British continued to visit 
Istanbul in this year for the purpose of educating the Ottoman officers. Quite interestingly, 
British tutors were not only brought for the instruction of the Ottoman officers, but also they 
were also even brought in for the Ottoman labourers. With the aid of this method it was possible 
to establish iron foundries in different regions in the Empire such as Samakofçuk, Pravişte, and 
Samokov. Subsequently, a British tutor who was an expert in his field, a British engineer, and a 
British translator were brought to the Empire to train the labourers, to work in these iron 
foundries producing the cannonballs. For some time they were unable to receive their salaries, 
then the Ottoman government ordered that their accumulated salaries be paid to them in full.535 
Mahmud, again not content with merely bringing British tutors to educate the Ottoman labourers, 
also sent some labourers to Britain in order to learn the new techniques in smelting and casting 
for use in the new iron foundry in Samakofçuk.536   
The British had not just come to the Ottoman lands to educate Ottoman officers and labourers or 
only for commerce with the Ottoman Empire; they also visited the Empire for scientific research, 
even though the real aim of that research was commercial. Likewise, in 1838, three British 
researchers came to the Empire sponsored by Britain in order to investigate the mines and 
vegetation in the Anatolian region. Ponsonby, who continued to play the role of advocate for 
British subjects’ rights, asked the Ottoman Government for their protection by the state officers 
wherever they went for their investigation.537 One of these cases was when a British citizen, who 
lived in Çesme   an Ottoman county in the west   died, and the Ottoman civil servant in the 
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county, Ali Bey, seized possession of his field, which was two hundred and twenty acres. 
However; his inheritors had already sold the field to a man named Solomon. Despite this sale, 
the Foreign Minister ordered the expropriation of the field but Ponsonby put in a request to the 
Government to cancel this order.538 Thereupon, as a last resort, the problem was brought to the 
Ottoman Court in Istanbul, and the Judge of Çeşme was instructed that he should not make any 
ruling on this issue until after the result of the Court.539  
The much-debated issue of these years was that of the employment of the British officers. Many 
articles can be found in the UK records with respect to topic;540 however, something should be 
said from the Ottoman’ point of view of the matter. The perspective of Mahmud and his 
statesmen on these British Officers was completely different from that of Palmerston, whose 
main aim in sending these officers to Istanbul was that they should be employed in the Ottoman 
Army. However, the Ottomans’ aim was to use the British officers to provide training for the 
Ottoman Officers, and thereby, by extension, improve the whole army.541 Nevertheless, it 
transpires from the Ottoman records that when it came to 1838, the Ottoman statesmen were not 
so sure what they wanted to do with these officers and because of this, many secret negotiations 
took place amongst the Ottoman statesmen to determine this issue. First of all, it must be 
considered that although  Mahmud and his statesmen’s main goal was to make an alliance with 
Britain, at the same time they had to consider keeping the balance of the diplomatic process in 
the region. They had to ensure that any action they embarked on would still appear to the 
Russians as if they were united allies. The majority of the documents reveal that whenever 
Mahmud made an order, or an Ottoman diplomat prepared a report in order to promote the 
benefits in making Anglo-Ottoman alliance, at the same time whoever was dealing with the 
diplomacy had warned that they should have to be very careful about how it would look to the 
Russians. For example, Mustafa Reşid prepared a secret report, and after explaining the benefits 
of employing British navy officers in the Ottoman Fleet, he warned that the Russians would have 
to be persuaded on this matter.542 The responsible diplomat for arranging the British officers’ 
employment in the Ottoman Fleet was Ahmet Fethi Pasha, the Ottoman ambassador in Paris. His 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
538 BOA C..HR, File No: 119 Document No 5910.	  
539 BOA, File No: 139 Document No 6930.	  	  
540	  For	  instance,	  Rodkey’s	  mentioned	  article	  is	  a	  nice	  example	  to	  look	  at	  the	  issue	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  Foreign	  
Office	  such	  as	  Palmerston	  and	  Ponsonby.	  
541 BOA, File No: 1174 Document No 46427 C. 	  
542 BOA, File No: 628 Document No 31066. 	  
172 
	  
	  
	  
opinion, stated in his report, was united with that of Reşid Pasha in that he thought to employ the 
British officers in the Fleet would be very beneficial for improvement but this situation would 
have to be implemented without upsetting the Russians   and he also mentioned that he was in 
agreement with Kaptan Pasha, the Ottoman Foreign Minister, on this matter.543 Ahmet Fethi 
Pasha also met with the British ambassador to Paris and negotiated several times over this issue, 
544 also sending several encoded reports on it from Paris.545 Despite all these negotiations, in the 
end, Mahmud decided not to give his permission for the employment of these officers in the 
Ottoman Fleet. He gave a rescript on this issue which he ordered the Ottoman Navy 
Undersecretary to draught in the field, stating he would not be employing any foreign officers in 
the Ottoman Army and Navy. The Government responded that there was already a draft prepared 
for the British Officers for just such an eventuality, and it would be more useful to send it with 
the new one prepared by the Navy Undersecretary, to the Ministry of Justice.546 
Although there had been that clash of ideas about the employment of British officers in the 
Ottoman Army, Anglo-Ottoman relations still remained very positive, since the Russian danger 
motivated the British to seek the benefits of good Ottoman relations, and the Mehmed Ali 
problem for the Ottomans remained a motivating factor on the agenda. And so, in British public 
opinion also, a positive feeling had been engendered for the Ottomans. As a result of this, a 
British community interested in Eastern culture and morality was started in London.547 The 
Ottoman Envoy, Sarım Effendi, reported to Istanbul imparting some information about this 
group. He mentioned that this community regarded the Ottoman Empire as the biggest and most 
significant representative of the Eastern world, so it might be useful to send some handwriting 
books and printed Ottoman text and an appreciative letter from Istanbul.548 The same kind of 
warm affinity had manifested itself in British diplomacy as well. The Ottoman ambassador at 
Prussia, Kamil Pasha, reported from Berlin that the Russian ambassador to Prussia threw a 
ballroom party in Berlin and the British ambassador to Prussia came to the party wearing some 
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Ottoman clothes and a shawl.549 This is a prime example showing what good standing both 
countries’ relations were in at that moment.  
Reşid Pasha was daily increasing the good impression he had upon Mahmud. First he was 
appointed as the Ottoman Ambassador to Paris in 1834, and then he was appointed as the 
Ottoman Ambassador to London in 1836. Eventually, Mahmud appointed him as head of the 
Foreign Office. As previously explained, he had sent many detailed reports from Europe to 
inform Mahmud about the latest developments in Europe, generally with respect to the European 
Powers’ current attitudes to the Mehmed Ali problem, and he did not like either the French or the 
Russians. As a matter of fact he was pro-British and had very much wanted to achieve this 
alliance with the British against all the Ottoman enemies: the first and foremost of these being 
Mehmed Ali, as his sovereign had wanted. Therefore Reşid Pasha’s appointment to the Foreign 
Office was perfectly suited to Mahmud’s plan and it was the reason behind the rapid increase in 
Ottoman diplomatic success. In this area, Reşid achieved many useful things, not only 
diplomatically and politically, but also he had embarked on some enterprises to establish close 
ties with eminent people in London to improve Anglo-Ottoman relations, such as to request from 
Mahmud permission to give some gifts to these kinds of people. For example, a medal studded 
with some precious stones was presented to Palmerston.550 Moreover, some gifts were given by 
Reşid Pasha to Queen Victoria and interestingly Palmerston’s mother.551 He also gave some gifts 
to the British ministers.552 Lastly, he gave some gifts to the Queen’s mother which Palmerston 
submitted to her and then informed Reşid Pasha he had done so.553 These things may have been 
just token gifts but they were given in an effort to improve Anglo-Ottoman relations, even if only 
slightly.    
As mentioned, the employment of British Officers in the Ottoman Army was problematic; 
however, the same problem was not the rule for the other departments. On the contrary, 
employing British workers in other departments was seen as an advantage, to help improve the 
Empire in a positive way. For example, at the beginning of the 1830s, some councils on different 
subjects were established for the purpose of the enhancement of state and society. In order to 
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improve these councils, a British man was employed. According to the records, he was an expert 
in agriculture and craft and it was considered beneficial to employ him on one of the Ottoman 
councils, such as farming, agriculture, handicraft, or industry.554 
Moreover, the former British translator Sapper so called in the records, requested a license from 
the Sultan to build and run a bake house in Istanbul. After a while, Mahmud gave his permission 
and in addition to this he also gave him twenty thousand Kurus to repair his house.555 The 
Ottoman chamberlain, who was responsible for all bakery houses in Istanbul, was also notified of 
this.556           
Ponsonby, as previously illustrated, sometimes stood in as advocate for the British merchants’ 
rights to the Ottoman Central Government. However, this time, interestingly enough, he 
advocated for an internal issue in favour of the Ottoman Empire. The British Consul at Erzurum, 
a city in the East, informed Ponsonby that the richest person in the city had been oppressing the 
public in the city and consequently, the public rose up against him.557 Thereupon, central 
government was informed of the incident by Ponsonby and it sent an official letter to warn the 
person involved.558 This situation shows how the British expanded their influence throughout the 
Empire from the second half of 1833.  
The most significant development for the Ottomans in 1838 was the treaty of Balta Limani, a 
commercial treaty which was signed on 16 August 1838 between The Ottoman Empire and 
Britain. This chapter does not scrutinize this treaty since it is to be examined in a separate 
chapter in combination with the Mehmed Ali problem, Mahmud’s plan and his statesmen’s 
diplomatic efforts.  
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7.8. 1839 
This year’s most significant feature in terms of commercial life in the Empire was the increasing 
number of British merchants trading in the Ottoman lands as local merchants. The biggest reason 
for this was the treaty of Balta Limani. After this Treaty, British merchants only paid twelve 
percent on exports and five percent on imports. In addition to these tariffs, there was an eight 
percent duty required from Ottomans who carried on domestic trade.559 However, while the 
Ottoman merchants had to pay this duty, foreign merchants did not have to pay it any more after 
Balta Limani. So from every point of view, foreign merchants had been given an advantage over 
Ottoman merchants in domestic competition.  
It is not goal of this chapter to examine this period from the point of view of the diplomatic and 
political developments, nor to discuss the various motives, aspects and repercussions of the 
Treaty of Balta Limani. The main aim of the chapter is to indicate, with examples of actual cases, 
large and small, the nature and tone of the improved Anglo-Ottoman relationships after the treaty 
of Unkiar Skelessi. Therefore, the rest of the chapter is given over to providing actual examples 
of developments in social and commercial life from this year in order to contribute to an 
informative illustration of this period in history.  
The increasing number of British merchants in Ottoman life after the Treaty of Balta Limani 
brought many problems with it. For example, a British citizen, called Marcus in the document, 
emigrated and got married in Silivri, a district close to Istanbul, and began to trade there. 
However, he had some problems with the locals and the Ottoman authorities. The public in 
Silivri complained about Marcus’s inappropriate behaviour. According to them this kind of 
behaviour offended their sensibilities and the dignity of Islam.560 This man also had some 
problems with the authorities with respect to payment of the customs duties due on his imports of 
coffee and sugar, and had disputes with the Ottoman officials. For all these reasons, the Ottoman 
Foreign Office made a ruling on the matter, and gave notice to the British Embassy that 
Marcuswas to be moved somewhere else in Istanbul or he would be sent back to his own 
country, Britain.561  
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Another interesting matter in the commercial life after the Balta Limani happened when the 
British and French Embassies’ translators brought some elephant's tusks and dates from Tripoli 
and also some bathrobes from Tunis for trading purposes. They wanted to take advantage of the 
privileges of the treaty of the Balta Limani regarding payment of the customs tariffs; however, 
this request was not accepted by the Ottoman Government.562 
Meanwhile, a conflict arose between the Ottoman authorities and the British Consul at Salonika. 
A Russian Merchant ship had an accident off the coast of Aynaroz, an Ottoman district in the 
Balkans. Some of the money and goods on the ship belonged to a British merchant. All the goods 
on the ship were under the governor and his officers’ supervision and then submitted to the 
shipmaster’s brother and agent and in return for a written document from the agent. After a 
while, the British Consul applied and indicated that the British merchant’s goods and money had 
been seized and therefore, he requested their return to the merchant. Following this request, the 
problem was investigated by the Central Government and the Ottoman Foreign Minister was 
able to inform Ponsonby that the money and goods had already been submitted earlier and thus 
the Consul’s application was in error.563  
Another interesting incident with respect to a British merchant was that he was dismissed from 
his coffee shop in Beyoğlu, which is a famous district in Istanbul, since he was mixing fake 
substances such as chickpea and so on with his coffee.564 This is a very clear example how, in the 
new atmosphere in Istanbul after Unkiar Skelessi, the British had taken their place in the 
Ottoman life with all their pluses and minuses. Another example of this matter was when an 
Arabic odalisque, or slave girl, was found in a British citizen’s house and was taken from the 
house and returned.565  
Meanwhile, the Ottoman government issued a decree that any civil trials needed for British and 
French citizens should be processed with their ambassadors and consuls or agents in attendance. 
This was in accordance with the treaties, which had been struck with these countries.566 It seems 
that the Ottoman politicians were trying to bring their procedures in line with the rest of 
European society.   
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Increasing inter-Anglo-Ottoman trade triggered the significant issue of piracy. With increasing 
trade, pirates started to operate in the seas. There were many incidents of piracy on the seas but it 
will suffice to provide only a few to convey understanding of this new issue which was a feature 
of this period.  
An Ottoman citizen, was called Yani Eksino, was carrying some goods in a Swedish ship 
towards Algeria. British pirates attacked the ship and seized all Yani’s goods saying they were 
French goods. The French were historically rivals of the British in the Mediterranean.567 
Thereupon, the Ottoman civil servant Ali Pasha prepared a report and suggested that the value of 
the merchant’s assets should be requested from the British Embassy.568 Another similar incident 
seen in this year was when a Muslim merchant was carrying his goods from Alexandria to 
Istanbul in a French ship and his goods were extorted from him after a British pirate ship attack. 
His assets’ value was requested from the British Embassy as well.569 Nevertheless, it wasn’t only 
British pirates who had been attacking ships, but there were also some Ottoman pirates. Ibrahim 
Reis attacked a British ship and seized the goods of a British merchant and this time the British 
ambassador applied to the governor of Rumelia to get the merchant’s assets back.570       
On the other hand, the positive contributions from the British had continued to improve the 
Ottoman Empire in this year as well. In this respect, a British engineer Mister Tyler was 
decorated for his valuable services in the Ottoman Armoury.571 Also, another British engineer, 
Roberson, had prepared an explanatory document about the necessity to establish an iron foundry 
in the Keban Mine.572 
There is a purchase record showing the Ottoman mentality in export operations. A British 
merchant bought twenty thousand barrel staves in order to take them to Malta, and Ponsonby 
requested permission for the ship to pass thorough the straits. However, at first, the head of the 
shipyard was asked whether these barrel staves were a needed in the shipyard or not. His reply 
was that there was no need for them in there, whereupon the ship was allowed to pass.573 In the 
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Empire the keynote principal before permission for an export had been to give priority for 
domestic use of the supplies. 
There are many such incidents from this period but the most important thing to consider in the 
light of the main argument of the thesis is that Mahmud’s plan, to make an alliance with Britain 
against Mehmed Ali, was conducive to a new period in the Anglo-Ottoman cooperation to 
improve and enhance the Ottoman Empire. As a matter of fact, before the 1830s, Mahmud had 
already achieved the status of being one of the most significant reformer Sultans, maybe even the 
first. However, the gravity of the Mehmed Ali problem had impelled him to give priority to the 
British in modernising his Empire according to Western principles. All examined incidents in the 
chapter comprehensively reveal, not just in theory but in reality, the level of influence the British 
had in the Ottoman reform period in the new period that had been brought about after Unkiar 
Skelessi. It must be acknowledged that Mahmud was not alone in the task of getting British 
support in the reform process; he had the help of some skilled and determined diplomats, such as 
Mustafa Reşid, Namık Pasha, Nuri Effendi, Sarım Effendi etc. Mahmud’s and all these 
diplomats’ vigorous efforts irreversibly lead the Empire to totally a new age. This age came to be 
called the Tanzimat Era, and it was to make all the efforts mentioned inscriptive; more lasting 
and purposeful than spontaneous or haphazard decisions. By this means the reform period gained 
international recognition and a more organised atmosphere, even though Mahmud did not live 
long enough to see his top diplomat, Mustafa Reşid, make his announcement of the script, 
Imperial Edict of Reorganization, on 3 November 1839, to the Ottoman public and all the 
ambassadors, including Ponsonby.                
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FINAL CHAPTER 
The Culmination of Sultan Mahmud's Diplomacy Prior to his Ultimate Critical Battle with 
Mehmed Ali 
 
From Mahmud’s point of view, the right time had finally come for a particular move he had in 
mind which would put an end to all the trouble his rebel governor had caused. As a matter of 
fact, as has been analysed from every perspective, his every diplomatic manoeuvre and order 
since the defeat at Konya, at the end of 1832, had been aimed in the direction of gaining British 
support, and at the same time handling the international position with regard to the Russians with 
great care.574 Simultaneously he was laying the foundations to enhance and reform the Empire in 
every respect: militarily, economically, administratively, and socially, by drawing upon 
European support and experience, especially that of the British.575 It is in this context that this 
chapter will examine in detail not only the Sultan and his statesmen’s final preparations to 
enhance the army for the ultimate battle with Mehmed Ali’s army, but also Mahmud’s and his 
diplomats’ struggle to solve the problem with diplomatically negotiated support from the British, 
as they had been trying to do since the outset of these difficulties. Nevertheless, the aim of this 
chapter is not to describe the final battle between the Sultan and his governor since this has 
already been done in detail by Turkish and English scholars. Subsequently, the main goal of this 
final chapter is to examine Mahmud and his statesmen’s final diplomatic and military 
preparations, which involved the extensive use of diplomacy whilst at the same time enhancing 
the Empire with European support, particularly from the British, before the deciding battle with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
574 As described in the previous chapters, Mahmud’s and his diplomats’ primary objective was always to make an 
alliance with Britain against Mehmed Ali, even when he called the Russians to the Bosporus and made the treaty of 
Unkiar Skelessi with them. Many Ottoman documents confirm that the Russians were being used as a weapon to 
wake the British up to how important the Ottoman Empire was to the protection of British interests in the region. Of 
course, the Russians were, at the same time, a temporary solution enabling the Sultan to bring Ibrahim Pasha to a 
halt, as, until the implementation of the Anglo-Ottoman alliance against Mehmed Ali and the Russians, he had been 
rapidly advancing with his army towards the heart of the Empire, Istanbul. Despite this pro-British atmosphere in 
this entire period, 1833-39, the weapon, Russia, had to be tactfully in the event of any possible repercussions from 
the Russians finding out they were being used. However, when looking at the relevant diplomatic events in the light 
of the other chapters, it could safely be said that Mahmud and his statesmen had been successful in their efforts on 
this matter.      	  
575 All detailed examples of British influence, between 1833 and 1839, upon the enhancement of the Empire in every 
aspect can be found in the seventh chapter of this work.   	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Mehmed Ali on 24 June 1839. For this reason this chapter will conclude this thesis’ attempt to 
uncover the true story of Mahmud and his statesmen’s diplomatic efforts, by recounting their 
final political manoeuvres of 1838 and in the first half of 1839. In this respect, this chapter will 
contribute, as have the other chapters aimed to do, to showing to what extent Mahmud and his 
government had had a role in bringing about in the European powers, particularly Britain, 
support for the Ottoman Empire in this fatal problem.        
1838 was a crucial year for Mahmud to make the final provisions for his plans to win all the 
available diplomatic support to his side and at the same time, as far as possible to make ready his 
own army for the anticipated battle against his rebel governor’s forces. Concerning this, he 
ordered on 20 February 1838, that Mustafa Reşid Pasha, who was the Ottoman Foreign Minister 
at that time, should be sent to France as the Ottoman Ambassador; and Ahmed Pasha, the 
governor in Aydın, should also be sent to Britain as the Ottoman Ambassador.576 According to 
the instructions he gave, the main aim of these appointments was to negotiate with the British 
and the French about Mahmud’s final plan with respect to the Mehmed Ali problem. Mahmud 
was aggrieved that Mehmed Ali was violating the treaty of Kutahya every day by his army 
relentlessly advancing towards to the provinces which were not in his jurisdiction. However, by 
shrewdly registering his protest with these countries he was paving the way for their 
understanding and approval in the eventuality his own forces had to make the first strike against 
Mehmed. Mahmud was planning to attack Mehmed Ali’s army in Syria, Aleppo, in the autumn 
of 1838,577 and by ensuring the European Countries knew Mahmud was the injured party, he 
could feel more confident of their support when the critical time came. In this respect, these two 
Ottoman Ambassadors were instructed to strive to induce both these countries to pledge him their 
support and win their approval for the intervention of the Central Government should the 
situation demand.578 It seems that Mahmud did not want to wait any longer to see the fruits of his 
diplomatic labour; with which he had been carefully preparing the way ahead since the beginning 
of 1833. However, the Ottoman statesman responsible for these last preparations for the battle 
reported that although this plan was applicable, when the time came, with acceptance from both 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
576 Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, ( The Original Name of the Ottoman Archives which is in Istanbul and involves all 
the Ottoman Documents from 1299 to 1923, and it will be referred to as BOA in the rest of the chapter) File No: 380 
Document No: 20558 C. 	  
577 BOA, File No: 380 Document No: 20558 C.	  
578 BOA, File No: 380 Document No: 20558 C.	  
181 
	  
	  
	  
countries, at the same time more work needed to be discreetly undertaken in order to augment the 
quantity of ammunition accessible by the army.  
Mahmud also made known to the relevant parties that if Mehmed Ali did not content himself 
with the provinces that he had obtained with the treaty of Kütahya, and if he attempted to 
challenge the Central Government and requisition even more of the lands which were not 
currently under his control, such as Bagdad or any other province, then this act would mean that 
the first act of aggression had come from him not from the Sultan, in consequence of this 
provocative manoeuvre by the Pasha. Mahmud went on to tell his diplomats that Britain and 
France should be ready to acknowledge that the Sultan had the right of intervention when it came 
to restraint of his rebel governor.579 Mahmud’s persistence, it seemed, was continuing to win 
British favour to his side in 1838, just as much as it had done in 1833 and Mahmud knew very 
well that first and foremost, he would have to prepare Palmerston to support the eventuality of a 
possible intervention, since Palmerston had not previously been very supportive of the idea of 
Mahmud’s attacking Mehmed Ali without the Egyptian army making the first move against the 
Sultan’s army. In this context Rodkey recounts that Palmerston said Britain:  
“would undoubtedly assist him to repel any attack on the part of Mehemet Ali, it would, on the 
other hand, be a different question if the war was begun by the Sultan”580 
 
Rodkey also has explained the reason for this opinion of Palmerston’s in that: 
“until the renewal of war between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt in 1839 Palmerston 
consistently counselled the Turkish government to keep the peace in the Levant in order that it 
might succeed with its plans for military and administrative reorganization, and on more than one 
occasion he took practical steps to further Ottoman reform.”581 
 
For these reasons Mahmud was aware that he needed to find reasonable and acceptable grounds 
to attack to his rebel governor should the occasion arise; he seems, however, to have assumed 
that if he had such grounds, the British would come to his aid if needed, an assumption based on 
his hopes that his armies were superior to those of the rebel Pasha. It would take the failure of the 
second assumption – and an international crisis – to produce such intervention.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
579 BOA, File No: 380 Document No: 20558 C.	  
580 F. S. Rodkey, Lord Palmerston and the Rejuvenation of Turkey, 1830-41, The Journal of Modern History, Vol.    
1, No. 4 (Dec., 1929), p.590	  
581 Ibid, p. 576-577	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Mahmud also indicated in his rescript that all statesmen should make the utmost efforts to dispel 
and repel all hazard and damage from Mehmed Ali, however he took pains to reassure them that 
Mehmed Ali would not dare to attack to any district which was under the Central Government 
jurisdiction. Nonetheless, these precautionary preparations, he continued in his orders, should be 
calmly made by laying down the suggested defensive preparations.582 In response, the governor 
of Urfa requested from the Sultan that any ammunition from the other further out provinces 
should be immediately transferred to Baghdad and to the cities near to it, as this was the nearest 
populated area to his advancing troops. This was vital, he added, since he had received news 
from Egypt that Mehmed Ali had established nine new regiments in Egypt and also at the same 
time the Pasha had sent the troops he had in Damascus to Egypt as well, and lastly, on top of that 
he had dispatched his generals to Aleppo and nearby cities.583 Mahmud and his statesmen had 
been careful to follow all Mehmed Ali’s moves very closely. In this case, the report about the 
governor was extremely detailed in all the latest developments and the activities he made in the 
region. For obvious reasons was is very useful to Mahmud and his statesmen to be well informed 
about all Mehmed Ali’s recent activities and also extremely informative to the observer to be 
able to see such detailed troop movements and appreciate how the Sultan responded. According 
to this report, the Egyptian troops had recently been dispatched to Gülek, a district in the South 
Mediterranean, by Mehmed Ali. There they were defeated; a proportion of them were killed and 
the rest of them had to retreat from the region. Thereupon, Ibrahim Pasha, the son of Mehmed 
Ali, took along almost five regiments of troops from Aleppo and attacked Gülek again. There 
were several reasons for Ibrahim’s attack Gülek from the governor of Urfa’s point of view: one 
of them could have been that he wanted revenge for the previous defeat in Gülek, or perhaps one 
of them was that Mehmed Ali wanted to distract the European Powers from his latest secret 
military preparations in the region. A third possibility was that he might have had the intention to 
first withdraw to Damascus, regroup, and then move towards Basra or Bagdad.584 
 
On the occasions when Mehmed Ali was defeated, Mahmud was of course pleased. However, he 
warned his statesmen that they should not be deceived by Mehmed Ali’s latest protestations that 
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583 BOA, File No: 380 Document No: 20558 C.	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he only really wanted peace. Mahmud was not taken in by these claims, and warned his 
government that Mehmed Ali would not give up on his real aims so easily and the only reason 
for this temporary appearance of peace-making was to give him time to regroup after his army’s 
latest debacles in various locations.585 He also stated in his rescript that Mehmed Ali was obliged 
to appear to be conciliatory, since the European powers had changed their opinion about 
Mehmed Ali after they saw his defeats; but this façade was only one of Mehmed Ali’s tricks and 
was bound to be short-lived. Mahmud’s wording started to become sterner and more direct as he 
continued with the observation that now everybody could understand how Mehmed Ali had 
betrayed his religion, and was a traitor to his state, and therefore if anybody had ever trusted him, 
they could clearly no longer do so. Finally, Mahmud ordered that for all these reasons, all the 
preparations against Mehmed Ali that he had recommended should be made, but nevertheless, 
until the right time came no direct action should be taken against him.586 Mahmud seemed to be 
determined to completely resolve his biggest problem this time. In accordance with this purpose, 
he put all his efforts into optimizing both the diplomatic conditions, and his army’s readiness, for 
war.     
After the Sultan’s order, the governor of Urfa reported that actually he had already been 
ceaselessly undertaking secret military preparations, even prior to the order. In this respect, he 
had established sixteen battalions of “redif” 587 troops and six battalions of redif artillerymen 
from Sivas, Diyarbekir, Urfa, and some other cities, and dispatched them to the Bagdad region.588 
All of these reports show that both sides, Mahmud and Mehmed Ali, had been careering towards 
a confrontation in battle at a great pace, yet at the same time both sides were seeking to win 
diplomatic support to their side during this process.  
On the Central Government’s side, preparations did not only involve the establishment of the 
new redif troops, but also a drive to increase the amount of available ammunition, and 
additionally, efforts to fulfil other deficiencies with respect to army equipment had also 
continued unrelentingly. In this respect, the governor indicated that the soldiers’ raincoats and 
clothing, made in white cloth because it was spring, should be supplied and also, he added, three 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
585 BOA,  File No: 382 Document No: 20584.	  
586 BOA,  File No: 382 Document No: 20584.	  
587 Redif means those Ottoman troops who had completed their mission in the army, after which they were on 
standby to be recalled to the army.	  
588 BOA, File No: 380 Document No: 20558 C.	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hundred dirhams, a kind of the Ottoman money, for food for the soldiers, and from ten to twenty 
para, another form of Ottoman currency, should be given to the soldiers as their salary.589   
As agreed in the Treaty of Kutahya, Mehmed Ali took on the responsibility of administering 
Syria and Adana as well as Egypt. However, after the signing of the treaty, he took the privileges 
the treaty offered and, disregarding its terms of restraint, started to attack to the cities which were 
under the Sultan’s control, such as Urfa, and Maras. Due to this aggression, the governor of Urfa 
stated in his report that because of the close proximity of Mehmed Ali’s troops to his city, he also 
had established three redif battalions, and five hundred Ottoman soldiers had been assigned to 
Urfa in order to drill these redif troops.590 In addition to these precautions, the governor stated 
that if Mehmed Ali’s army did attack Urfa, they would also need eight thousand pouches of 
Akçe, the Ottoman currency, in order to meet the army’s requirements for supplies. 
Following on from these developments came an extensive report with respect to the latest 
situation of the Mehmed Ali problem, in terms of the diplomatic conditions. This was presented 
to Mahmud.591 According to the report, the European powers, most notably Britain, were 
beginning to manifest their true opinions about Mehmed Ali Pasha and they were clearly in 
favour of the Ottoman Empire. In this respect, Ponsonby sent a diplomatic note to the Pasha 
stating that it was his duty as a governor to pay his eighteen months accumulated tax liabilities to 
the central government, and not to keep them for his own purposes. This show of support for the 
Ottomans, and international condemnation of Mehmed Ali Pasha was very useful, the report said, 
in terms of political benefits and advantages.592    
The complex diplomatic situation between the Sultan and the Pasha had been developing rapidly, 
as the end of the problem approached. In this context, the Ottoman statesmen had started to 
watch Mehmed Ali’s actions very closely. In accordance with this purpose some Ottoman 
officials had been assigned to monitor the Egyptian Fleet’s movements in and out of the Egyptian 
harbour which enabled a detailed report to be prepared and presented to the Marine Minister. 
After this report, Central Government ordered that no concessions or assistance should be given 
to Mehmed Ali over any land occupation or harbouring his fleet and he would be most insistent 
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on this matter, because carrying out this order would effectively block any sedition.593 This order, 
following closely after monitoring the movements of Mehmed Ali’s vessels had not only been 
about curbing Mehmed Ali’s armada but also applied to the activities of sympathetic Ottoman 
officials, who had been secretly supporting Mehmed Ali. One of them was the Major General of 
Maras, a city in the East; Süleyman Pasha. It was understood that he was a supporter of the rebel 
governor and therefore it was imperative that he should be excluded from Maras forthwith. Hafız 
Pasha was appointed to carry out this mission.594 This time, Mahmud was being very cautious 
and rigorously scrutinising the problem from every possible angle, trying to pre-empt every 
possible mishap.  
In addition to all these preparations Mahmud wanted to improve his army’s technical 
infrastructure by taking advantage of the expertise and availability of foreign army officers. As 
the chapter on the Ottoman Empire reform process describes, initially a lot of British officials 
were brought to the Empire to enhance and educate the new and inexperienced Ottoman Army. 
However, later on, Mahmud and Palmerston desisted from further usage of foreign army’s 
officers for training purposes Mahmud had only wanted these British Officers to educate the 
Ottoman officers in training techniques and improve the army in its ability to utilise technical 
equipment; but Palmerston, conversely, had wanted his officers to occupy permanent positions of 
command within the Ottoman Army. Therefore, Mahmud had turned to the Prussian officers as a 
more suitable source of the assistance he was looking for, and started to bring some of them over, 
in order to prepare the Ottoman Army for the last and biggest battle against Mehmed Ali.595  
Meanwhile, the practice of strengthening friendly British relations through private connections 
with the more influential members of society had increased, so that more British support could be 
mustered before the final battle. In line with this purpose, Mahmud sent a necklace studded with 
valuable precious stones to both the Queen Victoria and her mother. As an interesting aside about 
the necklace; there was an Ottoman coin, which was made from a valuable Turkish stone, called 
Akik Taşı, placed in the middle of the necklace. On this coin were written some Turkish words. 
This was done because Ottoman money was much in demand and highly respected in Europe at 
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that time.596 In addition to this, some Turkish furs and tapestries were sent to the Queen and her 
mother and a number of British ministers were also sent some gifts.597 These gifts were only 
small tokens but as Palmerston had assured, when he sent five horses as a gift to the Sultan in the 
name of the King a few years ago that “these horses were not so valuable themselves in financial 
terms but they would be a strong evidence to show Mehmed Ali and the Russians that Britain 
would stand by the Ottomans’ side in all circumstances.”598 Now it was the Ottoman’s turn to 
show Mehmed Ali and the other powers, with their token gifts that the British were with them to 
help resolve any problems. 
Meantime, as a matter of course, diplomatic relations between the Ottoman Empire and the other 
European powers had been ongoing in the context of the Mehmed Ali problem. One of the most 
significant parties on the diplomatic scene was Metternich. The Austrian Ambassador in Istanbul 
informed the Ottoman Government that Metternich sent a message to Mahmud suggesting that he 
decrease his latest military preparations against Mehmed Ali. Metternich also made a most 
surprising offer: to resolve the Ottoman’s problem without having to go to war599 It seems that 
Palmerston was not alone in feeling anxious about the prospect of disrupting European peace 
with a war between the Sultan and his governor. Interestingly, Mahmud responded to this offer 
saying that if Britain would join in with this possible attempt at an alternative solution as an 
allied country, he was inclined to accept this offer and told the Austrian Ambassador that he 
could indicate this response thus to Metternich.600 This response is more evidence demonstrating 
Mahmud’s strong desire for cooperation with Britain to solve the problem. Although all recent 
signs indicated that Mahmud was gearing up to eradicate his biggest problem with a final 
decisive battle, it seems that he had been weighing up the international balance of power and 
waiting until the time was right to employ an alternative solution.  
At this stage, analysis of the latest diplomatic developments from the point of view of the 
Ottoman side shows that all Mahmud’s and his diplomats’, efforts since the beginning of the 
problem, as described in the previous chapters, had finally started to yield their results. By the 
time 1838 came around, it seems that there was no longer any feeling of hesitancy in the majority 
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of the British with regards to supporting the Ottoman Empire. By way of example, when the 
Ottoman Prime Minister and Ponsonby had a meeting, they decided to join the Ottoman and 
British Armadas in the Lesbos and Chios to make a stronger force against Mehmed Ali. In this 
meeting Ponsonby asked the Prime Minister if in the eventuality of a war occurring between 
Central Government and the rebel governor, and if the Russians offered to help Central 
Government by sending the Russian fleet and troops to the battlefield, what would the Ottoman 
government to do about this offer?601 The time had come for Palmerston and Ponsonby to find 
out from Mahmud and his ministers their opinions on whether, in their minds, the conditions of 
the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi had lost their validity or not. In fact, the abolition of the treaty of 
Unkiar Skelessi was Palmerston’s single most important aim in Eastern affairs.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
At the same time, Britain had also started to make efforts to encourage the other powers in 
Europe to approach the Ottoman Government with help to solve the problem in diplomatic ways. 
In this respect, the British agreed to share their significant privileges, which had ensued from the 
treaty of Balta Limani, 16 August 1838, with the other European Countries, in order to create an 
alliance against Mehmed Ali. For example, the Ottoman Ambassador in Vienna, Mehmed Rıfat 
Bey, reported that Queen Victoria had stated in her speech on the opening day of the British 
Parliament that a commercial treaty with the Austrians, much like the treaty of Balta Limani 
would be very useful and beneficial for Austria, Britain and the Ottoman Empire.602 In the same 
vein, the old rivals in the Levant, Britain and France, had celebrated a commercial treaty signed 
together with the Ottoman Empire, with a banquet prepared by the Ottoman Government.603  
Meanwhile, the Ottomans continued to prepare their Army for the imminent battle with the 
Egyptian Army. In accordance with this purpose, they put in an order with Britain, France and 
Russia for body armour/uniforms.604 
As mentioned above, the Ottoman Fleet had started to act jointly with the British Fleet in the 
Mediterranean Sea. Unsurprisingly, the Russians found this a most irksome state of affairs. By 
way of example of this, the Prussian Ambassador in Istanbul communicated to the Ottoman 
Foreign Minister that the latest manoeuvres of the Ottoman Fleet along with the British war ships 
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around Izmir, (an Ottoman city in the Mediterranean) was making the Russians anxious.605 It 
seems that Mahmud felt he could now gradually start to leave aside being careful not offend the 
Russians, as he had had to do for so long when he was striving to make the Anglo-Ottoman 
Alliance possible. His real diplomatic plan’s true colours had begun to come out. Moreover, 
news had even started to appear in the British Press that if Mehmed Ali’s army started a war 
against the Central Government, it was planned that the British Fleet would to go to Alexandria 
to prevent the Egyptian army from causing any harm the Ottoman Empire.606 Such rumours 
abounded, and encouraged Mahmud to think that if he did act, the British would be on his side.  
These feelings were increased by reports from the Ottoman ambassador in Prussia, Kamil Pasha, 
who informed Istanbul that Britain had given formal notice to Mehmed Ali that the British 
supported the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and not his anarchic endeavours.607 The 
British Government wanted to reassure Mahmud and his ministers and in this respect, they also 
indicated to the Ottoman Ambassador in London, Sarım Effendi that the British would always be 
on the Ottoman side and continue to support them in their struggle against the Egyptian 
problem.608At the same time, Reşid Pasha, the Ottoman Foreign Minister, had been attempting to 
create a public opinion in Europe against Mehmed Ali; and in order to do that he had been 
getting in touch with the European Powers.609 From the Topkapi Palace, the view was looking 
favourable for a time of reckoning with the over-mighty governor of Egypt. 
But Mehmed Ali had not been sitting by idly and watching Mahmud’s diplomatic manoeuvres; 
on the contrary, he continued to be diplomatically active as well. He started to openly declare 
that he would not desist from seeking to gain his independence. Palmerston, although he was out 
of London at that moment, sent a letter to Sarım Effendi about this bold announcement, saying 
that Mehmed Ali’s last declaration had been made in order to find out how the European Powers 
would react, and when he got back to London he would like to meet and negotiate about this 
topic in detail with Sarım Effendi.610 Sarım Effendi reported after completing his round with his 
contacts among the British politicians in London that the British had a good mind to resolve the 
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problem for the benefit of the Ottomans.611 Another diplomat aside from Sarım Effendi, who had 
been very active in this process, was Kamil Pasha in Prussia. He met with the British Charge 
D'affaires in Prussia in order to find out what was happening with respect to the latest 
negotiations in the British Government about the Mehmed Ali problem.612 All of this active 
enquiry-making from the Ottoman diplomats show that they had been working hard under the 
Sultan’s direction to successfully achieve their objective of resolving the problem with the help 
of the British.  
Ibrahim Pasha, had also been watching developments and preparing for war. He, too, had been 
determined to enhance his army in preparation for the last battle. In this context, he tried to 
gather some weapons from the Dürzi people, a kind of religious community in the Ottoman 
Empire, but they refused to give up their weapons to Ibrahim and fought against him.613 
The diplomatic complexities increased as events moved towards crisis. For instance, although 
Britain and France had sternly warned Ibrahim Pasha to not attempt any kind of attack upon the 
Central Government’s troops, at the same time these two powers gave notice to the Central 
Government that if the Russians assisted the Ottoman Government, then they would support the 
opposite side: Ibrahim Pasha.614 All players in the game seemed, as it were, to place their last 
diplomatic card. But if the Europeans thought that they had the power to prevent the actors in the 
East from pursuing their own plans they were, not for the first or last time, over estimating their 
influence. As this study has attempted to show, the Ottomans were seeking to use the 
Chancelleries of Europe as much as the latter were trying to us them. 
The Ottoman Empire had been very sensitive to the diplomatic balance between all the countries 
in the region as well. Although Mahmud and his diplomats had been striving to gain British 
support, they had also been endeavouring not to cause the Russians to have misgivings about 
their true aims. This extreme sensitivity can be seen in the curious matter of an article containing 
positive points about the Sultan. It was printed by the Ottoman government, and would have been 
reproduced in the British newspapers but for the fact that when Mahmud saw the article he 
adjudged it to be unsuitable for republication in that form, in case the Russians might see the 
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Sultan effectively being praised by Britain and be offended at the cordial relations the article 
implied. For this reason, Mahmud ordered his ministers to have the style of the article softened 
so as not to be so effusive. Consequently, a British official was assigned to submit the new 
version of the article to the British newspapers.615 In the light of this example it could be said that 
Mahmud and his skilful diplomats were not just basing their diplomatic policies on only one 
possibility, on the contrary, they were aware that they had to consider all possibilities in this 
diplomatic struggle, from all angles.  
It was in this context that Mahmud ordered his ministers that they should be very careful about 
the latest diplomatic process in Europe and they should use the correct language when the right 
times came in order to ensure the European powers’ support of the Ottomans concerning the 
Mehmed Ali problem.616 
Meanwhile, Sarım Effendi delivered a secret report from London that he had met with 
Palmerston. This report stated that Britain was of one mind with the Sultan about the Mehmed 
Ali problem, and they would not in the least support Mehmed Ali in his struggle for 
independence.617 Sarım Effendi also indicated from London that after this meeting Palmerston 
sent a letter to Campbell, the British Ambassador in Alexandria, that Britain would not in any 
sense consent to, encourage or uphold Mehmed Ali’s separation from the Central Government.618 
This was just the kind of unequivocal support the Sultan had been working towards, and a far cry 
from the initial lukewarm response he had received at the outset. 
At the same time as these diplomatic developments, and as touched upon earlier in a separate 
chapter, there were two significant developments in the second half of the 1830s that had put the 
Anglo-Ottoman relationship on a very good footing. One of them was the Treaty of Balta Limani 
and the other was the Anglo-Ottoman cooperation to reform the Ottoman Empire and enhance its 
infrastructure. In particular, Mahmud wanted to use the Treaty of Balta Limani to completely win 
the British on his side, despite there being many negative features within the treaty which would 
straiten, somewhat, the Ottoman economic life. Moreover, the cooperation between the British 
and the Ottomans in the reform process to strengthen the Empire against Mehmed Ali and the 
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Russians, resulted in much-improved Anglo-Ottoman relations. Mahmud also took the advantage 
of the positive diplomatic atmosphere in his Empire's favour to reform his Empire by rallying 
European support in this process, which was one of Mahmud's most important goals.  
With these last positive diplomatic developments, even though Palmerston and Metternich’s 
apprehension about preventing the shattering of European peace had been on the agenda; from 
Mahmud’s point of view the diplomatic atmosphere seemed to be ready for the last operation 
against Mehmed Ali. The two most significant figures in the European diplomacy had tacitly 
expressed that they were in favour of the Ottomans defending their territory with a retaliatory 
strike against the provocation of Mehmed Ali’s unchecked army advances, and that that they had 
a right to intervene against Mehmed Ali after he had so blatantly violated the conditions of the 
treaty of Kütahya by attacking to his sovereign’s territories. Furthermore, in reference to the 
previous section, since 1826 Mahmud and his statesmen had been applying their utmost 
endeavours to the improvement of the new and inexperienced Ottoman Army, Asakir-i Mansure-
i Muhammediye. Furthermore, now he had gained the European countries’ support, and in 
particular, as described in the chapter about the reform programme, with the efforts the British 
made after the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi to educate the Ottoman officers and enhance the 
ammunition of the Ottoman Army, Mahmud had started to think that his army was now perhaps 
strong enough to beat his governor’s army. His renewed opinion about his forces potency meant 
that in his mind’s eye, this time was going to be completely different from the battles he had lost 
in Syria and in Konya in 1832. As a matter of fact Mahmud was not altogether unreasonable in 
thinking like this, since this time, he not only had on his side the support of the majority of the 
European countries, but also a much better trained and equipped army, by the virtue of all his and 
his statesmen’s vigorous diplomatic efforts, played out between 1833 and 1839.      
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Conclusion 
 
All Mahmud’s military and diplomatic preparations gave him the confidence to confront 
Mehmed about his continual breaches of the peace treaty. But in spite of Mahmud’s beliefs about 
his army’s strength and its capacity to beat his rebel governor’s army, the Ottoman army suffered 
a resounding defeat on 24 June 1839, in Nizip, an Ottoman district in the East. This was a 
devastating blow, and plunged the Empire into a major crisis; however, Mahmud did not live 
long enough to hear about this devastating turn of events since he died on 1 July 1839 only a few 
days before the news arrived in Istanbul. Despite the Sultan’s death and the defeat of his army, 
Mehmed Ali could not advance his army any further because of the diplomatic pressure on him 
from other European countries. At this stage, it should be mentioned that some foreign scholars, 
such as Webster, have attributed this diplomatic success over Mehmed Ali to Palmerston’s 
diplomatic ability. By way of illustration, Webster stated on this subject that; 
  “The triumph of Palmerston in 1840 was perhaps the greatest which he ever won in his long 
connection with foreign affairs… This result was obtained because Palmerston sought ends which 
in the long run even those who opposed him saw were necessary. The time was not ripe for a 
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire which would almost certainly have occurred if Palmerston had 
not had his way. This failure of Mahmud’s final fling at his vassal, so disastrous in its results, 
would have deprived the Porte permanently of the rule of all the Aran-speaking lands, including the 
Holy Places, unless it had been rescued by European, mainly British, action.”619 
 
These foreign scholars’ determinations and views do not show the whole picture from all aspects 
because according to the Ottoman records, Mahmud’s and his diplomats’ real role in this 
diplomatic success story has not been examined in detail. Their winning the European powers, 
particularly Britain, around to their side with their combined vigorous diplomatic efforts during 
the process, right up to the Egyptian army’s last decisive victory in Nizip, is a version of events 
that has hitherto been overlooked.It was, at least in part, those diplomatic and political efforts of 
previous decade which now bore fruit. The Ottoman Empire was thought to be reformable by 
Palmerston, and he no longer thought it was going to fall apart; he was also determined not to 
repeat the mistakes of 1832/3. 
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However, examination of this intensive diplomatic period, 1833-1839, from the point of view of 
the Ottoman side is vital. As it has been revealed in every aspect all through the thesis, the 
Ottoman influence, under the leadership of Mahmud, was in large part a strong factor 
determining the alteration of the attitude of the British, particularly Palmerston about this 
“Eastern Empire”. This mission was not easy since this very same person, Palmerston, and the 
very same British politicians, had been thinking the exact opposite at the beginning of the 1830s 
about the Ottoman Empire to the way they now thought about the Empire in the second half of 
the 1830s. Prof. Charmley summarised very well the British position in 1831 with respect to the 
Ottomans. 
“Palmerston’s initial stance on the Ottoman Empire was what one might have expected from the 
self-proclaimed inheritor of Canning’s philhellene policy; he was, initially, firmly on the side of 
those who believed that the Ottoman Empire was doomed. In a letter to his old friend (now 
ambassador to France) Lord Granville, in 1831, he wrote: “The fact is that Turkey is rapidly 
falling the pieces. This need not imply that he, personally, wanted the Ottoman Empire to collapse, 
but there were certainly those in the government who did.”620 
 
As it can be seen in these words of Prof. Charmley, although Palmerston was so pessimistic 
about the Ottoman Empire’s survivability or even worse, some British politicians in the Cabinet 
even desired the disappearance of the Empire, later on, the main British policy had been to 
support the maintenance of the territorial integrity of this Eastern country with their all might. It 
is a fact that that this sea change, in the British policy respecting the Eastern affairs which came 
about in only a few years, would have been too great to be spontaneous. For this reason, this 
thesis has attempted to put forward the Ottoman contribution to this remarkable process of 
change.  
Because of the neglect of this contribution, the main aim of this thesis has been to read this 
intensive diplomatic process with an emphasis on use of resources from the Ottoman perspective, 
in contrast to the account gleaned from European sources found in English works. In addition to 
this, the thesis has also attempted to reveal, as has not been hitherto recounted in the present 
literature about him; Mahmud’s both subtle and bold diplomatic manoeuvres from 1833 to 1839 
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designed for the purpose of solving the Mehmed Ali problem diplomatically and not with force, 
because of the limitations imposed by his Empire’s troubled economic, military and 
administrative conditions. It has been attempted to examine this diplomatic effort, in each 
different chapter from a different aspect, step by step in as much detail as possible, using the 
Ottoman documents.  
It can be said that this thesis has reached its goal and propounded Mahmud’s and his diplomats’ 
diplomatic abilities, revealing a story which is contrary to the common understanding of the 
matter gained from the widely accepted accounts drawn from European records with respect to 
period. Because of this, it will not be necessary to study diplomatic events after Mahmud’s death 
since the present literature has covered this in much detail. However, it should be mentioned that 
the last words of the thesis, based on the arguments presented in the chapters, assert that 
Mahmud’s and his diplomats’ contribution was considerable, and just as significant as that of 
Palmerston and Metternich. The Sultan’s diplomatic efforts greatly assisted in bringing about the 
first result in 1839, stopping Mehmed Ali from going any further,  and then the Convention of 
London, officially called the Convention for the Pacification of the Levant, signed in 1840 by the 
Ottoman Empire and the four European powers, Britain, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Mehmed 
Ali. This convention was vital, and profitable for both the British and the Ottomans, because 
Mehmed Ali and the Russians lost almost everything that they had acquired between 1833 and 
1839. This treaty would probably have evidenced to Mahmud that all his diplomatic efforts had 
been well worth all his trouble, had he lived long enough to see this positive final phase of the 
long and difficult diplomatic process he had instigated to free his Empire from two big troubles; 
Mehmed Ali and Russia.  
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HAT 362 / 20132 
• This is Mahmud II’s request to the Russian military for help against Mehmed Ali. However, 
calling the Russians to Istanbul was one of Mahmud’s diplomatic manoeuvres because,  as can 
be seen in the document as soon as the Russian troops arrived in Istanbul he started to look for 
ways of getting rid of them. 
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HAT 362 / 20132 
Benim vezirim, 
Rusya memurlarıyla vâkı‘ olan mükâlemeyi mutazammın işbu takrîrin manzûr ve me’âli malum-ı 
hümayunum olmuştur. Bunların fezleke-i ifâdâtı bizim sefâinimiz buraya mücerred devlet-i 
aliye’ye hidmet ve i‘ânet için gelmiş olmakla, henüz size emniyetname gelmeksizin avdet 
etmesini münasib görürsünüz siz bilirsiniz demek gibi oluyor. Lakin Fransa elçisi mübâdele 
olunan senedden dolayı sefâin-i mezkûre için kîl u kâl etmekte iken Rusyalı’nın tekrar kapak 
sefîneleri ve askeri geldikte sözü çoğaltmaz mı? Bu husus şöylece mutalaa-i hakikat ile 
savuşturulacak şey olmadığından ana göre beyninizde her tarafı güzelce te’emmül ve mülahaza 
olunarak karar-ı re’y ve mutalaatınızı taraf-ı hümayunuma arz ve iş‘âr eyleyesin. 
 
Şevketlû, kerâmetlû, mehâbetlu, kudretlû veliü’n-ni‘metim efendim, 
Muktezâ-yı irâde-i seniyye-i şahaneleri üzere Reis Efendi kulları evvelki gün Rusya elçisiyle 
general ve amirali sahilhane-i acizanesine celb ile bi’l-mülakat icrâ-yı rüsûm-ı âdiyeden sonra 
elçi-i mersûm Petersburg’dan dünkü gün Hocabey tarikiyle bahren bir tüccar sefinesiyle mektub 
vürûd etmişti. Bugün sabahleyin nüsha-i saniyesi dahi berren vasıl olmağın, me’âlini ifade için 
sizinle mülakat isteyeceğinden siz sabıkan da adamımızı dahi davet etmiş olduğunuzdan dolayı 
vâkı‘olacak ifadatı istimâ‘a âmadeyiz. Ba‘dehu biz dahi me‘âl-i tahriratımızı tebliğ ederiz 
demekle, beri taraftan bizim bugünkü mülakatı talebimiz bir asıl ve iki fer‘ üzerine mübtenidir ki, 
asıl dediğimiz bi-hamdullahi te‘âla usul-i mülkiyesi müttehid ve yek-diğerin efkâr-ı hayriye ve 
muhâdenet-i samimiyesini ……ve müşâhid iki devletin memurları olduğumuzdan 
devletlerimizin hulûs ve muhabbetini bir fâidesini te’yîd ve te’kîd maksadıdır. Ve fer‘in evvelkisi 
haşmetlû imparator cenablarının şu i‘ânet-i fi‘iliye hususunda vâkı‘ olan himmet-i aliyesini nezd-
i saltanat-ı seniyyede fevka’l-gâye bâ‘is-i memnûniyet ve mahzûziyet olduğunu bi’t-tekrar ifade 
ve beyan etmek ve ikincisi sefâin-i avniyenin hitâm-ı maslahata mebni şimdilik Süzebolu tarafına 
çekilmelerini hâlisâne müzakere eylemektir denildikte, mersûm maslahatın hitâmı zikr oluyorken 
İskenderiye’den cevab geldi mi ne vechle bitmiş oluyor deyu itiraz edecek, beri taraftan eğerçe 
İskenderiye’den henüz cevab gelmemiş ise de Rusya devletinin evvel emirde İskenderiye’de olan 
konsolos vekilini kaldırması ve ba‘dehu General Moradif cenâbları vasıtasıyla Mehmed Ali 
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Paşa’yı itaat ve inkıyâda daveti müş‘ir tenbihât gönderilmesi ve muahharan Rusya donanmasının 
vürûduyla i‘âne-i fi‘iliyenin vukû‘ ve şuyû‘ı had-i zatında maslahata külli te’sîr etmiş ve Rusya 
devletinin maslahat-ı devlet-i aliyeyi böyle bi’l-isâle ve Nemçe devletinin bi’t-tabi‘ iltizâmı ve 
Rusya devletinin işbu i‘âne-i fi‘iliyesini görerek bu esnada İngiltere devletinin dahi 
İskenderiye’ye mahsus kolonel irsâliyle Mehmed Ali Paşa’ya taraf-ı saltanat-ı seniyyeden inâyet 
buyrulan her ne ise kabul ve itaat etmesi tenbihatına dair te’kîdâtı ve Fransa sefâreti tarafından 
dahi toy söz verilerek İskenderiye’ye mahsus adam gönderilmiş olması cihetleriyle bu kadar 
mesâ‘i-i halisânenin tahallüf etmeyeceğine mebni maslahat bitmiş hükmüne add olunuyor. Elçi 
bey bu dört devlete Mehmed Ali Paşa’nın muhalefetini tasavvur eder mi denildikte, mersûm 
vâkı‘â Mehmed Ali Paşa’nın bunlara karşı durup muhalefet edebilmesi melhûz değil ise de 
mutlaka muvâfakat eder deyu hükm olunamaz. Hatta General Moradif İskenderiye’den geldiği 
vakit Bâbıâli’de olunan mülakatta dahi Mehmed Ali Paşa her ne kadar itaat yüzü göstermekte ise 
de buna emniyet olunamayacağından eğer aksi zuhûr eder ise ne mes’uliyet terettüb etsin 
demiştik demelerine cevaben, beri taraftan vâkı‘â general dostumuz öyle demişti. Lakin Mehmed 
Ali Paşa fakat taraf-ı devlet-i aliye’ye arz-ı itaat eylemiş olsa şüphe olunabilir ise de şimdi 
maslahatın derecesi o zamanki gibi olmayıp el-hâletü hazihi düvel-i mütehâbenin bi’l-ittihâd 
taraf-ı devlet-i aliye’yi iltizâm eylediklerini gereği gibi anlamış olduğundan başka arada 
Fransalı’nın kavî müte‘ahhidi dahi olmasına şüphe yeri kalmamak iktizâ eder denildikte, mersûm 
İbrahim Paşa Kütahya’da tevakkufuna söz verdikten sonra Aydın ve Saruhan taraflarına 
tecavüzâtı vukû‘a gelerek taarruzdan el çekmemiştir. Bu cihetle teyakkuz ve intibâh üzere 
bulunmak ve İskenderiye’den cevâb vürûduna kadar Rusya donanması burada tevakkuf etmek 
lazım gelir demeğin, beri taraftan anın o makûle su-i hareketi Fransa sefâretinin Mısır tarafına 
gönderdiği haberden mukaddem ve mücerred kendisinin edepsizliği demek olarak düvel-i 
mütehâbenin usul-ı mültezemesi beher hal babasına te’sîr ile bunu iade etmesi ağleb-i melhûz 
olduğundan söz burasındadır. Ve mamafih işte sefâin-i avniyenin şimdilik bi’l-iktizâ Sözebolu’ya 
çekilmesini ifade ve lede’l-hâce yine celb olunmak ve hazem ve ihtiyât elden bırakılmamak için 
olmakla, bunda mahzûr-ı mülâhaza var mıdır denildikte, mersûm eğer İbrahim Paşa kendi gaflete 
uyup da Üsküdar’a gelmek ister ise ve ol halde Rusya donanması dahi muvâfık-ı heva bulamayıp 
da Sözebolu’dan gelemez ise Dersaadet muhâtarada bulunmaz mı demesine mukâbil, beri 
taraftan İbrahim Paşa Üsküdar’a gelecek olursa bu donanmasının ne faydası olur denildikte, 
elbette faydası olur demeğin, elçi bey bizim gibi ministero takımından olmakla, ikimizin de fen-i 
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harbe aşinalığımız yoktur. General ve amiral dostlarımız fen-i harbin berri ve bahrisine aşina 
olmalarıyla anlardan soralım bakalım ne fâide beyan ederler denildikte, amiral-i mersûm askerin 
bir sahilden bir sahile yani Üsküdar’dan İstanbul’a mürûrunu ve Mısır sefinelerinin boğazdan 
duhûlünü men‘ eder demekle, beri taraftan Mısır sefinelerinin boğazdan girmesi Mehmed Ali 
Paşa’nın re’yiyle olacağından bu surette düvel-i mütehâbenin cümlesiyle mukâvemete kıyâm 
eder denilmek lazım geleceğinden başka, İbrahim Paşa Üsküdar’a gelmek lazım gelse harben ve 
darben def‘ olunduktan sonra karadaki fesadı denizdeki sefâin dâfi‘ olur mu deyu lede’s-su’al 
amiral ve general sükût ile elçi-i mersûm ol halde zat-ı şevket-me’âb-ı şahaneye ve vükelâ-yı 
devlet-i aliye’ye medâr olmaz mı demeğin, beri taraftan bu mücâvebâtımız yekdiğere mu‘âraza 
tarikiyle olmayıp mücerred hulûs ve safvetle hasbihal demek olduğundan doğrusu buna 
imparator cenâbları şu hususta saltanat-ı seniyyenin ne derece dostu olduğunu isbat edip ve fi’l-
vâkı‘ maslahat-ı devlet-i aliyede eser-i külli ve nef‘-i kesîri müşâhede olunmuş ve nezd-i âlide 
kemâyenbaği kadr u kıymeti bilinmiş olmasında şimdi sefâin-i mezkurenin Sözebolu’ya 
çekilmesini ifademiz saltanat-ı seniyye ile imparator cenâbları beyninde sübût-yafte olan kemal-i 
hulûs ve muhabbete ve teklifsizliğe mebni kân-ı devlet-i aliye hasbe’l-musalaha kendi 
donanmasını oraya göndermiş gibi add olunmak ve hatırınıza kat‘iyen bir gûna işin gelmemek ve 
gücenip incinmemek şartıyla meşrûttur. İskenderiye’den haber gelinceye değin ve küll dahi 
ziyade eğlenseler misafiretlerinden hoşnudlar. Fakat Fransalı ile senedleşilmiş olduğundan işin 
yeri orası oluyor. Yoksa bize göre değildir. Bir şey hulûsa makrûn oldukta, tarden ve aksen 
menâfi‘ câmi‘ olur. Yani sefâin-i mezkurenin vürûdu maslahat-ı devlet-i aliye’ye bi’l-vücûda 
nâfi‘ olduğu misillû şimdilik maslahata Sözebolu tarafına azimeti dahi ecânibin zan ve 
istirkâbdan dolayı vâkı‘ olan kîl u kâlinden tarafeynin selamet-i sâmi‘asını mûcib olarak bunda 
dahi menfa‘at mülahaza olunur denildikte, mersûm mademki zat-ı hazret-i şahane ve vükelâ-yı 
devlet-i aliyenin Rusya devletinin niyât-ı dostanesinde şübheleri olmadıkça hariçten söz 
söylemeye kimsenin hakkı yoktur diyecek, beri taraftan her şey hakka makrûn olmayıp bazen nâ-
hakta olunuyor denilmeğin, mersûm mukaddemâ Rusya donanmasının vürûdunda Ahmed Paşa 
hazretleri Sözebolu limanına azimetleri matlûb-ı âli iduğunu, lede’l-ifade ol vechle söz verilmişti. 
Ol vakitten beri bazen lodos esmiş ise de kuvvetli olmayıp nemrâd ifade dahi vukû‘ bulmadığına 
ve kaziyenin tebeddülüne mebni tevkîf olunmuştur. Lakin deminki ifadenizden yalnız sefinenin 
faydası olamayıp kara askerinin menfa‘ati münfehim oluyor demesine ve amenna öyledir 
cevabına bi’l-mukâbil mersûm mukaddemâ siz bana donanmanın icâleten celbini ifade 
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eylediğinizde Tuna boyuna doğru gelmeleri taleb olunan askerden başka buraya gelecek 
donanma ile tez elden bir beş bin kadar asker celbini söylemiştiniz deyip beri taraftan ba‘de’t-
tasdîk elçi-i mersûm işte ben ol vakit yazmış olduğumdan ber-vech-i bala bugün Petersburg’dan 
vürûd eden tahrîrâtın hülâsasını size getirdim deyu bir kıt‘a varaka ibrâz ve kıraatle tercüme-i 
me’âli mukaddemâ kara askerine dair yazılan mektubun vusûlüyle Besarabya tarafında ve 
Memleketeyn’de olan Rusya askerinden otuz bin piyade ve altı bin süvari askeriyle yüz on kıt‘a 
top tehie olunarak Tuna’dan imrâr olunmak ve Hocabey’den dahi beş bin asker gönderilmek 
üzere taraf-ı imparatoriden mahallerine tenbihat gönderilmiş olduğunu ve General Moradif dahi 
kendisine bu tarihten taze tarih ile bahren gelen mektubda ber-vech-i meşrûh mahallerine tenbih 
olunan otuz altı bin askerin imrârı İbrahim Paşa’nın Kütahya’da tevakkufu haberine binaen, 
tevkîf ve Hocabey’den irsâl olunacak asker ol emirde on bin olmak üzere tertib olunmuş ise de 
kezâlik haber-i mezkûra mebni beş bini tenzîl olunarak beş bin neferi üç kıt‘a kapak sefine 
refâkatiyle gelirken incimâd-ı bahr cihetiyle avdet etmiş oldukları muharrer olduğunu ve bu defa 
Hocabey’den bir Nemçe tüccar sefinesi gelmiş olduğuna nazaran incimâd mündefi‘ olmak iktizâ 
eylediğinden sefâin-i merkûme yine Hocabey’e gelmiş olmak lazım gelerek zikr olunan beş bin 
askerin dahi mu’ahharan tevkîfi yazılmış ise de mukaddemâ donanmanın haber-i sani 
yetişmeksizin evvelki haberle kalkıp geldiği misillû bunların dahi çıkmış bulunmaları ve bu 
takdirde iki üç güne kadar buraya gelmeleri melhûz iduğunu ve asker-i mezkûr geldiği halde 
buradaki donanma ile avdet etmek iktizâ edeceğinden bu tarafa vürûduna veyahut tevkîfi 
haberinin buraya vusûlüne kadar donanmanın burada tevakkufu lazım geleceğini ve Amiral 
Lazarof dahi mukaddemâ serasker paşa ve ferik paşa taraflarından biraz Rusya topçularının 
gelmesi mûcib-i mahzûziyet olacağı beyan buyrulmuş olduğundan bir nefer topçu haber ile 
birkaç yüz topçu ve biraz oficiyal dahi mârü’z-zikr beş bin askerle geleceğini ve imparator 
tarafından bu hususlar gâyet ihtimâm ve iltizâmlı tutulduğunu ifade etmeleriyle, beri taraftan 
öteden beri gâh edvâr-ı na‘kiye? Ve gâh esbâb-ı saire-i kevniyeden nâşi devletler beyninde vâkı‘ 
olan mübâyenet ve gerûdet müsellem ve safvetle ber-taraf ola geldiğinden ve devleteyn beyninde 
ez-kaza vukû‘ bulan ahvâl-i mâziye dahi havâlât-ı kadîmenin iadesiyle mensî olmuş ise de 
doğrusu imparator cenâblarının şu himmetleri mâ-sebk-i hâli bütün bütün unutturmuş ve taraf-ı 
saltanat-ı seniyye ile başkaca bir rabıta-i muhâdenet hâsıl ettirmiştir denilerek izhâr-ı mahzûziyet 
olundukta, elçi-i mersûm memuriyetinize ve zâtınıza kemal-i i‘timâdım olmakla, imparator bey 
dostluğu bu vechle itiraf olunmasından pek memnun ve pek müteşekkir oldum deyu hoşnutluk 
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getirerek general-i mersûm ibtidâ-yı meclisde serasker paşa kullarıyla dahi görüşeceğini ifade 
eylediğinden azimet hazırlığında, beri taraftan donanma hususunu onlarla dahi müzakere 
edersiniz denilip ol dahi söyleşeceğini beyan etmiş. Ve elçi-i mersûm dahi amiral ile bazı 
maslahatlar zımnında sefârethanesine gitmek istediğinden Memleketeyn ve Sırplı maslahatları 
müzakeresine vakit olamayıp fakat yirmi iki milyonun makbuz-ı senedi tarafeynden imza ve 
temhîr olunarak mübâdele olunduktan sonra malum-ı âlileri buyrulduğu üzere geçende Estiknaki 
Bey kulları sene-i mezkûrun tesviyesi için elçi-i mersûmla görüştüğünde Memleketeyn 
voyvodalıklarının biri mîr-i mümâileyh kullarına olmuş gibi bir suret verilmek üzere intihâb 
olunacak voyvodaların birinin mîr-i mümâileyh kullarına damad olmasını tezekkür etmiş 
olduğundan anın sohbeti açıldıkta, beri taraftan mukaddemâ bu husûs için taraf-ı saltanat-ı 
seniyyeden mahsus takrîr-i resmi verilerek Rusya devleti tarafından hüsn-i muvâfakat taleb 
olunmuş olduğundan bu defa elçi bey dostumuzun bu sureti irâd etmesi yine mücerred takrîr-i 
mezkûrun namusunu vikâye ve murad-ı âliye bundan muvâfakat demek olarak gâyeti taraf-ı 
saltanat-ı seniyyeye izhâr-ı hürmeti mutazammın olduğundan taraf-ı halisânemizden bu husus 
için başkaca ibrâz-ı mahzûziyet olunur denildikte, elçi-i mersûm kullarınca zikrolunan takrîr-i 
resmiden sonra imparatorum bu hususun imkânı mertebe-i uhde-i tevkîfiyle tesviyesini bana 
tenbih etmiş olduğundan bu suretle dil-hâh-ı âliye muvâfakat temennasında olduğunu beyan 
eyledim deyu böyle karar verilmesi suretini işrâb etmekle, beri taraftan Memleketeyn maddesinin 
elçi beyle olunacak müzakeresine bu dahi dâhil olur yollu mukabele ve sair bazı afakî sohbet ve 
tatyîb ve ikrâmlarına mübâderet olunarak general-i mersûm serasker-i müşarünileyh kullarına ve 
amiral ve elçi-i mersûmân dahi sefârethanelerine mutayyiben avdet etmiş oldukları muhât-ı ilm-i 
cihân-şümûl-ı şehriyârileri buyruldukta emr u ferman şevketlu kerametlu mahabetlu kudretlu 
veli-ni‘metim efendim padişahım hazretlerinindir. 
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HAT 365 / 20168 
Mahmud had been very carefully scrutinizing all diplomatic possibilities in the diplomatic 
struggle over his Empire’s lands and this document is a very good example of this characteristic 
in him. He orders to his diplomats that “although it is clear that France would not do anything to 
the detriment of Ottoman interests, French diplomacy in Istanbul should be pursued very 
carefully to avoid the eventuality of the French acting in accordance with their stated policies.” 
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HAT 365 / 20168 
Kaymakam Paşa, 
İşbu takrîrin manzûr ve me’âli malum-ı hümayunum olmuştur. Elçi-i mersûme şimdilik böylece 
başı örtülü söylenilmek olmadı. Fransa tercümanının mersûm Estiknaki’ye vâkı‘ olan ifadesi bir 
nev‘ lakırdı kapmak için oluyor. Ancak İngiltereli taraf-ı devlet-i aliyemizden cidden celb olunur 
ve bahren i‘âne-i fi‘iliyenin icrası husûle geldiği halde yalnız Fransalı başlı başına bir halt 
edemeyeceği emr u aşikârdır. Şu kadardır ki Fransızlıyı dahi şu günlerde pek şüpheye 
düşürmeyip bazen icabına göre hidmet-i riyâsetten ağız kullanmak ve muamelelerinden bazı şey 
anlamak gibi emr-i usul tutulmuş olsa bir be’is olmamak gerektir. Rusya elçisinin muzdarib-i 
merkûm hakkında irâd edeceği makâlâta göre ne vechle lisan kullanmak lazım geleceği bi’l-
müzakere tekrar taraf-ı hümayunuma arz olunsun. Ve mevâdd-ı saireye dair vâkı‘ olan 
müzakeratın mazbatası arz olundukta keyfiyet-i hal malum-ı şahanemiz olur.  
 
Şevketlû, kerametlû, mehabetlû, kudretlû velini‘metim efendim, 
Malum-ı hümayun-ı mülûkâneleri buyrulduğu üzere İngiltereli ile musammem olan rabıta-i 
ittifâkıyeden dolayı Rusya elçisine söylenecek sohbet-i mahremânenin nasıl zemin-i münasib ile 
irâd olunması husûsunu Reis Efendi bendeleri ve reisü’l-etıbbâ cihânbânileri Efendi da‘îleri 
İstifanali kulları ile kıbel-i meclis lede’l-mutalaa çünkü bu babda şeref-sünûh buyrulan irâde-i 
kerâmet-âde-i şehinşâhileri ol emirde elçi-i mersûmun ağzı araştırılıp ba‘dehu muamelesinden 
maslahatça bir nev‘ fayda teferrüs olunur ise ol halde keyfiyetin açılması sureti olarak fi’n-
nefsü’l-emr ibtidâ başı örtülü kelimât ile mersûmun ağzı aranıp da sonra lakırdının icab eden 
tarafa çevirilmesi hayırlı ve eslem görülüp şöyle ki eğerçe devlet-i aliyelerinin Rusyalı’dan berri 
ve bahri bir gûne isti‘âne etmek niyeti yok ise de İngiltere ile cereyan eden muamele-i 
hakikiyenin bi’l-farz Rusya elçisi mersûma açıktan söylenilmesi lazım gelse şayet bir madde-i 
mutasavverenin taleb-i vücuduna muhavvel olarak ihtimal ki Rusyalı kendi politikaları usulünce 
maslahatı ahar bir kıyafete koyup da tereşşuh ettirecek olur ise ol vakit Avrupalı’nın muamelat-ı 
haliyesine göre bazı mazarrâtı melhûz olup ezcümle Fransa tercümanı Lapir geçen Çarşamba 
günü Bâbıâli’lerinde İstifanaki kullarına tesadüf ile kân kendiliğinden olarak işitildiğine göre 
Mehmed Ali aleyhine istihdam olunmak üzere Rusyalı Anadolu tarafından asker sevk edecek 
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imiş. Eğer bu böyle olur ise Fransa devleti dahi Mehmed Ali’ye i‘âne eder ve Yunan hükümeti 
dahi ziyade tevsî‘ olunur denilse hiç böyle şeylerin hatıra bile geldiği yoktur cevabını verdikten 
sonra bu lakırdıyı Reis Efendi’ye söyledin mi deyu sualinde, söylemeye memuriyetim yoktur 
diyerek yine kelam-ı mezkûru te’kîd etmiş olmasına nazaran Fransalı bu maddede zanniyâta 
düşecek yani mukaddemce Fransa maslahatgüzarı merkûm Mehmed Ali’ye dair lakırdıya 
girişmek istediğinde önü kestirildiğinden şimdi İngiltereli ile rabıta-i ittifâkıye söyleşilip Rusya 
elçisi dahi mahrem ittihâz olunduğuna vakıf olmak lazım gelir ise ol halde yalnız bîgânelik 
Fransalı’da kalacağı cihetle güçlerine gidecek gibi göründüğünden emr u ferman keramet-unvan-
ı şahaneleri tamam-ı hal ve maslahata muvâfık olmak hasebiyle ol daire-i hikmet-i câmi‘adan 
çıkılmayarak başı örtülü ta‘bîrât ile Rusya elçisi mersûmun ağzı araştırılıp da devletinin 
menviyâtı ve kendisinin re’y ve mutalaatı bilinerek icabına göre lisan kullanılmak sureti 
beynlerinde tensîb olunmuş ve Kanpenik boğazından irsâl esnâ-yı mükâlemede kendilerine gelen 
kağıdı tercümesi dahi bu usule muvâfık görünmesiyle mülâhazat-ı vâkı‘aya kuvvet vermiş 
olduğundan Sırplı maslahatının ve sair mevâdın müzakeresinden sonra geçende İskenderiye’de 
olan konsolos vekilinin kaldırılması ve bu husûsta olan hüsn-i niyât-ı imparatorinin mukaddimesi 
olmak cihetiyle bunun elbette devlet-i aliyenin saadet-i hal ve ikbaline dair netice-i hayriyesi dahi 
olmak iktizâ edeceğinden elçi beyin bu babda bir gûne malumatı veyahut devletinin usulü 
malumu olması ve kendisi dahi hayırhâh adam bulunması cihetleriyle bu husûsda re’y ve 
mülâhazatı var mıdır yollu ve sair türlü çerâmûnyalı lakırdılar ile istikşâf-ı zamîrine ibtidâr 
olundukta, mersûm mukaddem merkûm Mehmed Ali’ye dair verilen takrîr-i resmiye muvâfakat 
cevabını devlete danışmaksızın vererek mesuliyeti üzerine almış ise de Rusya devletinin saltanat-
ı seniyye hakkında olan hulûs ve safveti muktezâsınca kendisi tasdik olunduğundan fazla olarak 
derhal konsolos vekili mersûmun celbi husûsuna dahi memur olunduğunu ve kendisinin konsolos 
vekili mersûmun celbine dair gönderdiği mektubuna hidmet-i riyâsetten yazılan cevabı dahi 
Petersburg’a irsâl eylediğini ba‘de’l-beyan devletin bu maddede netâyic-i menviyâtına vukûfu 
olduğunu ve şu kadar ki imparatorun devlet-i aliye hakkında olan efkâr-ı dostanesine vakıf olup 
bu Mehmed Ali gibi usât ve hûnenin dahi kemâliyle mebğûzu olduğunu bildiğinden buna dair 
her ne türlü şey teklif olunur ise bi’l-iftihâr istimâ‘ ile devlete yazıp tervîc edeceğini kemal-i 
havâhişle irâd edip beri taraftan dahi imparatorun hüsn-i niyet ve safveti nezd-i şahanelerinde 
malum müsellem olduğuna ve serbestiyet maddesi usul-i hükümdarinin külliyen muhalifi 
olacağından imparator cenâblarının manzûru olarak bu makûlelere bi’t-tabi‘ buğzı ve adâvet 
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edeceğine dair bazı sözler söylediğini zeylen konsolos vekili mersûm her ne kadar 
İskenderiye’den kaldırılmış ise de elbette bir takım Rusya tüccarı yine oramızda bulunacağından 
anların külliyen inkıtâ‘-i dar ve setrlerine dair elçi beyin memuriyeti yok mudur denildikte, 
mersûm serbestiyet maddesinin bir emr-i feci‘ olarak hikmet-i akliyeye ber-vechle tevâfuk 
etmeyeceğini ve devlet-i aliye ile Rusya devletinin usulleri müttehid olarak elbette yekdiğerin 
vikâye-i nizamına çalışmak elzem olacağını beyan ile merkûm Mehmed Ali bu serbestiyet 
lakırdısını tefevvüh etmekte ise de kendisinin yed-i tagallübünde bulunan ahaliye etmediği zulüm 
ve i‘tisâf kalmayarak o biçarelerin mahkumiyeti hiçbir mahale benzemeyip hal böyle iken 
kendisi daire-i mahkumiyetten a‘râz ile mutlakü’l-inân olmak ister dedikten sonra İskenderiye’de 
kalmış olan Rusya tüccarı her bir ilişkilerini kesmek için muvakkaten ikamete mezun ve müddet-
i ikametlerinde tesviye-i umurlarına dahi ahar bir devlet konsolosu memur olarak her ne ise 
cümlesinin karîbü’l-ahde oradan kalkacaklarını söyleyip bunun arasında galiba bu maddeye dair 
dahi bir söyleyeceğiniz var. Ama niçin söylemiyorsunuz. Yoksa bana itimad-ı tâmmeniz yok mu 
gibi zeminlerle söylenmeye çalışmasına nazaran İngiltereli ile vâkı‘ olan muameleye vukûflu 
görünüyor ise de kendiliğinden kat‘an yanaşmadığından ol vadide sözler söylemeye imâle için 
Rusya devleti ve gerek elçi bey devlet-i aliyenin her bir umurda mahremi olduğundan kendi 
mesâlih-i dâhiliyemizi bile istişare ederiz. Acaba bu Mehmed Ali habîsinin ibtidâ kuvve-i 
bahriyesi mi ibtal olunmak lazım gelir yoksa tertibat-ı berriyenin kuvvetli tutulması mı iktizâ 
eder. Tez elden hangi tarafın tedbirine teşebbüs olunmak akvâdır. Elçi beyin mülahazası ne 
vechle oluyor denildikte, mersûm şimdiye kadar bu husûsa sarf-ı efkâr etmediğinden evvel 
emirde cevab veremeyeceği cihetle düşünüp bundan sonraki mecliste re’y ve mutalaasını beyan 
edeceğini söylemiş olmakla, işbu mücâvebe keyfiyetinin zîr ve bâlâsı bir kerede beyne’l-havâs 
müzakere ve mutalaa olunarak yani merkûm Mehmed Ali habîsinin kuvve-i bahriye ve berriyesi 
haklarında mersûmun irâd edeceği makâlât-i melhûzaya göre nasıl lisan kullanılmak lazım 
geleceği söyleşilerek tekrar hâkipâ-yı mekârim-i hilafetpenahilerinden istizân-birle şeref-sünûh 
buyrulacak irâde-i seniyye-i şehinşâhilerine tevfikan iktizâsına bakılması hususunda ne vechle 
emr u ferman-ı şahaneleri müte‘allık buyrulur ise ana göre muktezâ-yı münîfi icrasına ibtidâr 
olunacağı ve mevâdd-ı saireye dair güzerân eden müzakeratın mazbatası dahi derdest olunmakla, 
bundan sonraca atebe-i felek-mertebe-i tacdarilerine takdim ve tesyâr kılınacağı muhât-ı âlem-i 
ârâ-yı zıllullahileri buyruldukta, emr u ferman şevketlû, kerametlû, mehabetlû, kudretlû 
velini‘metim efendim padişahım hazretlerinindir. 
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HAT 365 / 20198 
Reis Effendi (the Ottoman Foreign Minister) met with Ponsonby at the behest of Mahmud II to 
negotiate the latest developments. This document reflects Mahmud’s and his diplomats’ 
diplomatic manoeuvres and their awareness that if they could use Britain against all the other 
diplomatic actors in the diplomatic game, this would help them resolve their serious problems. 
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HAT 365 / 20198 
Sene 
Benim vezirim, 
İşbu takrîrin manzûr ve me’âli malum-ı hümayunum olmuştur. Elçi-i mersûmla şu günlerde 
görüşülmesi devlet-i aliyemizin bugünlerde kullandığı usule göre pek münasib oldu. Ve elçi-i 
mersûmun istediği mektub dahi kaleme aldırılıp sureti manzûrumuz olduktan sonra mersûma ita 
olunsun.      
 
Şevketlû, kerametlû, mehabetlû, kudretlû velini‘metim efendim, 
İrâde-i seniyye-i şahaneleri muktezâ-yı münîfi üzere dünkü gün Reis Efendi kulları İngiltere 
elçisiyle bi’l-mülakat rüsûm-ı âdiye ve sual-i hal ve hatırdan sonra beri taraftan devlet-i aliye ile 
İngiltere devleti beyninde olan revâbıt-ı mahsûsaya ve elçi beyle beynimizde olan üns ve ülfet ve 
husûsan Londra’da devlet-i aliye memurları ikamet üzere olduğuna nazaran cümleden ziyade elçi 
bey dostumuzla muhabere ve mülakatımız olmak iktizâ eder iken çoktan beri görüşülemeyip 
birbirimizi göreceğimiz geldi denilerek feth-i kelam olundukta, elçi-i mersûm izhâr-ı 
memnuniyetiyle kendisi dahi mülakata arzu-mend olmuş iduğunu ifade etmekle, beri taraftan 
evvelki gün İngiltere kuryeri gelmiş olduğundan elçi beyin malumat-ı cedidesi olmalıdır yollu 
lede’s-sual mersûm elçi-i lâhikin bugünlerde Dersaadet’e gelmiş olması mülahazasıyla kuryerin 
hamil olduğu tahriratın cümlesi elçi-i lâhika hitab olarak elçi dahi kariben gelmek üzeredir. Lakin 
te’min ve tevsîk ederim ki İngiltere devleti devlet-i aliyenin tamamiyet-i mülkiyesini isteyip ve 
geçende İskenderiye’den mahsus bir kolonel irsâl olunarak Mehmed Ali Paşa’ya taraf-ı hazret-i 
şahaneye itaat ve Halil Paşa hazretleriyle bi’l-müzakere kendiye ihsan buyrulan müsaadata 
kanaat etmek üzere te’kîd olunmuştur diyerek devleti tarafından kendisinin başka malumat-ı 
cedidesi olmadığını beyan etmeğin, devlet-i müşârünileyhâ mesleğinin usul-ı devlet-i aliyeye 
tevâfukundan izhâr-ı mahzûziyet olunduktan sonra elçi beyin İskenderiye’den yeni haberi var mı 
deyu olunan suale altı haftadan beri hiçbir haberim yoktur deyu cevab etmekle, mukaddemce 
İzmir maddesi için Kütahya’ya gönderilen sefâret ser-kâtibi Küçük Pizani’yi elçi bey istintâk 
etmiştir. Şifâhen ifadeleri oluyor denildikte, mersûm Pizani’nin İbrahim Paşa’dan getirdiği 
mektub malumunuz oldu. Şifâhen ifadesi babamdan habere müterakkabım haber geldiği gibi 
avdet ederim demekten ibaret oluyor ve askerini sarftan muhafaza etmek ve bir de ahali-i 
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memlekete ihtilal etmemek için hanelere iskân etmiş olduğundan Pizani Kütahya’da asker 
görmemiş deyu ba‘de’l-ifade bunu tercüman Pizani kendi karî‘sı olur üzere söylemişti deyip 
İzmir maddesini açarak İngiltere ve Fransa konsolosları bandıralarını indirdikleri gibi ahali iki 
büyük devletin bu gûne muamelesini müşâhede edecek derhal Mansurizade’ye cevab verip ol 
dahi biraz akçe ahziyle firar ederek İzmir’in asayişi avdet etmiştir demekle, beri taraftan ba‘de’t-
tasdik elçi bey siyâk-ı ifadesinden İngiltere ve Fransa devletleri beyninde vifâk ve ittihâd anlaşılır 
denildikte, mersûm vâkı‘â öyledir. Öteden beri meşhûd ve müte‘ârif olduğu vechle bu iki 
devletin ittifâk ve ittihâdı milletlerinin emn ve asayişini müstelzim olduğundan başka, bütün 
âlemde ihtilâlât ve muharebâtın indifâ‘nı mûcib dediğini müte‘âkib sizden bir şey sual edeceğim. 
Lakin sualimin ilerisi bâdi-i tekerrür olacağından ve bugünkü mülakatımız dahi mücerred te’kîd-i 
hulûs ve mevâlât zımnında olduğundan tefevvühünü tabi‘atım istemez. Eğer ruhsatınız olur ise 
söyleyemem demesine binaen, elçi bey dostumuzun hulûs ve safveti malumdur. Dostane suale ne 
denir denildikte, Rusya gemileri bugün gidecek mi demekle, beri taraftan evvel ve ahir 
tarafeynden alınıp verilen sözlere göre muvâfık-ı heva ile gitmeleri mukarrerdir. Lakin burası 
gibi yukarılarda dahi lodos var mıdır ve bilmiyoruz. Eğer cansızca ise kapak sefine gidebilir mi 
denildikte, ben yukarıda iken yüz kadar geminin gittiğini gördüm. Her bir sefinenin yelkeni kendi 
hacmine göre olduğundan büyük küçük müsâvidir. El-hâletü hâzihi Rusya donanmasında hareket 
alameti olmamakla, Fransa elçisi bey infi‘âl ediyor. Korkarım bir nâ-hoş ve nâ-mülayim hareket 
eyler. Hatta bugün sabahleyin dahi görüştüm. İzhâr-ı teessüf etti diyerek derece derece lakırdıyı 
kabartıp nihayet eğer yirmi dört saate kadar Rusya gemileri kalkıp gitmez ise Fransa elçisi tekdiri 
mûcib olacak bir hareket-i fi‘iliye-i aleyhine izhârına mecbur olacağı meczûmum olmakla, 
maslahatı bu dereceye getirmemeğe sa‘y olunmasını pek rica ve temenna ederim demeğin, beri 
taraftan Fransa elçisiyle olunan tanzîmât terk ve i‘ânete münhasır el-hâleti hâzihi senedleşilip 
maslahat bitmiş hükmünde olduğuna mebni Rusya gemilerinin tevakkufu i‘ânet zımnında 
olmayıp beher-hal gitmek üzere şöylece misafiret demek olacağından Fransa sefâreti tarafına 
ilişik olmamak iktizâ eder denildikte, elçi-i mersûm Fransa elçisi verdiği senedi devletin ismine 
vererek faraza Mehmed Ali Paşa razı olmadığı halde a‘mâl-i kuvvetle icrasına mecbur olduğu 
misillû bi’l-mukabele Rusya donamasının tevakkufu dahi kezâlik Fransa devletinin namusuna 
dokunacağına mebni bugün hareketi meczûmdur demekle, beri taraftan Fransa elçisi Rusyalı ile 
hırlaşıp da taraf-ı devlet-i aliyeye ettiği hüsn-i hidmeti mahv eder mi ve ol halde elçi bey 
dostumuz def‘ine sa‘y etmez mi denildikte, elçi-i mersûm ne kadar isterseniz ben o kadar 
kendisine söylerim. Lakin devletin ırz ve şanını vikâyeye mecbur olduğundan tesir etmeyip ber-
vech-i meşrûh yirmi dört saat zarfında Rusya tekneleri gitmediği halde hareket-i aliyeye 
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mübâderet edeceğini ve mukaddem dahi tez elden senedleşilmemiş olsa gitmeye hazırlanmış 
olduğunu ifade ve tekrar eyledikte, beri taraftan İzmir’deki İngiltere ve Fransa konsoloslarının 
bandıralarını indirmeleri İzmir maslahatına müessir olmuş olduğuna göre şimdi elçi beyler dahi 
İbrahim Paşa’ya katiyece bir haber gönderip Kütahya’dan avdet ettirseler sened-i mezkûrun 
hükmü istikmâl ve devlet-i aliyenin emniyet-i tâmmesi istihsâl olunarak bir güzel şey olurdu 
denildikte, mersûm mukaddemâ yazdığımız mektuplara benim emr u nehyim babamın elindedir 
deyu cevab yazmış olduğundan bu defa yine düvele cevab verdiği takdirde devletlerimizim 
şanına el vermeyeceğinden yazamamakta ma‘zûruz dediğini müte‘âkib Fransa elçisiyle akd 
olunan senedde münderiç i‘ânet-i hariciye ta‘bîrine İngiltere devleti dahi dâhil midir deyu lede’s-
sual, ta‘bîr-i mezkûr İngiltere devletine şâmil olmadığı beyan olunarak şundan dahi istidlâl 
olunmaz mı ki devlet-i aliyenin memuru hala Londra’da ikamet üzere olmakla, eğer ta‘bîr-i 
mezkûrun İngiltere devletine şümûlü mutasavvur olsa celb ve i‘âde olunurdu. Hatta şimdi 
maslahat bitmiş hükmünde ise de bi’l-farz iktizâsı takdirinde yine İngiltere devletinden i‘ânet-i 
fi‘iliye talebine sened-i mezkûr mâni‘ değildir denildikte, mersûm kâşki böyle olduğu evvelce 
bana ifade olundu. Zira bu ta‘bîre İngiltere devletinin ne nazarla bakacağı malumum değildir 
demekle, beri taraftan elçi beyin Fransa elçisiyle herbâr mülakat ve musâhabeti cihetiyle hakikat-
i keyfiyete vâkıf olması mülahazası ve kendisinin dahi bizden sual etmemesi cihetleriyle ifade 
olunmadı denildikte, mersûm Fransa elçisi bana ifade eyledi. Lakin bazı hâlât-ı nâzikede pek çok 
sual ve cevab muvâfık olmadığına mebni andan istîzâh etmedim demesinden Fransa elçisine bu 
i‘ânet-i hariciye ta‘bîrinde biz de dâhil miyiz demeğe tenezzül edemediği münfehim olarak 
mersûm eğer İngiltere devletinin ta‘bîr-i mezkûra dâhil olmadığını mutazammın bana iki satır 
mektub itâ buyrulur ise devletim tarafına bi’l-irsâl def‘-i eşkâl olunarak gayetle mü’eddâ-yı 
mahzûziyet ve beyne’d-devletyn bâ‘is-i te’kîd muhâlasat olacağında şübhe yoktur deyu mektuba 
taleb-kâr olduğundan izhâr-ı muvâfakat olunarak meclise hitâm verilmiş ve sair bazı ifâkî sohbet 
ceryanıyla avdet etmiş olduğu ve fi’l-hakîka sened-i mezkûrda i‘ânet-i hariciye ta‘bîr olup andan 
murad dahi yalnız Rusya devleti i‘ânesi demek olduğundan İngiltere dokunmuş olmamak için 
elçi-i mersûmun istediği vechle hidmet-i riyâsetten olarak çend satır bir mektub itâsı muvâfık 
irâde-i seniyye-i mülûkâneleri buyrulduğu halde müsveddesi kaleme aldırılıp hâkipâ-yı 
hümayun-i mülûkânelerine takdim ve istîzân kılınacağı muhât-ı ilm-i âlem-i ârâ-yı cihânbânileri 
buyruldukta emr u ferman şevketlû, kerametlû, mehabetlû, kudretlû velini‘metim efendim 
padişahım hazretlerinindir.   
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HAT 366 / 20220 
This is about the French Ambassador Roussin’s meeting with Ibrahim Pasha in Kutahya. In this 
meeting Ibrahim Pasha wanted control of Damascus, Aleppo and Adana, a large region in the 
south of the Empire. The French Ambassador Roussin offered a guarantee of forgiveness to 
Ibrahim Pasha from the Ottomans however; this was found “inappropriate” and not accepted by 
Istanbul. This document contains all these developments and also the Sultan’s earnest desire to 
not leave Adana to Ibrahim Pasha’s administration. 
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HAT 366 / 20220 
Sene 
Benim vezirim, 
Rusya elçisiyle olunan müzakereye dair işbu takrîrin manzûr ve me’âli malum-ı hümayunum 
olmuştur. Elçi-i mersûmla yolunda söyleşilmesin. Fakat şu Adana’nın verilmesiyle İbrahim Paşa 
razı olur mu deyu sorması mukaddem bu babda göstermiş olduğu muvasalaya münâfi olmuyor 
mu ve bu Adana için Fransa elçisi tarafından Kütahya’da Fransa maslahatgüzarına ne surette 
cevab yazıldı. Mersûm tarafından buna dair henüz bir gûne haber geldi mi. Eğer şimdiye dek 
gelmemiş ise hidmet-i riyâsetten tercümanın celbiyle sual olunsun. 
 
Şevketlû, kerametlû, mehabetlû, kudretlû velini‘metim efendim, 
Muktezâ-yı irâde-i seniyye-i şahaneleri üzere Reis Efendi kulları bugün dahi Rusya elçisiyle 
mülakat ederek Amedci Efendi kullarının mukaddemâ suret-i memuriyeti elçi-i mersûma ifade 
olunmuş olduğundan bu defa İbrahim Paşa Şam ve Haleb eyaletlerine İçil ve Alaiye sancakları 
hariç kalmak üzere izhâr-ı rıza gösterip, fakat pederinden mesuliyet özrüyle Adana eyaletinin 
ilhaken tevcîhinde ziyade-i istid‘âsı ve bunun üzerine dünkü gün Fransa elçisiyle müzakere 
olunup Adana eyaletine bi’l-farz taraf-ı devlet-i aliyeden müsaade buyrulursa bile Fransa ve 
İngiltere devletlerinin tecvîz-gerdeleri olmayacağını müş‘ir maslahatgüzara mektub yazacağı 
keyfiyetleri irâd ve ityân olundukta, elçi-i mersûm acaba İbrahim Paşa Adana’nın verilmemesiyle 
razı olur mu deyu lede’s-sual beri taraftan Fransa elçisi öyle mektub yazdığı halde muhalefet 
etmemesi ağleb-i ihtimal iduğu ifade olunup eğerçi Rusya devletinin böyle berren ve bahren 
i‘âne-i fi‘iliyesini meydanda olarak İngiltere devleti tarafından dahi İskenderiye’ye mahsus 
kolonel irsâliyle Mehmed Ali Paşa’nın taht-ı itaate duhûlü tenbih olunmuş ve Fransa devleti dahi 
elçisinin mukaddem verdiği senedi kabul ile hükmünü icra etmek üzere İskenderiye’deki 
konsolosuna yazmış ve muhalefeti takdirinde icbâr için donanmalar âmade kılındığı ihbar 
kılınmış olduğuna nazaran Şam ve Haleb eyaletlerinin ilhâkı ağır şey ise de ne çare hasbe’l-vakit 
ve’l-hal böyle icab etmiş olduğu yâd ve tezkâr olduktan sonra elçi-i mersûm işbu maslahatta 
devlet-i aliyenin hoşnutluk ve adem-i hoşnutluğu kendi irâde-i seniyyesine menût olarak hoşnud 
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olduğu halde Rusya devleti dahi hoşnud olacağını ifade ve beri taraftan izhâr-ı mahzûziyet-birle 
bu hoşnutluk fakat iade-i asayiş zımnında olup yoksa bundan maada hoşnud olacak mahalli 
olmadığı lede’l-ityân, elçi-i mersûm vâkı‘â öyledir diyerek tasdik etmiş ve İbrahim Paşa afv-ı 
umumi için Fransa elçisinden sened metâlibe etmiş ise de devlet-i aliye tecvîz buyurmadığından 
afv-ı umumi zımnında evâmir-i aliye neşrolunmak üzere müdafaa olunduğu lede’l-ifade elçi-i 
mersûm Fransa elçisinin teb‘a-i devlet-i aliye için sened vermesi yakışıksız olacağından 
müdafaası pek isabetli olduğunu ba‘de’l-beyan bu maddede devlet-i aliye ile Rusya devletinin ve 
düvel-i sairenin dostlukları gereği gibi meydana çıktığına dair mahremâne bazı mücâvebât vâki‘ 
olarak İbrahim Paşa bu tanzimâta razı olmadığı halde Amedci Efendi avdet edecek midir deyu 
lede’s-sual beri taraftan bir kere keyfiyeti bu tarafa yazması iktizâ edeceği cevabı verilip elçi-i 
mersûm Amedci Efendi kullarıyla İbrahim Paşa’nın beyninde vukû‘ bulan muamelat ve 
mücâvebâtı Petersburg’a yazmak üzere sormuş olduğundan iş‘ârı keyfiyeti ifade olunmuş ve üç 
saat kadar müddet mülakatta Adana ve Şam ve Haleb hakkında pek çok müzakere ceryan etmiş 
ise de nihayet Adana eyaletinin ilhâkı tecvîz buyrulmamak üzere Şam ve Haleb eyaletleriyle 
bitirilmesi maslahata hayırlı olacağı tarafeynden irâd ve teslim olunup bu sohbetlerden sonra 
elçi-i mersûm bu defa gelen askerin bakıyyesi olarak iki yüz neferle bazı çadır mahmûl bir 
gemileri geride kalıp zuhûr etmemiş olduğundan bir mahalde kazaya uğramış olması 
mülahazasıyla amiral tarafından taharrisine mahsus bir sefine irsâl olunduğunu ifade etmekle, 
beri taraftan kâşkî bir iki gün evvel haber verilmiş olaydı şimdiye kadar tahkîk olunurdu. Şimdi 
dahi Anadolu ve Rumeli sevâhiline çarçabuk tatarlar ihracıyla taharri ettirelim denildikte, elçi-i 
mersûm izhâr-ı kemal-i memnuniyet ederek amiral ile söyleşip iktizâ eder ise tatar irsâli için 
haber göndereceğini bi’l-ifade avdet etmiş olduğu muhât-ı ilm-i âlem-i ârâ-yı şehinşâhileri 
buyruldukta emr u ferman şevketlû, kerametlû, mehabetlû, kudretlû velini‘metim efendim 
padişahım hazretlerinindir. 
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HAT 366 / 20238 
This order of Mahmud II’s shows he had been following the diplomatic developments in the 
process closely because in it he warns his statesmen that he suspected that France continued to 
support Mehmed Ali despite Roussin’s apparent efforts to solve the problem. This document 
gives the details about this matter.  
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HAT 366 / 20238 
Sene 
Benim vezirim, 
İşbu takrîrin ve varaka-i mezkure manzûr ve malum-ı hümayunum olmuştur. İşte Mehmed 
Ali’nin müsted‘iyât-ı sâbıkasında ısrar ve ne gûne mağrûrâne muamele etmekte olduğu Amedci 
Reşid Bey’in takrîrinden malum oldu. Ve Fransalı’nın dahi bu herife i‘âne etmekte olduğu 
anlaşılıyor. El-hâsıl bu hususa iyice dikkat olunmak lazımdır. Reis ibtidâ Rusya memurlarıyla ve 
ba‘dehu Fransa elçisiyle mülakat etsin. Bakalım bu hususta mersûmların kullanacakları lisan ne 
olacak ana göre tedâbir-i icâbiyesi bi’l-müzakere taraf-ı hümayunumuza arz ve istizân olunsun.         
 
Şevketlû, kerametlû, mehabetlû, kudretlû velini‘metim efendim, 
Muktezâ-yı irâde-i seniyye-i şahaneleri üzere bu kere Bâbıâli’lerinde akd olunan meclis-i 
havâsda Amedi Bey bendelerinin vâkı‘ olan ifadatının üzerine maslahat-ı maliyeye dair hayli 
ebhâs ve müzakere ceryan edip fezlekesinde çünkü Mehmed Ali’nin mağrûrâne kullandığı tavır 
ve lisanına göre müsted‘iyât-ı sâbıkasından vaz geçirilmesi ve ta‘dîl ve tesviyesi şimdiki halde 
imkânda görünmeyip Fransa elçisine gelen tahrîrât meali dahi taraf-ı devlet-i aliyelerine 
kullandığı lisan-ı vechle olması tercüman Labir’in elçisinden olarak meclisten evvelce hidmet-i 
riyâsete götürmüş olduğu varakadan müstebân olarak fakat varaka-i mezkure bir küskünsü 
surette yazılmış olduğuna nazaran, elçi-i mersûmun istikşâf-ı zamîri icab-ı halden olup mamafih 
bu surette nâzik ve cesîm bir şey olduğundan tam mutalaya mütevakkıf olarak şöyle ki zîr ve 
bâlâsı bi’l-etraf düşünüldükten sonra muharebe imkânda görünür ise ol halde bundan a‘lâ tedbir 
olmayıp, fakat Rusya devletinin i‘ânesi şimdiye kadar muhafaza suretinde tutulmakta olmakla, 
anlarla söyleşilip tecavüz muamelesi gösterilmek üzere iktizâ eden i‘ânet ana göre taleb ve icra 
olunmak ve bu surette Fransa ve İngiltere devletleri bî-taraf dururlar ise ne güzel durmayacakları 
halde maslahata ker çalacağından anlarla dahi peşin söyleşmek ve gelecek asâkirin irâde-i 
ta‘yînât malzemeleri dahi istihzâr kılınmak ve’l-hâsıl maslahatın cevânib-i erba‘asından tutulmak 
icab-ı halden olduğu ve şu kadar ki İbrahim yakında bulunması cihetiyle bu vechle tedâbire 
teşebbüs olunduğu surette ilerlemek isteyeceğinden ana dahi iğfâl edecek bir tedbir icab edeceği 
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suretleri ba‘de’t-tezekkür bunların cümlesi tasavvur nev‘inden olacağından ibtidâ Rusya ve 
Fransa sefâretleriyle görüşülüp Fransa elçisi ne diyecek yani verdiği senedin icrasına 
çabalayacağı ve Rusyalı bu vechle tecavüzü i‘âneye girişeceği bir iyice anlaşıldıktan sonra tekrar 
müzakere olunmak muvâfık-ı maslahat düşeceğinden Rusya elçisi yarın kendiliğinden olarak 
Reis Efendi kullarına gelmek üzere haber göndermiş olduğundan fakat i‘ânet-i tecavüz 
hususunda yalnız elçiyle olunacak müzakere kâfi olamayacağı cihetle efendi-i mümaileyh kulları 
tarafından haber irsâliyle General Moradif dahi beraber olarak müzakere olunması ve ferdası 
dahi Fransa elçisi celb ve mülakat kılınması hususları istisvâb olunmuş olmakla, ol vechle icrası 
hususu muvâfık-ı irâde-i seniyye-i mülûkâneleri buyrulur ise emr u ferman şevketlû, kerametlû, 
mehabetlû, kudretlû velini‘metim efendim padişahım hazretlerinindir. 
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HAT 367 / 20280 
This document shows that Mahmud was very optimistic about making a military alliance with 
Britain at the beginning of the Mehmet Ali Problem since he was looking forward to hearing the 
news from Namık Pasha, who was in London to negotiate the matter. He was impatient to learn 
the result of his Pasha’s negotiations with the British because Ibrahim Pasha was moving quickly 
across Anatolia and from Mahmud’s point of view the only solution for this fatal situation was to 
strike a military alliance with Britain so he could subdue his rebel governor with their help.  
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HAT 367 / 20280 
Sene 
 
Kaymakam Paşa,  
İşbu takrîrin manzûr ve malum-ı hümayunum olmuştur. Takrîrinizde beyan olunduğu üzere elçi-i 
mersûma ol vechle cevab verilmesi münasibidir. Ancak İngiltere hayli boyu uzak mahal 
olduğundan bu on beş kıta cenk sefâini ne vakit gelebilir ve bu ittifâk husûsuna İngiltere kralı ve 
vükelâsının muvâfakat edeceği henüz pek de tebeyyün etmediğinden kat‘iyece şâfi cevabı 
gelinceye değin bizim donanmamız şöylece tahaffuzu suretinde durduğu halde Mısır’daki habîs 
herifin istediği mahallerde sefine-i menhûsası serbest serbest gezmesi karada olan hûne-i 
Mısriye’nin bir kat dahi şımarmalarını mûcib olacak ve ordu-yı hümayunumuzun dahi şimdiki 
hali malumunuz olmakla, artık ana göre bu taraftan lazım gelen tedâbir ve tertibât icrasına 
bakılmalıdır. Bu habîs herif ile oğlu olacak yarenlerin niyet-i fâsideleri bilinmek ve ana göre 
ordu-yı hümayunumuzu ne derece ihtimâm olunarak çıkarılmış ise de be-hikmetullahi teala 
[Devamı Çekilmemiş]  
 
Şevketlû, kerametlû, mehabetlû, kudretlû velini‘metim efendim, 
Malum-ı hümayun-ı mülûkâneleri buyrulduğu üzere İngiltere elçisi Kanin Mısır maddesine dair 
bazı şeyler sual etmekte olduğundan bugün Reis Efendi kullarıyla mülakatında dahi yine 
lakırdıyı açıp ibtidâ kendisi İngiltere’ye varıp da rabıta-i ittifâkıyeye dair devleti tarafından haber 
gelinceye kadar devlet-i aliye memurları berren ve bahren tecavüzi hareket etmeyip daima usul-i 
tahaffuzu iltizâm olunmak suretini marziü’l-temasta beyan ile ba‘dehu saltanat-ı seniyyenin şu 
Mısır maddesinde ne mikdar berriye ve bahriye i‘mâl edeceği ve Mehmed Ali habîsi hakkında 
faraza tazyîkât kavliye ve fi‘iliye icra olunup da kendisi Mısır’a çekilerek devlet-i aliyenin 
menâfi-i kadîmesini dahi kemâfi’s-sâbık i‘tâ edecek olduğu halde afv-ı âliye şayan olup 
olmayacağına dair saltanat-ı seniyyenin müntehâ-yı niyet-i câzimesini istifsâr eylemiş olmakla, 
bugün esnâ-yı mecliste ahar odaya çıkılıp serasker paşa ve müşir paşa bendeleri ve memurîn 
kulları ile beynimizde vâkı‘ olan müzakerât-ı âcizanemizde habîs-i merkûmun böyle ilerleyen 
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tahattîsi mücerred sefine-i menhûsenin Berr-i Şam sevâhilinde geşt u güzâr etmesinden neş’et 
edip yoksa be-havlu’llahi te’âla kuvve-i bahriyesi bir kere ibtal olunsa karada olan asâkir-i 
makhûresinin bir yerde dikiş tutamayacakları ve sâye-i şevket-vâye-i kişver-keşâbîlerinde 
hariçten i‘âneye kat‘a hâcet kalmayacağı bî-iştibâh ve sür‘at husûl-i maslahat zımnında 
İngiltereli’den matlûb on beş kadar cenk sefinesinden ibaret olacağı âzâde-i tekellüf-gevâh olup 
hatta elçi-i mersûmun serasker-i müşarünileyh bendeleriyle mülakatında dahi mesârif-i vâkı‘ası 
taraf-ı saltanat-ı seniyyelerinden verilmek üzere donanma-yı hümayun-ı şahaneleri ma‘iyetine on 
beş kıta cenk sefinesi terfîki söylenmiş ve elçi-i mersûm dahi muvâfakat suretinde cevab vermiş 
olduğuna nazaran kara tertibatının kat‘an lüzumu olmayıp donanma-yı hümayun-ı şahanelerinin 
heyet-i mecmû‘ası dahi meydanda olmak hasebiyle ana göre bu babda olan sualinin cevabı irâd 
olunarak hareket-i bahriyelerinin keyfiyeti tekrar olunması ve hain-i merkûm hakkında 
İngiltereli’nin kadîmden gayz ve adâvetleri derkâr olmak cihetleriyle afvı suretini sualden 
muradları merkûmun nefisini iltizâm demek olmayıp mücerred ileride şayed afvı tarafına gidilip 
de kendilerinin mesârifi hebâ olmamak için maslahatın hakikatini anlamak kaziyesine mebni 
olması vârid-i ezhân ve her ne ise bu makûle afv lakırdısına ecnebi takımını karıştırmak caiz 
olmayacağı vâreste-i kay u beyan olmakla, merkûmun hurûc-i ale’s-sultan fazîhasını irtikâbı ve 
bu misillû hûne kendilerinin dahi olsa afvı mümkün olmayacağı keyfiyâtı serd ve ityân olunarak 
afvı muhâlâttan olduğunun bildirilmesi suretleri münasib gibi mutalaa olunmağın bi-minhü teala 
bu husus için dahi yarın sabahleyin böylece cevab i‘tâsı hususunda ne vechle irâde-i seniyye-i 
şehriyârileri müte‘allık buyrulur ise emr u ferman şevketlû, kerametlû, mehabetlû, kudretlû veli-
ni‘metim efendim padişahım hazretlerinindir. 
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HAT 368 / 20345 
This is the order to Mustafa Reşid Pasha was sending him to Kütahya to negotiate with 
Ibrahim Pasha. In this document, Reşid Pasha was told to focus on keeping the administration 
of Adana in favour of the Sultan. If he could not achieve this, the conditions of France and 
Britain would have to be carefully considered, and they would have to be persuaded to act 
against Mehmed Ali as a second plan. The instructions given to Reşid Pasha are very 
important because they show that the Sultan hoped to resolve the crisis through diplomacy. 
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HAT 368 / 20345 
Sene 
 
Benim Vezirim, 
Mecliste bi’l-müzakere arz olunan işbu takrîrin ve müzekkere ile kaleme aldırılan müsvedde 
manzûr ve tafsîl-i keyfiyet mümâileyh Vassaf Efendi’nin takrîr ve ifadesinden malum-ı 
hümayunum olmuştur. Çünkü bu babda hatır-ı hümayunumuza lâyih olan tedâbir cümleniz 
tarafından dahi tasvîb ve istihsân olunmak hemen bu vechle icra ve mümâileyh Reşid Bey’in 
dahi icâleten harcırahı ve yedine verilecek talimatnamenin i‘tâsıyla ihraç ve i‘zâmına mübâderet 
olunsun.          
 
Şevketlû, kerametlû, mehabetlû, kudretlû veli-ni‘metim efendim, 
Muktezâ-yı ruhsat-ı seniyye-i şehinşâhileri üzere bugün Bâbıâli’lerinde muhtasarca meclis 
akdiyle Vassaf Efendi kulları dahi vürûd ederek müverred ilhâmât-ı beyaniye olan mübarek-i 
hatır keramet-mü’essir-i hilafet-penahilerine sânih olan mütalaat-ı sâibeyi bi’l-etraf tebliğ ve 
tefhîm etmekle, hüdâ bilirki zihn-i derrâk felâtûn-pesend-i şahanelerine lâyih olan tedâbir ve ârâ-i 
mahza isabet eden ve ayn-ı keramet olup bütün erbâb-ı ukûl beri de getirilse bundan ilerisini 
bulmak muhâl-i ender-muhâl olmağın müttehim-i zimmet-i ubeydânemiz olan tezâyüd-i ömr ve 
şevket-i hazret-i zıllullahileri ed‘iyye-i hayriyesi tekrar be-tekrar yâd ve tezkâr kılındıktan sonra 
emr u ferman keramet-unvân-ı şehriyârilerinin mu‘ânni-i dakikası üzerine ceryan eden 
müzakerât-ı kemterânemizde vâkı‘â mülahaza-i münîfe-i tacdârileri iktizâsınca sâye-i şevket-
vâye-i cihân-bânilerinde asker ve leşker ihraç ve tertîbi ve Rusyalı’dan asâkir-i berriye celbi 
mümkün ise de biraz vakte muhtaç olacağı ve İbrahim’in ise Kütahya’dan berilere hareketi 
takdirinde babasının mes’ulâtına müsaade gösterilmek çirkin düşeceği cihetleriyle maslahatın 
şimdilik şöylece bitirilmesi suretine bakılmak ehemm ve elzem olup şöyle ki Mehmed Ali’ye 
mukaddemce ihsan-ı hümayun-ı şahaneleri buyrulan eyâlât ve elviyeye bu kere Şam ve Haleb 
eyaletleri dahi ilave buyrularak Adana eyaletiyle İçil ve Alaiye sancaklarının tahlîsine çalışmak 
üzere Amedci kullarının Kütahya’ya irsâliyle yedine verilecek talimatta irâde-i seniyye-i 
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mülûkâneleri muktezâ-yı münîfi üzere bazı çeramunyalı ta‘abbüdât ve teminat serdiyle herifi 
iknâ‘ ve irzâya çalışıp husûlü takdirinde anın Kütahya’dan gerilere tahrîkiyle kendisi dahi binip 
Mısır’a gitmek ve şayet yine inad ve ısrar edecek olursa ol vakit keyfiyeti bu tarafa iş‘âr ve 
istizân ile gidecek cevabına intizâren İbrahim’i orada oyalandırmak gibi şeyler derc ve tezkîr ve 
İbrahim’e dahi bir kıt‘a sathîce mektub tahrîr ve tesyîr olunması ve mamafih mesâlih-i haliye ve 
tertibât-ı harbiye germiyetlice tutularak gece ve gündüz çalışılmak ve ezher-i cihet tedarikli 
bulunmak lazım geleceği misillû çünkü âmme-i alemyân indlerinde bedîhi ve ayân olduğu üzere 
bu Mehmed Ali’ye bu kadar memâlikin ihalesi mehâzîr-i kesîreyi müstelzim olarak şimdiki halde 
gösterilecek müsaade mücerred def‘-i mazarrat kaziyesinden ibaret olduğundan bundan ileride 
herifin icra-yı mefâsidine meydan verilmemek lazım geleceğine ve bu defa Fransa elçisi 
devletinin Mehmed Ali’den hoşnudsuzluğunu resmen beyan edeceğini söyleyip İngiltereli dahi 
elbette bu meslekte ve sair düvel-i Avrupa dahi herife suret-i adâvette olacağına binaen, devlet-i 
aliyeleri bir taraftan inşallahu teala tezyîd-i asâkir maddesine ve sair mevadd-ı mühimmeye 
ikdâm ve bir cânibden dahi Avrupa devletlerini ele alarak ve icab-ı hale göre birbirine 
tutuşturarak anları kuvve-i berriye ve bahriye hususlarında herife davacılık etmeye ve lede’l-hâce 
içlerinden hangisi münasib ise Mısır takımının aleyhine kullanmaya dair tedâbire mezîd-i 
ihtimâm-birle sâye-i mu‘âlla-vâye-i cihan-dârilerinde telafi-i mâfât emr-i ehemmine çalışılması 
suretleri söyleşilmiş ve tafsîl-i halin hâk-i atebe-i felek-mertebe-i padişahanelerine arz ve ifadesi 
mümâileyh Vassaf Efendi kullarının uhde-i isti‘dâdına havale olunmuş olmakla, hususat-ı 
merkûmede her ne vechle irâde-i seniyye-i şehinşâhileri müte‘allık buyrulur ise mahza hayır ve 
meymenet anda olacağı rehin-i ilm-i âli-i hilafet-penâhileri buyruldukta ol babda ve her halde 
emr u ferman şevketlû, kerametlû, mehabetlû, kudretlû veli-ni‘metim efendim padişahım 
hazretlerinindir. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
239 
	  
	  
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HAT 369 / 20346  001 
Mahmud was very angry with the French because he mentions in this document that they broke 
their promise and caused Adana’s administration to be given to Ibrahim Pasha. It is easy to see 
Mahmud’s anger level in his words about the French when he says they had an “apostate 
nature”. 
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HAT 369 / 20346  001 
Sene 
Benim vezirim, 
Nemçe elçisiyle olunan müzakere ve mücâvebâtı mutazammın işbu takrîrin manzûr ve malum-ı 
hümayunum olmuştur. Elçi-i mersûma el-hâleti hâzihi tutulan usule göre hidmet-i riyâsetten 
yolunda cevab verilmiş ve mersûm dahi yeni baştan muharebenin vukû‘ bulmasını tercih etmeyip 
Adana’nın ihalesiyle maslahatın bitirilmesini indinde münasib mülahaza add eylediğini ifade 
eylemiş. Çünkü bu Adana’nın ehven-i şer olarak ihalesi lazım gelmiş ise de ancak Rusyalı’nın 
sonradan muameleyi değiştirmesinden ve Fransalı’nın bir sözde durmayıp televvün mizacından 
maslahatın imtidâdıyla mazallahu teala bu Adana maddesi alt olarak fenaya varacağı anlaşılmış 
olduğundan bi’z-zarûr icra olunmuş olduğu müsellemdir. Yoksa bu Adana’nın bu vechle 
ihalesinde hatıra gelen mehâzir-i adîde ileride başkaca mutalaa olunacak maddeden olmakla, 
maslahat bitti demeye gelmez. Avâkıb-ı umuru düşmanın lazımdır.             
 
Şevketlû, kerametlû, mehabetlû, kudretlû veli-ni‘metim efendim, 
Nemçe elçisi min gayr-i resm Reis Efendi kullarıyla mülakat taleb etmekte olduğundan dünkü 
gün bi’l-mülakat elçi-i mersûm Avusturya devleti, devlet-i aliyenin dost-ı hem-civarı olmak 
hasebiyle hasbe’l-mevki‘ Fransa ve İngiltere devletlerinden ziyade ma‘ârif-i hal ve kuvve-i 
ikbâlini mütemenni ve memâlik-i mahrûsanin imtidâd-ı ihtilalinden sairinden efzûn müte’essir ve 
mutazarrır olacağı zâhir ve celîdir. Hatta bu usul-i mer‘îyesini te’yîden Rusya devletiyle bi’l-
ittihâd Mısır valisini itaat-i hazret-i padişahîye teşvik ve tahvîl için İskenderiye’ye mahsus 
memur göndermiş ve beynlerinde sebkat eden muhâtaba ve mücâvebe keyfiyetini geçenlerde 
tebliğ ve ifade olunmuş ve mesned-i riyâsetle Fransa elçisi beyninde bundan iki mâh mukaddem 
rabt olunan mu‘âhede iktizâsınca Mısır valisi Fransa sefâretinin tavassutuna münâbi‘at etmek 
lazım iken hilafına hareketle, vermiş olduğu cevabdır. Avusturya imparatorunun malumu olacak 
te’sîr ve infi‘âlini mûcib olmuştur. Mu‘âhede-i mezkûrede Fransa elçisi Rusya imparatoruna su-i 
zan ile sefâin-i Rusya’nın Dersaadet’ten iadesini şart kılması imparator-i müşârünileyhin 
namusuna dokunur bir kaziye olmakla, Fransa ile Rusya devleti beyninde haylice kîl u kâl ve 
muhabere-i bâdire tevellüdüne bâ‘is olup hâlbuki Fransa elçisi mu‘âhede-i mezkurenin icrasına 
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ikdâm ve Mısır valisini ilzâm edemedi. Devlet-i aliye ile Rusya devleti beyninde nice dühûr ve 
az zamandan beri vekâyi‘-i kesîre ve mu‘âdât-ı atîde vukû‘na mebni bu i‘ânât-ı fi‘iliyeyi 
Avrupalı su-i niyete hamletmişler ise de Rusya imparatorunun şimdiki usulü karînenin 
menviyâtına ve Edirne mu‘âhedesi in‘ikâdında mültezimleri olan usule muvâfık olmayıp 
mu‘âvenet-ı vâkı‘âsı devlet-i aliye hakkında sırf ihlastan mahza hayır-hâhlıktan ibaret olduğu 
Avusturya devletinin malum ve meczûmu olmuş ve şimdi Fransalı dahi anlamış olduğundan kat‘-
ı nazar el-hâletü hâzihi Fransa devleti umur-ı dâhiliye meşâğıl-ı mahsusaları sebebiyle Rusya 
dört yüz bin asâkir-i mürettebesi olan Avusturya devletiyle uğraşmak kat‘an işlerine el 
vermediğinden Fransa elçisi çend rûz akdemce Rusya elçisine ve bana gelip vâfir i‘tizârlar ve 
arz-ı hulûslar etti. Ve Fransa devleti dahi Rusya ve Avusturya ve İngiltere devletleri misillû Mısır 
valisinin def‘-i mazarrat-ı istirdâdiyesi esbâbına münşiyet olduğunu beyan ile tevsîk ve te’mîn 
eyledi. Yani Fransalı mukaddemden Mısır valisinin ağrâzını tervîc etmiş ise de şimdi birlikte ve 
Rusya devletinin berri ve bahri yirmi bine bâliğ olur askeri Dersaadet’te olup Adana’nın 
verilmeyeceği dahi mukaddem beyan buyrulmuş ve İbrahim Paşa istizân-ı adamı bile 
göndermemiş ve bunda verilen mahaller hakkında Avrupa’da feragat-ı arziye nazarıyla bakılmış 
olduğundan, zinhar Fransalı tarafından Mısır valisine i‘âne olunacak olursa Rusya imparatoru bu 
maslahatı iltizâm etmek hasebiyle Fransalı ile bozuşacağından bu Adana hususunda izhâr-ı 
metânet ve celâdet muktezâ-yı şan u şevket olduğunu ve bunun verilmesi suretine ben külliyen 
muhalif olduğumu nâsıhâne ifade ederim deyu bast u makâl etmekle, beri taraftan Avusturya 
devletinin devlet-i aliye hakkında mültezimi olan meslek-i musâfâtı ve hususuyla Perniç 
Metternik cenâblarının herbâr-ı mu‘âmele-i hayır-hâhâne ve tebligât-ı mahremânesi bâ‘is-i 
memnuniyet olmakta olup, bu defa devlet-i müşârünileyhâ tarafından İskenderiye’ye mahsus 
memur tayini kaziyesi dahi mûcib ve izbâr-ı mahzûziyet olduğu ba‘de’l-beyan Fransa elçisinin 
mukavele-i mezkure ile Rusya devleti sefâininin iadesini taleb etmesi elçi beyin ifadesinden 
müstebân olduğu vechle, çünkü Avrupalı bu hususda su-i zan etmiş olduğundan ibtidâları ol dahi 
buna zâhib olarak gayeti Fransa imparatoru cenâblarının niyet-i halisânesi Avusturya devleti gibi 
vâkıf olamamasından neş’et etmiş ve sonra anlaşılarak ittihâd hâsıl olmuş oluyor. Elçi beyin 
ifadesi üzere Fransa elçisi mukavele-i mezkurenin icrasına ikdâm etmiş olsa Rusya devleti 
sefâininin iadesine ısrar etmek ve devlet-i aliye dahi ol vaktinin iktizâsınca tecvîz edemeyerek 
uygunsuzluğu mûcib olmak lazım gelirdi. Her ne ise devlet-i aliye bilâ-vasıta imparator 
cenâblarının hüsn-i niyet hulûs ve emniyetine itimad ve emniyet edip mu’ahharan Avusturya 
devleti tarafından olunan tebligat dahi te’yîd etmiştir. Kaldı ki elyevm Adana’nın tevcîh ve 
adem-i tevcîhi emrinde irâde-i seniyye-i kat‘iye malumum olmamakla, mutalaa kabîlinden olarak 
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beyan ederim ki, elçi beyin ifadesi vechle vâkı‘â düvel-i fehime-i mütecâbenin cümlesi devlet-i 
aliyenin gayr-i teşekkülünde olarak devletlik şanını ve hükümdarlık namusunu vikâyeye himmet 
ettiler. Lakin şurası kâbil-i inkâr değildir ki ibtidâ Rusya devleti ve ba‘dehu Avusturya ve 
İngiltere devletleri İskenderiye’ye mahsus memurlar gönderdiler ve Paris’ten İskenderiye’de olan 
Fransa konsolosuna ve buradaki elçiden Mısır valisine mektublar yazıldı. Ve Fransa 
maslahatgüzarı Kütahya’ya gitti. Ve Rusya devletinin sefâin ve askeri buraya geldi. Mamafih bu 
esbâb-ı müctemi‘a Mısır valisinin Adana hakkındaki ilhakına mani‘ ve İbrahim Paşa’yı 
Kütahya’dan dâfi‘ olamayıp şimdi tedbir ya Adana’nın ihalesi veyahut harb ve kıtâlin iadesi 
şıklarından birinin tercihine müncer oluyor. İbrahim Paşa da bu defa Amedci Efendi’nin takrîri 
ve kendisinin takdim eylediği arîzasıyla ba‘de-zîn rızâ-cûyâne ve ferman-berâne-i hidmet-i 
saltanat-ı seniyyede bulunmak şartıyla Adana’nın ber-vech-i muhassıllık kendiye ihsan-ı 
hümayun buyrulmasını azîm tazarru‘ ve niyaz edip ve kendi adamını göndermemesi dahi Amedci 
Efendi devlet-i aliyenin mevsûk ve mu‘temed memurları olduğundan tebliğ-i sadaka ve 
ubûdiyetinin anın tavsîti iblağ olmak i‘tikâdında olduğundan neş’et ediyor. Bu surette zat-ı 
şevket-meâb-ı hazret-i hilafet-penahinin dimâ-i beşeriye ve hukuk-ı insaniyeyi ve kayine-i? 
müşârünileyhin is‘âf-ı mes’uliyete müsaade buyurmaları ilahice ve insanca asvab ve evla 
olduğuna ve Avrupalı’nın feragat-ı arziye nazarı nazar-ı sahîh olmadığına ve bu suretin zımnında 
ihtiyat-ı mehâzir-i zaman ve teskin kılıp ve ezhân-ı fevâidi dahi hâsıl olacağına şübhe yoktur. 
Mukaddemden Adana’nın verilmeyeceği beyan buyrulması bunların evvelki tavrına göre olup 
şimdiki lisan başka olmakla, padişahlar ullüv tab‘ ile meftûr olduklarından iradelerine muhalefet 
ve ru‘ûnet-i takarrür ağır gelir ise tezellül ve ibtihâl niyaz ve iltica dahi ol kadar ……-i âtıfet 
etmek fıtrat-ı aliyelerinin muktezâsındandır ki ol tecelliyi bizler bilmeyiz. Ve derhal kerimenin 
ecel ve a‘zami afv ve ihsan olduğu müttefik-i aliye olmakla, şan u şevket-i saltanatı seniyyeye 
bunu şayan görürüz. Ve bundan başka Kütahya’ya Rusya askeri sevki takdirinde iş büyüyüp elçi 
beyin ifadesi gibi şayed Fransalı dahi öte tarafa i‘âne etmek ve Rusya devleti Fransalı ile 
bozuşmak lazım gelir ise biz sebeb olmuş olacağımızdan Adana için bunu tecvîz edemeyiz. İşte 
mutalaat-ı vâkı‘â budur deyu mukabele olundukta, elçi-i mersûm hep insan hakkını ministeroluk 
vazifesini eda ettiğimiz kelamınız hakka makrûndur deyu teslim ve i‘tirâf-birle saltana-ı 
seniyyenin murad-ı âlisi her ne suretle olursa bizim hoşnud olacağımız ol surettir ve Adana’nın 
tevcîhine müsaade buyrulur ise bir gün evvel 
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HAT 369 / 20346  002 
Mahmud was very angry with the French because he mentions in this document that they broke 
their promise and caused Adana’s administration to be given to Ibrahim Pasha. It is easy to see 
Mahmud’s anger level in his words about the French when he says they had an “apostate 
nature”. 
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HAT 369 / 20346  002 
maslahat-ı teşebbühden kurtarılmak içün sürat-i icrası mühim ve münasibdir diyerek ve 
tarafeynden ibrâz-ı huluse dair ve sair bazı afaki sohbet cereyan ederek avdetetmiş ve bade 
İngiltere tercümanı Şayer gelip bu defa vürud eden elçileri henüz sefineden sefarethaneye gelerek 
Bab-ı Ali ile muamele-i resmiyeye inmemiş ise de evvelki gün bir tarafdan öz hakkında mütalaa 
tevcihiyle idügüne dair min-gayr-i resm mahremane vaki olan suvaline mebni devlet-i aliyye cüzi 
şey için muharebe muhlikesine ihtiyar etmeyüp Adana’nın ihalesine müsade buyurulmasını 
münasib mülahaza ederim deyü söylediğini ifade etmiş olduğu muhit-i ilm-i alem-şumul 
şehinşahileri buyuruldukda emr ü ferman şevketlü kerametlü mehabetlü kudretlü veliyü’l-niam 
efendim padişahım hazretlerinindir. 
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HAT 372 / 20392 
This is the letter from the British Prime Minister, Lord Grey to Mahmud II in February 1833. He 
wrote it after negotiating with Namık Pasha about the Sultan’s desire for an Anglo-Ottoman 
military alliance against Mehmed Ali. Grey states in his letter that he unfortunately had to 
convey that Britain was unable to help the Ottomans at this time, however the Sultan could be 
sure that the British politicians were fully aware of the importance of the Ottoman Empire for 
Britain and that in the eventuality of any possibility of attack by Mehmed Ali’s army on Istanbul, 
they would not allow the Ottoman Empire to fall into decay. 
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HAT 372 / 20392 
Sene 
Makam-ı sadâret-uzmâ’ya şehr-i Şubatın yirmi üçü tarihiyle müverrah İngiltere devletinin 
Başvekili tarafından irsâl olunan mektubun tercümesidir.  
 
Ba‘de’-elkâb, 
Namık Paşa hazretlerinin Dersaadet’e avdeti mu’ahharan Mehmed Ali’nin tasaddi etmiş olduğu 
ve Mehmed Ali’ye itaat ettirilmek için sefâin-i hümayun ile beraber hareket olunmak üzere cenk 
gâyeti i‘tâsıyla muavenet-i bahriyeye dair taraf-ı hazret-i şahaneden İngiltere devletine vâkı‘ olan 
iltimas ta‘cîl eylediği muamelat-ı hasımâneyi mutazammın paşa-yı mümâileyh marifetiyle irsâl 
buyrulan mektubun vusûlünü beyana ni‘me’l-vesile ittihâz eylemiştir. Mektub-ı mezkûr ve paşa-
yı mümâileyh vasıtasıyla İngiltere devletine olunan tebligat-ı saire İngiltere devletinin nice 
asırlardan beri beynlerinde olan revâbıt vifâk ve muhâdenet cihetiyle müttehid olduğu bir 
devletin derpîş olunan her bir mültemesine lazım gelen dikkat-i kaviye ile dikkat olunmuştur. 
Mehmed Ali’nin ef‘âl-i hasımânesi derecesini aşıp ve devlet-i aliyenin emn u asayişini ihlal 
ederek zat-ı hazret-i şahaneye İngiltere devletinden mu‘âvenet-i bahriye iltimasını ilkâ etmiş 
iduğunu metbû‘um kral cenablarının malumu oldukta pek müte’essif olmuştur. Taraf-ı âlilerine 
müte’essifâne ihbar ederim ki, İngiltere devleti kemaliyle ba‘de’l-mutalaa bazı ahval ve 
mülahazat-ı azîme sebebiyle el-hâletü hâzihi taraf-ı hazret-i şahaneye iltimas buyurdukları 
mu‘âvenet-i mahsusanın i‘tâsından memnû‘ olmuş olup, ancak İngiltere devletinin işbu kararı 
memâlik-i şahanenin de ahvâline kayıtsızlıktan neş’et etmeyerek bi’l-akis İngiltere devletinin 
devlet-i aliyenin tamamiyeti muhafazası ehemmiyetine daima efkâr-ı amîka derkâr olduğuna zat-
ı âlilerini fi’l-hakika temin edebilirim. Metbû‘um kral cenabları İngiltere devletinin devlet-i aliye 
ile ittihâdını müstelzim olan muhâdenet-i kadîmeyi derpîş mülahaza edip ve zat-ı hazret-i 
şahanenin cihât-ı adîde-i zatiye ile müverris ve ri‘âyetine istihkâk- âlisini dahi nazarından gâib 
etmez. Binâberîn efkâr-ı meşrûha dostiye dair olarak maslahat-ı hâliyede devlet-i aliyenin 
menâfi‘ine bir hidmet-i sahîha olacak delil arz ve izhârını arzu etmekle, mukaddemâ Amerika’da 
vâkı‘ Kolombiya Cumhuru nezdinde maslahatgüzarı olan kolonel Kambeli taraf-ı hazret-i 
şahaneden Halil Paşa vasıtasıyla Mehmed Ali ile mübâşeretine rağbet buyrulan muhabere ve 
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müzakerede İngiltere devletinin nüfuzunu îkâ etmek niyetiyle Mısır’a bi’l-irsâl teklif olunan 
maksadı istihsâl etmiş olması me’mûlündedir. Zikrolunan kolonel Kambil devlet-i aliyenin 
metâlibini ikmal edecek tanzimâtı istilzâm için İngiltere devletinin bütün nüfuzunu isti‘mâle ve 
maksad-ı memuriyetini gerek Halil Paşa’ya ve gerek Mehmed Ali’ye beyana ve Mehmed Ali 
müzakereyi fesh etmek veyahut muamelat-ı hasımâneyi tecdîd eylemek kasdını izhâr eylediği 
takdirde İngiltere devletinin tamamiyet-i devlet-i aliyeyi Avrupa’nın bir maslahat-ı nâfi‘ası 
olmak üzere ehemm add eylediğini ve kral cenabları cism-i devletinde tecziyesine müsamaha 
edemeyeceğini ketm etmeyerek pek şedîd ibarât ile ifadeye memurdur. İşte bu maslahat-ı 
mühimmede İngiltere devletinin kararı bu vechle olarak nezd-i devlet-i aliyede karîn-i kabul olup 
ve eseri devletynin de me’mûl ve müterakkıyete mutabık olduğu halde mûcib-i kemal-i 
mahzûziyet olacağı derkârdır. Kaldı ki paşa-yı mümâileyhin hareket-i maslaha ve ma‘kûlesi kral 
cenablarına ve devletine hüsn-i te’sîr eylemiş olduğunu taraf-ı âlilerine şehâdet etmeksizin işbu 
mektubu hatm edemem. Kral cenabları ve devleti paşa-yı mümaileyh bu tarafta müddet-i 
ikametinde …….olan bilcümle ri‘âyeti izhârdan müftehir ve paşa-yı mümâileyhin liyakatine 
lazım gelen şehâdetten memnun oldukları beyanı derkâr olan fart-ı ihtirâmımın kabulü niyazına 
ni‘me’l-vesile ittihâz olunmuştur deyu muharrerdir. 
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HAT 372 / 20392 A 
This is the letter from the British Foreign Minister, Palmerston, to Mahmud II in February 1833, 
which he wrote after he met with Namık Pasha. Palmerston expresses in his letter that the King 
had always supported the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and therefore his majesty 
was assigning Colonel Campbell to Egypt to negotiate the latest developments with Mehmed Ali 
Pasha. If Mehmet Ali said he would not give up his rebellion against his Sovereign, Mahmud II, 
Campbell was to sternly warn the Pasha that in this case Britain absolutely would support the 
Sultan because they were aware of the high importance of the Ottoman Empire’s territorial 
integrity in terms of the European balance of peace.  
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HAT 372 / 20392 A 
Sene 
Makam-ı sadâret-uzmâya şehr-i Şubatın yirmi üçü tarihiyle müverrah İngiltere devletinin umûr-ı 
ecnebiye nazırı tarafından irsal olunan mektubun tercümesidir. 
 
Ba‘de’l-elkâb, 
Mehmed Ali’nin mu’ahharan vâkı‘ olan muamelatına ve merkûmun isyanı cihetiyle teşebbüs 
olunan muharebede mu‘âvenet-i bahriyeden matlûbu taraf-ı hazret-i şahaneden metbû‘um kral 
cenâblarına nâme-i hümayunda beyan buyrulan iltimasa dair mektub-ı âlilerinin Namık Paşa 
hazretleri yediyle ahzinden kesb-i fahr eylemiştir. Zikrolunan mektub-ı âlilerinin cevabında 
evvela kral cenablarının Mehmed Ali’nin isyanı ve isyan-ı mezkûr mülâbesesiyle devlet-i 
aliyenin asayişi inkıta‘ı keyfiyâtı zat-ı hazret-i şahaneyi İngiltere devletine müracaat ihtiyacı 
halinde bulundurmuş olduğundan dolayı kemal-i te’essüfünü te’mine memur olmuştur. Ancak 
ilaveten ifadeye dahi memurum ki İngiltere devleti ol vechle müracaatı kral cenablarının zat-ı 
hazret-i şahane hakkında muhâdenet ve ri‘âyetinin hulûsuna dair zat-ı hazret-i şahane devlet-i 
aliyelerinin cezmine bir delil-i vâzıh ve nüvâzişâne add eylemiştir. Ve İngiltere devleti taraf-ı 
devlet-i aliyeden olunabilen her bir taleb ve iltimasa muvâfakat ve kezâlik memleketeyn 
beynindeki vifâk ve muhâdenete olan dikkat ve itibarını isbat için kâffe-i vesâili ittihâza kemal-i 
derece mesned ise de mamafih kemâliyle ba‘de’l-mutalaa el-hâletü hâzihi devlet-i aliyenin 
Mehmed Ali ile muharebede mu‘âvenet-i bahriye iltimasına muvâfakat edemeyeceğini 
müte’essifâne hiss eylemiştir. Lakin metbû‘um kral cenabları devlet-i aliyenin tamamiyetini 
muhafazasının ehemmiyeti meczûmu olduğuna ve İngiltere devleti ve devlet-i aliyenin menâfi‘-i 
müttehide-i adîdelerini bildiğine ve memleketeyn beyninde ittihâdı müstelzim olan muhâdenet-i 
kadîmeyi tahattur eylediğine mebni taraf-ı hazret-i şahaneye mesâ‘î-i cemilesinin mu‘âvenetini 
arzu ederek mu‘âvenet-i mezkure kral cenablarına şimdiki halde menâfi‘-i hazret-i şahaneye 
gayet müfîd görünüyor. Ale’l-husûs ki taraf-ı hazret-i şahaneden Halil Paşa vasıtasıyla Mehmed 
Ali ile mübâşereti tensîb buyrulan muhabere ve müzakereyi te’yîd eder. Kral cenabları 
mukaddemâ Amerika’da vâkı‘ Kolombiya cumhuru nezdinde maslahatgüzarı olan kolonel 
Kambeli bu maksada binaen, İskenderiye’ye vusûlünde memuriyeti ve İngiltere devletinin 
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efkârını gerek Mehmed Ali’ye ve gerek Halil Paşa’ya bilâ-ifâte-i vakt beyan eylemek talimatıyla 
Mısır’a irsâl etmekle, Halil Paşa ile halisâne muhabereye girecek devlet-i aliyenin menâfi‘ne 
müsa‘id tanzimatın husûlü için İngiltere devletinin kâmilen nüfûzunu ikâ edecektir. İngiltere 
devleti me’mûl ve müterakkabı olduğu vechle sa‘y ve ikdâmı zikrolunan müzakerede semere-i 
hayriyeyi müntic olduğu halde kendisini gâyet bahtiyar add eder. Ancak eğer müzakere-i 
mezkure fesh olunur ve eğer Mehmed Ali ef‘âl-i hasımânenin tecdîdinden dolayı ihâfe eder ise 
kolonel Kambel İngiltere devletinin tamamiyet-i devlet-i aliyenin muhafazasını Avrupa’nın 
menfaatli maslahatı olmak üzere ehemm add eylediğini ketm etmeyerek pek şedîd ibârât ile 
beyan ve cism-i devletin tecziyesine ber-vechle musamaha edemeyeceğini ilana memurdur. 
İngiltere devleti tarafından olunan işbu harekete taraf-ı devlet-i aliyeden zat-ı hazret-i şahanenin 
ikbâli hakkında kemal-i iltizâmı ve memâlik-i şahanenin tamamiyetine ikdâmına delil-i gayr-i 
mübhem nazarıyla bakılacağı me’mûlündedir. Kaldı ki Namık Paşa hazretleriyle muamelede 
bulunmaktan mahzûz olmuştur. Paşa-yı mümâileyhin hüner ve dirayet-i zatiye ve meslek ve 
hareket maslahası kral cenabları ve devletinin ri‘âyetini istihsâl etmiş ve layıkıyla ifâ eylediği 
memuriyet-i mühimmeye intihâb-ı hazret-i şahaneyi tasdik eylemiş olduğu beyanı derkâr olan 
hürmet ve ri‘âyetimizin ibrâzına ni‘me’l-vesile ittihâz olunmuştur deyu muharrerdir. 
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HAT 380 / 20558 C 
In February 1838, Mustafa Reşid, the Ottoman Foreign Minister at that time, was sent to Paris 
and Ahmed Pasha, the Governor in Aydın, was sent to London as Ottoman Ambassadors. Their 
missions were vital because Mahmud was making his last preparations to attack Mehmed Ali. He 
ordered them to persuade these countries’ public opinion to be in his favour so that in the event 
of any war with his governor’s army, they knew he was in the right because Mehmet Ali had 
broken the treaty of Kütahya by attacking the territories which were under the Sultan’s control. 
Mahmud was really determined to defeat his rebel governor this time and wanted to prepare the 
diplomatic atmosphere in the eventuality of such a battle. This document gives details about this 
topic. 
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HAT 380 / 20558 C 
Sene 53 
Maruz-ı kullarıdır ki, 
Havâdis-i Mısriye’ye dair ve vakt-i harîfte Haleb’e doğru sarkmak ifade ve istizânına mütedâir 
defa-i saniyede takdim kılınan maruzat-ı bendegânemin cevab-ı âlisi olmak üzere bu defa hâme-i 
zeyb-icâl olan emirname-i sami-i cenab-ı vekâlet-penâhide gâile-i mezkûrun Fransa ve İngiltere 
devletleriyle bi’l-müzakere ortadan kaldırılması çaresine bakılmak için hala umûr-ı hariciye 
nazırı devletlû Mustafa Reşid Paşa hazretleri Fransa tarafına ve Aydın müşîri devletlû Ahmed 
Paşa hazretleri dahi İngiltere canibine mahsusan büyük elçilik ile memur ve tayin buyrulmuş 
olduklarından ve müşârünileyhümâ hazerâtının mahallerine vusulüyle bu suretleri müzakere 
ederek memâlik-i mahrûsadan şu fitne-i dâimenin def‘i hususuna devleteyn-i 
müşârünileyhimânın muvâfakatlarını istihsâl-i emniyesi dahi vakt-i harife kadar ancak müyesser 
olacağından inşallahu teala ol suret müyesser olduğu halde herifin üzerine varılmak tedbirinin ol 
vakit sırası geleceği ve şimdilik icab-ı hal ve maslahata göre nasıl hareket ve tedbir olunmak 
lazım gelir ise icra-yı iktizâsına bakılmak üzere bir taraftan dahi evvelki tertib ve tasmîm vechle 
münasib şayialarıyla peyderpey mühimmat ve sair levâzımâtın irsâli ve şu kadar ki hain-i 
merkûm uhdesinde bulunan mahallere adem-i kanaat ve icra-yı mel‘anet ile eğer Bağdad 
taraflarına veyahut sair mahallere tahattî ve tecavüz-i gûne harekete ibtidâr eder ise ibtidâ 
tecavüzü hareket kendisinden vukû‘ bulmuş olacağından ve öyle hareketine devleteyn-i 
müşârünileyhâ ve sairleri dahi davacı ve devlet-i aliye haklı bulunacağından indifâ-i mazarratı 
lazım geleceğine mebni ol vakit müdafaaya mezun değilim deyu mutalaa veyahut Dersaadet’e 
inhâ ve istizân eylemekle, vakit geçirilmeyerek meyâmin-i te‘âla teveccühât-ı kudsiyet-i ayat-ı 
cenab-ı şahane ile indifâ‘-i müfsidet ve mazarratına sarf-ı makderet ve madem ki merkûm 
tarafından bir gûne hareket vukû‘ bulmadığı halde sırası gelmesine ta‘likan tedâbir-i lazıme ve 
tedârikât-ı mukteziyenin uluvvlü ve telaşlı tutulmayarak usul-i hakimâne ile icrasına dikkat 
olunması emr u ferman buyrulmuş olmakla, malum-ı çâker ubûdiyet-i iktirân olmuştur. Her halde 
ve ba-husus işbu mevâdd-ı hayriyede emr u irâde-i seniyye vechle hareket-i vâcibe-i uhde-i 
ubûdiyet olduğuna binaen, tıbk-ı emr-i ferman-ı âli vechle merkûmun Bağdad tarafına veyahut 
sair mahallere tecavüzü vukû‘ı takdirde be-avnullahi teala yümn-i teveccühât muallâ-âbad cenab-
ı zıllullahi ile indifâ‘-i müfsidetine mübâderet ve mademki merkûm tarafından bir gûne hareket 
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vukû‘ bulmadığı surette sırası gelmesine ta‘lîkan a‘mâl-i tedâbir-i lâzımeye dikkat olunacağı 
derkâr olup ancak beyandan müstağni olduğu vechle icabı takdirde bu makûle hain ile 
mukabeleye mübâşeret göz arkada kalmayacak derecede mühimmat-ı lâzımenin kâmilen hazır ve 
âmade bulunmasına muhtaç iduğu vâreste-i kayd u işaret ve bundan sonra Samsun iskelesine 
tevârüd edecek mühimmatın bu tarafa nakli ekall bir mâha mütevakkıf olarak hâlbuki çöl 
tarafının vakt-i rebi‘î hemen duhûl eylediğine nazaran, hain-i merkûmun şayet şu aralık Bağdad’a 
veyahut sair mahale tecavüzü vukû‘ı takdirde cüz’i mühimmat ile mukabeleye kalkışmak Allahu 
teala hazretleri Habib-i ekremi hürmetine her halde ve her bir mahalde fevz ve nusret ihsan 
buyursun. Encâmında hacâleti davet demek olacağı dakikası müstağni-i külfet hikayettir. Bu 
cihetlerle mühimmat-ı matlûbenin nasıl mümkün olur ve ne vechle kolayı bulunur ise bir dakika 
evvel bu cânibe isâli hususuna müsaade-i seniyye-i erzân buyrulmasını b-tekrar inhâ ve istid‘âya 
cesaretim her ne kadar mugâyir-i adâb-ı ubûdiyetim ise de bu babda nâçâr ve ma‘zûr olduğum 
cihetle zaruriü’l-vukû‘ı olan taksîrât-ı bendegânemin afvı şeyme-i kerimine hakkâniyet veliü’n-
ni‘melerine müfevvezdir. Bugünlerde ihtilâs olunan bazı havâdise göre güya hain-i merkûm 
Mısır’da müceddeden dokuz alay asker tertîb ve tahrîr ve Berriyetü’ş-şam taraflarından tuttuğu 
asâkiri Mısır’a göndererek Mısır’da olan muallim-i asâkiri Haleb ve sair mevâkı‘e sevk ve tesyîr 
vadilerine sapmış. Ve geçende Gülek’de üzerine sevk eylediği asker ric‘at-ı kahkari ile avdet ve 
birkaç yüz süvari-i Mısriyeyi maktûlen rıhlet ve bu maddenin ve bu maddenin üzerine hain-i 
merkûm mübtelâ-yı hacâlet olduğundan bu defa oğlu İbrahim haini Haleb’den dört beş alay asker 
alarak Gülek’de üzerine atf-ı veche-i nikbe? Eylediği rivayet olunmakla, merkûmun bu vechle 
hareket ve azimeti ya fi’l-hakika ahz-i intikam mutalaasıyla mıdır? Yahut Beriyyetü’ş-Şam 
taraflarında vukû‘ bulan tedarikâtı pek şüyû‘ bulduğundan encâmı bu madde kendilerine muzır 
olur tasavvurâtıyla o tedarikâtı kavme yedirmek için bir hile midir? Yoksa Şam’a çekilip de 
oradan Basra’ya veya veyahut Bağdad’a sarkmak mülahazasında mıdır? Her ne ise Mısırlı’nın şu 
aralık pek telaşları olduğu zâhir ve çâkerleri dahi bir taraftan ber-vech-i hafî levazımat-ı 
mukteziyeyi tehiye ve ihzâra çalışmakta olduğum emr bâhir olarak akdemce şeref-sünûh 
buyrulan emr ve irâde-i seniyye vechiyle Sivas ve Diyarbekir ve Urfa ve Maden-i Hümayun 
kazalarından müretteb on altı tabur asâkir-i redife ve altı bölük topçu asâkir-i redifesi icra-yı 
münâvebe ve talimat şayiasıyla mevâkı‘-i münasibe celb ve cem‘ olunmuş ve olunmakta 
bulunmuş olmakla, geçende iş‘âr-ı âcizânem vechle asâkir-i merkûmenin yağmurluklarıyla 
mevsim-i baharın takarrübüne mebni beyaz bezden elbise-i sayfiyeleri derdest-i i‘ mal olarak bi-
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avnihi te‘âla meyâmin-i enzâr- mehâsin-i âsâr-ı hazret-i padişahî ile asâkir-i merkûmenin ta‘lîm 
ve ta‘allum hususunda az vakitte kesb-i meleke ve malumat eylemeleri me’mûl ve bunların hîn-i 
münâvebelerinde nısf-ı mâhiye ile üç yüz dirhem nân ve on paradan yirmi paraya kadar 
mahalline göre katık-ı baha i‘tâsı ve hengâm-ı seferde maaş ve mâhiye ve tayinatlarının be-
tabaka-i asâkir-i mansûre taburları usulünce icrâsı mukaddemki nizâm-ı âli iktizâsından iduğu 
emr-i gayr-i meçhûl olup, bu cihetle asâkir-i müctemi‘anın esnâ-yı münâvebe ve lede’l-iktizâ 
hengâm-ı seferde maaş ve mâhiye ve tayinatlarının verilmesinde bir gûne hata vukû‘ bulmamak 
için taraf-ı bendegânemi ihtâra müsaade-i seniyye şayan buyrulması. 
Geçen sene Sincar ve Telafer ordusu biraz ileride bulunduğu cihetle kavâ‘id-i hazem ve ihtiyata 
ri‘âyeten Urfa’nın bir mikdar kalabalıklandırılması münasib gibi hâtır-ı âcizâneme gelerek 
asâkir-i redifenin münâvebe ve ta‘lîmlerinin icrası şayi‘asıyla Maden-i Hümayun kazalarından 
müretteb atîk üç tabur asâkir-i redifeden ma‘-zâbit beş yüz bu kadar nefer intihâb ve tefrîk ve li-
ecli’l-muhafaza Urfa’ya tayin olunmuş ve zabitan ve neferât-ı merkûme bu münasebetle hem 
ta‘lîm ve ta‘allum resmini ikmal ve hem bazı bî-edeb aşâir makûlesinin te’dîb ve terbiyesini 
istikmâl ve bu askerin Urfa’da bulunmasının muhsinâtından olmak üzere eyalet-i mezkûrdan 
hemen bin beş yüz keseye karîb vâridât-ı cedîde istihsâl ve vâridât-ı merkûme akdemce takdim 
kılınan defter-i vâridâta idhâl kılınmış ve zabitan be neferât-ı merkûmenin ekser vakitleri urbân 
ve aşâir ile uğraşmakla geçip seferber hükmünde bulunmuş oldukları cihetiyle sâye-i ihsân-vâye-
i hazret-i padişahîde maaş ve mâhiyeleri tamamen ve nân ve katık bahaları münâvebe usulü üzere 
kâmilen i‘tâ ve husus-ı mezbûr Bâbıâli’ye dahi tahrîr ve inhâ ve maaş ve mâhiye ve tayinat 
defterleri Dersaadet’e takdim ve isrâ kılınmış ise de zabitan ve neferât-ı merkûmenin 
memuriyetlerine dair kalemce bir gûne kayıt bulunmadığından asâkir-i redifeye i‘tâsı mu‘tâd 
olan rub‘ı- mâhiyeden fazla asâkir-i mansûreye tatbikan verilmiş olan üç rub‘ mâhiyeyi mesârifât 
hazinesi kabul etmemiş olup vâkı‘â hazâin-i celîle bu makûle hesablarda usul-i hazineyi iltizâma 
memur, hâlbuki kullarınız dahi emanet-kâr olduğum cihetiyle sırası düştükçe hakikat-i hali 
ifadeye mecbur ve bu babda ma‘zûrum. Şöyle ki Allahu teala hazretleri vücûd-ı hümayun-ı 
cenâb-ı mülûkâneyi dünya durdukça hatalardan masun buyursun. Uhde-i çâkeriye muhavvel 
mahallerin bu sene-i müteyemminede taraf-ı bendegâneme terk ve ihsân buyrulan temettu‘âtı 
hususunda erzân buyrulan müsaade-i ihsân-âde-i seniyyenin kavlen ve fi‘ilen ifâ-yı hakk-ı 
teşekküründe âciz olduğum cihetiyle işbu ihsân bî-pâyân-ı cenâb-ı zıllullahiyi ……Sincar, 
Telafer ve Akçadağ orduları mesârifâtında ve mahal-i malumede bulunan kaymakamlarım 
256 
	  
	  
	  
kullarının mesârifât-ı vâkı‘alarında ve sair hususlarda tasarruf ka‘idesine ri‘âyet ve emvâl-i 
mezkûreyi teleften vikâyet ederek muhafaza sureti bi’l-iltizâm, el-hâlethü hâzihi uhde-i 
bendegiye muhavvel eyâlât ve elviyenin hâvi olduğu kazalar ahalisi zimmetlerindedir. Hüsn-i 
tahsîl olan emvâl- bakâyâ ve tayinat-ı askeriyeye sarf olunmak üzere anbarlara müdahhar olan 
zehâir ve erzak baha olunmak üzere ale’t-takarrüb on bin kese mikdarı akçe sermaye tarîkiyle 
ind-i kemterânemde mevcud ve bunun bir akçesini boş yere telef günah-ı kebâir hükmünde iduğu 
rû-nümûd olmakla, bu suretle bakâyâ ve zehâir-i bahâ-i mezkûre emvâl-i mîrîyeden ma‘dûd 
olduğu halde sermaye olarak nezd-i bedegide mevcud olduğu cihetiyle hasbe’l-kadar buradan 
infisâl-i kemterânem vukû‘ı takdirde emvâl-i mezkûre takımıyla emr buyrulan mahale devr ve 
teslim olunacağı ve icabı takdirde yol harçlığı dahi bi’l-istizân alınarak teleften vikâyesine bezl-i 
makdûr kılınacağı zâhir ve kulunuza asıl mal ve rıf‘at ve dünya ve ahirette necât ve selâmet rızâ-
yı hazret-i mülûkâneyi tahsil iduğu emr-i bâhir olmakla, bu suretle asâkir-i redifeye verilen cüz’i 
maaş ve mâhiyenin adem-i kabulüyle çâker-i nev-temennilerini? İhtilâca düşürmeyerek lütfen ve 
ihsânen tamamen i‘tâsı hususunda istihsâl-i müsaade-i seniyyeye derkârı inâyet-i aliyeleri ihsâs-ı 
niyâz-ı acizanem olduğu.  
Bend-i sânide muharrer olduğu vechle bakâyâ-yı merkûme ve zehâir bahaları on bin kese mi olur 
yoksa daha ziyâde mi olur cümlesi mal-ı mîri olup, ancak bakâyâ-yı mezkûrenin tahsili ne 
derciyle olacağına ve zehâir ve erzak- saire dahi tayinata sarf olundukça, akçe hükmüne 
gireceğine mebni bend-i evvelde iş‘âr-ı âcizânem vechiyle Mısırlı tarafından bir uygunsuzluk 
vukû‘ı takdirde külliyetlu akçeye ihtiyaç mess eyleyeceği derkâr ve ol vakit Dersaadet’e 
yazatura? Akçe getirelim tasavvuru ifâte-i vakti müstelzim olacağı hâtır-güzâr ve lâ-simâ refâkat-
i bendegîde olan süvari ve piyade asâkir-i muntazamanın idaresi ve münâvebeye gelen ve 
gelecek on altı tabur asâkir-i redifenin nân ve katık bahalarının i‘tâsı ve yağmurluklarıyla elbise-i 
sayfiyelerinin mesârifi pek çok akçeye tevakkuf eyleyeceği aşikâr olmakla, bu suretle maslahatı 
sekteden vikâyeten taraf-ı âcizâneme ta‘vîzan sekiz bin kese mikdarı akçe ihsan buyrulması 
hasbe’l-maslaha münasib gibi hatır-ı bendegâneme geldiği.  
Veli-ni‘met-bî-minnetimiz ve veli-ni‘met-i âlem-i padişahımız efendimiz hazretlerinin böyle bir 
vakitte erîke-i pîrâ-yı saltanat ve şa‘şa‘a-i efzâ-i aver-nekde-i şevket ve hilafet buyurulmaları 
ancak sâye-i ihsân-vâye-i tâcdârilerinde bi’l-cümle ibâd-ı sadakat-i‘tiyâdın mahfûz-ferve-i? 
asâyiş ve aceze-i fukara ve zu‘afânın nâil-i emn ve arâmiş olmalarıyla, beraber sâye-i sâyebân-ı 
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mu‘adelet-unvân-ı cihândârilerinde pençe-i dâ-i? izâl tedbir-i dârvi-i isabet-pîrâ-yı 
mülûkâneleriyle şifâ-pezîr kavânîn-i mu‘âlla-bedhîn-i müccededâne-i şahanelerinin memâlik-i 
mahrûsatü’l-mesâlik-i hilafet-penâhilerinde bi’s-sühûle icraya muvaffakiyet dahi mevhûb 
oldukları adl u dâd ve şeriat-i mutahhara-i hazret-i seyyidü’l-enbiyâya i‘tisâm ve istinâd-ı 
şehriyâneleri iktizâ-yı celîlinden nâşi mahzâ tevfîk ve ihsân-ı cenâb-ı hüdâvend-kadir iduğu 
vâreste-i kayd u tezkîr olarak mukaddemlerde bu havâli ahalisi ru’esâları olan eşkıyânın istilası 
ve kendilerinin dahi bi’t-tabi‘ şekâvete meyl ve ülfetleri takrîbiyle taraf taraf beynlerinde deverân 
eden kıtâl ve habâset mâni‘-i ticaret ve harâset olduğundan ekseri fakat bir senede kendilerini 
idare edebilecek ziraate kanaat ve katl-i nüfus ve nehb-i emvâl ile rahatsızlığı âdet edinmişler 
olup, ancak el-minhüllahi’l-kerim meyâmin-i teveccühât-ı kudsiye-i ayât-ı cenâb-ı şehriyâr heft-i 
iklim berekâtıyla o makûle münâdiü’l-husus? Ve eşkıya olan mahallerin ekser zabt ve teshîr ve 
levs-i vücûd eşkıyadan tasfiye ve tathîr olunmuş ve mukaddemâ şekâvetle me’lûf olanlar beyleri 
olacak hûnenin zulm ve te‘âddisinden kurtulup ve sâye-i ihsân-vâye-i hazret-i pâdişahide 
emniyet ve rahat kesb edip ziraat ve ticarete başlamış ve ol vakit nâna muhtaç olanları derece 
derece huzur ve refâh görmekte bulunmuş olduklarından memâlik-i mahrûsada mer‘îü’l-icra olan 
nizâmâtın buralarda dahi icrası hususunu iltizâm ve hatta muhtaç-ı te’dîb ve gûş-mâl olan 
devecik misillû bazı eşkıya-yı ekrâdın terbiyesiyle şu tarafların bütün bütüne idhâl, daire-i hüsn-i 
nizâm olunmasını ifade ve istirhâm etmekte, oldukları cihetiyle bi-avnihi teala sâye-i şevket-
vâye-i cenâb-ı cihân-bânide ileride anın dahi icabına bakılmak üzere şimdilik Maden-i Hümayun 
kazalarıyla Diyarbekir ve Urfa eyaletlerinde ihtisâb ve damga nizamının icrası tensîb ve bilâd-ı 
sairede câri olan usul vechiyle kimesneye gadr olunmayarak rüsûmât-ı lâzımesi tertîb olunmuş ve 
eyaleteyn-i mezkureteyn rüsûmâtı henüz yoluna konulamadıysa da Maden-i Hümayun kazaları 
maktû‘a rabtla iki yüz elli üç senesi martından itibaren tâliblerine ihale ve ilzâm olunarak işbu 
ihtisâb maddesinden dahi iki bin dokuz yüz kırk üç kese akçe vâridât-ı cedîde istihsâl ve bu defa 
münâvebeye celb ve cem‘ olunan asâkir-i redifenin mesârifât-ı vâkı‘asına medar olmak üzere 
defteri tanzîm ve irsâl kılınmış olmakla, icra-yı iktizâsı mütevakkıf-ı irade-i seniyye olarak şu 
kadar ki mukaddem ve bu defa istihsâl olunan vâridâtın cesâmeti mülâbesesiyle usul-i hazâin-i 
celîleye tatbikan haziran ve eylül itibarlarıyla taksit-i rabt buyrulur ise buraca tahsilâtın biraz 
ağırlığı takrîbiyle güçlük görüleceğinden vâridât-ı mezkure tekâsîdâtının lütfen birkaç mâh gerice 
tanzimiyle kullarını güzeşte-i hasarından vikâyeye müsaade-i rahîmâneleri erzân buyrulması 
ihsâs-ı niyâz-ı bendegânem iduğu muhât-ı ilm-i âlem-şümûl-i veli-ni‘meleri buyruldukta emr u 
ferman hazret-i men lehü’l-emr ve’l-ihsanındır. Fi 25 Za sene 53. 
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HAT 381 / 20567 
Mahmud started to reap the rewards of his diplomatic efforts in sending Ahmed Pasha and 
Mustafa Reşid Pasha to Europe to win European public opinion to his favour in the case of a war 
with Mehmed Ali. This shows in this message sent by Metternich to the Sultan saying that they, 
Britain, Austria and The Ottoman Empire could resolve the problem without resorting to war. 
This document gives the details of Metternich’s surprise offer.  
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HAT 381 / 20567 
Sene 
Seniü’l-himemâ kerimü’ş-şimemâ devletlû aıfetlû efendim hazretleri, 
Malum-ı âli buyrulduğu vechle hariciye müsteşarı saadetlu Nuri Efendi senâverilerinin bu defa 
Nemçe elçisiyle vâkı‘ olan mülakatında Viyana sefiri saadetlu Rıfat Beyefendi bendelerinin 
vukû‘ bulan iş‘ârâtında bu Mısır meselesi hakkında Prens Metternik tarafından tebliğ olunan 
ifâdât mazbatası ve anın üzerine elçi-i mümâileyhin Mabeyn-i Hümayun-ı şevket-makrûn-ı 
hazret-i mülûkâneye vürûdunda mübarek ve derbâr-ı hikmet-i asâr-ı şahane ve lisan-ı mu‘cez-
beyan-ı padişahaneden şeref-efzâ-yı sünûh ve sudûr buyrulan nutk-ı hümayun-ı hakâyık-nümûn-ı 
cenâb-ı hilafet-penahi mazmûn-ı münîfü’l-hâme’l-bakî evvelki gün havâs-ı vükelâ-yı fehâm 
hazerâtıyla akd olunan meclis-i meşverette kıraat ve bi’l-cümle me’âl ve mezâyâlarına harf be-
harf dikkat olunarak icra-yı iktizâlarına dair cereyan eden müzakerât-ı âcizânemizin fezlekesinde 
ifâdât-ı merkûme saltanat-ı seniyyenin hain-i ma‘hûd aleyhine bir müddetten beri teşebbüs 
buyurduğu tedarikât-ı hayriye-i harbiyesinden külliyen men‘ ve tevkîfi ve bu kere fazla olarak şu 
maddenin muharebesizce bir ortası bulunmak usulüne teşvik ve tesvîfi müş‘ir ve mutazammın 
olduğu halde taraf-ı hazret-i eşref-i şahaneden elçi-i mümâileyh irâd ve tefhîm buyurdukları 
irade-i isabet-nümâyende-i cenab-ı cihan-bâni mahz-ı keramet ayn-ı inâyet ve bendegân-ı 
sadakat-nişanlarına ez-ser-no bir talimat pür-hikmet olmasıyla hâsıl olan mübâhât ve 
müfâhiretimizden nâşi du‘â-yı ….eyyâm-ı ömr ve şevket ve ikbâl ve mefhûriyet muhalifîn-i 
saltanat ve iclâl-i hazret-i şehinşâhi tekrar aynü’t-tekrar ziver-i zaman müsâdefet-unvan kılınarak 
suret-i halin tıbk emr u ferman dekâyık-ı beyan-ı hazret-i mülûkâne üzere Sivas müşiri devletlû 
Hafız Paşa hazretlerine taraf-ı senâveriden ve mümâileyh Rıfat Beyefendi bendelerine dahi 
müsteşar-ı müşarünileyh cânibinden tahrîr ve iş‘ârına müsâra‘at olunması ve bundan böyle sair 
sefâretlere dahi iktizâ ettikçe işbu irade-i keramet-ifade-i hazret-i şahane mantûk-ı celîli üzere 
lisan kullanılması tamam-ı muvâfık-ı hal ve maslahat olup ez-cümle İngiltereli’nin akd u rabtına 
mâil olduğu mu‘âhede-i ittifâkiye çünkü saltanat-ı seniyyenin dil-hâh-ı âlisine mutâbık olmadığı 
cihetiyle imza olunmaması hususu geçende ber-muktezâ-yı irade-i seniyye devletlu Reşid Paşa 
hazretlerine yazıldığı misillû mu‘âhede-i merkûme hakkında bu tarafta dahi İngiltere elçisine 
bazı mertebe itiraz ile reddi iğtirâr gösterildiğinden dolayı mu‘âhede-i mezkurenin suret-i kabul 
ve tasdikinde güya saltanat-ı seniyyeye ait olacak fevâid ve menâfi‘ ve suret-i redd ve terkinizde 
kendisinin aksi tahayyülâtını mübeyyin İngiltere elçisi mümâileyhin talimname ve müzekkire 
kılıklı tercüman Pizani’ye vermiş ol dahi kemal-i tehevvür ve mugâlata ile müsteşar-ı 
müşârünileyhe göndermiş olduğu iki kıta varakada muharrer kelimât-i terviciye hefevât-ı 
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tahvîfiyeden başka, tercüman-ı mersûmun kendi sözleri olmak üzere işte bunu size mahremâne 
söylerim diyerek vâki olan ifadesinde güya bu mu‘âhedenin adem-i kabulüne dair izhâr 
olunmakta olan tereddüd Rusyalı’nın ilkâsıyla olduğunda şüphe yoksa da asıl buna sebeb olan 
devletlu kapudan paşa hazretleriyle müsteşar-ı müşârünileyh-i senâverilerinin re’y ve marifetleri 
olduğunu elçi bey duymuş ve anlamış olduğundan eğer bundan sonra yine tereddüd olunur ise 
müşârünileyhümâyı bi’t-tergıbiye kadar çabalayacak ve nihayeti devlet-i aliyeye mûcib-i 
mazarrat olacak deyu bir takım hezeyân etmiş ve eğerçe beri taraftan dahi bu maddede 
Rusyalı’nın kat‘iyen medhali ve henüz mu‘âhede-i mezkure keyfiyetine haber ve agâhı olmayıp 
hususuyla mu‘âhede-i mezkure devlet-i aliyenin işine elverir ve hatta mu‘âhedeye bile benzer şey 
olmadığından biz İngiltere devletiyle şöyle bir mu‘âhede yapacağımız demekle ve müsveddesini 
göstermeye utandığımız cihetiyle buna dair hala ol tarafa bir şey açılmamıştır. Kaldı ki elçi beyin 
bizlere sebebiyet-i özr etmesi ve mazallahu teala hakkımızda iğbirâr-ı hazret-i şahaneyi davete 
çalışacağım demesi kendisinin iddiasında olduğu dostluk ve hayırhâhlık sözü değildir zemîninde 
mukabele olunmuş ise de gerek mezkur varakaların birinde lakırdılar ve gerek tercüman-ı 
mersûmun söylediği sözler doğrusu ağırca kelamlar ve güce gider şeyler olduğuna ve bundan 
kat‘ü’n-nazar kâffe-i mesâlih-i saltanat-ı seniyyede büyük ve küçük cümle bendegân müttehid ve 
yek-vücûd olarak ale’l-husus ki bu madde zımnında elçi-i mümâileyh tarafına her ne ifade 
olunmuş ise ittifak-ı ârâ ve istihsâl-i ruhsat-ı seniyye-i hazret-i padişah-ı cihan-pîrâ vukû‘-yafte-i 
tertîb ve tasvîb olunmuşken elçi-i mümâileyhin bu gûne bazı bendegân hakkında tahsis-i madde 
etmesi nâ-be-câ ve taraf-ı saltanat-ı seniyyeye halen ve istikbâlen zerre kadar bir gûne menfaati 
melhûz olmayan kaziye-i nâ-marziyenin talib-i ahd ve şarta ifrâğını tecvîz etmemek mugâyir-i 
sıdk ve ubûdiyet olmadığı müsellem ve hüveydâ olup her ne ise elçi-i mümâileyhin işbu ifadâtına 
dahi Nemçe elçisi mümâileyh ibrâr ve tefhîm buyrulan cevab kerâmet-nisâb-ı hazret-i şehin-şâhi 
vechle cevab-ı savâb i‘tâsı lazım geleceğine ve fakat ol suret şöylece lisânen şöylece ifade olunsa 
yine müşârün-ileyhümâdan şübhe ile kâ ni‘ olmayarak şemâteti artıracağına ve işitildiğine göre 
Nemçe elçisi mümâileyh Mabeyn-i Hümayun-ı Şahane’den avdeti akabinde bilcümle düvel-i 
mütehabbe süferâ ve maslahatgüzarlarını sefarethanesine davet ile bugün zat-ı şevket-me’âb-ı 
hazret-i şehin-şahi Mısır meselesi hakkında bana şöyle buyurdu. Cenab-ı seniü’l-cevânib-i 
hazret-i mülûkâneden böyle temin olundum diyerek ilan etmiş olduğundan suret-i irade-i 
seniyye-i cenab-ı şahane her ne kadar mesmû‘ı olmuş ise de buna dahi bu taraftan cevab-ı âli 
irâesi kendisinin izâle-i şübhesine medâr olacağına mebni zikrolunan varakalar müşârünileyh 
müsteşar efendi senâverleri tarafından sathîce bir tezkire ile hâ-ki-pâ-yı âlice arz u takdim 
olunarak ol babda izbâr buyrulacak cevab-ı âlide mesela hain-i merkûm aleyhine icra 
buyrulmakta olan tedarikât-ı harbiyeden ferâgat olunmasına dair bu defa prens Metternik 
tarafından vâkı‘ olan ihtarâtı Nemçe elçisi Bâbıâli’ye ifade eylediğinden başka, şu gâilenin 
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muharebesizce bitirilmesinin bir çaresi bulunması hususunda bazı mülahazasını dahi bilhassa 
taraf-ı eşref-i hazret-i şahaneye tebliğ etmek üzere geçen gün Mabeyn-i Hümayun-i şahaneye 
geldiğinde vesâtet-i behiyyeleriyle şu vechle bu vechle nutk-ı hümayun şevket-makrûn-ı 
mülûkâne beyan ve ityân buyrulduğu tafsilatı tekrarıyla mukaddime olunarak bu ittifak 
mu‘âhedesine dahi İngiltere devleti dostane ve hayır-hâhâne muvâfakat edecek ise bu babda dil-
hâh-ı âli-i hazret-i şahane bu merkezde olduğundan bu surette akd ve tanzimi rehin-i makbûliyet 
ve karîn-i mahzûziyet-i hazret-i tacdâri buyrulacaktır. İşte elçi-i mümaileyh dahi keyfiyeti bu 
vechle devleti tarafına bildirsin yollu emr u ferman-ı şahane buyruldu deyu izah ve tasrîh 
buyrulması münasib gibi mutalaa olunmuş ve ol vechle efendi-i müşârünileyh cânibinden çend 
satır bir kıta tezkire ile mezkûr varakalar leffen irsâl sevi-i sâmileri kılınmış ise de ber-vech-i 
muharrer tezkire-i mezkûreye cevab-ı âli tasvîri ve müşârünileyh Hafız Paşa hazretlerine ber-
mûcib-i irade-i seniyye yazılacak mektub-ı senâverilerinin dahi bir kıta müsveddesi kaleme 
aldırılmış ve ol dahi manzûr-ı ma‘âlîm-mevfûr-ı hazret-i şahane buyrulmak üzere taraf-ı 
vâlâlarına gönderilmiş olmakla, müsvedde-i merkûmenin dahi sebk u siyâk ve ibaresi hakkında 
ne vechle irâde-i ma‘âlî-i ifade-i hazret-i mülûkâne müte‘allık buyrulur ise ana göre harekete 
mübâderet olunacağı beyanıyla tezkire-i senâveri terkîmine mübâderet olundu efendim.  
 
Ma‘rûz-ı bende-i müsted‘îleridir ki, 
İşbu tezkire-i âlileri ve müşârünileyh Hafız Paşa hazretlerine yazılacak tahrîrât-ı samileri 
müsveddesiyle zikrolunan talimatlar takdim-i atebe-i aliye-i hazret-i şahane kılınarak cümle-i 
meşmûl-i enzâr-ı şevket-âsâr-ı cenab-ı padişahi buyrulmuştur. Müsvedde-i mezkûre meclis 
müzakeratı iktizâsınca kaleme aldırılmış olduğundan istizân-ı sâmileri vechle savb-ı âlilerinden 
müşârünileyh Hafız Paşa hazretlerine ve müşarünileyh müsteşar efendi bendeleri cânibinden dahi 
mümâileyh Rıfat Bey bendelerine tarafına tahrîr ve iş‘âr olunması ve bundan böyle sefâretler 
câniblerine dahi ol vechle lisan kullanılarak ifade kılınası ve İngiltere elçisiyle tercüman 
Pizani’nin o makûle üst perdeden çakmaları ve tehevvürâtı ifadeleri her ne kadar ru‘ûnet ve 
huşûnet iktizâsından ise de bunlar bu maddeden dolayı ezhânı hayli yoracaklarından 
müşârünileyh müsteşar efendi bendeleriyle bi’l-müzakere ana göre icabının icrası emr u ferman-ı 
hümayun-ı mülûkâne buyrulmuş ve tıbk-ı iş‘âr-ı sâmileri vechle müşârünileyh müsteşar efendi 
bendelerinin tezkiresine cevab-ı âli yazılarak müsvedde-i mezkûre ile iade kılınmış olmakla, ol 
babda emr u ferman hazret-i veliyyü’l-emrindir. 
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HAT 382 / 20584 
This is Mahmud’s order to his statesmen that they should make final preparations for a 
possible war with Mehmed Ali’s army. According to him everybody understood how harmful 
Mehmed Ali was to his Empire and nobody in Europe objected to this decision. Despite this, 
he ordered his statesmen that they should tread very carefully until the right time came and 
no direct action should be taken against him yet. As can be seen in this document Mahmud 
appears to be determined to completely resolve his biggest problem this time. In accordance 
with this purpose, he put all his efforts into optimizing both the diplomatic conditions, and his 
army’s readiness, for war. This document also contains a very extensive report, which was to 
be presented to the Sultan, about the latest diplomatic and military conditions. 
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HAT 382 / 20584 
Sene 
Benim vezirim, 
Bi’l-müzakere arz olunan işbu takrîrin manzûr ve malum-ı hümayunum olmuştur. Hususât-ı 
merkûmenin hepsi yolunda mutalaa olunmuş olduğundan tıbkı istizân olunduğu vechle icra-yı 
iktizâlarına ibtidâr olunsun. Ma‘teve herifin şu günlerde ağız gevşetmesi bütün bütün niyet-i 
fâsidesinden geçmek suretinde olmayıp mücerred min tarafullah her ne mahalde askeri var ise 
münfehim ve perişan olmakta ve bu hallerini Avrupa devletleri gördükçe merkûmun hakkında 
olan muamelelerini değiştirmekte olduklarından bi’z-zarûr bir müddet mülâyemet suretinde 
görünmesi yine bir nev‘ hilesinden ibarettir. Bu herifin nasıl kıyâma ve hain-i din ve devlet 
olduğu büsbütün artık meydana çıkmış ve kimsenin hiç artık şudur budur diyecek yeri kalmamış 
olduğundan hemen be-avnihi teala hakkında lazım gelen tedabirin bir taraftan icralarına bakılmak 
için taraf-ı şahanemizden istizân olunarak iktizâlarına bakılsın. Fakat bir müddetçik dahi açıktan 
olarak üzerine varılmayarak mevsim ve sırası gözetilsin. Hemen hak-ı teala hazretleri şer ve 
mazarratından cümleyi halâs eyleye. Âmin.           
 
Şevketlû, kerametlû, mehabetlû, kudretlû veli-ni‘metim efendim, 
Malum-ı hümayun-ı mülûkâneleri buyrulduğu üzere ahvâl-i Mısriye’ye dair Rusya sefâreti 
tarafından verilip manzûr-ı ma‘âlîm-mevfûr-ı şehriyârileri buyrulmuş olan havadis kağıdı evvelki 
gün sahilhane-i ubeydânemde havâs-ı me’murîn kullarıyla bi’l-ictimâ‘ kıraat ile icab-ı hal-i 
maslahat üzerine deverân eden müzakerat-ı âcizânemizin fezlekesinde evrak-ı mezkûre 
meallerinde Beriyyetü’ş-şam ihtilalinde Mehmed Ali haininin biraz galebesi gösterilmiş ise de 
mesmû‘ât-ı saire buna muvâfık olmayıp her ne ise merkûm dava-yı âtılında yine devletlere 
müracaat edeceğini söylemiş olmasına göre ağzı gevşemiş ve hod-be-hod hasmâne hareket ve 
ilan-i istiklale cesaret edemeyeceği tebeyyün etmiş olduğundan ve İngiltere ve Fransa ve Rusya 
devletleri her halde hukuk-ı devlet-i aliyeyi itiraf etmekte ve hususuyla İngiltere devleti her ne 
mülahazaya mebni ise devlet-i aliyeyi haklı tutarak arz-ı mu‘âvenet etmekte oldukları ve sâye-i 
şevket-vâye-i şahanelerinde İngiltereli ile akd-i ittifak hususuna teşebbüs olunduğu cihetle bir 
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buçuk senelik müterâkim olan tekâsît akçesi şu esnada kendisinden taleb ve iddia olunması 
politikaca dahi faideli olacağından ve hatta bu husus geçende İngiltere elçisi tarafından dahi ihtar 
olunmuş iduğundan Kapı Kethüdası celb ile tekâsît akçesinin vakitleri hulûlünde vürûdu me’mûl 
iken şimdiye kadar zuhûr etmemesi bâdi-i ta‘accüb ve istiğrâb olmasıyla serî‘an bi’t-tahrîr 
cevabını celb eylemesi tenbih ile evvel emirde bu vechle hafifçe sıkıştırılması ve bu kağıtların 
dahi sair havadis evrakı misillû birer sureti ihraç ile Hacı İzzet Efendi kullarına teslimen Hafız 
Paşa bendelerine gönderilmesi ve süfün-i menhûse-i Mısriye’nin hurûcuna ve suret-i seyr ve 
hareketlerine dair evrak-ı mezkurede muharrer olan keyfiyet dahi ber-tafsil kapudan paşa 
bendelerine yazılıp habîs herifin tezvîr ve fesâdına bir gûne ser-rişte verilmemek için hudud 
talimatını tecavüz ile donanma-yı hümayun-ı şahanelerini ilerletmemesi te’kîd olunması ve 
Gavur dağında dahi ihtilal peyda olması ve Maraş feriki Süleyman Paşa’nın hain-i merkûm 
taraftarı olduğu gereği gibi tebeyyün ve tahakkuk etmesi cihetleriyle artık ba‘de’zîn paşa-yı 
merkûmun Maraş tarafına ayak bastırılmaması caiz olmamak hasebiyle hakkında musammem 
olan muamelenin kış gelir gelmez icrasına müşârünileyh Hafız Paşa bendeleri teşcî‘ kılınması ve 
maiyetinde her ne kadar bazı oficiyaller var ise de topçu muallimi olmadığından Prusya’dan yeni 
gelen topçu oficiyallerinden iki çavuş ve bir yüzbaşı ve nümune bölüğünden bazı güzide adamlar 
tayin ve irsâl olunarak gönderilecek toplar dahi anların istedikleri gibi olmak üzere bu tarafta 
marifetleriyle intihâb ve isrâ ve bu gidecek Prusyalı topçuların yerine burada kullanılmak üzere 
bir yüzbaşı ile iki çavuş dahi celb olunmak münasib olacağından bu hususun dahi Prusya’dan 
getirilecek piyade ve süvari oficiyallerinden dolayı derdest olan kontratoya derc ve imla 
olunması ve geçen ki mecliste İngiltere kraliçesine irsâli tensîb olunan gerdanlıktan maada 
kendisine ve validesine kürk ve akmişe misillû tertîb kılınan hedâyâ-yı seniyye-i şahaneleri 
karantina münasebetiyle zedelenerek zinet ve nümâyişi gideceğinden o makûle eşya 
gönderilmekten ise kraliçe-i müşârünileyehâya yaptırılacak gerdanlık yine bin yüz bin iki yüz 
keselik olursa da yine topu bin beş yüz keselik olmak üzere validesine dahi üç dört yüz keselik 
bir aded murassa halhal imal olunup ortası beyza akik taşı olması ve çünkü Avrupa’da Osmanlı 
parası mergûb ve muteber olduğundan üzerine dahi makama muvâfık Türkçe münasib beyt hak 
ettirilmesi ve muktezâ-yı irade- seniyye-i şahaneleri üzere ilan-i sefâret maddesi Reşid Paşa 
bendelerinin hareketinden bir hafta evvel icra olunacak ise de Rusyalı birden bire ürkütülmemek 
için pek bîgâne tutulmayarak ilanından birkaç gün evvel iktizâsı vechle Rusya sefâretine ifade-i 
keyfiyet olunarak evvelce mahremâne ifadesi dahi taraf-ı eşref-i şehinşahilerinden emr u ferman 
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buyrulduğu ve bu vechle canib-i imparatoriye bildirilmesi matlûb-ı âli iduğu irâd ve beyan 
olunması ve zikr olunan hedâyâ-yı seniyye-i şahanelerinin ve gerek İngiltere umûr-ı ecnebiyesi 
nazırı Lort Palmerston ile umûr-ı politika kalemi müdürü mister Beggaveze şimdiden gidecek 
nişan-ı âlişanların imal ve ikmali yirmi yirmi beş güne tevakkuf edeceğinden bu kadar müddet 
müşârünileyh Reşid Paşa bendelerinin bu tarafta tevakkuf ile tekmilini beklemek ve ileride 
çıkaracağı karantinadan dolayı dahi vakit zayi etmek iktizâ etmeyip bir an evvel savb-ı maksûda 
vüsûl için müşârünileyh bendeleri hemen beş on gün zarfında hareket ve azimetle bunlar 
karantina mahallinde yetiştirilmek üzere verâdan gönderilmesi ve icab eden mahfazaları beraber 
karantina çıkaracağından sonra ahar mahfazalar ile irsâl olunmak suretiyle asıl mahfazaları 
şimdiden yaptırılıp müşârünileyh bendelerine verilmesi ve bu suretle müşârünileyh bendelerinin 
hareket ve azimeti takarrüb etmiş olacağına binaen, keyfiyet mesela işbu Perşembe ve Cuma 
günlerinde Rusya sefâretine ifade olunup Pazar ve pazartesi günlerinden birinde ilan kılınması ve 
müşârünileyh bendelerinin sâye-i şevket-vâye-i mülûkânelerinde râkib olacağı vapur sefine-i 
hümayunları iktizâ eden kömürünü Malta’ya ve malzeme-i sairesini Marsilya’ya kadar kifâyet 
edecek derecede olmak üzere ne maslahatla gideceği bilinmeyerek şimdiden tehîe-i ve istihzâr 
ettirilmesi hususları münasib gibi mülahaza ve mutalaa olunmuş ise de ber-vech-i muharrer icra-
yı iktizâları hakkında ne vechle emr u irade-i keramet-âde-i cenab-ı cihanbânileri müte‘allık ve 
şeref-sünûh buyrulur ise ana göre harekete ibtidâr olunacağı muhât-ı ilm-i âlem-i ârâ-yı 
tacdarileri buyruldukta emr u ferman şevketlû, kerametlû, mehabetlû, kudretlû veli-ni‘metim 
efendim padişahım hazretlerinindir.                                            
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HAT 833 / 37560 G  
The Ottoman Ambassador to Paris met with Palmerston at the behest of the Sultan in 1836. 
Mahmud placed particular importance on Damascus and so he ordered his ambassador to 
persuade Palmerston that Mehmed Ali was damaging the Ottoman Empire and tyrannizing 
the Ottoman public in Damascus. For this reason it was indispensable to disentangle 
Damascus from the rebel governor. This document is about this meeting with Palmerston. 
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HAT 833 / 37560 G  
Paris sefiri Amedi Bey bendelerine  
Berr’üş-Şam maddesine dair atufetlu Beylikçi efendi hazretlerinin İngiltere devleti umûr-i 
ecnebiyye nazırı Lord Palmerston ile beyinlerinde hayli müzakereler cereyan etmiş ve nazır-ı 
mûmâ-ileyh tarafından bazı güna taallülât îrâdıyla tehir-i maslahata dair sözler ityân olunmuş 
olduğu efendi-i mûmâ-ileyh tarafından savb-ı atûfîlerine iş’âr kılınmış iduğuna ve ol babda bazı 
mütâlaât-ı behiyyelerine ve Fransa devleti memurlarından devlet-i aliye hayr-hâhlığında bulunan 
bazılarına taraf-ı saltanat-ı seniyyeden nişan-ı ali ita buyurulması hususuna dair ifâdât-ı saireye 
mütedâir mersûl-i sûy-i senâver buyurulan tahrirat-ı behiyyeleri ba’de-l-hall meal ü mezâyâsı 
malum-u hulûs-verî olmuş ve hak-pây-ı maâlim-ihtivâ-yı hazret-i mülûkâneye arz u takdim ile 
meşmûl-nigâh-ı atıfet-i iktinah-ı cenab-ı cihanbani buyurulmuştur. Malum-u valaları olduğu 
üzere Berr’üş-Şam’ın Mısır valisi yedinden nez’iyle hey’et-i asliyesine ircâ’ı maksadına dair bu 
tarafta İngiltere elçisine verilen müzekkere-i mahremanede muharrer olduğu vechle bu maddeye 
İngiltere vükelasının muvafakati istihsal olunması hususu efendi-i mümâ-ileyhe tahrir ve iş’âr 
olunmuş ve bu defa cevaben vürud eden tahriratı mealinde vakıa iş’âr-ı valaları vechle nazır-ı 
mumâ-ileyh tarafından taallülât îrâdıyla tehir-i maslahata dair sözler îrâd kılınmış olduğu 
muharrer olup çünkü Mısır valisinin devlet-i aliye hakkında meşhûd olan ef’âl-i kabîha ve 
uhdesinde bulunan eyâlâtta kain ahali ve fukara haklarında vaki olan mezalim-i sarîhası 
cihetleriyle Berr’üş-Şam’ın yedinden kurtarılması icâbât-ı mülkiyeden görünmüş ve bu hususta 
İngilterelünün muaveneti munzamm olduğu halde suhûlet-i maslahatı müstelzim olacağından ve 
Mısır valisinin ez her cihet uygunsuzluğu İngiltere vükelası indinde dahi bilinip husus-i mezbura 
meyl ü muvafakatleri bazı emare-i isti’dâdiyye ile me’mûl bulunmuş olduğundan elçi-i mumâ-
ileyh ol vechle müzekkere-i mahremaneye ibtidar ve bu madde vükela-yı mûmâ-ileyhümün celb 
ve imâleleriyle hasıl olacağı cihetle ol tarafta dahi iktizasına bakılması keyfiyeti efendi-i mûmâ-
ileyhe tavsiye ve iş’âr kılınmış ve ol dahi mukteza-yı memuriyeti üzere nazır-ı mûma-ileyhe 
müzâkerât-ı lazımeye mübaderet ve istihsal-i emr-i maksuda kemal-i sa’y ü gayret etmiş ise de 
bunların mücerreb olan hal ü mişvarları iktizasınca her ne vakit taraf-ı devlet-i aliyyeden böyle 
bir iltimas vukuunda hayr-hâhlık yüzünde görünerek suret-i nasihatte bir takım taallülâttan ibaret 
lakırdılarla mebhas-i müracaata girişemiyerek itirazât-i beyhude ityân ile tesiri görülemediği 
nümâyân olduğundan ve bunlara sarf-ı ebrû vadisinde izhar-ı müracaat olundukça kendi 
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politikalarının tervicini elden bırakmayıp evvelki sözlerini iade ederek bu suret ise saltanat-ı 
seniyyeye dahi bir güna züll ü şe’ni mucib olmakta iduğundan bu hususun bütün bütün bahsinden 
geri durulmak saltanat-ı seniyyenin icabat-ı mülk-dârîsine muvafık olmadığı misillü bunların şu 
adem-i muvafakatleri cihetiyle tesir etmeyecek vakitte taleb-i muavenette inhimâk sureti 
gösterilmek dahi fi-l-hakika münasip olmayacağından şimdilik bunun bahsi bu merkezde 
bırakılarak ol tarafların an be an müşahede olunan vakt-i politikalarına göre husus-i mezbura dair 
ifâdât-ı seniyye-i devlet-i aliyenin tesir edeceği anlaşıldığı halde hemen bahsine girişilerek işin 
gelişine göre davranılmak lazımeden ve icab-ı irade-i seniyye-i hazret-i şahen-şâhîden olmağla 
suret-i irade-i seniyye mûmâ-ileyh Beylikçi efendi hazretlerine tahrir ve iş’âr olunmuş 
olduğundan zat-ı samileri dahi bu usul vechle icra-yı levazım-ı temşiyet-kârîye himem-i 
behiyyeleri der-kâr buyurulması mütemenna-yı hulûs-verî iduğu ve iş’âr buyurulan nişan 
hususunun dahi şimdilik tehiriyle ileride bir münasebet vukuunda icra-yı icabına bakılacağı ve 
tüccar taifesinden Hamlet nam kimesne Dersaadet’e azimet etmiş ve kendisi muteberce adam 
bulunmuş ve taraf-ı Samilerinden atufetlu Namık Paşa hazretlerine ve sair bazı mahallere mektup 
gönderilmiş olduğu beyanıyla ahz u itaya dair mersum ile bazı maslahat vukuu takdirinde 
hakkında hüsn-i muamele olunması ihtar olunmuş olup henüz mersumun bu tarafa vüruduna dair 
bir mesmûât olmayıp vürudu takdirinde iş’âr-ı samileri vechle hakkında muamele-i münasibe 
icra olunacağı beyanıyla ….. 
 
2 Safer 52                       
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HAT 833 37560 K 
This is a report by Namık Pasha, who was in London to negotiate a possible alliance with Britain 
against Mehmed Ali Pasha. This report gives many details about his days and meetings in 
London. 
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HAT 833 37560 K 
 
Maruz-i kullarıdır ki  
İngiltere kralı Brayton şehrinden Londra’ya avdet eylediğine ve aralıkta süfera ve devletinin 
kibârını görmek için Loh tabiriyle bazen teşrifat icrası mu’tâd iduğuna binaen işbu mâh-ı 
Şevval’in dördüncü günü teşrifat-ı mezkurenin icra olunacağından ve çakerleri dahi kral-ı 
müşarün-ileyh ile resmi mülakat eylemediğimden yevm-i mezkurda kral-ı müşarün-ileyhin 
sarayına azimet olunmak üzere umur-i ecnebiye nazırı tarafından haber gönderilmiş ve tayin 
kılınan vakitte kral sarayına azimet olunmuştur. Bi-l-cümle süfera ve kibâr ve zabitan-ı askeri 
cem’ olunduk da Fransa elçisi ve Amerika cumhuru tarafından memur elçi dahi kral-ı müşarün-
ileyh ile mülakat edeceklerinden kulunuz dahi sıram gelerek nazır-ı mûmâ-ileyh ile beraber nezd-
i krala gidilmiş olmağla bugünlerde âsitâne-i saadet’ten mektup alıp almadığımı sual 
eylediğinden boşuna vüruduna muntazır olduğumu beyan ve ifade eylediğimden hele uyuşulmuş 
yakinen bitmiş haberi gelir dediğinden öyle söyleniyor lakin tahriren haberim yoktur dediğimde 
bu keyfiyet kral-ı müşarün-ileyhe mucib-i taaccüb olarak Londra’da ikamet-i acizanemden 
hoşnudiyyet izhar ve fabrika ve sair görülmeğe şayan mahalleri gördüğümden ve minister ve sair 
süferanın ikramından ve bundan akdem Dersaadet’te ikamete memur olan Gordon ile 
görüştüğümden ve İngiltere zünânının hüsnünden istifsar etmekle icabına göre riayet ve edeb ile 
cevap verilerek çıkılmış ve tekrar sair süfera maiyetlerinde olan memur ile taht dîvânhânesine 
girdiklerinden sırasıyla çakerleri girmiş ve ba’de kibâr ve zabitan-ı askeri dahi vâhiden ba’de 
vahidün girdiklerinden bazısı kral-ı müşarün-ileyh ile tekellüm eylemiştir.      
Resm-i mezkur icra olunur iken güruh-u süfera seyirci gibi bir tarafta durduklarından nazır-ı 
müma-ileyh nezd-i acizaneme gelip çakerlerini bir kenara çekmiş ve Dersaadet’ten bugün kağıt 
aldığını ve İbrahim’e giden Rusya kontu Dohamel merkuma imparatoru tarafından olan ifadesini 
ve suret-i memuriyetini beyan eyledik de ben askerim pederimin emrine itaat ederim imparatorun 
bu vechle infialinden mükedder olurum deyu cevap verdiğini ve Konya’da zahîre ve hatabın 
kılletine mebni askeri düçar-ı müzâyaka olduğundan ve güya asker-i menhûsesi efendimizin 
itaatinde olduklarından Bursa’da kışlamak üzere istîzânı hâvî Babıali’ye tahrirat gönderdiğinden 
bunun üzerine meşveret olunarak zat-ı samileri Rusya askerinin geçirilmesini tensib buyurmuş 
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iseniz de devletlu Serasker paşa hazretleri muhalefet eylediklerini ve vükela-yı devlet-i aliye bu 
aralık mütelâşî olduklarını ifade eylemiş olmağla bu hususta harben şiddetli hareket etmelerini 
nazır-ı mûmâ-ileyhten iltimas eylediğimde memurlarının İskenderiye’ye vusûlünde harîfin 
muhalefet edemeyeceğini ima ve beyan eyledi.  
Bâlâda mestûr teşrifatın üçüncü günü kraliçenin dünyaya geldiği güne tesadüf eylediğinden 
teşrifat-ı mezkurenin bir aynı dahi yevm-i mezkurda icra olunmak ve bu cem’iyette kraliçe ve 
sair kibâr-ı haremleri dahi bulunmak adet-i kadimeden ve süfera ve kübera dahi teşrifat-ı evvel 
misillü kraliçe ile görüşmek lazımeden olmağla sairleri gibi çakerleri dahi mahal-i cem’iyette 
azimet edip kraliçe ile mülakatımda tab’-i mekârim-teba’-i şahaneyi sual eylediğinden iktizasına 
göre cevap verildiği malum-u devletleri buyurulmak üzere iş’âra ictisar kılındı baki irade 
efendimindir.  
 
8 Şevval 48                Mehmed Namık 
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HAT 833 / 37560 M 
Another of Namık Pasha’s reports about his last meeting with Palmerston. He was to leave 
London because the British Cabinet rejected the Sultan’s offer of an Anglo-Ottoman military 
alliance and he met with Palmerston just before he left London. This report shows how 
Palmerston was dissatisfied with his cabinet’s decision. 
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HAT 833 / 37560 M 
 
Maruz-i kullarıdır ki  
Diğer arîza-i bendeganemden malum-u devletleri buyurulacağı vechle umur-i ecnebiye nazırı 
kat’î cevap verdiğinden Mavroyani kullarıyla bi-l-müşavere bundan böyle çakerlerinin Londra’da 
durup taraf-ı devletlerinden haber vürûduna intizar eylemem beyhude ve kumandasıyla müftehir 
olduğum asakir-i şahanenin yanında bulunmaklığım lazımeden iduğu tekellüf-i iş’ârdan azade 
olmağın işbu yevm-i Cuma nazır-ı mûmâ-ileyh ile mülakat olunarak İngiltere devletinin bu aralık 
devlet-i aliyyeye iane eylemesine İngiltere vükelası karar vermemiş oldukları ifadenizden malum 
olduğundan bundan böyle benim burada durmaklığım beyhude ve kumandasıyla müftehir 
olduğum asakir-i şahanenin yanında bulunarak veliyy-i nimetim padişahıma hizmet eylemem 
mucib-i kaide olduğundan taraf-ı şahaneden kral cenaplarına ve taraf-ı sadaretten sizde olan 
mekâtîbin ecvibesini verseniz bir kadem akdem gider idim ancak cenabınızdan şu vechle rica 
ederim ki şu hususta İngiltere vükelası harben hareket etmeğe henüz karar vermediklerini düvel-i 
aher süferasına ve gerek şahs-ı diğere ifade etmeyerek mektûm tutulmasıdır zira bu havadis gerek 
Mehmet Ali mel’ûnunun ve gerek taraftarlarının şımarmalarına sebep olacağından gerek kral 
cenaplarının ve gerek İngiltere vükelasının şevketlu veliyy-i nimetim padişahıma ve devleti 
hakkında izhar eyledikleri hulûs ve muhabbet ve mel’ûn-u merkumun aleyhinde olarak adavet 
mesleğinde devam ve sebat ve düvel-i saireyi dahi meslek-i mezkur üzere durmaklığa mecbur 
etmek ve benim gideceğimi kimesneye bildirmemek ve taraf-ı devlet-i aliyeden haber ve irade 
vürûduna kadar Mavroyani’nin bu tarafta tevkifi tensib olunduğundan öteden beri hakkında 
derkar olan hüsn-i muamelenizi dirîg etmemektir zira muhibbiniz Londra’da cümle taraflarından 
devlet-i aliye hakkında müşahede eylediğim hulûs ve muhâdenetten hoşnut olarak bundan böyle 
dahi dostluğunuzu me’mûl ederek veliyy-i nimetim padişahım huzurunda dahi böylece şehadet 
eylerim dediğimde nazır-ı mûmâ-ileyh serian Dersaadet’e azimetimi tensib etmiş ve devlet-i 
aliyyenin hayr-hâhı olarak devlet-i aliyyenin mamur ve düşmanlarının makhur olmasını ve 
Mehmet Ali aleyhinde olarak düvel-i saire taraflarından dahi müdahaleye ruhsat 
vermeyeceklerini ve Mavroyani kulları hakkında dahi hüsn-i şehadet ederek onun kalıp 
kulunuzun gideceğimi mektum tutacaklarını ve İngiltere vükelası bu hususta devlet-i aliyye’ye 
harben iane etmeğe henüz karar vermemiş iseler de mukteza-yı vakt ü hâle göre hareket ve 
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harben dahi muavenet etmeğe karar  verecekleri ihtimal iduğunu ifade eylemiş olmağla hemen 
kuryel çıkmak üzere olduğundan bu kadarcık iş’âr kılındı. …… teala yola çıktığımda her bir 
keyfiyet tafsilen iş’âr kılınacağı ve irade buyurulan tarikten azimet kılınacağı ve bugün Viyana 
tarikiyle vürûd eden havadise göre Mehmet Ali devlet-i aliyye’ye itaat edeceği ve mersum 
Mavroyani’nin dahi bir kıta arîzası leffen takdim kılındığı malum-u devletleri buyurulduk da emr 
ü ferman efendimindir.  
 
10 Şevval 48          Mehmed Namık                
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HAT 1169 / 46234 B   001  
This document is a reply from Istanbul to Ponsonby’s insistent demand for an explanation of the 
secret article of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. As can be seen in the document the reply was 
given in an abrupt manner. Istanbul says, in brief, ‘This treaty is absolutely not an assault treaty; 
on the contrary, it is a defence treaty concerning the security of the Ottoman lands’. At the end it 
clearly states: ‘Since these matters have been repeatedly expounded in great detail to the British 
and French ambassadors, no further explanations will be forthcoming’.  
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HAT 1169 / 46234 B   001 
İngiltere elçisine cevaben verilecek takrir-i resminin müsveddesidir 
Geçen sene devlet-i aliye ile Rusya devleti beyninde akd olunan muahededen dolayı asalatli 
İngiltere devleti elçisi dostumuz bazı telaş ve ıztırab izhar etmişidi ki devlet-i aliye bunları elçi 
beyin hüsn-i hal-i saltanat-ı seniyye hakkında kemal-i himmet ve iltizamına haml ile zikr olunan 
nâ-becâ ıztırabların teskini zımnında hüsn-i iradetiyle muahedenin suret-i sahihasını elçi beye ita 
ve muahede-i mezkure eczasından olan madde-i münferidenin icmalen mealini beyan ve inha 
ederek bir şehadet-i muhadenet ve itimadın ibrazını tensib buyurmuş bu vechle suret itasında 
muahede-i mezkurenin taarruz u taaddiye mail olmadığına ve mevzû’i mahza muhafaza 
maksadından ibaret iduğuna dair ednâ şüpheyi def’ ve izaleye salih bazı izahat dahi terfik ve 
ilave kılınmış idi. Devlet-i aliye bu vechle dostları olan devletler süferası haklarında riayet ve 
safvetine dair delail ü berâhîn-i müselleme izhar buyurarak süfera-yı muma-ileyhüm 
taraflarından kıymeti takdir ü vüsûk u itimadlarıyla mashub bir mukabele-i layıka icra 
olunacağını me’mûl buyurmakta iken elçi beyin işbu şehr-i Nisan’ın yirmi birinde takdimini 
vazife-i zimmet add etmiş olduğu takriri me’mûl-i mezkurun hilafı zuhurunda fevk-al-gaye 
müteessif olmuştur. Şöyle ki salif-üz-zikr takrir bazı ibaratı havi ve ima ve ilkaatı muhtevidir ki 
devlet-i aliye eğer muahede-i mezkurenin akdinde derkâr olan makasıd-ı hayriyyeye dair ednâ 
su-i zannın eserini bile imha ve izaleyi samimi iltizam buyurmamış olsa şan ve namusunu 
vikayeten bunların cevabından vareste olurdu. İşte bu maksada mebni vükela-yı devlet-i aliye 
İngiltere kralı cenab-ı haşmetmeabının sefirine ilan ve beyana ibtidar eder ki elçi beyin 
mukaddemce ahz eylediği muahede mevad-ı celiyyesi sureti bi-l-külliye aslına mutabık olup ve 
elçi beyin farz ettiği misillü hiçbir sehv vaki olmayıp ve Türkçesi Rusyacasına kamilen mutabık 
olarak elçi beyin takririnde beyan olunan tenakuzat bir taraftan mukaddem veyahut muahhar olan 
ibare ve cümlelerle bilâ rabıta ale-l-infirâd ahz olunmuş iki fıkra mütehâlifeye ve diğer taraftan 
elçi beye ita olunan Türkçenin Fransızcaya tercümesinde olunan sehv-i azime haml olunmak 
lazım olup fi-l-hakika bir devlet hissesine müterettib-ül-ita olan asakirin miktarı li-ecl-ül-tayin 
evvelce devlet-i müstaîne ile müzakere etmek salahiyetini yalnız kayd u ihtiyat etmeksizin 
devlet-i mezkureye talep ettiği kadar kuvvetleri idaresine tefvizi deruhde etmesi müstagreb 
olurdu. Bu takdirce o misillü muhabere ve tevafukun zarureti muahedede mezkur olmasa bile 
tabiat-ı ahvalden lazım gelir halbuki bilakis işbu muhabere ve tevafuk hususu muahedede 
mahsusen iş’âr olunmakla elçi bey dahi Rusyacasını Türkçe olan ibare-i atiyye ile bi-l-ihtimam 
karşılaştırarak sehlen mülzem olur ki ibare-i mezkurda haşmetlu cemî’ Rusyaların imparatoru 
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cenabları tarafeyn-i fahimeteyn muahedeye ne miktar askerler ve kuvvetleri lazım görülür ise 
beren ve bahren itasını vaad eder. Binaenaleyh kavl olundu ki ol halde devlet-i aliyyenin istiane 
edeceği berri ve bahri kuvvetler devlet-i aliyyenin idaresine müfevvez ola deyu muharrer 
olmakla muhtelif tevil etmek ve Rusya devleti vermeye muhtac olacağı askerin miktarında hiçbir 
dai verememek üzere farz olunmak elçi beyin takririnde irad olunan ittifak-ı müsavi usulüne 
muhalif olacağından başka her türlü istiklal-i politika mülahazasını taklîb ve mahv etmek bu 
misillü şarta tâbi’ olan devleti diğer devletin kudret-i mutlaka ve gayr-ı mahdudesi tahtına vaz’ 
eylemek demek olur ve madde-i münferide mukaddemesinin terk-i itasından elçi beyin istinbatını 
murad eder göründüğü neticeler dahi bir taharri-i amîka artık mukavemet edemez. Devlet-i aliye 
akd eylemiş olduğu muahedenin başlu şurutunu dostları olan devletlere ita etmekliği tasmim 
buyurduk da madde-i münferidenin dahi lübbünü ihbar ile bu takyîdi asla ketm etmeyerek bilakis 
tercümanlara ilan buyurmuş olup ve bu misillü ihbarı mahza kendi idare-i müstakile ve 
ihtiyariyyesinden neş’et eylediği ve-l-hasıl bir devlet-i müstakile ve mutlaka diğer bir devletle bir 
muahede akdini münasip bulduk da muahede-i mezkureye alakası olmayan aher devlete beyana 
asla muhtac olmadığı cihetle ol vechle bi-l-istihkak hareket buyuruldu. Devlet-i aliyenin tarih-i 
mezkurdaki hareketinin esbabı her ne ise devlet-i aliye ondan hesap vermek iktiza etmeyip lakin 
devlet-i aliye kendüye azv olunan şeyler kamilen hata-amiz olduğunu gayet resmi vechle protesto 
eylemek uhdesine müterettibdir. Devlet-i aliye Akdeniz boğazının seddine dair şart ancak 
İngiltere ve sair bilcümle düvel taraflarından tasdik ve itiraf olunmuş olan istihkak-ı kadimini 
tasdik ve teyid eylediğini ve şart-ı mezkurun hiçbir kimse aleyhine bir sıfat-ı müteaddiyye yahut 
hasmanesi olmadığından başka cümleden evvel intifâ’ı devlet-i aliyyeye aid bir maksat hıfz ve 
tedâfü’den ibaret iduğunu devlet-i aliye şimdiye kadar bi-d-defaat beyan buyurmuştur. İmdi 
zatında hiçbir hasmane şeyi şamil olmayan her kangı taahhüdün mukaddemesinden keyfiyet 
hasmane terettüb eder mi ? İşbu meselenin hallini elçi beyin bigarezliğine havale ederiz. Devlet-i 
aliyyeye elçi beyin irad eylediği diğer bir kazıyenin fehmi dahi müstas’ab olur ki muahede-i 
mezkure madde-i münferidesinin kısm-ı îzahîsi bir ittifak-ı müsavi şurutunu ifaya devlet-i 
aliyenin nâ-kabiliyetini mutazammın olduğundan devlet-i aliyyenin şan ve namusuna münâfî 
olmuş olur âyâ iki devlet bir ittifak-ı tedafüi akd eylediklerinde yekdiğere mutlaka aynı hidamatla 
muamele ve yalnız bir vechle mesela muavenet-i mütekabileye muhtac olmaları kazaya-yı 
zaruriyyeden midir  ve bilakis muahedeynden her biri fiilini kendi mevki’-i coğrafisine ve vesail-
i idare-i mülkiyesine ve tevâfukat-ı mütekabileye ziyade tatbiki kabil olan şeylere hasr eylemesi 
tabii değil midir. İngiltere devletinin tarihimde Avrupa’nın düvel-i fahimesiyle bu misillü ittifaka 
dair emsal kesire olarak hiç kimse zikr olunan ittifaklara tarafeyn-i muahedeynin biri yahut diğeri 
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için zaaf yahut bir ittifak-ı müsavi şurutunu ifaya adem-i liyakatini istidlal kaydına düşmemiştir. 
İşbu delail ü berâhînin sıhhati elçi bey tarafından kamilen tasdik ve itiraf olunacağında şüphe 
olmayarak berâhîn-i  mezkure muahede-i mezkure aleyhine iradında ısrar olunan nâ-becâ isnadatı 
ifham ve iskate şayan olmağla devlet-i aliye ifade-i ahire olmak üzere bu defa dahi ilan buyurur 
ki devleteyn-i muahedeteyn beyninde bahtiyar hüma  inzimam eda-yı müştereke ile akd olunan 
muahede-i mezkure aher hiçbir devlet-i saliseye ednâ şek ve evsvese irâs edemez. Bu vechle 
devlet-i aliyenin Rusya devletinden talebine istihkakı olan muavenet bir maksad-ı müteaddiye 
mebni olmayıp kezalik Akdeniz boğazının mesdûdiyyeti ancak Karadeniz sevahiline müstakilen 
hükm eden devletlerin emniyetine ale-s-seviyye nâfi’ ve lazım olan bir tedbir-i ihtiyati ve 
tedafüidir. İşbu şuruta tesâvî-i hukuk u zamân-i usul ü menâfi’ derkâr olup bir taraftan dahi bir 
ittifak-ı vüsûk ve itimad-ı mütekabile ve müştereke üzerine müessis olarak her türlü ittihada 
ehem ve elzem olan işbu şurut mevcut olmadıkça hulusa makrûn olamayıp ve cari olamaz. Bu 
cihetle Rusya devletinin şurutu vasıta-i müsaadesiyle kendi makasıd-ı mahsusasını istihsale 
münasib gördüğü kadar asker irsal etmesi farzını devlet-i aliye kabulden baid olarak işbu ittifak 
başka şey olmayıp illâ hüsn-i haline ve temamiyetine ve istiklaline ziyade bir zamân ü kefalet 
iduğunu netice-i ahval aleme isbat edeceğine kaviyyen cezm ü yakin hasıl eylemiştir ve işbu 
cezm ü yakinin ihlaline beyhude sa’y olunur. İngiltere devleti ve müttefiklerinin menafi-i 
azimeleri işbu istiklal-i âlîye taarruz etmek isteyen her kim ise aleyhine istikrar-ı muhafazasını 
müsted’î oldukları sahih ise İngiltere devleti devlet-i aliye ile Rusya devleti beyninde teymmünen 
cari olan ittihad ve ittifaka ancak kendi maslahat-ı mahsusasına müsaid ve mesaliha-i âmme ve 
asayiş-i şarkıyyeyi müeyyid nazarıyla bakmak lazım gelir. Geçen şehr-i Kanun-i Sani’de 
Petersburg’da imza olunan muahede beyn-el-devleteyn derkar ve atide dahi devleteynin asayiş ve 
emniyet-i mütekabileleri için semerat-ı selamet ü san hasıl edecek olan muhadenet-i haliseye dair 
bir rehn-i cedid arz etmiştir. Ve İngiltere vükelasının muahharan şehr-i Temmuz’un sekizi 
tarihiyle müverrah muahede hakkında ziyade insafla re’y u muhakeme etmeleri taraf-ı devlet-i 
aliyyeye tesliyeti mucib olarak İngiltere vükelası zikr olunan muahedenin evvel-emirde olunan 
taharrisinde Rusya devletine menafi-i hasriyye ve istisnaiyye verecek bir teaddi sıfatını müşahede 
etmişler ise de tarafeyn-i muahedeynin ifadat ve izahat-ı vakıası işbu tesirin def’ ve izalesine 
kaviyyen medar olmuş olduğunu alenen tasdik eylemiştir. Bu takdirce devlet-i aliye me’mulüne 
istihkakı olmak üzere itikad buyurur ki elçi bey kendi devleti tarafından beyan olunan de’be 
muvafık vechle 
 
279 
	  
	  
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HAT 1169 / 46234 B   002  
This document is a reply from Istanbul to Ponsonby’s insistent demand for an explanation of the 
secret article of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. As can be seen in the document the reply was 
given in an abrupt manner. Istanbul says, in brief, ‘This treaty is absolutely not an assault treaty; 
on the contrary, it is a defence treaty concerning the security of the Ottoman lands’. At the end it 
clearly states: ‘Since these matters have been repeatedly expounded in great detail to the British 
and French ambassadors, no further explanations will be forthcoming’.  
 
HAT 1169 / 46234 B   002 
hareket ederek muahaede-i mezkure hakkında muamelat-ı cedideye teşebbüs-i terk eder ve o 
makule muamelat ancak maraz vukua ve ve hayz vücuda gelmiş bir fiil hakkında mukadder ve 
gayr-i müsemmer bir münazaa ve mübaheseye badi olur. Devlet-i Aliyye’nin her bir devlet-i 
müstakile ve mutlakaya aid istihkakat mucebince hareket ederek akd eylemiş olduğu bir 
muahede aleyhine meccanen ta’riz olunmakla tervic ve te’yidi samimi murad olunan istiklale 
münafi hareket murad olunmak misüllü muayene celb  olunur ve şahr-i Temmuzun sekizi 
tarihiyle müverrah muahedeyi keyfiyet-i sahihası üzre irayeye salih olan muhakemat ve kıyaset 
biddefaat beyan olunmuş olduğundan devlet-i aliyye ilan buyurdu ki badezin iradi murad 
olunacak esile ve istifhamata bu güne kadar olunan ifadata havaleden gayri cevab 
veremeyecekdir deyu muharrerdir. 
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HAT 1190 / 46885 
This is a very extensive report by Mustafa Reşid Pasha from Europe. This report is a very 
significant document because it shows how the Ottomans were aware of the diplomatic 
developments in Europe. Mustafa Reşid Pasha gives every detail of the diplomatic conditions in 
Europe at that time and evaluates how these conditions could be turned in favour of the Ottoman 
Empire.   
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HAT 1190 / 46885 
 
Atebe-i bülend-mertebe-i veliyy-ül-niamilerine maruz-i çakerkemineleridir ki   
El-hâletü hâzihi Avrupa’da politika maslahatları sıkışmakta ve Lehlünün Beç muahedesi 
iktizasınca imtiyâzât-ı kadîmesinin iadesi sureti herkesin lisanında ve her bir gazetelerde deveran 
etmekte olarak hatta parlemento kamarası açıldığı gün Fransa kralının îrâd ettiği nutk-u 
resmiyyesine cevaben aza-yı meclis taraflarından verilen cevab-ı resmîde dahi münderic olup 
Rusyalunun ise kibr ü gururu iktizasınca bu teklifin lakırdısına bile yanaşamayacağı ihtimaline 
ve Frengistan’ın meşhur olan istidad-ı ……. nazaran beyinlerindeki münakaşının gittikçe iştidâdı 
melhuzattan görünüp bu evânda bu hususlara dair ve Nemçelünün Rusyaludan rû-gerdân olarak 
İngiltere ve Fransa devletlerine izhâr-ı meyl etmekte olduğuna mütedair her taraftan tûl ü derâz 
pek çok makalât istimâ’ olunmakta olduğu misillü geçen gün Ceneral Kelmino ile mülâkat 
olunmuş olduğundan ol dahi mahremâne vaki olan ifadesinde Rusya imparatoru’nun Prusya 
kralıyla karabet-i sıhriyyesinden nâşî beyinlerinde muhabbet-i kaviyye der-kâr ise de bu keyfiyet 
ancak zâtlarına mahsus olarak tarafeynin vükelâ ve ve askerî rüesâsının birbirleriyle zıddiyetleri 
bu defa Kalbeş cemiyetindeki muâmelâttan gereği gibi tebeyyün etmiş ve ba’de Tebic’e 
geldiklerinde Avusturya İmparatoru’ndan dahi Rusya İmparatoru’nun me’mûlü olan hüsn-i 
muamele zuhur etmeyip birbirlerinden vahşet ve nefret emârâtı müşahede kılınmış olup işte 
bunların bu vechle uyuşamamaları devlet-i Aliyye’ye göre ayn-ı menfaat ve mevsim-i fırsat 
olmağla bundan istifade olunmak lazım ve mühimdir demesiyle taraf-ı çakeriden dahi Lillah-ül-
hamd zât-ı şevket-simât hazret-i şahen-şâhinin kemâl-i akl-ı Felatun-pesend-i mülûkânelerinden 
nâşî her bir hususât-ı dahiliye ve hariciyeye himmet-i âliye-i şahaneleri rütbe-i nihâyede ve 
vükelâ-yı devlet-i aliye hazeratının dahi mesalih-i haliyye üzerine takayyüd ve ikdam ve basiret 
ve ihtimamları şu surette bu surette olmağla bi-lutfihi Teala az vakitte derece-i matlûbeye vasıl 
olacağımızda iştibah yoktur yollu bazı ecvibe îrâdından sonra Avusturya devleti bir vakitten beri 
Rusyalu tarafına mail ve İtalya kıtasına Fransa’nın serbestiyeti sirayeti vâhimesinden dolayı 
daima bu taraftan mütevahhiş iken şimdi birden bire tebdil-i usûl ile Rusya İmparatoru tarafına 
izhâr-ı nefret etmesi câ-yı taaccübdür denildik de vakıa Fransa’nın bir vakitten beri aralık aralık 
zuhura gelen ihtilal-i dahilisi cihetiyle sirayet-i  serbestiyet vâhimesi daima Avusturyalunun 
zihinlerinde bulunduğundan başka sabık Avusturya İmparatoru dahi sinn-i pîrîsi iktizasınca her 
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taraf ile uyuşup muharebeden istinkaf suretini iltizam edegelmiş olduğundan Rusyalu tarafına 
meyl ü mümâşât göstermiş ise de Nemçelünün dahi Rusyaludan nefreti emr-i tabii olup ale-l-
husus Rusya devletinin istila-yı memalik maddesinde usûl-i tama’kârânesi dahi Avusturya 
devletini tahdiş etmekte ve Fransa devleti dahi şimdi evvelki surette olmayarak kral-ı sabıkın 
bâis-i hal’ ü ref’i olan bazı kavânîn-i mukteziyyehâlâ Fransa kralı hakkında altı mah mukaddem 
zuhura gelen vaka-yı malumeden sonra icab ve lüzum-u mütalaası ve cümlenin ittifakıyla ber-
vech-i suhûlet tesis ve icra olunmaktan nâşî Avusturya devleti Fransa devletinin bu vechle usûl-ü 
hükümdarisine kuvvet geldiğini gördükçe vâhime-i kadimeden mutmain-ül-kalb olarak 
Rusyaluya nefret ve bu taraf meyl ve rağbet izhar etmektedir vadisinde bazı kelimat ityan 
eyledikten sonra Rusyalunun memalik-i devlet-i aliye hakkında der-kâr olan su-i niyetlerini 
Fransa kralı sabıkın zamanındaki kendisinin Dersaadet’te sefareti hengamında memalik-i 
mahruse-yi şahanenin maaz-Allah-u Teala mukasemesi hakkında Rusyalu tarafından Fransa 
devleti canibine muarız-ı ıtmâ’da ilka olunan sözlerde çünki memalik-i İslamiyye hasb-el-mevki’ 
Rusya ile Nemçelüye semt olarak bu tasmîm-i fâsid ancak ikisi hakkında demek olacağından 
Fransa dahi Rin nehri semtinde kain hududuna mücavir bulunan düvel-i sağire memleketlerini 
zabt ile tevsi-i memalik etmek ve Prusya devletine dahi Nemçe Devleti tarafından bi-r-rıza bir 
kıta-i münasibe verilmek suretinde bazı kelimat-ı mazarratâmiz beyan olunmuş ve ol eyyamda 
Fransa umur-i ecnebiyyesi nezaretinde dahi Rusyalunun meclubu bir adam bulunduğundan onun 
tervici sebebiyle buradan dahi bu maddeye meyl gösterilerek memalik-i devlet-i aliyyenin ahvali 
sefaret münasebeti ve gerek kendisinin mukaddemlerde Rin semti cenerali olarak oralara vukuf-i 
tâmmı cihetleriyle bu husus kendisinden ne vechle isti’lâm kılınmış olduğunu ve kendisi dahi 
saltanat-ı seniyyeye der-kâr olan hayr-hâhlığı iktizasınca tahkik-i  ahval-i memaliği kendi 
canibinden tertib ve irsalini tensib ettiğini seyyahların taraf taraf geşt ü güzârına talluk vesilesiyle 
maslahatı uzatıp bir taraftan dahi Rusyalu tarafından ilka olunan bu niyet-i kerihenin netice-i 
vahimesine dair mülahazat ile devleti vükelasının kulaklarını doldurmağa nasıl sa’y u gayret 
etmiş ve ba’de kral-ı sabık-ı mezkurun tard u def’i sebebiyle Fransa devletinin usûlü mütegayyir 
ve Rusya hileleri dahi herkes indinde mütehakkık  olduğundan bu mütalaa-i kerihe zihinlerden 
çıkarılmış olduğunu ifade ve beyan edip filhakika cenaral-i mûmâ-ileyh evvel ü ahir devlet-i 
aliyeye hayr-hâh ve gayretli bir adam olarak Nemçelünün bu aralık Rusyadan müteneffir ve 
İngiltere ve Fransa taraflarına mütemayil olduğunu sair bazı emârât ve mesmûât dahi teyid 
etmekte olduğundan başka İngiltereden taraf-ı riyasetpenahiye takdim olunan arîza mealinde 
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malum-u veliyy-ün-niamileri buyurulmuş olacağı vechle İngiltere umûr-i ecnebiyyesi nazırı Lord 
Palmerston’un sözleri dahi bu sureti ima eder vakıa İngiltere ve Fransalunu Rusyalu ile der-kâr 
olan zıddiyet ve münafeseleri günden güne iştidâd bulmakta olmasına nazaran bunların harekat-ı 
fiiliyyeleri takdirinde Nemçelünün mevki’-i coğrafisi ve Prenc Maternik’in makbul-u alem olan 
politikasının tesiratı cihetiyhle bunlar elbette Avusturya devletiyle akd-i peyvend-i ittifaka 
mecbur oldukları misillü Nemçelü dahi Rusyalu tarafından her ne kadar ıtmâ’ olunur ise de 
Rusyalunun maaz-Allah-u Teala bir kat dahi tevsî’-i memâlik ve tezyîd-i kuvvet etmesi kendi 
hakkında dahi vahim-ül-akıbe olacağını ve Rusyalu ile bi-l-ittifak hareketi takdirinde Macar ve 
İtalya ahalilerinin Rusyalu ile der-kâr olan zıddiyet-i tabiiyyeleri cihetiyle ol halde Nemçe 
devletine münkad olmayıp makam-ı isyanda bulunacaklarını mülahazadan hâlî olamayacağından 
bunlara meyl göstermesi istib’âd olunur şey değildir. Bu cihetle devlet-i aliyeye göre lazım olan 
şu politikaların kemal-i nezaketi vaktinde kangı taraflar ile işini uydurmak ehem görünür ise 
vakit zayi olmaksızın ol tarafların celbine bakılmak sureti olduğundan akl-ı kısır-ı kemteranem 
erdiği ve tahsil-i vukuf olunabildiği derecede cümlesinin ahval-i haliyyesine tatbikan mütebâdir-i 
hatır olan keyfiyat beyan olunmak icab-ı maslahattan görünmüştür. Evvela İngiltere devletinin 
malum-u veliyy-ün-niamileri buyurulduğu üzere kuvve-i bahriyesinin kemali cihetiyle her yerde 
nüfuzu cari ve Rusyalu ile beyinlerinde olan adavetleri devlet-i aliyenin beka-yı saadet-i hâlî 
arzusuna dair niyetleri şek ve şüpheden ârî olup Mehmet Ali’den dahi şimdiki halde nefret-i 
külliyeleri der-kâr ise de şimdi merkumun üzerine hareket olunmasını tecvîz etmemeleri ancak 
Rusyalu ile meydanda olan münafeselerinin neticesi tebeyyün edinceye kadar devlet-i aliyyeyi 
Mısır tarafıyla meşgul bulundurmamaktan ibaret görünür ve bunların usûl-i sabitesi cümle 
indinde müsellem olmak sebebiyle bir kere dostluğa takviyet verilir ise ondan dönmeyecekleri 
dahi me’mûldür ve Avrupaluyu Rusya aleyhine kızıştırmakta olan ve ale-l-husus Fransaluyu 
mecbur eden ancak İngiltere devletidir. Saniyen Fransa’nın rüesası gayet mütelevvin ve fırka-ı 
muhtelifeden ibaret adamlar olduklarından bunların kavl ü fiillerine kemaliyle itimad olunmak 
caiz olmayıp eğerçi içlerinde Ceneral Kelmino gibi âkil ………… temyize muktedir adamlar 
bulunarak daima Rusyalunun su-i niyetlerini iktiza edenlere ifham ve devlet-i aliye menâfi’ini 
iltizam etmekte iseler de sair fırkaların her biri bir mülahazada olarak hatta bir takımı Mehmet 
Ali’nin nasıl mekkâr ü desisekâr ve ne derece zalim ve gaddar olduğu cümle indinde 
anlaşılmışken yine ona sahabet suretinde ve bir sınıfı dahi Rusyalunun meclubu olduklarından 
mıdır nedir devlet-i aliye memalikinden dolayı düvel-i kebire beyninde mümâsse ve münafese 
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iktiza etmez ve ehl-i İslam sahabet olunacak millet değildir hemen bu hususta Rusyalu ile 
uyuşulmak lazımdır dava-yı batılında ve bir güruhu dahi memalik-i İslamiyyeyi Hud’a-negerde 
Rusyalunun istilasından Fransa devletine ne menfaat ve ne mazarrat gelebilir bu madde Hind 
memaliğinden ve muamelat-ı bahriyesinin kesret ve kuvvetinden nâşî ancak İngiltere devletinin 
düşüneceği şey olmağla Fransa devletine göre lazım olan fakat kendi menâfi’ne bakmaktır zu’m-
u fâsidinde olarak bunlar bu lakırdıları bazen parlemento kamaralarında dahi tefevvüh etmekte ve 
neşr ettikleri ketb-i kerihe ve gazete evrakına dahi yazmaktadırlar ve Fransa kralının dahi 
Rusyaluya meyl-i hafîsi söylenmektedir lakin bunlarda bu ihtilaf-ı arâ var iken başlı başlarına bir 
şey yapmağa muktedir olamayacakları ve belki bu revişleri ileride kendi memleketlerinin envâ’-ı 
ihtilal teşevvüşata giriftarlığını intac edeceği mülahazadan ba’id değildir,. Şu kadar ki İngiltere 
devleti bir vakitten beri Fransa devletinin İngiltere devlet ve milletine irtibat-ı kalbiyyesini 
istihsal etmiş olduğundan Fransa rüesasının mecburen İngiltere ittifak ve politikasından 
ayrılamayacakları ve İngilterelu nasıl hareket ederler ise bunların dahi birlikte olacakları aşikar 
görünür. Salisen Nemçe devlet, bir vakitten beri Rusyaluya mail iken şimdi beri tarafa meyl 
göstermesi sahih olduğu halde devlet-i aliye hakkında dahi bi-t-tabi nazarı değişmek lazım 
geleceğinden ve İngilterelünün nüfuz-u bahrîsi nasıl ise Nemçelünün dahi bulunduğu hal ve 
mevki iktizasınca berren nüfuzu öylece cari göründüğünden yani Nemçelü tarafeyn-i 
muarızeynden kangısına meyl-i sahih gösterir ise elbette ol tarafın işine kuvvet geleceği bedihî 
olması cihetiyle cümle devletler Nemçe devletinin politikasına kemal-i dikkat ile bakmakta 
olduklarından  
Avusturya devletinin usul ü ahvalini tedkik etmek dahi devlet-i aliyeye göre ehem umurdandır. 
Hal böyle olunca saltanat-ı seniyye cümleden evvel ve akdem İngiltere devletini kemaliyle temin 
edip ısındırmak lazım geleceğinden bir taraftan Dersaadet’te olan İngiltere elçisi vesatatıyla ve 
bir canibden dahi Londra’da olan sefaret-i devlet-i aliye marifetiyle kemâ-yenbagî çalışılmak ve 
çünki Fransa devletinin politikası müstakil olmayıp İngiltereye merbut olduğundan ve bu kadar 
fırka-i muhtelifenin cümlesini celb etmek hayyiz-i imkanda olmayıp bi-l-farz mümkün olsa bile 
İngilterelü layıkıyla devlet-i aliyeye ısınmadıkça yalnız bunlardan bir faide me’mûl 
olmadığından burası şimdiki usul üzere idare olunarak asıl İngilterelü ile işi görmeğe bakılmak 
mukteza-yı maslahattandır zira İngilterelü ile uyuşulur ise şayet bunların Rusyalu ile 
münafeseleri kızıştı da muharebeyi netice verecek olur ise ol vakt İngilterelüyü devlet-i aliyyeye 
maaz-Allah-u Teala bir güna zarar gelmeyecek suretlerde kullanmak ve beyinlerinde indifâ’-i 
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münafese takdirinde dahi Mısır ve Yunan maslahatlarını dil-hâh-ı devlet-i aliye üzere gördürmek 
gibi bazı menafi’ melhuz olduğu misillü saltanat-ı seniyye Nemçe devletinin dahi menviyat-ı 
hakikiyyesini şimdiden nazikane ve üslub-u hakîm-âne ile istikşaf buyurup da Nemçe devletinin 
meyl-i sahihi kangı tarafa ise devlet-i aliye dahi şu vakt-i nazikte usul-ü politikasını ona göre 
uydurmak lazım geleceğinden ve bu keyfiyet ise yalnız Dersaadet’te olan Nemçe elçisi veyahut 
maslahatgüzar Mavroyani vesatatlarıyla hasıl olamayarak hem devlet-i aliyenin ahval-i 
politikasına layıkıyla aşina ve hem Prenc Maternik’e kemâ-yenbagi hulûl edecek bir sefirin 
Beç’te bulunmasına mütevakkıf olup faraza bu suretmuvafık-ı irade-i seniyye buyurulup da icra 
olunduğu halde Nemçe devleti her kangı tarafa mail ilsa ve Avrupa’nın şimdi meydanda olan 
politikası her nasıl netice verse yine devlet-i aliyyenin istifade buyuracağı bedihidir zira orası 
Avrupa’nın merkezi olarak her bir şeye layıkıyla tahsil-i vukuf olunabileceğinden mesela el-
hâletü hâzihi meydanda olan münafese daha ziyade alevlenip de muharebeyi müntac olduğu 
surette eğer Nemçe devleti filhakika İngiltere ve Fransalu ile  müttefikan hareket eder ise devlet-i 
aliye dahi tedabir-i lazımesini ona göre icra etmek ve şayet Nemçelünün bu taraflara meyli sahih 
olmayıp da yine Rusyalu ile müttehid olduğu takdirde dahi orada bulunacak sefir an-be-an 
devlet-i aliyeyi ve Londra ve Paris’te bulunan süferayı agah ederek mümkün mertebe def-i 
mazarrata çalışılmak ve hiç muharebe zuhur etmeyip de maslahat böylece tereddüd ve tezebzüb 
suretinde kaldığı halde dahi saltanat-ı seniyye hem bir taraftan istihbar-ı ahval ile Nemçe 
devletinin celbine çalışıp bir canibden dahi Prenc Maternik’in ifadatından istifade ile ve Yunan 
maslahatlarının ol taraftan dahi başkaca bir tarik ile tedabir-i lazımesine teşebbüs kılınmak ve 
Nemçe devletinin nizamat-ı dahiliyesi cümlenin teslimgerdesi olarak ekserişleri saltanat-ı 
seniyye usulüne dahi muvafık olduğundan faraza oradan iktiza eden muallim ve erbab-ı 
sanayinin celbi hususuna dahi bakılmak gibi bazı kavaid hatıra gelir ve Nemçe devleti nezdine 
ber-minval-i muharrer bir sefir tayin buyurulduğu halde maslahatgüzar Mavroyani kulları bey de 
atılacak adam olmayıp Avrupa ahvaline vukufu ve sıdk-ı dirayeti olmağla onun dahi ya sefaret 
maiyetinde müsteşarlık suretiyle veyahut aher bir icab edecek mahalde yine maslahatgüzarlık ile 
istihdamı şan-ı maâlî- nişan-ı saltanat-ı seniyyeye ve hal ü maslahat icabına muvafık görünür ve 
el-hâletü hâzihi Yunan kralına Yunanilerin evzâ’ından fütûr gelerek bu defa Atina’ya gitmiş olan 
babası Bavyera kralına suret-i isti’fâda cevap vermiş olduğu ve Yunanilerin Eflak ve Boğdan gibi 
idare olunmak üzere yine devlet-i aliyyeye ittibâ’ niyetinde oldukları havadisleri bugünlerde 
işitilmeğe başlamış olduğundan şu Yunanileri gereği gibi taraf-ı saltanat-ı seniyyeye celb ve 
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imale için bunların şu aralık memalik-i saltanat-ı seniyyede ziyadece sıkıştırılmayarak 
kendilerine bazı mertebe hüsn-i muamele gösterilmesi maslahatça nâfi’ gibi mülahaza olunur. 
İşbu ifâdât–ı meşrûha buraların ahvaline ve mesmûât-ı vâki’ye tatbikan hatıra makulesi şeyler 
olarak bunları uzun uzun yazmak had-i ağabeydanemden haric ve cümle ……. Umûr nezd-i vâlâ-
yı veliyy-ül-niamilerinde tariften müstağni ise de her bir işitilen ve hatıra gelen şeyleri bildirmek 
dahi mukteza-yı sıdk u ubudiyetten olmağla mücerred malum-u ali veliyy-ül-niamileri 
buyurulmak için takdim-i arîza-i bendegâneme ibtidâr kılınmış olduğu inşa-Allah-u Teala muhat-
ilm-i alileri buyurulduk da her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i men leh-ül-emrindir.  
El-hâletü hâzihi İngiltere devletinin kemal-i sürat ve germiyet ile donanma techiz etmekte olduğu 
ve Fransa’nın dahi Bahr-i Sefid ve bahr-i muhit taraflarında olan tersanelerinde kezalik aceleten 
külliyetllü süfün-i harbiye hazırlanmakta iduğu herkesin lisanında alenen söylenip gazetelerde 
dahi açıktan açığa yazılmakta olmağla iş’âra ictisar kılındığı inşa-Allah-u Teala malum-u veliyy-
ül-niamileri buyurulduk da her halde emr ü ferman hazret-i men leh-ül-emr efendimizindir.  
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